The research investigated factors that either enhanced or undermined community cohesion in two local wards in Bradford, where there were established Muslim communities and where Muslim migrants had recently arrived.

Even though the fieldwork was conducted in early 2006 the findings remain relevant to contemporary debates on social policy. This publication is an additional output from a larger study funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation on *Immigration, faith and cohesion: Evidence from local areas with significant Muslim populations*, with fieldwork conducted in three sites – Birmingham, Newham and Bradford.

The study covers:

- Research method and sample characteristics;
- Spaces and interactions;
- Help and support: bonding and bridging networks;
- Political and civic involvement;
- Transnational engagement, community and belonging;
- Attitudes of policy-makers and service providers.
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Community cohesion is the centrepiece of the government policy which was formulated in response to the urban disturbances in northern towns during 2001. A number of official reports identified lack of community cohesion as the critical factor. The Commission for Integration and Cohesion widened the concept of community cohesion from faith and ethnic groups to encompass income and generation, suggesting that the concept is more complex than the earlier definition allowed. However, the concern with terrorism has meant that Muslims still remain the focus of debates on cohesion. The central argument for community cohesion, the self-segregation thesis adopted by a number of official reports, was based on Bradford. A major aim of this project, carried out in Bradford, was to unearth and explore the factors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areas where there were established Muslim communities and, in addition, those where Muslim migrants had recently arrived.

The research investigated factors contributing to community cohesion as it affects recently arrived Muslim and non-Muslim migrants and established communities in two local wards in Bradford: Bowling and Barkerend and Little Horton. The sample consisted of 117 participants; this was broken down into 52 recently arrived Muslims, 15 recently arrived non-Muslims, 35 established Muslim residents and 15 UK-born non-Muslim residents. Interviews were also conducted with ten local policy-makers and service providers. Even though the fieldwork was conducted in early 2006 the findings are very relevant to contemporary debates on social policy. This publication is the outcome of a larger study funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation on *Immigration, faith and cohesion: Evidence from local areas with significant Muslim populations*, with fieldwork conducted in three sites – Birmingham, Newham and Bradford.

**Sample characteristics**
The difference between Muslim and non-Muslim migration in this study is that most recently arrived Muslim respondents entered the country for the purpose of marriage while non-Muslim participants entered for either education or employment. The highest rates of education in the sample were found among recent non-Muslim arrivals and recently arrived Muslim participants had higher rates of education than established Muslims. Many Muslims, established and recently arrived that were interviewed, had lower employment rates than all categories of non-Muslim participants and the highest rates of unemployment were found among recent Muslim arrivals. All new arrivals, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, faced economic hardship and recently arrived non-Muslim participants had the highest levels of difficulty. There are indications from the housing data that there was overcrowding among all faiths in the sample. Extended families were more common among new arrivals than established Muslim respondents. Finally, home ownership was high among all categories of Muslims interviewed.

**Spaces and interactions**
The data challenged conventional wisdom, including political and policy discussion, which perceives Bradford as being an acutely, and problematically, ethnically and religiously segregated city. There is clustering of Muslim communities but the established Muslim participants in particular showed greater likelihood than recent arrivals to have greater interactions
and live in neighbourhoods with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. All the participants had a strong sense of local pride and the evidence from the sample suggests a high degree of interaction across ethnic and religious boundaries in wide-ranging public spaces in their daily lives. Attitudes, in particular between the established respondents, were very similar and revealed common perceptions on a range of local issues.

Help and support: friendship and kinship networks
Established Muslim respondents were more likely to utilise friendship networks (bridging social capital) than recent Muslim arrivals, who tended to use kinship networks (bonding social capital). Among established Muslim respondents there was variation, with women accessing kinship networks while men deployed friendship networks. While there are complex reasons for using a particular form of social network, an important but partial explanation is the ability to speak English: there were a sizeable number of Muslim women participants, recent arrivals and established residents, who speak English poorly or not at all. There was also a drift among established Muslims interviewed from kinship to friendship networks. This appears to be in line with the view of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion, which suggests that those who have kinship networks are more likely to develop friendship networks. Religion alone did not seem to be a factor in preventing respondents from mixing. Established Muslim male participants had more spaces where they met people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds than other categories in the sample.

Political and civic involvement
Established Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation of any group in national and local elections, higher than UK-born non-Muslims. All established respondents in this study had higher rates of participation than new arrivals of all faiths. There was a low level of involvement in organisational participation mainly due to lack of time, work and family obligations. More women than men were involved and those who were involved were mostly better educated and fluent in English. Among recent arrivals of all faiths, the lack of organisational participation was due to a lack of information, limited knowledge of English and unfamiliarity with life here. However, the sample in this research gave a variety of public activities that brought diverse communities together, ranging from educational organisations, multicultural events and initiatives targeting socio-economic issues. On local, national and international issues there was broad agreement and commonality of concerns among the participants. In terms of local issues there was a divergence of views on the assessment of local government but most of the participants professed that they had little influence on local decision-making processes. One exception was that more established Muslim respondents felt that they could try to make an impact. On national and international issues, many respondents felt that they had strong disagreement with government policy, but had no way of influencing the process. There was a degree of cynicism prevalent among the established participants of all faiths about the transparency of the democratic process.

Transnational engagement, community and belonging
Transnational contact for all the participants was weak: small sums of money were sent as remittances and contact was restricted to the newspaper or the telephone. Visits to country of origin were quite limited and not very frequent, but regular for some respondents.

Established Muslim respondents had a strong identification with Britain while new arrivals of all faiths had dual loyalty; identifying with relatives in the country of origin and with family in Britain. All the respondents had a positive perception of living in Britain and their dislikes included racism, Islamophobia, the weather and British food. However, they felt the country was fair, well ordered, peaceful and had good access to social and healthcare services: particular praise was given to the NHS. Muslim participants felt that there were few religious constraints on their lives, except for the need for halal food and segregation for women, or discrimination from Islamophobia.

Established Muslim respondents felt that their neighbours accepted them and that there were few impediments on them socialising outside of
their ethnic and religious groups. There were no substantive differences within the sample in relation to education. Most agreed that they required good leadership, infrastructure, equipment, staff and governors with a strong parental involvement for a school to function well. Recently-arrived Muslim participants raised the issue of segregated schools for girls and mother-tongue teaching in Punjab for their children. All the participants agreed that their main concerns in schools were substance abuse, poor discipline, peer group pressure and wanting their children to speak good English.

There were differences in views on marriage between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents: the former talked of family, religious and cultural compatibility while the latter talked of love as the only criterion. Established Muslims in the sample added family compatibility to the issue of love and consent. They were happy if their children selected their marriage partners as long as they got family approval. There was a strong disapproval of forced marriages. When the issue of free speech was raised, the main difference was between UK-born non-Muslim participants and the others. Established and recently-arrived Muslim respondents, and non-Muslim recent arrivals, agreed that there should be some limits to sexually explicit and religiously offensive material but there was no strong sentiment overall expressed in response to this question.

**Attitudes of policy-makers and service providers**

Outside the world of local government community, cohesion is often seen as government speak for ‘minorities policy’. There is little consensus on its meaning and application and a pick and mix approach is used where organisations adopted those aspects that they thought relevant for their organisation and work. The local policy-makers in Bradford that were interviewed often viewed deprivation and marginalisation to be the main issues. At best the cohesion policy is seen as another version of multiculturalism or interfaith activity and at worst it is seen implicitly as coercion. There was various crosscutting activity, such as educational collaboration between schools, but often little activity that brings together Muslims and the white community. Local policy-makers were concerned that community cohesion does not deal with the white working class: an important missing factor. Furthermore there was a need to recognise that new arrivals, asylum seekers and refugees have quite different requirements and needs to the established Black Minority Ethnic (BME) population.

The shortcoming of the community cohesion approach was recognised in the findings of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion, which focused on the concerns that the white working class is missing from the equation. Local policy-makers’ concerns often focused primarily around housing and education and how to overcome the resistance of the white working class to mixing with the dominant BME group, Pakistanis. A range of participants were also concerned by the poor media representation of Bradford which made their work harder by sensationalising issues.
Community cohesion: definition and critique

In the ‘new conventional wisdom’ social cohesion has become central to contemporary policy debates (Buck et al., 2005). Marking a shift from economic concerns of the 1980s and 1990s, the preoccupation with social cohesion is mirrored in the growing interest in communitarianism and active citizenship. Presently, the consensus among experts and lay people alike asserts that the quality of public and civic life is in alarming decline. Social cohesion, as an idea, has its roots in the heart of classical sociological theory. It is found in an array of conceptually rich frameworks which aim to explain the social consequences of structural change, in particular industrialisation and modernity: Ferdinand Tönnies utilised Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Émile Durkheim focused on mechanical and organic solidarity while Talcott Parsons explored theories of normative integration couched in functional discourse (Vertovec, 1999).

Discussions around community cohesion are associated, and also overlap, with ideas of cultural capital, common identity and values, social order and social control and conflict reduction. These ideas – and more besides – are condensed and fed into processes which if understood, exploited positively or harnessed will, it is argued, foster the development of a harmonious society where all groups have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy (Jensen, 1998).

The main drive in the UK for the shift in policy-making and social research has been associated deeply with community race relations, in particular the Oldham, Burnley and Bradford riots of 2001. The dominant framework for interpreting the riots was, and to a large extent, remains ‘the binary opposition between social cohesion and segregation’; the self-segregation thesis (Ouseley, 2001), defining as the hallmark of a dysfunctional community (Bagguley and Hussain, 2006). The Cantle Report and others (Cantle, 2001; Clarke, 2001; Denham, 2001; Ritchie, 2001) drew on the concept of self-segregation that was first articulated in the Ouseley Report on Bradford, entitled Community Pride Not Prejudice. The existence of parallel lives, according to Cantle, occurred when inter-reaction across ethnic communities is minimal. The ethnic and cultural differences are enhanced, negatively, by other salient features of the city’s population including physical segregation in housing, itself compounded by separate educational arrangements, along with distinct community and voluntary associations, employment, places of worship, language and wider cultural networks. Within the Bradford presented by Cantle, there is no contact between different communities – rather there are layers of separation, of polarised enclaves and special interests, all of which raised the spectre of ‘sleepwalking into segregation’ (Phillips, 2005).

Parallel lives, then, it was argued led to ignorance, fear, the likelihood of demonisation and disinformation, along with a lack of civic pride, all of which are partly attributable to a lack of quality leadership. For policy-makers, communities and their aspiring leaders, community cohesion continues to be perceived as a set of beliefs, assertions and mechanisms which can work towards helping ‘micro-communities to gel or mesh into an integrated whole’ (Cantle, 2001).

Despite the contested and politicised nature of the term, it has been defined, at least on one occasion, by the Local Government Association. For the LGA, community cohesion exists where and when:

- There is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities.
- The diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and positively valued.
- Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities.
• Strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.

(Local Government Association, 2002)

Inequality appears to be an important aspect within this definition. In fact, it has been recognised as a major barrier to inclusion. Home Office indicators for measuring community cohesion in the locality, for example, include educational attainment and long-term unemployment, both of which are aspects that impact the lives of all communities, regardless of ethnicity or faith. While social class, along with social and cultural capital, is noted to be an important variable, the main gaze is placed upon cultural and ethnic differences as contributory factors for the failure of community cohesion.

The development of cohesion as a policy direction came through the Community Cohesion Pathfinder Programme, which considered best practice and tested innovative methodologies of engagement. Practical guidance dealing with local level implementation came from the Home Office Community Cohesion Panel and by the Local Government Association (Home Office, 2003; Home Office, 2004; LGA, 2005). The Public Service Agreement (PSA) rooted community cohesion into policy structure by agreeing on targets between the Treasury and other government departments as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review for 2005–08.

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) in its final report Our Shared Future (2007) is the first instance where recently arrived or new arrivals (former migrants with less than five years of residence in the UK) are discussed within the context of cohesion policy and, in turn, this document offered a newer and, at the time of writing, the latest definition of community cohesion:

• There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country.

• There is a strong sense of an individual’s rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them and what they can expect in turn.

• Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment.

• There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny.

• There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a particular place, with a focus on what they have in common.

• There are strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and other institutions within neighbourhoods.

The CIC widened the concept of community cohesion from faith and ethnic groups to encompass income and generation and hence suggests that the concept is more complex than the earlier definition allowed. In addition, the CIC identified weaknesses with the approach when it noted that there are localities with high levels of deprivation and cohesion (possibly due to local initiatives) while, conversely, there are some affluent areas demonstrating low levels of cohesion. By introducing migrants into the remit of the cohesion agenda the Commission differentiated between cohesion and integration. It noted that cohesion is a process that applies to everyone so that all groups and communities get on together while integration is principally a process ensuring that ‘new residents and existing residents adapt to one another’ (CIC, 2007: 9).

Communities Secretary Hazel Blears’ response to the Commission was to accept its definition of community cohesion and the call for a single national Public Service Agreement (PSA) for community cohesion. The Chancellor, in October 2007, announced a new Public Service
Agreement. The PSA 21 identified a three prong agenda: building cohesive, empowered and active communities. In addition, it acknowledged five other indicators for community cohesion: the percentage of people who believe that people from different backgrounds get on well together; the proportion of people who have meaningful interaction with people from different backgrounds; the number of people who feel that they belong to their neighbourhood; the section of people who feel that they can influence decisions in their locality; and, finally, a flourishing third sector and the proportion of participation in culture or sport. In response to the CIC report, Blears also elaborated upon five key principles: the need to shift away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach; mainstreaming of cohesion into wider policy issues; a national framework for local support and guidance; the integration of newly arrived former migrants and existing communities; building positive relationships between different groups and focusing on what works. The Government also responded with a ten-point action plan, which increased community cohesion funding to £50 million for the next three years, the promotion of ‘Citizens Days’ and information packs for newly arrived migrants (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008; Blears, 2007; HMSO, 2007).

Meanwhile, critics of the newly received wisdom argue that social cohesion marks a shift away from the long-standing government policy of multiculturalism. Kundnani described community cohesion as the demise of multiculturalism, earmarking a return to assimilation. Indeed, migration itself has been sold as a threat to a cohesive national identity, despite the multicultural history of the country and the question marks surrounding the nature of a ‘cohesive identity’ and what it might look like. There is also a tension between buzzwords such as ‘citizenship’ used in national level contexts and ‘community cohesion’, which is more likely to be deployed at the local level. Marked inequalities of BME communities in housing, employment, education and access to welfare are apparent and still need to be addressed; citizenship and community cohesion both fail to address this. Furthermore, ethnic minority low socio-economic integration has remained within some sectors of government policy but has failed to accommodate state conceptualisations of cohesion which emphasise social relations, community bonds and local networks (Kundnani, 2002).

Social capital – comprising of access to networks, belief in shared norms and the capacity to obtain and maintain mutual trust – is seen as an important variable in the promotion of community cohesion. Putnam (2000) makes the distinction in the forms of social capital between bridging (inter-community) and bonding capital (intra-community). Bridging capital generates broader identities and reciprocity, which is better for external linkages and information diffusion. Bonding capital is inward looking and organised around dense networks within ethnic enclaves (Putnam, 2000: 22–3). High levels of bridging capital lead to better functioning of democratic processes and play an important role in giving associational cohesion to social life along the lines of interest while in turn overcoming primordial solidarities which are perceived to work against social cohesion. All this resonates with contemporary concern over how ethnic minorities specifically associate with wider society. The Cantle Report (2001) referred to the important role of bridging social capital and implied the negative role of bonding capital. This view is nuanced by the Commission for Integration and Cohesion as it pointed out that those who have bonding capital are more likely to develop bridging social capital. Meanwhile, with ‘bridging social capital and a local sense of belonging, we can bring the community together to create a culture of respect, restore neighbourliness and build good relations’ (CIC, 2007: 112, 162).

Social capital, a part of the neo-liberal agenda, can be used to mobilise resources, activate individuals and networks, which then justifies the withdrawal of the welfare state. However, Putnam’s characterisation of social capital and communities is simplistic and not necessarily helpful in developing coherent and effective social policy. His approach ignores the fact that communities are complex and, for example, involved in political struggles for resources as well as being in a constant state of social flux, civic evolution and cultural change. Social capital theory
downplays the conflictual nature of civil society, in this case also ignoring the impact of resistance to immigration and exclusion of outsiders. Indeed, the dark side of social capital as a process that can potentially foster a negative form of cohesion is removed from Putnam’s discussion. Social capital and community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power, which forms an essential aspect of any discussion of community (Zetter, 2006).

The concept of self-segregation was adopted by the Cantle and Denham Report and subsequently entered the lexicon of government. However, for Ouseley, the belief in and use of ‘segregated communities’ is based on a deeply held perception on the part of local policy-makers and as such, it became a part of the terms of reference for his inquiry. Subsequent investigation into the notion that Bradford is demographically segregated by Ludi Simpson (2004; 2005) and Deborah Phillips (2002) argued, and comfortably demonstrated, that the Pakistani population growth is due to natural fertility and some in-migration while the population overall is gradually dispersing, at rates slower than those of other minorities, out of the inner cities into the suburbs. The rate of dispersal is slower than other communities, particularly Indians, but this reflected a lack of social mobility rather than a propensity to self-segregate (Simpson, 2004; 2005; Phillips, 2002). Qualitative research by Alam and Husband on young Pakistani men reinforces the point that these young men are integrated in ways reflecting their experience as Bradfordian and British (2006). Research into schooling, however, does show that higher concentrations of particular Muslim groups such as Pakistanis (Burgess, 2005) does occur but whether this is a product of choice or the result of catchment areas remains a question unanswered.

There has been a shift in Ted Cantle’s original position partly in response to the sustained critique of the notion of segregated communities by researchers (Cantle, 2005). Traditional multiculturalism, he argues, is inadequate and unhelpful as it focuses on differences not commonality. Ignoring the differences between ethnic groups, for example, leads to competing claims of belonging and recognition. Instead Cantle is arguing for a new form of multiculturalism based on norms and values that transcend (ethnic) identity politics. This new approach would have several benefits:

- promote equality;
- help new communities to come to terms with difference;
- enable the expression of commonality leading to the likelihood of cross-cultural contact;
- increase the likelihood of diversity being perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat.

This shift in position was also reflected in the way that local policy-makers, such as Bradford Vision, had struggled to apply the concept of community cohesion, and moved on to new agendas and approaches which emanate from this process. Bradford Vision talked of ‘Shared Futures’ rather than ‘community cohesion’, principally because of the term’s problematic nature when it comes to implementation, a point discussed in greater depth within the section on policy-makers. The ‘Shared Futures’ approach is also adopted by the Integration Commission and its recommendations are accepted by the government (CIC, 2007).

**Project rationale**

The project investigates a range of factors, which undermine or promote cohesion in areas with both established and recently arrived Muslims. The project is based on semi-structured interviews undertaken in three localities – Newham, Birmingham and Bradford. Interviews were done with four types of residents: long-term, or settled Muslim residents; recently arrived Muslims; recently arrived non-Muslims; and non-Muslim UK residents, which in the case of the research on Bradford were predominantly white, British born residents. In most cases Muslims were interviewed by Muslims of the same gender and background and those of other faiths or no faith were interviewed by interviewers from the same ethnic and religious background. However, in the case of Bradford, most participants were interviewed by Muslims but matched by gender. In addition,
interviews with community representatives, local agencies, key organisations and public officers shed light on the local and national contexts while also drawing attention to the impact of the cohesion agenda upon various Muslim communities and their broader social settings.

In light of specific socio-economic conditions and analysis of responses to contemporary local events, the project provides insights into common and possibly differential aspirations, perceptions, experiences and strategies among the research sample. The project also examines the ways and extent to which recently arrived Muslims are integrated into existing Muslim communities.

The project focuses on cohesion and considers the importance of understanding factors that are facilitators and barriers to community cohesion in areas where there has been, and in some cases continues to be, significant Muslim migration. The first area, Newham, where recently arrived Muslims are of various ethnic heritages and backgrounds (Iraqis, Somalis, Turks and Bosnians, for example), are settling in an area with existing established Muslim communities (mainly Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims). The second area, Birmingham, has its own sense of complexity. Here, there are recently arrived Muslims from a diversity of groups and contexts while there are also new arrivals joining existing Muslim communities that are already established, often for the purpose of marriage. The third area, Bradford, is of lesser diversity in terms of BME populations but there has developed what might be called an extensive marriage migration and family re-unification culture or practice. This is not exclusive to Bradford but it is a feature that is more pronounced there due to its particular migration history.

This report analyses data specifically from the Bradford site. The figures and data are drawn from closed and open-ended questions within the research instrument and also complemented with data generated from interviews with policy-makers and others.

**Muslims in Bradford**

The majority of the Muslim population in Bradford are from the Mirpur, Attock and Rawalpindi districts in Pakistan, Sylhetis from Bangladesh and Gujaratis from India. More recently arrived Muslims have come from the Balkans and refugee families from Bosnia-Herzegovina have also settled in the city. The entire spectrum of debate in relation to Muslims in Britain has a relevance to Bradford and, often, what happens in Bradford can have a bearing on wider UK policy and debate. In order to understand and contextualise Bradford, it is useful to offer a brief but broad thumbnail sketch covering aspects of the race relations narrative over the last 30 or so years.

Early race relations discourse was not based around Muslims and Islam, or even religious identity and faith more generally, but rather often focused on the perceived problems associated with immigrants and immigration, most notably racism and barriers to integration. Discussions started moving into the domain of faith during the late 1970s and early 1980s, first with the Honeyford Affair, followed by the Satanic Verses Affair and then the riots and disturbances of 1995. With the exception of the protests about Rushdie’s book, these were local issues that rapidly became emblematic of Muslim communities nationally. In the aftermath of the most recent disturbances of 2001, a number of official reports were written, the significance of which continues to reverberate at national and local levels. In the main, these reports have had a lasting impact on the debate around integration and multiculturalism, once the touchstone of liberal British consensus. The overall debate has become complicated by the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly after 9/11 and then 7/7. While there was collective relief in Bradford that the 7/7 bombers came from Leeds and elsewhere it has raised public concern about the Muslim population in general and particularly those who are of Pakistani heritage. With the August 2006 transatlantic aircraft terror plot, again Muslim men of Pakistani heritage became subject to intense public scrutiny. In the overall discussion on Muslims in Britain, Bradford has played a prominent role in the public imagination whether it is about integration policy, multiculturalism and community cohesion, forced marriages, honour killings or riots and violence.
Research question
A major aim of the project has been to unearth and explore the factors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areas where there are established Muslim communities and, in addition, into which Muslim migrants, have recently arrived. The cognitive, structural, perceptual and material context affecting aspects of social cohesion are integral parts of the research question.

These factors are:

• Characteristics of the locality, its ethnic and religious composition and level of deprivation and the socio-demographics of individual residents covering religion, gender, age, ethnicity, country of origin, education and occupational status. Providing the material context that influences the dynamics of social cohesion.

• Connections and associations of residents with each other in the same neighbourhood, locality and other localities in Britain. Examining cross-cutting interaction and modes of cooperation in specific settings in terms of, its nature, quality and strength.

• The impact of local, national and international interventions on how people feel in terms of ‘common sense of belonging’ and evidence for social cohesion and what factors affect it.

• Transnationalism is the final factor; its impact on social cohesion and testing the hypothesis that transnationalism-integration is not a zero sum game.

The investigation examines the interplay of these factors and the way that they are articulated in the daily lives of individuals: in their neighbourhood and networks, in public spaces, at work, in school, leisure and in civic and political activities.
2 Research method and sample characteristics

Key points

- Most recently arrived Muslim respondents entered the country for the purpose of marriage whereas those of other faiths or no faith entered for education or employment.
- The highest rates of education were found among recently arrived respondents who were not Muslim.
- Recently arrived Muslim respondents had higher rates of education than participants from the established Muslim population.
- Both recently arrived and established Muslim respondents had lower employment rates than those of other faiths or no faith.
- Recently arrived Muslim respondents had higher rates of unemployment than established Muslim respondents.
- All newly arrived respondents faced economic hardship and levels of hardship were highest among participants outside the Muslim faith.
- There were indications of overcrowding among all faiths in the sample.
- Extended families were more common among newly arrived Muslim respondents.
- Home ownership was high among both recently arrived and established Muslim participants.

Research methods
The research design and instruments were planned and constructed by the COMPAS project team and consisted of semi-structured interviews in three areas of Britain where there are significant numbers of settled Muslim residents and recent arrivals. A key difference emerging from this is the ways these distinct groups deal with, or indeed, have an impact on the notion of cohesion. The Bradford sample included Muslims and people of other faiths or no faith residing in two local wards. Before any empirical work was done, however, a local area paper was commissioned in order to identify two local wards and local issues that affected residents and the findings of this paper were factored into the questionnaire.

Ward selection was based on the following criteria: ethnic and religious diversity, migration history, socio-economic deprivation indicators; the institutional landscape; the structure of the Muslim communities; local governance and policy issues concerning community cohesion and ethnic relations, regeneration as well as voting patterns; local media coverage of Muslim issues within Bradford; and the selection of two recent issues with local relevance. Throughout, a ‘locally grounded’ approach to investigation has been taken.

A team of local researchers was assembled and subsequently based within the Ethnicity Social Policy Research Centre at the University of Bradford. The team, working under the overall management of this report’s author, first produced a background paper and then conducted the semi-structured interviews. The team leader and key members of the team have extensive experience of researching within Bradford. Many of the field researchers have considerable local knowledge and possess sensitivity to the research sample’s perspectives due to being locally based and, in many cases, having existential and working knowledge of their communities; language skills and sensitivity to cultural practices being key elements which enable access. Overall the team produced the local paper, which identified two wards that fitted the criteria for the investigation and was responsible for supervising the data collection. A panel of interviewers that have the appropriate gender and ethnic mix conducted the interviews.
Researching in Bradford, already a venue where research fatigue is evident (Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert, 2007), has become increasingly difficult given the present climate of fear and suspicion generated by the War on Terror of outsiders. During the fieldwork phase of this project, many of those approached as possible participants were reluctant and wary about speaking with researchers. Nevertheless, due to persistence and good channels of access, the team was successful in connecting with some members of the sample that would be otherwise difficult to reach; recently arrived Muslim women, other recently arrived individuals and also some linguistic minorities in the Pakistani community being particularly inaccessible to those deemed as outsiders, or without the credentials required to enable access and foster the levels of trust required. Overall, the team adopted a snowball approach to sampling and managed to engage with a diverse cross-section that an outside team may have overlooked, or simply been unable to access. Prior to the fieldwork, the researchers received interviewing skills training from COMPAS and during the data collection phase, sought advice and guidance from the team leader as and when required.

The research question investigates factors contributing to community cohesion as it affects recently arrived migrants and established communities in two local wards: Bowling and Barkerend and Little Horton. The sample consisted of 117 participants, with whom semi-structured interviews were undertaken.

This sample included the following:

- 52 Muslims (recent arrivals);
- 15 non-Muslims (recent arrivals);
- 35 established Muslim residents;
- 15 UK born non-Muslim residents;
- 10 Qualitative interviews with local policy-makers and service providers.

In each ward, recently arrived Muslims (less than five years’ residence), established Muslims (more than ten years’ residence or born in the UK) and recently arrived residents of other faiths or no faith were included in the sample, including people born in the UK. Those defined as ‘recently arrived Muslims’ are the primary focus of the research, as is their experience and perception of belonging within a given locality. As such, recently arrived Muslims are greater in number than those participants belonging to other categories. The three further markers of identity and position (religion, ethnicity and migration status) are overlapping in nature and reflect three dimensions of the sample.

The research instrument covered the chosen wards, where two recent local issues (urban regeneration and crime) were identified around which some of the questions about cohesion and belonging were focused and formulated. These questions are aimed at helping establish the extent of residents’ awareness of their locality and any involvement in decision-making processes and perceptions of belonging. The chosen wards are adjacent to each other so local issues have significant salience in both wards.

During the data gathering phase a few issues did emerge. The first related to some of the questions in the questionnaire and recent immigrants, in particular, are reluctant to part with information that they perceived to be sensitive; information concerning benefits and earnings, for example. Recently arrived respondents generally had very little to comment about British society and, women in particular appeared to express especially limited knowledge, but this may have been due to being ‘gate keepered’ by elders. Established Muslim respondents, however, were keen to air their views and opinions about a host of issues. Iraq in particular figured in the discussions of established groups and recent arrivals of all faiths.

Data entry from the semi-structured interviews and the translation, where necessary, and transcription of the responses to the open-ended questions was conducted by COMPAS, as was any initial and basic analysis of the questionnaire data (through use of SPSS).
Sample characteristics
A purposive, quota-based sampling strategy was used to select eligible respondents in order to meet the desired characteristics of the sample as discussed above. The sample was further defined through factoring in other markers of identity such as ethnicity, country of origin, gender and age (18–24, 25–44, 45 and over – these quotas were set according to the 2001 Census data for the wards selected). In terms of faith, three-quarters are Muslims, mainly of Pakistani heritage (the largest single category within the sample) but include participants from Bangladesh, India, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Trinidad and Uganda.

Respondents of other faiths or no faith in the sample include individuals with Bangladeshi, Trinidadian and Zambian heritage. The white and white other categories include white British, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Czech (see Table 1). The sample characteristics reflect the local area pattern for migration in that it is primarily marriage migration (Samad and Eade, 2003) but family reunification is still an important factor. Motives for migration vary by gender with most women arriving primarily for marriage and/or for the purpose of family reunification while men appear to be more equally divided between marriage and education motives (Figure 1). Among recent arrivals there are differences discernible by faith. Most recently arrived Muslim respondents enter Britain as spouses. However, among recently arrived respondents of other faiths or no faith, over half came for education and a third for work (Figure 2).

The city of Bradford showing the two wards where the research took place

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Socio-demographic features

The sample holds a range of interesting features. It reflects, for example, some of the more general characteristics common to the ward, including high levels of multiple deprivation and low human capital, particularly among minorities (Valentine, 2006). In terms of educational achievement, there are more Muslims with only primary or no educational qualifications in comparison to other respondents. Similarly, the number of Muslim respondents with tertiary educational experiences is relatively low. Meanwhile, other recently arrived respondents have the highest rates of education, higher even than UK born respondents, irrespective of faith. However, adding more texture and depth to the sample, recently arrived Muslim participants have higher rates of post-secondary education than established Muslim respondents. The sample, overall, indicates that the number of recently arrived Muslims without primary educational qualification is declining which runs parallel with shrinking opportunities for manual labour in the city (Table 1).

Educational patterns, generally speaking, feed into occupational status. The average employment rate for the district is 63.4 per cent and it is lower for the wards, which are 50.7 per cent for Little Horton and rise to 56.6 per cent in Bowling and Barkerend. The average district rate for unemployment is 6.9 per cent, but again, the pattern indicating various forms of deprivation continues as unemployment is higher for the two wards running at 14.9 per cent for Little Horton and 12 per cent for Bowling and Barkerend (Valentine, 2006).

The employment rate for Muslims, both recent and established, in the sample is low compared to other respondents. When Muslim occupational status is disaggregated between recent and established Muslims, important differences emerge. Unemployment numbers are much higher among recent arrivals with less than one in five unemployed compared to one in twelve among established Muslim participants. Many recently arrived Muslim respondents are involved in raising families, while established Muslim population
Table 1: Sample characteristics (absolute values)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Recently arrived Muslim</th>
<th>Established Muslim resident</th>
<th>Recently arrived non-Muslim</th>
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</table>

Totals refer to sample size in each category.
Interviewees are more evenly spread in terms of what might be called life phases: roughly equal proportions are raising families, students or placed themselves in the ‘other’ category which includes ‘retired’ and ‘looking after the sick’ (Figure 3, Table 1).

When asked how they are managing, recent arrivals (irrespective of faith) were more likely than respondents from the established population to say that they faced financial difficulties. With low employment rates for Muslim participants, both recent and established, it seemed peculiar that only

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**Figure 1: Main reason left country of origin by gender**

- To marry someone living abroad
- To pursue education
- Wanted to join family/relatives living abroad
- Financial reasons – get a job/start a business
- Safety reasons – fear of persecution

N=86

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**Figure 2: Main reason left country of origin by category of interviewee**

- To marry someone living abroad
- To pursue education
- Wanted to join family/relatives living abroad
- Financial reasons – get a job/start a business
- Safety reasons – fear of persecution

N=67
a few established Muslim respondents perceived themselves to be in financial difficulty. This may partly be explained by greater access to welfare support among established Muslim residents, most said that they received means tested benefits. This proportion was lower for recently arrived Muslim participants and much lower for participants of other faiths or none (Figure 3).

Research on housing in Bradford shows that overcrowding among the Muslim population is relatively common. Around 8.3 per cent of households for the district as a whole are overcrowded but the rates are higher in the two wards where the research was sited. Terraced properties account for over half of the houses in the two wards. Around a quarter are semi-detached and over 15 per cent are flats or shared dwellings. In Little Horton 15.2 per cent of all households are overcrowded whereas in Bowling and Barkerend the figure is 12.9 per cent, while the average household size is 2.55 for the metropolitan district. In Little Horton the average household size is 2.89 and for Bowling and Barkerend the corresponding figure is 2.68 (Ratcliffe, 1996: 31; Valentine, 2006).

Findings from the sample are fairly consistent with this evidence and suggest overcrowding exists among recent arrivals of all faiths (Figure 4).

Extended families are not uncommon in the city and there is a correlation between household size and overcrowding with extended families facing particular difficulties, as the option of moving to larger properties is not feasible (Ratcliffe, 1996: 31). The sample suggests that extended families are more common among recently arrived Muslims, with over half of this group of participants living in extended families. Living in extended families was less common among established Muslim participants and those of other faiths or none (Figure 4).

The two wards have a high level of home ownership and renting among Muslims is a residual category. High ownership was achieved through borrowing short-term loans from kinsfolk (Ratcliffe, 1996: 34). Recent and established Muslim respondents showed a high level of home ownership and more than half the established Muslim respondents in the sample were owner occupiers (Figure 4).
Summary
Recent Muslim arrivals in the study sample entered the country for the purpose of marriage while participants from other categories entered for either education or employment. The highest rates of education were found among respondents who had arrived recently but were not Muslim. Recently arrived Muslim participants had higher rates of education than established Muslim participants. Generally, Muslim respondents were found to have lower employment rates than those in other categories. The highest rates of unemployment were found among recent Muslim arrivals.

All new arrivals faced economic hardship, though levels of difficulty were reported as lower by Muslim respondents. There are indications from the housing data that there is overcrowding among all faiths. Extended families were more common among new arrivals than established Muslim respondents. Finally, home ownership was found to be high among all categories of Muslim participants.
Key points

• Muslim respondents were residentially clustered.

• Respondents from the established Muslim population showed a greater degree of interaction than recent arrivals and were living in neighbourhoods with different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

• All groups showed a strong sense of local pride.

• A high degree of interaction was evident across ethnic and religious boundaries in wide ranging public spaces in respondents’ daily lives.

• Especially amongst participants from established populations, attitudes were very similar across different faiths and there was commonality of perceptions on a range of local issues.

One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the promotion of robust and affirmative relationships between people from different backgrounds in the place of employment, schools and other establishments in the neighbourhood (CIC, 2007). It feeds into the government emphasis upon a common sense of belonging that combines local loyalty and affiliation with national identity (Blears, 2007). This policy objective emerged partly as a consequence of Cantle (2001) when describing Bradford and other northern cities as having polarised segregated enclaves: which in turn fostered little contact between different groups of people. This chapter explores people’s experiences of and feelings about living together, their interactions and their views on their neighbourhoods and localities.

Neighbourhood: work and spaces

Bradford’s residential patterns tend to be pronounced along ethnic and religious lines, which has been demonstrably linked to racism in the housing market and also reinforced by elements of white economic migration and flight (Ratcliffe, 1996; Simpson and Gavalas, 2005). While there are high concentrations of Muslims in inner city wards, the wards selected for the research project as a whole show a relatively mixed picture in terms of ethnicity and religion and the majority population remains white (Valentine, 2006). In our sample, a significant minority of Muslim participants (both recently arrived and established) live in neighbourhoods’ populated with people of the same ethnic and religious background. The second largest concentration of Muslim participants was found in neighbourhoods with different ethnic and religious groups and then a smaller cluster was found within areas with a mixture of different religions and ethnicities. Established Muslim participants tended to be more evenly spread: residing in areas of the same ethnicity and religion and areas of different ethnicity and religion equally. Recently arrived Muslim participants seemed to mirror the early settlement patterns common to the now established Muslims. Other recently arrived respondents, however, were mainly clustered around people of different religion and ethnicity to their own. Participants who were born in the UK and not Muslim were clustered around a mixture of different ethnicities and religions (Figure 5). The pattern emerging suggests that established Muslim respondents are more evenly spread across the different neighbourhoods and are contributing to the net outward movement or mobility – to suburbs, for example – within the local population as a whole. Later on, evidence will be considered whether this suggests an increase in social (bridging) capital, but it is a feature that is often overlooked within debates around Muslim self-segregation.
Working patterns were found to be fairly similar across all participants, with groups clustered around employers from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Seen in another way, the majority work mainly for white British employers, a point that is not that unusual considering the political economy of the employment market. Among recently arrived Muslim respondents, however, over half work for an employer from the same religious and ethnic background, perhaps reflecting their limited capacity to communicate in English but also suggesting that these groups
continue to rely on ethnic and religious networks. Nearly a third of the same group, however, worked for an employer of a different ethnic and religious background which again points to a diversity of skills, social capital and perhaps personal preferences with regard to work, community and communication. Among established Muslim respondents, a much lower proportion work for an employer from the same ethnic and religious background and around half were found to work for an employer from a different ethnic and religious background (Figure 6).

A feature that is borne out of housing and employment characteristics is the degree of interaction and engagement with different ethnicities and religions. When questioned about the spaces they moved in and with whom they came into contact, the pattern from the sample demonstrates that with the exception of home and religious places respondents generally met more people from different ethnic and religious background than from the same ethnic and religious background. This evidence contradicts suggestions that Muslims are inward looking, isolationist and prefer to meet and mix with their own kind. Meeting and mixing with people, in this context, refers to meaningful engagement with those of the same and different ethnic and religious backgrounds, as opposed to mere encounters with ‘familiar strangers’ (Milgram, 1977). Home and religious places are spaces where people are more likely to meet people of the same ethnic and religious background while public services and facilities, shopping and entertainment spaces are places where meeting people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds is to be expected. Most of the sample met people from the same ethnic and religious background at home, while around half said that they met members of the same ethnic and religious groups in religious venues. Other instances where meaningful cross ethnic and religious engagement took place included those in work venues, while shopping, at entertainment venues and while engaging with public services and facilities.

Muslim respondents follow the general pattern of the sample of meeting the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different ethnicities and religious groups in various locations outside the home.

Figure 7: Percentages of interviewees meeting people of same/different ethnicity and religion by type of meeting space
There are, however, differences between recently arrived Muslim respondents and established Muslim respondents. The most striking variation is that recently arrived Muslim respondents met roughly the same number of people from different ethnic and religious groups as they do from the same ethnic and religious groups. Established Muslim respondents, however, met considerably more people from different ethnic and religious groups than from the same ethnic and religious background (Figures 8 and 9). Established Muslim

**Figure 8: Percentage of recently arrived Muslim arrivals meeting people of same/different ethnicity and religion by type of meeting space**

**Figure 9: Percentages of established Muslims meeting people of same/different ethnicity and religion by type of meeting space**
participants have a clear choice and could remain fixed, or drawn to areas such as Manningham where there are higher concentrations of the same ethnic and religious background. The fact that they do not seem to go against the conventional ‘self segregated’, or pathological ‘Muslim insularity’ thesis that has been given so much credence over the last decade.

Within the data, it became possible to identify the number of different spaces where interactions between members of different groups took place. In addition, it allows us to ascertain differences and similarities according to different marks of identity, including age, gender and, of course, ethnicity. In terms of meeting people and the spaces where they met generally, women and young people meet more people from different ethnic and religious background than men and older people. Recent arrivals of all faiths have a more limited range of contacts. Female participants had an average of just over seven spaces where they met people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds while male respondents only had around five such meeting spaces. Generally, the younger age ranges have more meeting spaces with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Recently arrived Muslim respondents had more spaces where they met people from the same ethnic and religious background while established Muslim respondents had more spaces where they met people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Recently arrived respondents of other faiths or none showed a similar trend. Outside the Muslim faith, established respondents showed the lowest number of spaces for meeting people of different ethnicity and religious backgrounds (Table 2).

**Locality and locals: attitudes among different groups**

The data also allows for distinguishing the attitudes of residents to the locality, to each other, both inter-group and intra-group attitudes and to see whether there is convergence or divergence of viewpoints. All the groups in the sample felt deep attachment to the locality based on living among familiar people as well as comfortable access to amenities and services, which, in the broader sense refers to not only state provision of civic services, but the existence of infrastructure which services cultural needs. Among established participants, many stated that they were born, raised, educated and still have many friends in their present home locality. In the majority of cases, the participants held positive views of their locale and the communities in which they appear to thrive. Although this may be an example of participants painting an overly rosy picture of their locales, previous work which, at least in part, explored and presented attitudes toward home locales seems to reinforce this finding (Alam, 2006; Alam and Husband, 2006). Some established UK born residents commented that their locales have improved which indicates that the positivity expressed may be due to recent initiatives within some areas. Indeed, the Trident Regeneration Programme’ formed in 2000, is mentioned as having a significant amount of positive impact.

“Nice people, nice neighbour, friendly and helpful in need. English neighbours are very good too. Schools are very close, mosques are very close also.” (Recently arrived, male, Muslim)

“Improved over the last few years – safer, cleaner, quieter and I get on with people, especially the neighbours. Schools are close by, shops and work are close too.” (Established resident, female, non-Muslim)

UK-born participants who were not Muslim talked of friendly and helpful Pakistani families, while Pakistani participants made similar comments about their white neighbours. In both cases, those interviewed generally spoke of a close knit but diverse community where the chances of everyone knowing each other are high.

“They are really good, talk to me, hi and bi (sic).” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

“Friendly people: know most people because I have grown up with them.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)
Recently arrived respondents expressed a liking of the diversity in their area which allowed them to be less conspicuous and therefore integrated into what they felt is a tolerant, quiet and peaceful area. Despite this generally positive attitude, racism and discrimination were also mentioned.

At a more personal and normative level, a positive aspect of every day life in some areas, as table 2 below shows, is the number of meetings people have with others. The table below shows the average number of meetings by category of people met.
felt by female Muslim participants in particular, is the advantage of having people from the same linguistic and religious background living in the locale. This was much more strongly felt among recently arrived Muslim respondents. As one participant commented:

“Our own people living here, this is no different from living in Pakistan.” (Recently arrived, male, Muslim)

Those participants who fall into this category expressed a feeling of safety, as they were more likely to become ensconced in familiar existing networks. However, the Pakistani community should not be considered homogenous and there are differences highlighted on the basis of clan and village allegiance. Mirpuris and Chachi Pathans, are good examples where distinctions within the wider catch all categories of ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Muslim’ are identifiable on the basis of language, as well as nuances of religious practice and belief. Many recently arrived Muslim women from the sample, however, felt that they could not make any meaningful response to the question pertaining to meeting and interacting with others and their ‘don’t know’ response may reflect some isolation from public sphere activity.

Across all groups, common concerns were raised about litter, run-down areas, drug culture, crime and reckless driving.

“Drug use by local young people … destroys families and communities.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

“I don’t like the drugs and gun shooting, it is so scary.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

“Worry about my grandchildren when they play out, because in the back alley there is broken glass, dirty rubbish which needs cleaning. It’s very unhygienic.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Recently arrived participants complained about the over-built nature of the locality and the lack of green and open spaces for children.

Some established residents singled out Slovaksians for anti-social behaviour and residential overcrowding. A number of established Muslim participants complained in a similar vein about ‘asylum seekers’ in general, while also commenting on similarities between ‘asylum seekers’ now and an earlier generation from their own community.

“Every house that is empty is now being filled with Slovaksians and so on. It’s disturbing sometimes as they don’t understand the different cultures around them.” (Established resident, female, non-Muslim)

“The Slovakia people … I don’t like them standing on the street.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Summary
The data challenges conventional wisdom, including political and policy discussion which perceive Bradford as being an acutely, problematically, ethnically and religiously segregated city. There is clustering of Muslims but the established Muslim population from the sample in particular, showed a greater likelihood than recently arrived participants to have greater interactions and live in neighbourhoods with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. All groups have a strong sense of local pride and the evidence suggests a high degree of interaction across ethnic and religious boundaries in wide ranging public spaces in their daily lives. Attitudes in particular between the established populations are very similar and showed a commonality of perceptions to a range of local issues. This raises questions about the nature of social capital, in particular bridging capital, and the role and influence of bonding capital, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
4 Help and support: bonding and bridging networks

Key points

- Established Muslim respondents were more likely to utilise bridging social capital than recently arrived Muslim respondents.
- There was a drift among established Muslim participants from bonding to bridging social capital.
- There was variation among established Muslim participants, with women accessing bonding social capital while men deployed bridging social capital.
- A sizeable number of female Muslim respondents, recent arrivals and established participants speak English poorly or not at all.
- Religion alone does not seem to be a factor in preventing groups from mixing.
- Established male Muslim respondents had more spaces where they meet people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds than any other group in the sample.

There is considerable discussion among policy-makers and academics on the role of social capital, which I examined in detail in the introduction. In contemporary public policy discourse on community cohesion, bonding capital is formulated negatively while bridging capital is seen in a positive light. The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple dichotomy of good and bad social capital is not helpful and that in their view the presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social capital. This chapter investigates the networks of help and support that people use to better understand the role of social capital in relation to community cohesion.

Information, help and support

Around two-thirds of recently arrived respondents of all faiths did not require any advice or assistance whether on entry or during settlement. Some recently arrived respondents accessing advice after entry turned to friends and advice centres equally. Recently arrived Muslim respondents, however, veered from this practice with the males mainly turning to advice centres while women sought assistance from relatives. A third of recent arrivals of all faiths who did require advice upon entry can be broken down further into distinctive categories of practice. Only a third of recently arrived Muslim respondents received advice through various sources, while the same is true for over two-thirds of recently arrived respondents of other faiths or none. Those who needed advice often followed a similar pattern, first turning to friends and work colleagues, before moving on to formal structures for information. The advice sought was based around work issues and housing, but also extended to ascertaining knowledge on shops, schools, family planning and financial matters. Social contacts became broader over time, primarily established with the same ethnic and religious group but social networks also came to grow around work colleagues, housemates and peer groups – such as fellow students. Among recently arrived Muslim participants, many replies indicated that they needed no outside help. When they did need outside help, only a small proportion turned to advice centres and even fewer turned to family and friends. In general, recently arrived Muslim respondents turned to neighbours, social services, social workers, teachers, police and solicitors for a range of issues; from identifying doctors, computer classes, filling in tax forms, ascertaining immigration status, dealing with litter in the neighbourhood and ways and means of tackling anti-social behaviour. Among recently arrived Muslim participants, social contacts among women seem to be concentrated around relatives.
and within kinship networks, perhaps an obvious feature given that many said they had few opportunities for wider social intercourse due to their relatively brief period of living in the city.

The quantitative and qualitative data suggests that the range of advice and support accessed is significantly dependant on competency in spoken English. Figure 10 shows that among recently arrived participants of all faiths, those speaking English very well or well on entry had more post-secondary or secondary education. Recently arrived Muslim respondents were more likely to speak English very well or well on arrival than those from the established Muslim population, which may reflect better rates of education among recently arrived Muslims. Among those of other faiths or none, nearly half of recently arrived respondents spoke English very well or fairly well on arrival (Figure 11).

When the sample was asked about their ability to speak English now, the largest group who could speak English only poorly or not at all were among Muslim participants (Figure 11 and 12). There are variations, with established Muslim respondents having greater familiarity with English than recent arrivals. However, slightly more recently arrived Muslim respondents speak English and other languages at home than only other languages. Among other recent arrivals, most respondents speak English very well now, which is not surprising as they have higher rates of post-secondary education than Muslim respondents (Figure 10 and 11, Table 1).

The data suggests that there is a correlation between the limited range of contacts held by recently arrived Muslim respondents (particularly women) and the lack of English language capability.

Figure 12 indicates a cluster of Muslim participants who do not speak English at all, the largest group being recently arrived Muslim women.

“I had a great deal of difficulty speaking English in the beginning but now it is much better. I want to keep improving my English language so people may see that a woman can really do something.” (Recently arrived, female, Muslim)

Established Muslim participants were more likely to employ bridging capital than recently arrived Muslim respondents who tended to be more dependent on bonding capital. The number of established Muslim respondents who had sought

Figure 10: Number who spoke English on entry to the UK by education and category

![Figure 10: Number who spoke English on entry to the UK by education and category](image)

advice or assistance was low and among those that did, only a small proportion often turned to the local advice centre to access information concerning housing, jobs and education. The qualitative data shows that there is a difference in terms of gender. Female respondents tended to refer to family and relatives before accessing more formal institutions for advice and assistance. However, the number of established Muslim women participants who visited advice centres, job centres, social service, or local councillors is significantly higher than their more recently arrived counterparts. The kind of assistance appears primarily related to care responsibilities, such as childcare, reception level schooling issues, as well as assistance with benefit forms and dealing with PAYE. Furthermore, the social circles of established Muslim women in the sample appeared to be much more diverse than recently arrived participants. While relatives remained important, friendship circles, primarily drawn from the same ethnic and religious background, were much more significant and there is evidence of social contacts drawn from different ethnic and

![Figure 11: Use of English by category](image1)

![Figure 12: Number of Muslims speaking English now by category and gender](image2)
religious groups. This is far more common among women who worked and developed social networks from their working environment.

The pattern with male respondents from the established Muslim population is different. For this group, friends are turned to before more formal avenues for advice are sought. Friendship circles continued to be important, as they were the main arenas for social contact, whether drawn from work contexts, the local neighbourhood, or other arenas where meaningful social interaction took place. Friends from the same ethnic and religious background were significant but the number of acquaintances of different ethnic and religious backgrounds was also higher for this group of participants. This aspect of social life marks them out clearly from recently arrived Muslim respondents as they have more meeting places with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds than from their own. This is not surprising given the fact that they are, after all, ‘settled’ and therefore have acquired and built relationships over time, but more than that, have acquired and developed the necessary skills to make such acquaintances: language, culture and, more specifically, an understanding of norms, values etc. What is surprising is that the data on space shows that established Muslim participants had around half the spaces for meeting people of the same ethnic and religious background than they did for meeting people of other ethnicities and religions (Figure 9, Table 2). Both the quantitative and qualitative data suggests that established Muslim men from the sample have a more diverse range of social contact (based on affiliations of ethnicity and religion) than those of other faiths or none, a point that suggests Islam is not necessarily a factor in determining whether groups mix with each other or not.

Among UK-born participants of other faiths or no faith, many men claimed they had no need for advice and women said that if needed they would turn to neighbours and friends before turning to any agency. Social contacts were equally divided between friends and relatives and there was rough parity between those from similar backgrounds and those from different ethnic and religious groups. Table 2 on spaces shows that established participants who were not Muslim had the second lowest number of spaces for meeting with people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. There is no obvious explanation for this lack of interaction and this is an area for further investigation.

**Bonding and bridging social capital**

In terms of social capital among Muslim respondents, the overall trend appears to be a move to complement bonding capital with bridging capital. The recent arrival of Muslim participants to the UK has been facilitated through bonding capital, as more than half of this group of respondents came for marriage and several others for family reunification (Figure 2) with family remaining an important aspect in terms of social contact and support. However, established Muslim respondents appeared to be increasingly using friendship networks, which include members of different ethnic and religious groups. This suggests a gradual and incremental shift away from dependency on bonding capital to bridging capital. The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a variety of complex reasons, ranging from structural factors such as residential concentrations from the same ethnic and religious group to social-psychological factors reflecting the desire to sustain and maintain kin and kith relations. Established Muslim participants, however, did complain that relatives don’t help; which facilitates the reliance on friends (some are from different ethnic and religious groups) and the use of mainstream agencies for support.

“The best people that help me were the CAB (Citizens Advice Bureau). In my community … you have the advice centre within the Asian community but they are not highly educated but they are not fluent in your first language, which is English.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

Mosques do not figure in the qualitative data as a resource base that they can turn to for support or advice. Mosques are divided by sect: Barelwi, Deobandi, Ahmadiyya, etc. and by linguistic sub-grouping, in the main Mirpuri and Chahchi Pathan. Only one participant stated that a friend at the mosque helped, otherwise, conventional agency support is sought out by respondents from the established Muslim population.
Summary
Established Muslim respondents were more likely to utilise bridging social capital than recent Muslim arrivals who tend to use bonding social capital. There was variation among established Muslim participants, with women accessing bonding social capital while men deploy bridging social capital. While there are complex reasons for using a particular form of social capital, an important but partial explanation is the ability to speak English. The study found a sizeable number of Muslim women participants, both recent arrivals and established residents, who speak English poorly or not at all. There is also a drift among established Muslims from bonding to bridging social capital. This appears in line with the view of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion, which suggests that those who have bonding capital are more likely to develop bridging social capital. Religion alone does not seem to be a factor in preventing groups from mixing. Established Muslim male participants had more spaces where they met people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds than any other groups in the sample.
Key points

- All established groups from the sample had higher rates of participation in the electoral process than new arrivals, irrespective of faith.
- Established Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in the electoral process.
- Overall there was a low level of involvement in organisational participation by the sample.
- More women than men were involved in organisational participation.
- The sample revealed a variety of public activities that brought diverse communities together.
- On local, national and international issues there was broad agreement and commonality of concerns among the different groups in the sample.
- Most groups in the sample felt that they had little influence on local decision-making processes, with the exception of some established Muslim participants who felt they could try to make an impact.
- On national and international issues, all groups from the sample strongly disagreed with government policy and felt they had no way of influencing it.
- Respondents from established populations of all faiths were cynical about the transparency of the democratic process.

Voting patterns
Findings from the sample support the literature, which suggests that South Asians have a high rate of participation in the electoral process (Anwar, 1994; Léhé, 1990). Around half of the sample had voted in the 2005 general election, with no appreciable difference based on gender. This is lower than both the national and regional turnout. In the sample, turnout increased with age and figures were higher among UK-born respondents. Voting turnout in the sample declined with higher levels of education: lower participation rates were found among those with post-secondary education. Muslim participants were more likely to have voted, and turnout was highest among established Muslim participants, followed by UK-born participants of other faiths or no faith and then recently arrived Muslim participants. The lowest turnout was found among recently arrived participants of other faiths or no faith.

The local election turnout among the sample was higher than the national turnout, with more men voting than women. In other respects, the pattern was similar to national voting trends. Turnout increased among older age groups and was higher among UK-born respondents than...
those born abroad. Turnout declined with higher rates of education and was higher among Muslim participants. The highest turnout was found among established Muslim participants, but this was only slightly higher than UK-born participants of other faiths or none. The lowest turnout for local elections was found among participants who had arrived recently and were not Muslim (Figure 13). In both national and local elections, the participants most involved in politics were from the established Muslim population, in the 45+ age group and with secondary education or below.

Organisational involvement

Overall, involvement in organisations was found to be low, although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents to participate in an organisation.

Involvement was highest among participants from the 25-44 age range. Unlike the range of electoral involvement, respondents with post-secondary education were more involved in organisations and involvement was higher among UK-born participants than those born abroad. Muslim respondents were slightly more likely to be involved in organisations than other categories, with established Muslim respondents having the highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondents having the lowest (Figure 13).

The qualitative data indicates that participation rates are also low among recently-arrived participants of other faiths or no faith. The key barriers are lack of information, followed by lack of time due to being in work and or family commitments and, for some, a lack of language proficiency hinders participation. Recently arrived Muslim respondents had a similar profile, except that some women were involved in religious/cultural activities, such as organising *Eid* (religious festival) parties, teaching Urdu in the local mosque, participating in *Naat* programmes or in school activities where they have some association. There were important differences in the reasons given by established Muslim men and women from the sample for non-involvement in organisations. Male respondents tended to say that they were too busy with work and family, however, some had tried, unsuccessfully, to initiate an activity, such as ‘teaching music to Asian kids’ but found that funding organisations were not interested. Others felt that they were excluded deliberately by institutional racism and...

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**Figure 13: Political and civic involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% voters in May 2005 election</th>
<th>% voters in local elections</th>
<th>% with active role in organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-born</td>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>25-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary or below</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>non-Muslim</td>
<td>Recently arrived non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established non-Muslim</td>
<td>Established non-Muslim</td>
<td>Recently arrived Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established Muslim resident</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recently arrived</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=117: before missing values for particular variables are taken out. *The percentages on voting refer only to those who are eligible and registered to vote.*
some considered political organisation, to be corrupt and were not interested in getting involved as they were seen to be unnecessarily confrontational in nature. For female respondents lack of time was most often given as the reason for non-involvement, however, some women also identified a lack of English proficiency and their general level of education as a reason for non-participation. Some women stated that the community would not consider such political or organisational engagement as respectable. The exceptions to this were involvement connected to religious activities and those linked to their children. Generally, the Muslim community sampled felt that these were legitimate areas for Muslim women to be involved in. There were exceptions, however, with some established Muslim women respondents wanting more activity and complaining about the lack of sports and gym facilities for them. Among interviewees of other faiths or no faith, men said that they were not interested or that they were in contact with a number of organisations through work. Women, on the other hand, said that they were too busy with work and family.

**Impact of agencies**
When asked which organisations brought people together, all groups referred to social, educational and community organisations but there were variations. Recently arrived participants identified workplace, educational institutions, sports and churches. Responses from recently arrived Muslim interviewees tended to be more specific, but also included a significant number of ‘don’t knows’. Women talked of Islam in general, Quranic recital as a specific example, others talked of English language and exercise classes, Sure Start and charities such as Islamic Relief, Christian Aid, etc. Among men the ‘don’t knows’ were also high but men did mention Bradford Trident’s various initiatives, West Bowling Advice Centre, local schools, colleges and the university as well as sport organisations. Similar responses were given by participants from established populations across faiths, who mentioned the Mela, schools, Parkside Community Centre, the local council’s Foyer Project, Sure Start as well as Islamic organisations.

**Issues**
The sample were asked what issues concerned them, on local, national and international level; the authorities’ responses to their concerns and whether or not they felt they had any impact on decision-making processes. Similar local issues concerned the sample, however, their views varied, ranging from satisfaction to highly critical, when local authority response is considered. Most respondents agreed that they could not influence the local decision-making process, although a sizable proportion of established Muslim respondents disagreed. Local issues of concern centred around anti-social behaviour of young men, of Pakistani heritage in particular; drugs, crime, violence and speeding cars are considered unanimously by the various groups as the primary problems of the locality. As discussed earlier, the run down nature of the neighbourhood, litter and lack of open spaces for children were also issues of common concern.

“Drugs, shootings, car theft, break-ins ... that sort of thing.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

“Kids hang around on the street and drugs among them is getting common here.” (Established resident, female, non-Muslim)

In response to whether participants thought that the authorities were dealing justly and fairly with these issues, there was considerable diversity between and within categories. Recent arrivals were mainly of the opinion that the authorities were dealing fairly and justly with local issues, but there was some dissension. Among recently arrived Muslim participants there seemed to be divergence along gender lines. Some women said that social services and the police were helpful, the authorities doing their best and that Trident has made an impact, but some responses were critical as anti-social behaviour and crime remained an issue. Recently arrived Muslim men from the sample were overwhelmingly critical, saying that there was no effective policing to deal with drugs, crime and anti-social behaviour, and that the police don’t care about Muslims and there is a need for more activities for young people.
Established participants reiterated these sentiments:

“Apart from when … policemen get shot, that’s the only time they notice anything? It’s a real problem.” (Established resident, female, non-Muslim)

A minority of respondents did differ from this opinion and say that some efforts were being made. A few established Muslim participants claimed that they were happy with the police and authorities:

“They’re doing a good job. Putting cameras up, so that helps.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

The majority were dissatisfied with the law and order situation and, when asked if the authorities were doing enough, replied:

“No, I don’t think so. No.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Interviewees from this group were also concerned with the stop and search activities of the police.

When asked if they felt that they could influence decision-making processes in the local areas there was a high level of negative responses from all categories in the sample but the reasons varied, with positive responses increasing with established groups. A few recently arrived respondents who were not Muslim said that they could hold influence if the issues were related to human rights, while others said they would just go to the police. Generally, recently arrived Muslim women participants responded in the negative, citing a lack of English proficiency, family responsibility and cultural factors as barriers to participation and influence. Those that responded positively said that this could be done by speaking their minds, meeting people and participating in the decision-making process. The ‘don’t know’ response was higher among men for whom many of the negative reasons were related to entry status; some indicated the futility of engaging as everything is agreed in advance. Those who responded positively referred to voting as the only option but were ultimately cynical:

“Local councillors, once elected, are not interested in the electorate.” (Recently arrived, male, Muslim)

Established participants of other faiths or no faith felt powerless, saw voting negatively and felt that they had very little impact on the political process for a number of reasons.

“I have only one vote/one voice.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

“In my neighbourhood I am one of very few white families and the Asians have all the power – even during local elections.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

“Once elected they do what they [politicians] want.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

There was a larger proportion of respondents from the established Muslim population, both men and women, who felt they could influence local decisions by raising their voice, interacting through schools, local councillors and MPs, voting and generally being proactive. More respondents from this group felt that they could influence the local decision-making process than from any other group.

In relation to issues in Britain, more broadly, there was a greater degree of satisfaction among new arrivals in the sample while all established groups were highly critical. Common concerns were anti-social behaviour, deprivation and the rise of the far right, with established Muslim participants placing a greater emphasis on discrimination and terrorism as issues that concerned them. In response to whether the respondents could influence the decision-making process, established groups were quite close in their response of feeling ineffective and lacking influence, leading some to be rather cynical of the political process. Many recently arrived participants of other faiths or no faith felt that there were no issues concerning them. They found that things are quite organised, if not too regimented,
while others mentioned discrimination and anti-social behaviour. Among recently arrived Muslim participants, the number of ‘don’t knows’ due to isolation (homes having no TV or radio) was particularly high from women. These women did, however, mention concerns about drugs, violence, crime and anti-social behaviour, while male respondent’s concerns tended to be about unemployment and its social ramifications, the rise of the British National Party and the impact of anti-terror legislation on Muslims, in particular the impact of stop and search policy.

Established Muslim participants, both men and women, raised concern about drugs, crime, poverty, unemployment and homelessness, the London bombing and the rise in Islamophobia and racial attacks, in particular media racism, stop and search and targeting of Muslims.

“I think quite a lot of Islamophobia, and you know, racism stuff that is happening, especially in the media nowadays. I mean everything seems to be targeted at Muslims ... since 9/11.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

“White people sneering at our prophets or joking about my religion.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Established participants of other faiths or no faith were primarily concerned about social issues: poverty, homelessness, unemployment and anti-social behaviour, the health of the NHS, dentist shortage and the rise of the BNP.

“Rise of the ‘fascist’ right using parties such as the BNP. They are dividing communities.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

Respondents across all categories complained that the government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the hands of the rich and powerful, with political leadership vulnerable to corruption.

On the response by authorities to national issues, there was again a mixed view. Among recently arrived Muslim participants, there was a low response from women with a high proportion of ‘don’t knows’; though some commented that:

“All Muslims are classed as truants/terrorists.” (Recently arrived, female, Muslim)

Among men from this category, some mentioned the tightening of immigration, lack of employment opportunities for unqualified workers and the need for more democracy. Recently arrived participants of other faiths or no faith seemed generally satisfied, though there were comments about negative stereotyping of Muslims. A high level of dissatisfaction with the authorities was evident among established participants, with areas of concern being the increasing disparity of wealth, politicians feathering their nests, government being unresponsive to citizen’s concerns and anti-social behaviour. Established Muslim participants added concerns about racism and youth unemployment, but a small number expressed satisfaction at the treatment they received.

When asked about decision-making affecting Britain, participants across all categories felt that they could not have a meaningful impact at the national level. A few recently arrived Muslim women interviewees expressed the view that they would try:

“It is my country, my children are born here.” (Recently arrived, female, Muslim)

Others felt that a lack of education and knowledge of broader issues inhibited them.

When international issues were discussed, all groups were deeply unhappy with UK foreign policy and raised concerns about war in general, Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, believing they had no meaningful influence on foreign policy. Recently arrived interviewees talked in general terms of Western imperialism, punctuated with concerns about global poverty and other issues. Recently arrived Muslim women respondents held concerns about war, terrorism, rape and Muslim suffering in general and about the war in Iraq specifically. These concerns extended to general loss of life, including combatants of other faiths or no faith. Recently arrived Muslim males in the sample mentioned injustices to Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan and Kashmir and were concerned that if Iraq could be ‘invaded’, then the same could be done with Pakistan. Established participants of other faiths or none reiterated concerns about Iraq, Afghanistan
and Palestine, the war on terror and Guantanamo, but also raised concern for poverty in Africa and the spread of AIDS. Established Muslim interviewees talked particularly of ‘a mercenary world’ where the government is unresponsive to its own electorate, with 10 Downing Street uncritically following the Whitehouse. The government’s handling of terrorism, the rise of Islamophobia, the lack of democracy and justice and the immigration discourse are all raised as matters that concerned them.

“I don’t think our involvement/destruction of Iraq was justifiable both ethically and both principally.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

“People are being killed there ... it’s not that they are just Muslims. All people in Britain, whether they are Christians, English, they are being killed. Wherever I see, I see people dying. This makes me sad, this should not happen. There is no need to do that.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Recently arrived respondents were almost unanimous in their negative assessment of UK foreign policy. Recently arrived Muslim participants added that the authorities needed to sort out Britain’s problem first, but agreed that terrorism needed to be dealt with. Similar sentiments were articulated by established participants of other faiths or none, who added concerns about the government’s lack of independence from the US and lack of action on global poverty. Established Muslim respondents were extremely unhappy with UK policy in the Middle East, in particular Iraq, and urged for peace while being critical of media representation of Muslims.

Most male respondents were quite cynical when discussing foreign policy, saying that the decision to go to war was made prior to public debate and that the anti-war protest had no impact. Established participants felt that voting had no effect on foreign policy, politicians were not straightforward and UK foreign policy was dominated by the US. While a small minority of established Muslim respondents said that they could have an impact and that there is a need to be proactive, the majority felt that voting didn’t make any difference, as larger interests are more influential, giving the Iraq War as an example.

“I think it was an unjust war and personally you know we didn’t go through the UN, they planned it many months before and I don’t understand why Tony Blair just followed him along. Because nobody else openly sort of supported Bush as much as Tony Blair. And he didn’t take into consideration that a country like Britain has high minority groups and the possible consequences it could do to them.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

Summary
Established Muslim respondents had a higher rate of participation in national and local elections than any other group. Irrespective of faith, established groups had higher rates of participation than new arrivals. The sample showed a low level of involvement in organisational participation, mainly due to lack of time, work and family obligations. More women than men were involved, and those who were involved were generally better educated and fluent in English. Among recently arrived participants of all faiths, the lack of organisational participation was due to lack of information, knowledge of English and familiarity with life here. The sample gave a variety of public activities that brought diverse communities together ranging from educational organisations, multicultural events and initiatives targeting socio-economic issues. On local, national and international issues there was broad agreement and commonality of concerns among the different groups in the sample. In terms of local issues, there was a divergence of views on the assessment of local government, but most of the groups professed that they had little influence on local decision-making processes. There was an exception in that more established Muslim respondents felt that they could try to make an impact. On national and international issues, respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with government policy and felt that they had no way of influencing the process. There was a degree of cynicism prevalent among established participants of all faiths about the transparency of the democratic process.
6 Transnational engagement, community and belonging

Key points

- Transnational contact for participants from all groups was found to be weak.
- Established Muslim participants had a strong identification with Britain.
- Newly arrived participants of all faiths had dual loyalty.
- All groups of participants had a positive perception of living in Britain.
- Muslim respondents felt that there were few religious constraints on their lives except in a few areas.
- Established Muslim participants felt that there were very few impediments in terms of socialising outside their ethnic and religious groups.
- No substantive differences emerged on the different groups’ views on education from the sample.
- Recent Muslim participants raised the issue of segregated schools for girls and mother tongue teaching in Punjabi for their children.
- Participants from all groups agreed that their main concerns in schools were substance abuse, poor discipline and peer group pressure.
- Participants of different religions held different views on marriage.
- Strong disapproval of forced marriages was expressed by established Muslim respondents.
- When the issue of free speech was raised, most participants did not express strong sentiments.

This chapter examines the degree and ways and means that recent arrivals of all faiths maintain transnational contacts. The range of contacts includes identifying with family members, relatives and friends and engagement in business and political activity in their country of origin. Strong transnational involvement, however, does not rule out integration into the country of settlement. Although the relationship between transnationalism and integration are dependant on the degree of socio-economic incorporation, recent studies of transnational engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging in the society former migrants have settled. Poor economic integration reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin and vice versa, while good employment correlates with weak identification with country of origin (Engbersen, 2007). The findings on transnational engagement are then related to positive and negative perceptions of belonging to their local community and Britain.

Remittances and assets

The evidence showed that while transnational financial contact is not significant, and a large percentage of the sample stated that this question was not relevant, the local area paper (Valentine, 2006) showed that transnational religious networks are active in Bradford. Recent arrivals of all faiths and established Muslim respondents were involved in remittance transfers. The sums were small, a point supported by a housing trust official who, when interviewed, argued that remittances are not significant asset transfers to countries of origin because it has little affect on home ownership, which is very high among Muslims in Bradford. Recently arrived Muslim respondents were the most frequent in
transferring money, followed by established Muslim respondents and then other recently arrived respondents. The amounts remitted were primarily to family and relatives for basic living necessities and were clustered around several points in the year with a smaller grouping around once a month. The recently arrived Muslim respondents showed a marginal preference for informal networks for transferring funds and the sums remitted for both categories are relatively small. The largest amounts were remitted by recently arrived Muslim participants and only four participants transferred more than £1,000. When participants were asked about property ownership in their country of origin, this was more common among recent Muslim arrivals than any other group. Most of the recently arrived Muslim respondents owned property; this proportion was lower among established Muslim participants and only a few recent arrivals of other faiths or no faith owned property. In most cases, homes abroad were looked after by family and relatives.

Money transfers are made to the country of origin, with recent and established Muslim participants and recently arrived of other or no faith remitting funds to welfare and religious organisations in Britain and other countries. Only one participant, a recently arrived Muslim, stated that they remitted funds for investment purposes.

Recently arrived participants across all faiths, were more likely to be in contact with their country of origin than established Muslim respondents. Recently arrived Muslim respondents showed a preference for print media, but both recent and established Muslim residents in the sample used a range of media to keep in contact. Telephoning was very popular among Muslim participants, with parents being the most common contact. Respondents in all categories often communicated every week and the use of prepaid phone cards was found to be popular. When asked about visiting their country of origin there was a high level of negative responses from all recently arrived participants, while established Muslim respondents ranged between annual visits and trips made less than once in five years. All categories when visiting did so with family.

When participants were asked whether they were involved in homeland politics while in Britain, positive responses were very low, with respondents of all faiths declaring that they were not involved in politics taking place in their country of origin.

Transnational identification

Established Muslim participants reported a strong sense of belonging to Britain while the recently arrived Muslim respondents had a greater sense of dual loyalty. When asked where the people most important in their lives live there was a clear difference between all recent arrivals and established Muslim residents in the sample. Most recently arrived participants said their important social connections were in their country of origin, while around half of established Muslim participants said their important social connections were in Britain.

Qualitative data supported this. For example, when asked do you still belong to your country of origin?, the majority of recently arrived participants stated that that’s where they were born and where their family are. Many also said that they wanted to go back, although a minority felt that they have loyalty in both places. Recently arrived Muslim participants made similar responses saying that’s where their family, siblings and roots are. However, a small minority said that their brothers and sisters are here and hence are British. Established Muslim participants reiterated this discourse of roots and family but a few stated that they were made to feel Pakistani and seen as foreigners, even when they were born in Britain. However there was variation along gender lines, with an overwhelming majority of women saying that they belonged to Pakistan but at least half of the men saying that they belonged to Britain. They were born here, lived here all their life, their family are here or don’t like Pakistan, because of its politics and the fact that they feel an alien there.

When asked: do you feel you belong to more than one country?, many recently arrived participants felt they did not, as their families were back home, they wanted to go back and felt that they only belonged to their country of origin. When this question was asked of recently arrived Muslims, however, participants responded positively, as they had family in both countries, ‘kids here and parents there’, an aspect of life that
perhaps helps develop a dual sense of belonging. Similar responses came from established Muslim residents in the sample.

“Yes, I do because my children are born here. They can’t live in Pakistan. I say my country is Pakistan, they say our country is Britain because we are born here.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

However a minority of established Muslim male respondents said that they belong here and Pakistan is only for vacations.

“No, this is the only country I like more.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

Factors impeding or prompting belonging
When asked about what they liked and disliked about Britain, all groups had largely positive responses to living in the country. Recently arrived participants liked the way the system and authorities worked and were happy with work and living conditions.

“I think it’s generally a fair society ... you can get on with your living ... on the whole it is a peaceful country.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

Unsurprisingly, many disliked the weather but also raised concerns about what they perceived to be a lax attitude toward drugs. Non-white participants mentioned racism and Eastern Europeans complained about the lack of a social cultural centre for them. Muslim participants were positive about the functioning of the welfare state, praising the NHS, education, transport, the benefit system, freedom of speech, racial and gender equality and the general sense of security and good standard of living.

“Freedom, benefits help and advice, NHS very good. Help the poor and all, protect people.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Among the dislikes mentioned by recently arrived Muslim respondents were racism, Islamophobia, British food, drinking, the immodest dress of women and drug consumption, while many also missed family and friends. Women mentioned a preference for single sex education but felt socially isolated, as they could not visit relatives as they did in Pakistan. Coupled with this, they perceived a lack of privacy at home and felt disappointed by a lack of respect for elders. Men’s complaints featured criticism of bureaucracy, taxation, too much freedom and breaking of laws and what they considered to be the over-empowerment of women. Established participants of other faiths or no faith raised the same positive factors about the welfare state but mentioned their concern in relation to the rise of the BNP, unfairness to poor people and the unemployed and disliked benefit abuse, immigration and thought that Bradford was a dirty city.

“Good education system – it’s free, everyone has access. Welfare state – everyone has the right to access.” (Established resident, male, non-Muslim)

“Britain is still unfair – there are still poor people who get ignored.” (Established resident, female, non-Muslim)

Established Muslim participants reiterated the positive and negative points made by the recently arrived Muslims and established residents of other faiths or no faith in the sample. Where they did differ was that a few clearly stated that life is better than Pakistan and loved the monarchy.

“I think we have a great Queen. I really do, I think we have a fantastic Queen. I think she’s absolutely brilliant.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

“If you lived in Pakistan right now, what do they give you? You get nothing. Here you get everything.” (Established resident, male, Muslim)

But some were unhappy at the UK’s lack of independence from the US and worried about the impact of the war on community cohesion as well
as the impact it has on day-to-day life: the cost of visiting the dentist, constant changes to the laws, NHS and taxation. A few women complained about the lack of places for Pakistani women to socialise.

Community and belonging: what it means

Muslim respondents felt that they only had to behave differently when it affected their religion, however, these impediments were less of an issue for established Muslims than recent Muslim arrivals in the sample. When asked how their religion affected the way they lived, all other categories were unanimous that it had no impact on the way they lived. Muslim participants, however, said that they had religious freedom but raised the issue of accessing halal food.

“I can’t eat at KFC as they do not provide halal food, but it does not matter. Otherwise I have no problems.” (Recently arrived, male, Muslim)

For female participants, it was the need to wear hijab when women mixed with men, or segregation from men, except when engaging with health service providers and professionals. This was less of an issue for established Muslims than for recently arrived participants.

Discrimination did emerge as an issue, but this was something that all groups felt, to varying degrees and in different ways. Muslim participants felt that it has become more of an issue post 7/7. When considering the question of religious discrimination and racism outside the Muslim faith, only a small number of participants complained of religious discrimination by other Christians. When these groups were asked about racial discrimination there is a divergence between white and non-white people. Non-whites, both recent and established, complained of racism particularly at work and even bullying, while most UK-born white respondents had no problem in this area. A significant minority of Muslim participants perceived discrimination on the grounds of religion. Those exhibiting explicit religious appearance, wearing hijab or beards seemed most prone to discrimination by neighbours, employers, service providers and the police. Muslim participants complained that this facet of life used to be all right but the situation grew worse, particularly after 7/7; one male complained that Afghans are stereotyped as belonging to Al-Qaeda. A significant minority of Muslim participants, recent and established, complained of discrimination by neighbours, employers, teachers, service providers, police and in other every day settings. As one recently arrived Muslim male stated, neighbours look ‘at me as though from another planet’.

“I have a beard and some employers discriminate because of this.” (Recently arrived, male, Muslim)

The participants reflected a mixed community where most people got on with each other. Most participants felt that they were accepted as part of the local community, with some minor variations. Some recently arrived respondents commented that neighbours were kind but were aware that discrimination existed. Some complained of discrimination at work and others were aware of discrimination even though they had not experienced it. Established participants who were not Muslim claimed to be fully integrated into the local community. As one man said, ‘I lived here most of my life and know most of my neighbours’. Muslim respondents also felt that they were accepted by their neighbours. Some established Muslim participants commented that things were worse a few years ago, but that they were now accepted not only by Asians but by white and black people. There were some exceptions: a few respondents complained that white neighbours did not tolerate them, a few white respondents complained of Pakistanis not accepting them and an Afghan participant complained of Pakistanis not accepting him.

Impediments to more social contacts with different ethnic and religious groups were considered. Respondents from the established population felt there were no barriers. Recently arrived participants of other faiths or none felt there weren’t any barriers to social contact; except that they worked too much and their language proficiency was poor. One Trinidadian participant stated that she didn’t like drinking and the pubs and clubs environment, preferring beach
culture. One white participant stated that his social circle was limited by the lack of an Asian language.

Recently arrived Muslim women in the sample overwhelmingly said that there were a number of impediments, the most common being family commitment, socialisation limited to the family due to religious and cultural reasons and that if they went outside the family they could only do so in women only environments. Recently arrived Muslim male respondents had fewer impediments to socialisation but raised the issues of language, cultural differences and tastes in music and religious proscriptions preventing them going to pubs and clubs.

The situation for established Muslim participants seems different. The majority of participants in this group, including women, stated that there were no restrictions or impediments for socialising outside their religious and ethnic group. A few women mentioned family responsibilities and cultural values as impediments and men pointed out that negative media representations kept white people out. Some were concerned about children being culturally segregated, while others pointed out that community centres separated Mirpuris from Chachis.

**Children and upbringing**

No substantive difference on educational views emerged from the sample. There was general agreement that a first-rate school should have strong leadership, high-quality teachers and governors, strong discipline and good student behaviour, a conducive learning environment, modern buildings and equipment, in particular ICT. Parental involvement and strong liaison between parents and teachers were also agreed to be important criteria. Established participants who were not Muslim felt that schools should be culturally mixed and promote equality of opportunity. This group were happy with schools but wanted some standards improved. Some commented that deprived areas have less opportunity to improve with parents facing difficulty in meeting their children’s schooling needs: clothing is expensive for recent arrivals. Irrespective of religion the sample considered mother tongue teaching to be important, that girls should dress appropriately and felt that children are too fashion conscious and growing up too fast. Recently arrived Muslim participants emphasised the need for segregated girls’ schools, high standards of behaviour, religious education and respect for teachers. They were generally happy with schools, but reiterated the need for mother tongue teaching and religious education; a small minority wanted Islamic schools. Established Muslim respondents reiterated these points, but were more specific about mother tongue teaching and wanted Punjabi taught so that their children could communicate with their grandparents. A few said that they preferred mixed gender schools, were against all Asian schools, would like them to have more non-Muslim friends and wanted their kids to speak English without accents. These participants were also generally happy with schools, but concerned about drugs, poor discipline and mixing with the wrong crowd.

“No happy about education ... because of drugs and stuff like that on the streets.”
(Established resident, male, Muslim)

“Lack of discipline, lack of respect.”
(Established resident, male, Muslim)

There were variations in attitude to marriage and these are apparent between recent and established Muslim participants. When the question of marriage was raised, recently arrived Muslim respondents talked of religious, sectarian, educational and cultural compatibility as well as employment and educational prospects as means which could provide the necessary security. These points were echoed by recently arrived participants of other faiths or none. There were gender variations in these opinions. Women tended to talk of love, communication and trust tempered with parental consent and approval, while men appeared to put compatibility with their parents before emotional attachment. Established Muslim participants reiterated the variables necessary for financial security, but both men and women in this group put love and personal happiness much higher than recently arrived Muslim participants, with ethnic background being...
less important but with religious background still being important. Consent was also important to participants from this group; they are against forced marriage and saw cultural and educational compatibility as important.

“Most of the people are marrying of their choice these days. If they are happy, then Mum and Dad should agree with that if they are happy. If they have studied and have a good job, they should get married. They should get the blessing of their parents also. Parents do agree with them. They don’t have any choice.” (Established resident, female, Muslim)

Established respondents of other faiths or no faiths talked of love as the only criterion for marriage, while recent arrivals talked of respect for family, friendship, security, work and good morals as necessary.

When questioned on whether there never should be limits on free speech, most of the sample agreed that there should be limits. Most Muslim respondents gave more than one reason for placing limits on free speech and generally Muslim respondents and recent arrivals of other faiths were in favour of limits. However, a significant proportion of respondents born in the UK of other faiths or no faith disagreed with the proposition of limiting free speech, even when offensive to religion.

There was a more unanimous response to the question on limitation of sexually explicit material, with the majority of participants in all groups agreeing there should be limitation. A similar response emerged to the question of incitement to religious hatred, with established participants being particularly in favour of limits to free speech in this context.

The qualitative data produced a very low response rate, especially from participants outside the Muslim population. The only difference between recent and established Muslim respondents was that the former are also concerned with religiously offensive material but specific to Islam, while the latter are more concerned with religious hatred in general and applicable to all religions, in addition to sexually explicit material. Both agreed there should be some boundaries to free speech but the question did not generate much of a response in terms of depth or texture.
Summary
Transnational contact for all the groups was found to be weak. Small sums of money were being sent as remittances and contact was restricted to the newspaper or the telephone. Visits to country of origin are quite limited and not very frequent but regular for some groups. Established Muslim participants had a strong identification with Britain, while new arrivals of all faiths have dual loyalty; identifying with relatives in the country of origin and with family in Britain. Participants from all groups had a positive perception of living in Britain and their dislikes included racism, Islamophobia, the weather and British food. They felt the country is fair, well ordered and peaceful with good access to social and healthcare services – particular praise being given to the NHS. Muslim respondents felt that there were few religious constraints on their lives except for the need for halal food and segregation for women, or due to discrimination from Islamophobia. Established Muslim participants felt that their neighbours accepted them and there were very few impediments on them in terms of socialising outside of their ethnic and religious groups. No substantive differences emerged on the different groups’ views on education. Everyone agreed that they required good leadership, infrastructure, equipment, staff and governors with a strong parental involvement for a school to function well. Recently arrived Muslim participants raised the issue of segregated schools for girls and mother tongue teaching in Punjabi for their children. All the groups in the sample agreed that their main concerns in schools were substance abuse, poor discipline, peer group pressure and they wanted their kids to speak good English. There were different views on marriage between Muslims and participants of other faiths or those with no faith, the former talked of family, religious and cultural compatibility while the latter only talked of love as the only criterion. Established Muslim participants added to family compatibility the issue of love and consent. They were happy if their children selected their marriage partners as long as they got family approval. There was a strong disapproval of forced marriages. When the issue of free speech was raised, the main difference was between UK-born participants who were not Muslim and those from other categories. All the other groups agreed that there should be some limits to sexually explicit and religiously offensive material but there was no strong sentiment overall expressed in response to this question.
Key points

- There was little consensus on the meaning and application of community cohesion.

- Local policy-makers that were interviewed saw deprivation and marginalisation as the main issues.

- At best, community cohesion was seen as another version of multiculturalism or interfaith activity. At worst, it was seen as implicitly as coercion.

- Local policy-makers raised concerns that community cohesion does not deal with the white working class.

- There is a need to recognise that new arrivals, asylum seekers and refugees have quite different requirements and needs to the established BME population.

- In recognition of the shortcoming of community cohesion, local policy-makers have adopted the Shared Futures approach.

- Local policy-makers’ concerns focused primarily around overcoming resistance to mixed housing and education.

- There were concerns about the poor media representation of Bradford, which sensationalises issues.

As discussed in the introduction there has been considerable uncertainty about the definition of community cohesion on the national level and no more is this ambivalence apparent than in the application of this policy on the local level. It should be noted that major developments in the evolution of community cohesion policy, such as the deliberation of the Commission for Integration and Cohesion came after the interviews with the gatekeeper interviews, which were conducted for this study. Gatekeeper interviews indicate that there is no consensus on the meaning and significance of community cohesion; it is a contested concept, which is ambiguous and interpreted in various ways to fit the range of activities undertaken by various organisations. Most commonly it is understood as ‘government speak’ for multiculturalism, inter-culturalism, or race equality depending on the nuance given. It is generally understood as social policy directed at BME population and is considered to be difficult to put into action.

“Community cohesion is a new version of multiculturalism. It’s one and the same thing.” (Muslim, faith based community organiser)

“Community cohesion is something used for gaining funding (laughs). It’s, you know, it’s government-speak to save you talking about inter-faith work and well, not just inter-faith work it’s, you know, inter-cultural work. It’s not a happy term. But it’s there. We try to use it to gain some funding and favour.” (Christian, faith based community organiser)

One official working on community cohesion in the city inferred negativity to the concept indicating that it implies coercion and cannot be legislated for.

“… cohesion is so near to coercion. You know, it really is ….” (Official dealing with community cohesion)

Others simply see the lack of violence as an indicator of policy success. The Bradford Metropolitan Council at that time didn’t deal with community cohesion directly and had subcontracted this responsibility to Bradford Vision in which City Hall was a leading and key player in
partnership with West Yorkshire Police, Education Bradford, NHS Health Trusts and voluntary and community organisations. Neighbourhood renewal is the cornerstone of Bradford Vision programmes with community cohesion acting as a cross-cutting programme with the themes of equity, pride and participation, community relations and community safety. Other organisations have incorporated community cohesion where they thought it is relevant to their work.

Cohesion issues
Views of the stakeholders interviewed are, perhaps, at variance with official understandings of the problems pertaining to cohesion. The major factors are seen to be deprivation and marginalisation and the role of the far right in stoking up tensions. Communities are not seen to be self-segregating; the areas with high Muslim populations are very mixed and housing segregation is a legacy of racism in the housing market combined with white economic migration and flight leaving high densities of Muslim areas; a point reflected in the ethnic composition of schools.

“So the fact that the white middle classes separate into Ilkley, says ‘why aren’t these middle classes mixing with the BMEs, and mixing cohesively?’ However when the Pakistani community is left on its own mainly in the inner city parts of Bradford, mainly because of white flight and economic flight – affluent Hindus and affluent Muslims and affluent Sikhs have all pursued equity, wealth in the outer suburbs of Bingley and Ilkley … but then they purport that somehow the Muslim community don’t want to mix, which I think it’s a misnomer actually.” (Housing trust official)

The locality approach of policy focuses on the BME population and while neighbourhoods they live in are mixed, there is segregation between them and all-white neighbourhoods. The challenge is to include the white working class which is considered to be the missing factor.

“I don’t care whether it’s community cohesion or race relations, at the end of the day what we’re doing here is … sort of excluding the indigenous population and we really need to bring them back into, you know, you know the celebration thing.” (Education official)

“You know, particularly when you’re sort of celebrating diversity, you know, which we’re forever talking about, you know, the curries, the saris, you know, the steel bands and stuff like this, but we talk very little about British culture and it’s hardly surprising to me that people are going to be offended, because what they’re being told all the time is, what, isn’t Islam great? Isn’t Hinduism great? Isn’t Rastafarianism fantastic? You know, all this. What about the white culture? What about, you know, the indigenous culture?” (Education official)

There is also a need to recognise that recent arrivals, including economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from Africa, Eastern Europe and the Philippines have different requirements and needs when compared with the established BME population.

Policy objectives
Various organisations have attempted to implement their understanding of what they see to be the relevant aspect of community cohesion in their own way. In education it has meant the twinning of school activity, dealing with racial harassment, encouraging inter-faith activity and strengthening school-parental relations in order to support curricular activity and in housing it is reflected in meeting the future demand for housing by BME communities and through neighbourhood renewal. Generally there is very little cross-cutting activity, bringing together Muslims and the white community but there are important exceptions.

“Take part in … as many … opportunities as we can create. We have, today we were … meeting with St Joseph’s which is a Catholic school, and sort of reviewing and seeing where we’d got to in terms of the way we’re working together.” (School head teacher)

Structural limitations are the main reason for failure to engage with major issues in housing and
schools. Housing associations or urban regeneration projects cannot operate substantively outside their mandated area and schools, while trying to diversify the student population, are unable to redraw catchment areas.

“I believe schools are more segregated than housing estates. That is a nut nobody seems to want to crack. The two key areas to crack in relation to cohesion are education and housing.” (Housing trust official)

Impact of policy
Activities of individual programmes are producing results, educational results are improving, crime in the wards focused on in this study is down to the city average and relations between communities have improved. Policy agenda also demands that there is greater involvement of grassroots activity and this has given a sense of involvement with various activities.

What can be done?
Bradford Visions shift away from community cohesion to Shared Futures (Bradford Vision, 2006) is in recognition of a major failing of the policy because it did not engage with the white working class.

“So for me, the language of Shared Futures is, you know, how can you build common interest here? How do we build a shared interest for the future about our city and our people and our young people? What is it? Let’s have some clear messages, what we’ll tolerate from each other. What it means to be English, British, Bradfordian in this context.” (Official dealing with community cohesion)

All the organisations reiterated that the missing piece of the jigsaw is this group and they have to deal with the hard and difficult issues rather than avoiding them. Turning white segregated areas into mixed ones is difficult as there is resistance to mixed housing. An officer working on community cohesion recalled how, when a house is put on the market, “the neighbour shouts over ‘don’t sell it to Pakis will you’. So he shouts back ‘no way, no fucking way’”. The implication is that the arrival of Muslims leads to white flight. Creating mixed schools when there is so much resistance by whites to send their children to schools with Pakistani students is again a challenge that requires long-term and detailed consideration.

“You go down to a school that’s just maybe half a mile from here, and the majority are Asians … You go the other way, 250 metres they’re all white … But they’re not coming here, they’re going the other way.” (School teacher)

This is in spite of the fact that some white schools may be failing and the neighbouring Pakistani dominated schools are doing much better, even so, white parents would not send their children to them. The Shared Futures approach shares many features of community cohesion, but unlike community cohesion, is to include the white population in the programme and to persuade them to accept diversity. This would require careful and sustained use of the media to persuade the white population that they are the main beneficiaries of such programmes and that BME do not get the lion’s share of resources. In addition, the approach would need to trumpet success stories to all the local communities of Bradford and also to challenge negative media representation of Bradford.

“I always feel that Bradford is hard done by in the media, you know.” (Local government official)

“And there is the media and anti-Muslim propaganda, and there’s some very scary things as well.” (Official dealing with community cohesion)

Summary
Outside the world of local government community cohesion is just seen as government speak for minorities policy. There is little consensus on its meaning and application and a pick and mix approach is used where organisations adopted those aspects they thought relevant for their organisation and work. Local policy-makers view deprivation and marginalisation to be the main...
issues. At best it is seen as another version of multiculturalism or interfaith activity. At worst it is seen implicitly as coercion. There is various cross-cutting activity such as educational collaboration between schools but there is still little activity that brings together Muslims and the white community. Local policy-makers are concerned that community cohesion does not deal with the white working class: an important missing factor. Furthermore there is a need to recognise that new arrivals, asylum seekers and refugees have quite different requirements and needs to the established BME population. In recognition of the shortcoming of community cohesion, local policy-makers have adopted the Shared Futures approach. In some way this pre-empted the findings of Commission for Integration and Cohesion, which not only adopted this approach but also focused on the concern that the white working class is missing from the equation. Local policy-makers’ concern focuses primarily around housing and education and how to overcome the resistance of the white working class from mixing with the dominant BME group, Pakistanis. There are also a range of participants concerned by the poor media representation of Bradford which by sensationalising issues makes their work harder.
8 Conclusion

There is a slide in views between recently arrived and established communities with the latter more integrated and moving closer to the mainstream on a number of issues. Deprivation and marginalisation, in particular, unemployment and low skills, overcrowding and lack of financial well-being affected all the groups but more so for recent arrivals than established populations. Housing concentrations formed by a combination of racism and demand for cheap housing is now being maintained by white economic migration and flight. Established Muslim participants mixed more than recently arrived Muslims and so did the young when compared with older people. Weak language ability appears to make recently arrived Muslim respondents move in circles limited to their own ethnic grouping. However, in public spaces (work, shopping, entertainment), there were high rates of mixing among Muslim participants, both recent and established, which in the case of established Muslim participants was much higher that the UK established population.

Established groups from the sample, both Muslim and those of other faiths or none, share a deep sense of attachment and belonging to their locality. All the groups sampled were unanimous in their concern for anti-social behaviour, crime and drugs related activity involving mainly young Pakistani men. Concern for litter and the run down nature of the area came high on list of concerns. Recently arrived Muslim participants employed more bonding capital while established Muslim respondents tended to use more bridging capital by accessing friendship networks, and agencies for advice and help. Established Muslim respondents had a high turnout in electoral politics but low rates of involvement in organisations mainly due to work and family commitments. There was no evidence of involvement in politics of the country of origin or elsewhere. Agency impact in bringing groups together is recognised, particularly by established Muslim participants: Trident and local community centre and schools were mentioned. Members of the established population were found to be more informed of issues than recent arrivals. Local issues that concerned all groups were crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour; national issues were poverty, unemployment, the future of the NHS, drugs, crime, terrorism, racism and Islamophobia and international issues were dominated by the Iraq war, Afghanistan and all groups unanimously voiced strong opposition to foreign policy. As for exerting influence, established Muslim participants believed they could make an impact on local issues. No group felt they could make any meaningful impact on national issues; in the main, they were cynical of politicians and believed that voting made no difference to policy.

When asked about community and belonging most of the groups liked living in Britain, were happy with the welfare state, unhappy with the weather, British food and racism. Established Muslim respondents showed strong feelings of attachment and liking for Britain and the locality. Religion has little impact on established Muslim respondents capacity to socialise but those who are visibly Muslim, wearing beards and hijab, complained of discrimination. All the groups felt they were part of the community, more so for established groups, and participants felt accepted by neighbours irrespective of ethnicity and religion. There was broad agreement by all groups on what constituted a high-quality school: good teachers, facilities, discipline and academic standards. Muslim participants felt that schools should provide mother tongue teaching and religious education, although the demand for Islamic schools was not significant. Some established Muslim respondents declared a preference for co-education and ethnically mixed schools for their children. Marriage patterns differ between recent and established Muslims in the sample. Established Muslim participants appear to be shifting from sub-ethnic and sectarian compatibility of marriage partners, which leads to
trans-continental marriages, to potential partners from Britain being simply Muslim where individuals choose but parents give consent.

Recent arrivals, irrespective of religion, transfer funds more than established Muslim respondents and maintain greater contact with the country of origin, through the print media, telephone calls and visits. The amounts of money transferred were found to be relatively small and had no impact on house ownership. More established Muslim participants said that they only belonged in Britain, while recently arrived Muslim participants felt they had dual loyalty and other recent arrivals did not feel they belonged.

Policy-makers have no consensus on the meaning of community cohesion and have replaced the term with Shared Futures, which is equally amorphous and ambiguous. Policy-makers and community organisations are acutely aware that they need to engage with the white working class and make them more receptive to notions of diversity and harmony. Policy is piecemeal with an emphasis on locality and user impact and within these criteria it has been effective with participants giving positive examples of initiatives emerging from the Trident programme and local schools.

Deprivation, marginalisation, exclusion and racial discrimination are all major issues mentioned by the participants but the crucial factor is the long-term revival of the Bradford economy. As long as there is no turnaround then there will be fractious and contentious rivalry for a shrinking cake. There are a number of issues that emerged, which need to be engaged with in the future. Media representation and presentation is an important issue. Bradford is a focus of anti-Muslim media reporting which erroneously and unjustifiably makes negative commentary on the city. The city needs to manage representation more effectively and simultaneously project more vigorously the successes that it has had. The failure to present successes means that the negative image dominates the media. The crucial area of engagement is bringing the white working class into the remit of community cohesion policy. The two hard and difficult areas, which will require innovative and original approaches, are how to make housing and education more mixed. Social mobility by Muslims in the housing market is met by discrimination and white economic migration and flight; how this will be changed is a major issue. Housing concentrations are reflected in school catchment areas and in order to have more mixed schools, which some established Muslim respondents are keen on, white resistance to sending children to such schools needs to be addressed. These crucial areas will have to be addressed if more mixed residential patterns and schools are to be achieved.
Notes

Introduction

1 Social cohesion and community cohesion are terms that are used interchangeably and the latter reflects the local dimension and emphasis of this concept.

2 Bradford Vision was the district-wide local strategic partnership bringing together the public, private and not-for-profit sectors to work together for the development of Bradford. It was wound up in March 2008.

3 In the whole sample around two-fifths of non-Muslim UK-born interviewees were ethnic minority in origin.

4 A more detailed discussion can be found in the local paper commissioned for this project on Bradford (Valentine, 2006).

Chapter 3

1 The interviewees understanding of neighbourhood refers to the street where they live or to the streets around their homes, which is a narrower geographical area than when they refer to locality.

2 Bradford Trident is a community led company working on the urban regeneration of the Park Lane, Marshfields and West Bowling areas of Bradford.

Chapter 5

1 Political and civic engagement covers a range of activities that broadly falls within the remit of associational community activity. This covers civic activism (decision making for and about providing local services such as provided by the role of local councillor or school governor); engagement in consultation processes pertaining to local issues and various forms of engagement in the democratic process such as liaising with local and national political representatives. As well as formal volunteering, giving unpaid help to groups, clubs or organisations to benefit other people and the environment (Kitchen et al., 2006).

2 The range of organisations is from: school related (PTA, play groups, school governors), youth clubs, running adult education classes, standing on mosque committees, membership of political parties, social welfare and voluntary groups, community organisations, trade union activities, housing and neighbourhood groups, human rights organisations or appointment as magistrate or special constable.

3 Naat is poetry that specifically praises the prophet Muhammad and is the Islamic equivalent of a hymn.

Chapter 6

1 Urdu is taught under mother tongue teaching but most of the Pakistani community speak Pahaari/Mirpuri, a Punjabi dialect, and the difficulty is that Punjabi Muslims do not teach it or standard Punjabi in schools in Pakistan.

Chapter 7

1 Bradford Vision was wound up in March 2008 and most of its activities absorbed by various council departments.
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