Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK
Acknowledgments

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The findings and recommendations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the view of the Department for Communities and Local Government.
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Chapter 1
Executive summary

The Office of Public Management (OPM) has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) to conduct a literature review that provides a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. The specific objectives of the review are to provide an overview of evidence on:

- what Muslim communities’ attitudes are towards violent extremism;
- what Muslim communities understand by ‘violent extremism’ and how this understanding is shaped;
- the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism;
- any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and
- how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism.

The literature search, review and synthesis were informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies and universities. These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK. The search was conducted in partnership with search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP). The review as conducted over a number of stages and literature was identified from a number of sources including database searches, expert and prevent lead consultation, website searches and OPM and CLG collected literature. After a rigorous sifting process, 36 items were included for review.

The review found that there is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and ‘support’ for it. Additionally, there are also some limitations to the methods utilised in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, the purpose of these studies is to conduct a snap shot of public attitudes, rather than a more rigorous research study of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings.

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1.1 Key findings

Objective 1: Attitudes towards violent extremism

Attitudes towards violent extremism vary across contexts and the evidence suggests that although the vast majority of Muslim respondents across studies condemned violent extremism, they are more likely to understand the justification for it in foreign countries such as Israel, Chechnya and Iraq than in the UK. For example, only 7 per cent of respondents in a Populus poll of Muslims (2005) reported that there are ‘circumstances under which suicide bombings can be justified in the UK’ whereas 16, 13 and 15 per cent of respondents felt that ‘there were circumstances under which suicide bombings can be justified’ in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq respectively.

A consistent finding in the attitudinal surveys and polls identified in this review suggest that Muslim communities reject violent acts against civilians. For example, The 1990 Trust (2006) reported that in their survey of Muslim views an overwhelming majority of 96 per cent respondents indicated that ‘acts of terrorism against civilians’ were not ‘justifiable’. Additionally, a Populus poll (2006) of Muslims found that only 7, 16, 10 and 11 per cent of respondents agreed that there were ‘circumstances under which they thought that suicide bombings could ever be justified against civilians, the military, the police and government buildings/workers’ respectively.

There is significant coverage in attitudinal surveys and polls of Muslim communities’ feelings regarding the treatment of extremists espousing violence or those that are suspected of espousing violence. A GfK NOP (2006) survey of Muslims reported that 68 per cent of respondents felt that ‘religious leaders who speak in support of terrorism should be thrown out of the country.’ Another study by Gohir (2006) reported that 74 per cent of Muslim respondents supported ‘banning Muslim groups that incite hatred and violence in the UK.’

A number of surveys have tried to assess the level of support or condemnation for the violent acts of 7/7. Eighty-five per cent of respondents in a FOSIS survey (2005) of British Muslim students condemned the London attacks. Additionally, an ICM poll of Muslims for the Telegraph (2006) found that 75 per cent of respondents had ‘no sympathy’ ‘with the feelings and motives of those who carried out the London attacks, regardless of whether they thought the attacks were justified’. The 1990 Trust (2006) reviewed these findings and concluded that: ‘to understand the motive behind an action cannot be equated with violence itself.’ 5

Objective 2: Understanding of violent extremism

A small number of attitudinal surveys, polls and local level qualitative studies have explored Muslim respondents’ understanding of violent extremism. The evidence suggests that there is a significant concern about the terminology associated with violent extremism. There is also a lack of understanding of the different terminology.

In one attitudinal survey and one local level qualitative study, Muslim respondents expressed the view that concepts such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ should not be confused with ‘violent extremism’.

For example, a survey of Muslims by The 1990 Trust (2006) asked respondents to consider ‘what form radicalisation takes’ and the findings indicated that a majority (65%) felt that radicalism was not linked to violent action with 46 per cent reporting that radicalism meant ‘greater involvement in politics’ and 19 per cent reporting that it meant ‘disillusionment with politics’. Only 2.5 per cent felt that radicalism means ‘involvement in violent action’. A further 23 per cent felt that it meant a ‘bit of both, that is, more involvement in politics and violent action’.

Also, in a local qualitative study conducted by Redbridge Faith Forum (2009), Muslim community leaders were eager to emphasise the differences between ‘extremism’ and ‘violence’ and that extremism itself was not in fact a problem. They made comparisons between religious extremists and football fanatics who also may or may not become violent. Respondents also referred to members of the British National Party who are often regarded as extreme but not necessarily violent.

A small number of attitudinal surveys (2) and one qualitative local level study suggest that there is a considerable amount of concern in the Muslim community about the definitions of terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’.

A FOSIS survey with British Muslim students (2005) asked respondents how they would define ‘religious extremism’. Many respondents found this difficult to answer leaving the response section blank. Those that did reply provided widely varied definitions for example, ‘someone who practices Islam fully’ and ‘violence towards innocent lives, using religion as an excuse’. FOSIS argue that varying interpretations of the term have an effect on the way that society, media and the Government view Muslims. The lack of defining parameters means that it is difficult to know who is and is not included. For FOSIS this means that when the Government issues guidance or legislation, it:

‘…must involve the Muslim community so that they feel that the definition is accurate. This will avoid much of the criticism currently facing new government legislation.’

Finally, a small number of local level qualitative engagement studies (2) provided evidence that suggests that Muslim communities in respective local areas regard violent extremism as criminal acts.

6 FOSIS(2005): pg 42.
Objective 3: Reasons for supporting/condemning violent extremism

A considerable number of attitudinal surveys, polls and local level qualitative studies have explored Muslim respondents’ reasons for supporting or condemning violent extremism. The key themes that will be explored in this section are: Islam as a reason for condemnation; defending Islam as a reason for support; foreign policies as a reason for support/cause of violent extremism; degree of religiosity and condemnation/support for violent extremism; and discrimination, deprivation and empowerment as reasons for support/causes of violent extremism.

A small number of local qualitative engagement studies in Redbridge (2) have explored local Muslim communities’ understanding of violent extremism and its causes. When asked to elaborate on the reasons for their condemnation of violent extremism the communities emphasise that Islam in fact demands such condemnation. This was in addition to such acts being perceived as criminal in nature.

Similar views were expressed by Muslim participants in another local study in Redbridge by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008b). They emphasised that Islam as a religion does not permit violence or preach hatred and in fact, it emphasises tolerance and democracy.

A small number of polls and attitudinal surveys (2) have asked Muslim respondents to consider the extent to which violent acts are justifiable in order to defend Islam from perceived hostiles. Some surveys focus on general acts of violence whereas others refer to specific instances of violence, for example the attacks on Danish embassies after the publication of the cartoons.

In terms of general acts of violence, for example, a Pew global attitudes survey (2006) reports that 3 and 12 per cent of Muslim respondents felt that ‘suicide bombings against civilian targets’ could ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ (respectively) be justified ‘in order to defend Islam’. The addition of the clause ‘in order to defend Islam’ could potentially have encouraged emotive responses or imply the existence of a state of war or conflict. For example, a similar question in the 1990 Trust survey (2006) which omitted the clause and asked Muslim respondents about the extent to which ‘acts of terrorism against civilians’ were justifiable found that only 2 per cent of respondents agreed.

In terms of specific acts of violence, the ICM poll of Muslims for the Telegraph discussed above also asked respondents whether it was ‘right or wrong’ for Muslims to ‘attack Danish embassies in Muslim countries as a result of the publication of the cartoons’ with a majority of 82 per cent thinking it was wrong and 14 per cent thinking it was right.

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (4) have asked Muslim respondents to consider whether violent extremism is caused by or justifiable because of Britain’s foreign policies, for example support for the US ‘war on terror’ or the situation in Palestine. Additionally, a number of local level qualitative studies (3) have also explored Muslim communities’ understanding of the extent to which Britain’s foreign policies contribute to the causes of violent extremism.
and support for violent extremism. It is important to note that in the attitudinal studies and the local-level qualitative studies, respondents are often expressing opinions about reasons for support/causes of violent extremism rather than indicating their own support for violent extremism as a result of Britain’s foreign policies.

More specifically in relation to the 7 July bombings in London in 2005, a GfK NOP survey of Muslims (2006) asked respondents to consider the extent to which they agreed that the July bombings were ‘justified’ because of ‘British support for the US war on terror’. Sixty-one per cent of respondents disagreed (strongly disagree and tend to disagree) and 22 per cent agreed (strongly agree and tend to agree). Young people between the ages of 18-24 years were more likely to strongly agree (16%) than those between the ages of 25-44 years (10%) and over 45 years (7%). It is worth noting that there was also a comparatively high number of ‘don’t know’ responses to this question: 17 per cent overall, with the figure rising to 20 per cent for women.

Another poll, this time by Populus (2006), asked Muslim respondents the extent to which they agreed that ‘the British invasion of Iraq was the principal reason for the London bomb attacks’. Half the respondents agreed, with 31 per cent strongly agreeing and 19 per cent tending to agree.

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (3) that have asked Muslim respondents about the extent to which violent extremism is justifiable across a range of contexts have also reported on levels of religiosity and the extent to which this has an impact on levels of support and condemnation.

Some surveys and polls addressed the issue of religiosity and views on extremist violence. As discussed above, the GfK NOP survey of Muslims (2006) asked respondents to consider the extent to which they agreed that the July bombings were ‘justified’ because of ‘British support for the US war on terror’. Those respondents that attended mosque at least once a week were more likely to strongly disagree (55%) than those that never attended mosque (45%).

Some of the surveys reviewed looked at the issue of attacks against civilians and non-civilian targets. The results of a 2009 Gallup global study of interfaith relations in Britain, France and Germany indicated that British Muslims for whom religion is important were at least as likely (90%) as British Muslims for whom religion is not important (87%) to say that ‘attacks against civilians’ cannot be ‘morally justified.’

These findings imply that there is no clear relationship between degree of religiosity and supporting or condemning violent extremism. In some instances (for example, in the Gallup poll discussed above) it appears to slightly reduce levels of support but the extent to which these findings are significant is not clear due to the lack of reporting or discussion on the statistical significance of findings across the survey reports.
Finally, a small number of local level qualitative studies (4) explored the respective local Muslim communities’ understanding of the causes of violent extremism and factors that contribute to support for it. Amongst the factors discussed are discrimination, deprivation and empowerment. In a few of these studies, the respondents condemn violent extremism openly whereas in other studies there seems to be the assumption by the authors that respondents reject violent extremism. Additionally, respondents tend to use the terminology ‘causes of’ and ‘support for’ violent extremism almost interchangeably. However, the evidence presented in this section needs to be interpreted with the caveat that perceptions of the causes of extremism are not necessarily the same as reasons for support of violent extremism.

For example, a local Muslim study in Ealing, reported by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008), found that respondents felt that violent extremism and Islamophobia were ‘two sides of the same coin’ with the latter providing the ‘hunting ground’ for the former. Additionally, deprivation was thought to make people more vulnerable because they are more likely to be ‘weak’, ‘left out’, ‘in need’ or ‘not have any future.’ However, the respondents also felt that ‘support for violent extremism is not exclusively an issue of poverty or deprivation’ as they recognised that a number of violent extremists have had professional backgrounds.

**Objective 4: Patterns of change in attitudes**

There is no coverage in the literature of how attitudes have changed and the reasons for change. Additionally, given the challenges associated with data and methods elaborated on in Section 2 of this report, it is difficult to compare findings across studies to identify any patterns of change.

**Objective 5: How attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism**

A small number of studies, primarily local level qualitative studies, explored the extent to which a rejection of violent extremism would result in speaking out against or reporting violent extremist activity. The respondents in these studies identified a number of barriers to reporting or speaking out against any known violent extremist activity: a lack of trust in police and other authorities, a sense of loyalty to Muslims and the fear of association with violent extremist activity.

A survey of British Muslim students by FOSIS (2005) found that the majority (72%) of respondents would ‘inform the police straight away’ if they thought ‘a fellow Muslim was planning an attack’ and that 48 per cent of the rest would ‘try to talk them out of it and then inform the police.’
A number of local qualitative studies (3) found that Muslim respondents were wary of the police and unsure as to whether they would report any suspected violent extremist activity. One local study by Belur and Begum (2008) in Barking and Dagenham asked Muslim respondents to consider whether or not they would inform the police if they suspected any violent extremist activity in the area. Results indicated that the local Muslim community had over-riding mistrust in, as well as fear of, the police. The authors reported that the lack of trust was a result of previous negative experiences with the police where the suspicions the respondents had reported had been dismissed almost immediately because of lack of proof. This discouraged respondents from approaching the police in the future with any further suspicions they may have. Respondents also often reported that troubled relations and conflict with police in their countries of origins had led to their reluctance to engage with the police. For other respondents, their status as illegal immigrants also meant that they were reluctant to approach the police. Finally, some respondents reported having no confidence or trust in the police's ability to tackle other crimes, let alone violent extremist activity. These findings reflect the views of a group of people in one local area and thus need to be interpreted with caution.

Similar barriers emerged in other studies. For example, in their engagement with young people in Barnet, Ryan et al. (2008) reported that respondents were often unwilling to speak out against other people as the police were commonly seen as the ‘enemy’\(^\text{10}\). Since relations between the police and young people are often reported as being troubled, these findings are perhaps not surprising.

In another study, Blick et al. (2006) found that young Muslims feared that the police may over-react or misuse their powers. The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 was an example of the kind of over-reaction that the young people feared. Respondents reported concern about their own safety and feared that the reported extremist's associates may target them.

A few qualitative studies and attitudinal surveys (2) touched on a number of other reasons why Muslims who reject violent extremism would not report violent extremist activity to the police. For example, a FOSIS survey (2005) found that 20 per cent of Muslims would not inform the police of any known extremist activity, with 2 per cent reporting that this was because they ‘would never grass on a Muslim’\(^\text{11}\), 6 per cent not specifying why, 10 per cent giving no response, and 2 per cent reporting fear or mistrust of the police.

\(^{10}\) Ryan et al. (2008): pg 37.
\(^{11}\) FOSIS (2005): pg 36.
1.2 Conclusions and key learning points

Gaps in the evidence base

This literature review has described in depth the paucity of high quality evidence on the attitudes of Muslim communities towards violent extremism. There appear to be particular gaps in the following areas of evidence. High quality:

- quantitative survey evidence which explores the views of a representative sample of Muslims, including representative sub groups of Muslim communities
- qualitative research studies, which adopt a rigorous approach to sampling, thereby taking into account the enormous heterogeneity of the Muslim community
- studies which explore current approaches being used by practitioners to challenge the views of violent extremists and the relative success of these. This could include, for example, rigorous evaluations which explore ‘what works’ in challenging and undermining these views where they arise. This pragmatic focus can provide much needed balance to the theoretical and conceptual literature
- studies which explore the link, and the factors which support, people moving from a view which is supportive of violent extremism toward becoming actively involved in violent extremist groups.

Language

There is some evidence that there is a lack of a common understanding or language which defines violent extremism and that this has created a degree of mistrust of the Prevent agenda in the Muslim community. A key learning point to consider is:

- Prevent practitioners should ensure that all publications, guidance, commissioned research, and communications materials are checked to ensure that a consistent terminology is applied in relation to violent extremism.

Working with Muslim communities

There is evidence in the literature that many in Muslim communities seek to be actively involved in assisting with any future work that seeks to challenge those who support violent extremism, with some believing that research in the past has been ‘done to them’ not with them. A key learning point to consider is:

- It is important for further research studies relevant to violent extremism to actively involve Muslims at all levels in the design and delivery of research, involving those with a deep understanding of the community and the religion to identify ways to counter those who support violent extremism.

Factors that are related to attitudes to violent extremism

Due to the limitations of the evidence, we are not in the position to generalise about most of the factors associated with attitudes about violent extremism. However, the issue of foreign policy and the perceived injustices against Muslims abroad appears to arise frequently as factors which contribute to attitudes. A key learning point to consider is:

- It is important to ensure that foreign policy is communicated by providing clear messages about why certain decisions have been taken, using a range of channels to communicate with different parts of the community, particularly young people, and providing safe spaces in which people can air their grievances.

Layers of influence

It is clear that the factors and contexts related to attitudes towards violent extremism are extremely complex. There are also significant gaps in the evidence base. One useful conceptual model through which to view the varying factors recognises that people as individuals exist in a nested hierarchy of social aggregates. The model is visualised in the diagram below.

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In the centre of the diagram is an ‘individual’ with his or her set of characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status etc). The next circle represents immediate networks such as ‘family and household’. The characteristics of the family and household, the family structure, strength of family relationships are all important here. The circle around this is the ‘local community’ where a range of community characteristics will be important, such as levels of community cohesion, levels of civic participation, strength of community leadership, levels of deprivation, geographical location, etc. The next circle is ‘organisations and institutions’ where characteristics such as types and membership are also of importance (mosques, youth clubs, community organisations etc.) Lastly, the outer circle represents wider society, attitudes and behaviours, which could include attitudes towards foreign policy, the role of police and criminal justice, and levels of tolerance and attitudes to race and faith.

The utility of this conceptual model is that it draws attention to the fact that attitudes and behaviours are not pre-determined by any inherent characteristics of an individual or some other organisation or groups of people. Instead the linkages can be complex and are influenced by the interactions across the different ‘layers’. The key learning point to consider is:

- Seeking to understand how attitudes, whether supportive or condemnatory, towards violent extremism are shaped requires an approach to research that explores all of these layers and the relationship between them. This can also lend itself to providing greater clarity about the contexts and issues on which Muslim attitudes are sought. Research that explores a range of potential relationships between these layers of factors and particular individuals who are at risk from, or are already with, extremists could provide powerful evidence of the relative importance of, and links between, different factors and people’s behaviours.
2.1 Aims of the review

The literature review is intended to support the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) in gaining a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. In particular, the review aims to identify and explore factors that inform these views. The review draws together and synthesises the evidence on attitudes to violent extremism in Muslim communities in the UK in order to:

- inform the development by CLG of further research on attitudes in the context of existing studies;
- identify key evidence gaps;
- provide further understanding of the issues, to assist in the interpretation of findings from other CLG quantitative and qualitative research on attitudes to violent extremism; and
- assess the evidence on the factors that are related to attitudes to violent extremism.

It is important to note that the focus of this study was to identify and assess existing empirical studies, rather than conduct a review of various theoretical discussions about drivers to attitudes. Additionally, the literature review has been designed and conducted to meet the specific objectives, as articulated by CLG, of providing an overview of the evidence on:

- what Muslim communities’ attitudes are towards violent extremism;
- what Muslim communities understand by ‘violent extremism’ and how this understanding is shaped;
- the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism;
- any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and
- how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism.

Representatives from CLG and the OPM review team recognised, from the outset, a number of implications for the literature review as a result of the infancy and complexity of the preventing violent extremism agenda (referred to as Prevent throughout this document)\(^{13}\) and the way it sits within wider policy developments. These included:

- attitudes towards, awareness of, and behaviours in relation to violent extremism may not be easily distinguishable from a wide number of confounding variables operating at local, national and international levels;

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\(^{13}\) CLG (2008) Preventing violent extremism – A strategy for delivery.
• findings from studies derived from particular localities and regions may not necessarily be applicable at the national level;

• there is likely to be a paucity of robust quantitative studies;

• there is likely to be a lack of studies comparing Muslim communities with non-Muslim communities, and amongst different sub-groups within Muslim communities. This compromises our ability to assess the uniqueness or generalisability of documented findings; and

• it is highly likely that research findings are cautious about attribution and causality, with a tendency to identify factors without necessarily indicating the strength and/or direction of relationships.

Both CLG and OPM colleagues acknowledged that there is likely to be a dearth of good quality relevant material, and that there may be numerous gaps in the evidence base. The literature review is designed, therefore, to ‘map out the terrain’ and to adopt a strategic approach in honing in on particular areas that have the greatest potential in yielding key insights and learning points to inform CLG’s policy work.

2.2 Reading this report

As explained previously, this literature review has been designed to meet the very specific objectives listed above. This has meant that although there is a wide range of broadly interesting material related to violent extremism and/or Muslim communities this was not directly relevant to the aims and objectives of the review. This piece of research is thus by no means intended to be an exhaustive review of literature relating to violent extremism and/or Muslim communities.

While a number of the key principles underpinning systematic reviewing techniques have informed some of the processes (e.g. clear inclusion/exclusion criteria, use of quality standards to assess material, etc), this is not intended to be a systematic review. For example, while the search process relied on electronic searches and academic and community contacts (discussed in more detail in the next section), limited hand-searching was conducted. While we used quality standards to assess the material reviewed, we selected standards that were fit for purpose for this type of review rather than adopting some of the far more rigorous standards applied to full systematic reviews.

There has been significant variability in the terminology used relating to violent extremism in the literature (discussed in more detail in the next section) and OPM have strived to report the findings of empirical studies using the exact wording of questions asked of respondents. Beyond this, OPM have used language which is consistent with the aims and objectives of the review.

14 For example, looking at the impact of violent extremism and anti-terror laws on Muslim communities in terms of discrimination, stop-and-search etc, the history of radical Islam, theoretical explorations of the causes of violent extremism, a review of theories relating to attitudes to violent extremism etc.
Additionally, although the focus of the review is Muslim communities in the UK, decisions were taken in consultation with CLG that a small number of international documents would be reviewed and the findings presented within the report. These findings are meant to present alternative perspectives and are not necessarily generalisable or translatable to the UK context.

The remainder of the report reads as follows:

- **Section 3** describes the methods used for searching, securing and reviewing the material. It also provides an overview of the key characteristics of the reviewed literature in terms of methods used, types of literature or study, and the quality of the literature. Challenges relating to methodologies, terminology, data analysis and reporting are also discussed.

- **Section 4** presents the findings against each objective, although there are variances in the amount and types of evidence available for each. It also provides selected international evidence on attitudes towards violent extremism in Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain. The section concludes by presenting a number of gaps identified in the literature.

- **Section 5** concludes the report by drawing together the key themes and identifies key learning points relating to further research and actions.
Chapter 3
Method and overview of material included

3.1 Searching and reviewing

Our approach to the literature search, review and synthesis is informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies\textsuperscript{15} and universities.\textsuperscript{16,17} These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK.

The literature search was conducted by search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP), recognising the importance of qualified search specialists in enhancing the quality of reviews.\textsuperscript{18}

The review was conducted over a number of stages and was initiated by initial broad database searches. Broad search terms\textsuperscript{19} were generated in collaboration with CLG. An iterative process was agreed whereby the findings from preceding searches would inform the direction and focus of further searchers and, ultimately, of the review. These searches resulted in very little relevant material being identified and even fewer empirical studies.\textsuperscript{20}

All material identified in the searches was shared with CLG so that we would be able to work collaboratively to decide the best strategy to secure relevant material for the review. This strategy included:

- revised database searches
- input from experts and Prevent leads\textsuperscript{21}
- selective website searches\textsuperscript{22}
- assessing OPM and CLG collected literature.

\textsuperscript{16} EPPi-Centre, Systematic Research Synthesis (eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Default.aspx?tabid=67).
\textsuperscript{19} A full list of initial and revised search terms used can be found in Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{20} Appendix 2 illustrates the databases that were searched, the specific search strategies that were used and the results obtained.
\textsuperscript{21} Further information about the Prevent leads and experts consulted with can be found in Appendix 6.
\textsuperscript{22} A full list of websites searched and the results obtained can be found in Appendix 3.
The material identified from these sources was sifted to assess relevance against the following inclusion/exclusion criteria which were agreed by CLG and OPM:

- focus on project aims
- published between 2000-09
- about Muslim communities in the UK.

There was a lack of relevant literature, particularly empirical literature, identified through the search process. Additionally, empirical studies that were identified were often reported in a manner that made it difficult to assess the quality of the original research (e.g. sampling method not described, objective of original study not reported, analysis procedures not explained, etc). OPM and CLG thus agreed that whilst the quality of literature would be assessed and reported, all material, regardless of quality, that met the inclusion/exclusion criteria would be reviewed in full. It was also agreed that the quality of literature generated through quantitative approaches would be assessed using US Census Bureau standards\(^\text{24}\) (13 standards) on the minimal information required in reporting survey or census data. Additionally, it was agreed that the quality of literature generated through qualitative approaches would be assessed using a set of five simple standards recommended by the EPPI-Centre (University of London, Institute of Education).

Material that met the inclusion/exclusion criteria was read in full and data were extracted using a Data Extraction Sheet (DES) (included in Appendix 5) designed in collaboration with CLG. The reviewed literature was analysed using broad content analysis which was guided by the research specification.

\(^{23}\) The full list of quality standards can be found in Appendix 4.

\(^{24}\) US Census Bureau (2006), Minimal information to accompany any report of survey or census data (http://www.census.gov/quality/S12-0_v1.2_Minimal_Info.pdf)
The diagram below illustrates the different stages of the review. Further information on each of these stages can be found in Appendix 6.
3.2 Overview of material included

The literature reviewed has been generated via a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies including both primary and secondary data. It consisted of a combination of:

- quantitative studies, including attitudinal surveys, public opinion research and polls conducted by research centres, think tanks, market research organisations and pollsters
- local level and small-scale qualitative studies and evaluations of Prevent-related activity
- theoretical think pieces including secondary research
- academic articles from journals and books
- international primary and secondary research.

Approximately 450 documents were sifted which resulted in 36 documents being shortlisted for inclusion in the review. Appendix 7 presents a diagram illustrating the process by which the literature identified from the six sources listed above was sifted to arrive at a final shortlist.

Of the 36 documents that were shortlisted and reviewed, 13 were generated through quantitative approaches including attitudinal surveys, public opinion research and polls. Eighteen were generated through qualitative approaches including local level and small-scale qualitative studies and evaluations of Prevent-related activity as well one cross-European study by the Change Institute. Five documents were think pieces with a combination of theoretical and secondary research and a further three were purely international and focused on violent extremism across a range of European countries.

In general, the review found there to be a number of weaknesses in terms of the quality of available evidence. Firstly, there is a lack of clarity or consistency around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and ‘support’ for it. Secondly, there are some limitations to the methods utilised in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, these studies were meant to capture a snap shot of public attitudes, and were not intended to be rigorous research studies of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings.

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25 Some studies reviewed included both national and international perspectives.
26 Note that the numbers add up to more than 36 documents in total as some studies used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
Quantitative studies were assessed against a number of quality standards and assigned a score out of thirteen. As a number of the standards referred to very basic information (organisational sponsor, survey/poll conductor) that all studies provide, it is clear that not all the standards are of equal importance when assessing the quality of the work itself. Definitions of ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ quality are influenced more directly by standards that account for the robustness and reliability of the evidence itself such as statistical precision, sampling methodologies etc.

Using this convention, the studies were generally of low to medium quality. Many studies are not always reported in a way that allows a full assessment of ‘quality’ as defined for this review. For example a number of studies only reported ‘top-level’ findings and provided very basic information about respondents. There was thus often a lack of information on methods used, quality of data generated, weighting and estimation procedures, the statistical significance of findings, analysis procedures used, etc. This does not necessarily mean that the original studies were of poor quality. It simply means that the published material tend not to be reported in a way that facilitates an accurate assessment of the quality of the original studies. One such example identified through the search process was a study by Humayun Ansari on the ‘Attitudes to Jihad, Martyrdom and Terrorism among British Muslims’. Although the findings were relevant to the objectives of the research, the considerable lack of information on sample size, sampling methodology, wording of questions, statistical significance etc meant that assessing the quality of the original research was not possible. On this basis, OPM and CLG agreed not to include the study in the review.

Qualitative studies were assessed against a number of quality standards and assigned a score out of five. The same convention for assessing ‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’ quality was applied. These studies also tended to be of low and medium quality, although they were more evenly spread across the two categories. This lower rating tended to be so because methods were not clearly described. Most studies were local engagement studies with small sample sizes and there was very little attempt in the reported outputs to assess the theoretical representativeness of the findings generated. The secondary research was generally of low quality, with the material reported with little or no accompanying technical information. The international documents were also secondary research but had more technical information reported in contrast to the other secondary research mentioned previously.

The full list of material reviewed can be found in Appendix 8 which also provides an overview of the key characteristics of reviewed material, including types, methods, sample, geographical coverage, quality assessment scores etc.

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3.3 Challenges relating to methods and data

Robustness of material generated through quantitative approaches

The material that is available is not particularly robust. Thirteen studies involved quantitative methodologies including surveys and polls. A number of these consisted primarily of datasets which were not accompanied by reports or analyses; or contained only very limited information relating to sample size/design, dates and methods of data collection and the statistical precision of results. These studies were identified from either OPM’s collection of documents compiled over the course of Prevent-related projects or through website searches. This has meant that it was impossible or very difficult to identify sampling methodologies as well as the representativeness of the sample. This lack of reporting on methods and design compromises the ability to assess the significance of any findings. It should also be noted that the purpose and objectives of such polls and surveys is about providing a quick snapshot of public opinion, rather than undertaking a methodologically rigorous research process. The above caveats are important to bear in mind as the dearth of material available for this review has meant that the findings from a number of such polls and surveys (GfK NOP, 2005; ICM, 2005; Populus, 2005, 2006; 1990 Trust, 2006) have been quoted extensively in this report.

Other studies have accessed Muslim communities through ‘gatekeepers’ including a range of Muslim community organisations, which may or may not have their own vested interests. ‘Snowball sampling’ is also used, where respondents are encouraged to identify other respondents that may be interested in contributing. In fact some studies are clear that they have not aimed to ensure a representative sample and recognise the potential for bias:

‘The student sample may have been biased towards those Muslim students who are of a more religious inclination: those who are involved in their own Islamic society, who have had previous contact with FOSIS, or who attended one or more Islamic conference. While this limitation presents boundaries on how representative our sample is, it does not reduce the value of the data.’

The timing of surveys has also been such that they have often directly followed highly emotive events, for example, the deportation of foreign nationals, accusations and arrests that prove unfounded, the publication and re-printing of the cartoons in Denmark in 2005-06, heightened levels of tension in Iraq and Palestine and finally the 2005 shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by the police in London.

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29 GfK NOP (2006); ICM Research (2005; 2006); Populus (2006; 2006).
Similarly, the wording of questions can often be open to interpretation thus making room for emotive responses. For example, the following questions are ambiguous in that they might imply a state of war or conflict and may also encourage emotive responses:

‘Please tell me whether you think it was right or wrong for Muslim demonstrators to carry placards calling for the killing of those who insult Islam’

‘Violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam can be justified…’

There is also a great deal of variability in the terminology used across the quantitative studies which significantly limits our ability to interpret the significance of findings, compare findings or draw conclusions as it is likely that the type of terminology used can also impact on responses received. There are broadly two different types of variability in the terminology used. Firstly, there are a range of terms used to refer to ‘violent extremism’ as the subject of this review. These include:

- suicide bombings
- suicide operations
- acts of terrorism
- attacks by British suicide bombers
- attacks that target civilians
- violence for political ends/‘noble reasons’
- London bombings, July bombings, 7/7 bombings.

Secondly, there are also a range of terms used to refer to ‘support’ for violent extremism. These include:

- acceptable
- justified/justifiable
- morally justified
- understanding of motives/reasons
- right/wrong
- sympathise with motive/feeling/cause.

In addition to variability in the terminology used, there was also variability in the response options that respondents were able to choose from which can also impact on the manner in which questions are answered, particularly questions about controversial issues. Whereas a number of surveys used five-point Likert scales, others provided ‘yes/no’ response options which can potentially force respondents to make simplistic decisions on

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very complex issues. The impact of the variability in terminology and in response options was often demonstrated by high levels of ‘don’t know’ responses or non-responses. This could indicate that many respondents found it difficult to provide straightforward answers, particularly to structured ‘closed’ questions.

The majority of studies did not use probability samples (8) which negates our ability to interpret the statistical representativeness and significance of the findings. This inhibits our ability to interpret the generalisability of findings or to draw firm conclusions. Even in cases where probability samples were used, there is often a lack of detail in the reporting of methodologies and about response rates. The studies that do include information on statistical representativeness commonly do so by including standard error estimates in datasets or by indicating general confidence interval levels. However these statistics are more often than not unaccompanied by any discussion or interpretation. There is very little discussion or interpretation of the precision of results in the accompanying report.

**Robustness of material generated through qualitative approaches**

The eighteen qualitative studies reviewed employed a range of methods including in-depth interviews, focus groups and seminars. Of these eighteen studies, the majority were local-level engagement studies, mapping and needs analysis studies, local Prevent programme evaluations or Community Engagement Pathfinder studies in areas including Redbridge, Trafford, Barnet, Hounslow, Ealing, Birmingham, Bury and Barking and Dagenham. The sample of respondents for in-depth interviews ranged from approximately 25 to 40 and the number of focus groups and seminars held ranged from 1 to 19. Where information was provided, focus groups tended to include eight to ten participants. Workshops and seminars tended to be larger.

Sampling methodologies primarily involved approaching ‘gatekeepers’ and through ‘snowball recruitment’ so may be subject to sampling bias. The qualitative research focused on wider discussions about issues facing local communities and/or perceptions and understanding of the risk factors associated with violent extremism by different groups within local communities. Findings and emphasis therefore varied due to different local contexts: ethnicities, age, socioeconomic status, community relations, and relationships with police and local authorities etc.

The aims of those studies were not to generalise findings but to explore in more depth the extent to which violent extremism was perceived to be a problem in the local area and what the causes of the problem were perceived to be in order to derive local community-based solutions. There were thus very few attempts to validate the findings as these were meant to be descriptive rather than inferential. For these reasons there is a need to be cautious in the interpretation of the findings and the extent to which they are representative of wider Muslim communities.

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34 Populus (2005), 20 per cent of respondents answered ‘don’t know’ or ‘refused’ when asked to answer ‘yes/no’ about whether there are circumstances under which suicide bombings can be justified in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq.
Summary

The methodological weaknesses and inconsistencies discussed above limit the extent to which clarity can be provided on the aims and objectives of this review. The reliability of reported evidence also often suffers from a lack of detail about some of the methods used. This compromises our ability to assess the representativeness and significance of findings.

Conceptual confusion compounds the methodological shortcomings. There is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and ‘support’ for it. Additionally, the groups being studied are wide ranging and there are significant differences in the way they are described. For example, age ranges are presented in different bands: 18+, 15+, 19-23 and respondents are described using different terminology: Muslims in Britain, British Muslims, London Muslims etc. Individual qualitative studies tend to focus primarily on one or two sub-groups (location, ethnicity etc) whereas the quantitative studies tend not to focus on one group (although there are concerns about the representativeness of sampling methodologies employed). There are no comparative studies across sub-groups, localities and time-periods. On the other hand, there are some studies that compare Muslim respondents’ attitudes with those of non-Muslims.

With regards to coverage across the objectives of the review, most of the evidence in the literature is relevant to, albeit not always directly, Objectives 1 (attitudes) and 3 (reasons). There is also some evidence available that is relevant, again not always directly, to Objectives 2 (understanding of extremism) and 5 (attitudes and behaviour). There is almost no evidence in the reviewed material relevant to Objective 4 (patterns of change) and it is very difficult to compare studies over time for the reasons outlined above.

The available evidence base is presented in the following sections of this report and needs to be understood against the context of the caveats highlighted here.
Chapter 4
Research Findings

4.1 Objective 1: Attitudes towards violent extremism

Key themes

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls have explored Muslim respondents’ attitudes towards violent extremism. The evidence suggests that there are a number of contextual factors that have an impact on the manner in which Muslim communities think about violent extremism. These factors are discussed in more detail below and are organised under the following themes:

- national versus international violent extremism
  - violent extremism in the UK
  - violent extremism in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq.
- targets of violent extremism (civilian or other)
- support for violent extremism for political/religious/noble reasons
  - violence for political ends
  - violence for a noble cause.
- support for violent extremists and violent extremist groups
  - deportation of extremists espousing violence
  - banning extremist groups
  - support for specific violent extremists/groups.
- 7/7 attacks as violent extremism
  - support/condemnation of 7/7 attacks versus sympathy with motives/cause
  - 7/7 bombers as ‘martyrs/acting according to true principles of Islam’

4.1.1 NATIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (3) asked members of Muslim communities in the UK to consider the extent to which violent extremism is justified in a range of countries including the UK, Israel, Chechnya and Iraq. It is important to note that these studies tend to ask about very specific responses to very specific sets of contexts and thus the findings reported may not necessarily be generalisable beyond those contexts. It is also important to note that the studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: GfK NOP, 2005: Medium; ICM, 2005: Low; Populus, 2005: Low.
Violent extremism in the UK

In a survey of Muslims carried out by GfK NOP (2006), only 13 per cent of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ (5%) or ‘tended to agree’ (8%) that they could ‘understand why some young British Muslims might have wanted to carry out suicide operations in Britain’.

In an ICM poll of Muslims (2005) for the Guardian only 5 per cent of respondents felt that ‘further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK’ are ‘justified’.

Only 7 per cent of respondents in a Populus poll of Muslims (2005) reported that there are ‘circumstances under which suicide bombings can be justified in the UK’. It is also important to note there was a considerably high level of ‘don’t know/refused’ responses (16%) and that response categories provided were restricted to ‘yes/no’. This could indicate that people found it difficult to make ‘right/wrong’ judgements about complex issues.

Although the percentage of respondents that felt violent extremism could be justified is higher (13%) in the GfK NOP study (2006) than in the other two studies (5 per cent and 7 per cent for the ICM (2005) and Populus (2005) polls respectively), it is important to bear in mind that whereas the former provides respondents with two response options that indicate levels of agreement (strongly agree, 5 per cent and tend to agree, 8 per cent) the latter two provide only one (‘justified’ and ‘yes’). Additionally the former study asks respondents whether they ‘understand’ why violent extremism occurs and the latter two studies ask whether such acts are ‘justified’.

Violent extremism in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq

In a Populus poll of Muslims (2005), 16, 13 and 15 per cent of respondents felt that ‘there were circumstances under which suicide bombings can be justified’ in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq respectively. On the other hand, 66, 68 and 69 per cent of respondents felt that ‘suicide bombings’ could not be justified under any circumstances in Israel, Chechnya and Iraq respectively. It is important to note that there were high levels of ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ responses which accounted for approximately 20 per cent of responses for each country. Since the response categories provided were restricted to ‘yes/no’ this high level of ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ responses could indicate that people find it difficult to make ‘right/wrong’ judgements about complex issues.

The evidence from this poll suggests that Muslims are more likely to understand the justification for violent extremism in foreign countries such as Israel, Chechnya and Iraq although the majority did not support violent extremism in the UK or elsewhere.

4.1.2 TARGETS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A consistent finding in attitudinal surveys and polls (5) identified in this review strongly suggest that Muslim communities reject violent acts against civilians. The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: 1990 Trust, 2006: Low; Populus, 2005, 2006: Low; Mogahed, 2007: Low; Gallup, 2009: Medium.
Violent acts against civilian targets versus other targets

Mogahed (2007) reports that London Muslims were just as likely (88%) as the general public (92%) to feel that ‘attacks that target civilians’ could not be ‘morally justified’.

Similar results were reported in the 2009 Gallup global study of interfaith relations in Britain, France and Germany. Roughly nine out of ten (89%) British Muslims surveyed felt that such attacks ‘cannot be justified’.

The 1990 Trust (2006) reported that in their survey of Muslim views an overwhelming majority of 96 per cent respondents indicated that ‘acts of terrorism against civilians’ were not ‘justifiable’.

Two Populus polls (2005, 2006) asked members of the Muslim community to consider whether there were ‘any circumstances under which they thought that suicide bombings could ever be justified against civilians, the military, the police and government building/workers.’ The 2005 poll demonstrated levels of agreement of 7, 21, 11, and 9 per cent for the respective targets mentioned above. The 2006 poll demonstrated little change, with levels of agreement of 7, 16, 10 and 11 per cent respectively.

4.1.3 SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM FOR POLITICAL/REligious/Noble REASONS

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (4) asked Muslim respondents to consider the extent to which it is justifiable or acceptable to use violence for political ends, religious reasons or noble reasons. Some studies asked about the use of violence generally, whereas others asked about the use of violence by religious or political groups.

Violence for ‘political ends’

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: GfK NOP, 2005: Medium; ICM, 2005: Low.

The GfK NOP (2006) survey of Muslims reported that a large majority of respondents (85%) either ‘strongly disagreed’ (73%) or ‘tended to disagree’ (12%) that it was ‘acceptable for religious or political groups to use violence for political ends.’ Respondents between the ages 18-24 were more likely to disagree (79% ‘strongly disagreed’ and ‘tended to disagree’) than respondents of other ages. However, these younger respondents were comparatively more divided on whether they strongly disagreed (59%) or tended to disagree (20%). Additionally, respondents that preferred British law were more likely to strongly disagree (77%) compared to those who preferred Shariah law (67% strongly disagreed). This suggests that while there is an overall feeling of condemnation of such acts, there are also some factors that appear to influence attitudes to a greater or lesser degree (age, preference for British/Shariah law).
A survey of Muslims conducted by ICM (2005), reported that 93 per cent of respondents felt that the ‘use of violence for political ends’ was ‘unacceptable’. There did not appear to be any differences across gender, age, social class or ethnicity. However, the higher level of condemnation in this survey may have been a result of terminology used and the fact that response categories provided were ‘unacceptable/acceptable’ compared with five-point scales of agreement used in the GfK NOP (2006) study.

**Violence for a ‘noble cause’**

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: Mogahed, 2007: Low; Gallup, 2009: Medium; Saggar, 2009: Medium.

Mogahed (2007) reports that London Muslims were in fact slightly more likely than the general public (81% vs. 72%) to think that there was no ‘moral justification’ for acts of ‘violence for a noble cause’.

Saggar (2009) comments on these findings by saying that: ‘this is the case even though it might have been expected that Muslim respondents would embody a greater implicit identification with political grievances in the Middle East that are already deeply embroiled in violence.’

In comparison, a Gallup study of interfaith relations in Britain, France and Germany (2009) found that 48 per cent of British Muslims felt that ‘violence for a noble cause’ ‘cannot be justified’ whereas 6 per cent felt that it was ‘completely justifiable’. The rest of the respondents fell within the five point scale. The range of response options provided may explain the spread of responses. There is no indication in the report by Mogahed (2007) about whether the response options provided were ‘yes/no’ or whether responses have been aggregated across response options (for example adding ‘strongly agree’ and ‘slightly agree’ responses).

### 4.1.4 SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISTS AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS

There is significant coverage in attitudinal surveys and polls (7) of Muslim communities’ feelings regarding the treatment of extremists espousing violence or those that are suspected of espousing violence. Some studies have asked respondents for their opinions about the deportation or the banning of religious leaders and foreign nationals who speak openly about their support for violent extremism. Others have asked about Muslim respondents’ support for specific groups such as Al Qaeda or violent extremists such as Osama Bin Laden. The majority of studies did not focus on one particular sub-group. However, the FOSIS (2005) survey focused on British Muslim students.

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Deportation of extremists espousing violence

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: GfK NOP, 2005: Medium; ICM, 2005: Low; FOSIS, 2005: Medium

The GfK NOP survey of Muslims (2006) asked the respondents to consider the extent to which they thought that ‘religious leaders who speak in support of terrorism should be thrown out of the country.’ A total of 68 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement, with 55 per cent strongly agreeing and 13 per cent tending to agree. Those respondents that preferred British law were more likely to strongly agree (63%) than those that preferred Shariah law (50%). The same was true of respondents over 45 years (60%) compared with those between 18-24 years (49%).

A similar question in an ICM survey of Muslims (2005) asked respondents whether they personally felt that ‘foreign Muslims who incite hatred’ should be ‘excluded/deported’ or ‘allowed to live in the UK’. Just over half of respondents (52%) thought that such individuals should be ‘excluded/deported’, while over a third (38%) thought that they should be ‘allowed to live in the UK’.

A survey of British Muslim students by FOSIS (2005) found that 34 per cent of respondents felt that the UK should ‘deport foreign nationals accused of extremism’. FOSIS notes that this is in contrast to national feeling and quotes a Guardian newspaper poll in 200536 which found that 62 per cent of general public respondents supported the deportation of foreign nationals. FOSIS recognises this difference of opinion and goes on to argue that whereas the government feels these measures will help curb extremist activities, Muslim communities feel that the ambiguity surrounding what does and doesn’t constitute ‘extremist’ speech means that these measures could act as a barrier to freedom of speech and thus a curtailment on civil liberties.

‘when language is based on undefined terms such as ‘extremism’, it becomes difficult to know exactly what would constitute a breach of law, especially given the wide range of interpretations for such terms.’37

36 Monthly Guardian poll by ICM. Can be accessed at: image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/08/22/0mGuardian-BPC-aug05-terror.pdf
37 FOSIS (2005): pg 53.
**Banning extremist groups**

The two studies discussed in this section were of medium quality: FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Gohir, 2006: Medium.

The study by Gohir (2006) which reported findings of a survey of Muslims and non-Muslims found that there is a high degree of support amongst the Muslim respondents for ‘banning Muslims groups that incite hatred and violence in the UK’ (74%). There were similar levels of support amongst respondents classified as the ‘general public’ (69%) and ‘Jewish respondents’ (81%). Additionally, 76 per cent of Muslim respondents, 73 per cent of the general public respondents and 80 per cent of Jewish respondents think it is ‘essential’ or ‘desirable’ for ‘Muslims to condemn and isolate those who preach and practice violence’.

On the other hand, a survey of British Muslim students by FOSIS (2005) found that approximately half the respondents (52%) did not think that ‘organisations accused of extremism should be shut down.’ Of those respondents who did think that organisations accused of extremism should be shut down, only 8 per cent felt that ‘the government alone should make the decision that an organisation is extreme’. Instead, 25 per cent felt that the ‘Muslim community alone should make this decision’ and 26 per cent felt that ‘the Government and the Muslim community together should make this decision.’

However, the results from the FOSIS survey of British Muslim students (2005) should be interpreted cautiously given that respondents were recruited using convenience and ‘snowball’ sampling methods and as discussed earlier, the authors were clear that they had not aimed to ensure a representative sample.

**Support for specific violent extremists/groups**

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: ICM, 2005: Low; Pew, 2006: Medium; Mirza et al., 2007: Low.

The Pew global attitudes study (2006) reported that 14 per cent of Muslims in Great Britain express ‘a lot’ or ‘some confidence’ in ‘Bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs.’

Additionally a survey of Muslims by Mirza et al. (2007) indicated that only 7 per cent of respondents ‘admire organisations like Al Qaeda that are prepared to fight against the West.’ There was a difference between age groups, with those of 16-24 years more likely to agree (13%) than those over 45 years (3%).

Finally, an ICM poll of Muslims for the Telegraph (2006), reported that 7 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘Western society is decadent and immoral and Muslims should seek to bring it to an end, if necessary by violent means’ while 80 per cent agreed that ‘Western society may not be perfect but Muslims should live within it and not seek to bring it to an end.’
4.1.5 7/7 ATTACKS AS VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A number of surveys (3) have tried to assess the level of support or condemnation for the violent acts of 7/7. Some surveys have asked explicit questions about whether the attacks were right or wrong whereas others have tried to gauge levels of sympathy with the cause of the bombers. Yet others have tried to gauge the extent to which potentially radical interpretations of Islam can result in support for the bombers. The majority of studies did not focus on one particular sub-group. However, the FOSIS (2005) survey focused on British Muslim students across the UK.

**Support/condemnation of 7/7 attacks versus sympathy with motives/cause**

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: ICM, 2005: Low; FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Populus, 2005: Low; 1990 Trust, 2006: Low; Saggar, 2009: Medium.

The survey of British Muslim students conducted by FOSIS (2005) asked respondents whether they condemned the London attacks with 85 per cent responding ‘yes’, 4 per cent responding ‘no’ and 11 per cent providing no response. FOSIS felt that this level of condemnation was reassuring as it was: ‘a positive reflection of their religious understanding that there is no place for terrorism in Islam, and that they are not guilty by association.’

A Populus poll of Muslims (2006) following the acts of violence on 7/7 asked the respondents to consider the extent to which they thought the ‘7/7 attacks were wrong but the cause of the bombers was right.’ 69 per cent of respondents disagreed and in this case younger people were more likely to disagree: 74 per cent of respondents of 25-34 years disagreed compared with 64 per cent of respondents over 55 years who disagreed. However, since there is no indication of the statistical precision of these findings, they need to be interpreted cautiously. Additionally, the wording of the statement is such that respondents could potentially provide a ‘disagree’ response by disagreeing with the first half (attacks were wrong) and/or the second half of the statement (cause was right).

A poll of Muslims conducted by ICM for the Telegraph (2006) asked respondents whether it was ‘right or wrong’ for ‘Muslims to have bombed London on 7/7 and 21/7’ with only 1 per cent thinking it was ‘right’. The same survey asked respondents to consider the extent to which they had ‘any sympathy with the feelings and motives of those who carried out the London attacks, regardless of whether they thought the attacks were justified’. Seventy-five per cent had ‘no sympathy’, 12 per cent had ‘a little sympathy’ and 8 per cent had ‘a lot of sympathy’.

On the other hand, the 1990 Trust (2006) reviewed the same ICM findings about levels of sympathy with the feelings and motives of those who carried out the attacks and concluded that: ‘to understand the motive behind an action cannot be equated with violence itself.’\(^9\) The author goes on to argue that ‘an understanding and contextual explanation as to why an occurrence takes place, is not justification or glorification.’\(^{40}\)

### 7/7 bombers as ‘martyrs/acting according to true principles of Islam’

The Populus poll (2006) of Muslims discussed above (quality: low) also asked respondents to consider the extent to which they thought the ‘7/7 bombers were acting according to the true principles of Islam.’ Eighty-seven per cent of the respondents disagreed and there did not appear to be any difference across gender or age.

The respondents were also asked to consider the extent to which they thought the ‘7/7 bombers should be considered martyrs.’ Sixteen-seven per cent of respondents disagreed and 13 per cent agreed. The rest of the respondents ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ or answered ‘don’t know’. Respondents over 55 years were more likely to disagree (74%) that the ‘7/7 bombers should be considered martyrs’ compared to respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 (56%). However, a large number of the respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ (23%) compared with the total sample (12% neither agreed nor disagreed). Finally, men were slightly more likely to disagree that 7/7 bombers should be considered martyrs (71%) than women (64%).

### Selective international evidence

This section presents selective evidence from a handful of international documents\(^{41}\) in order to provide a snapshot of attitudes towards violent extremism across Europe. As mentioned earlier, these findings are meant to present alternative perspectives and are not necessarily generalisable or translatable to the UK context.

#### National vs. international violent extremism

A qualitative study by the Change Institute (2008) found that Muslim respondents in Denmark felt that violence may be acceptable in situations of war and self-defence. This was considered to be particularly the case in Palestine which the respondents viewed as being unjustly occupied. Respondents in Germany, although unanimously against the use of violence in Germany or other European countries, were a little more split on conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine. While some people felt that violence by Palestinians is understandable, others made a clear distinction between violence in defence and violence that targets civilians as in the case of suicide bombings (in Palestine).


\(^{40}\) Ibid: pg 12.

\(^{41}\) Mascini, P (2006); Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006); Change Institute for European Commission (2008); Buijs, F (2009)
Targets of violent extremism

A Gallup survey (2009) reported that in both Germany and Britain, less than 0.5 per cent of Muslim respondents felt that ‘attacks against civilian targets’ were ‘completely justifiable’ with this figure rising to 4 per cent for Muslims in France. An earlier Gallup study in 2007, reported in the same study, which surveyed Muslims in Berlin, Paris and London found that 98 per cent of Berlin Muslims, 89 per cent of Paris Muslims and 88 per cent of London Muslims felt that ‘attacks against civilian targets’ were ‘unjustifiable’. The same study also surveyed the German, French and British general public and found that 98, 95 and 92 per cent of respondents respectively felt that ‘attacks against civilian targets’ were ‘unjustifiable’.

Support for violent extremists and violent extremist groups

As discussed above, a Pew global attitudes report (2006) reported that 14 per cent of Muslims in Great Britain express ‘a lot or some confidence in Bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs’. This figure falls to 7 and 5 per cent for Muslims in Germany and France respectively and rises to 16 per cent for Muslims in Spain.

In Pargeter’s qualitative study (2006) with North African immigrants across Europe, she found that the ‘war on terror’ has created a complex relationship between the ‘moderates’ and the ‘radicals’ as defined in this study. The moderates are concerned that admitting the presence of radicals would be giving Islam a bad name and go against their sense of brotherhood. Some moderates, on the other hand, are more open about the presence of radicals but believe that the problem should be solved within the community.

Additionally, although the moderates are against the use of violence, like the radicals they support the idea of defending Islam. The author argues that ‘there is a distinct sense of protectiveness toward those with radical tendencies. Many express the view that those espousing violence are people who simply get carried away with their faith or who do not understand Islam properly. … Others are keen to portray the radicals as victims who cannot be held responsible for their own actions and attitudes. The reasons for this protectiveness are complex and are in some ways related to a sense of being a community under siege. However there is also an ambiguity because in many cases the political grievances and goals of the moderates do not differ substantially from those of the extremists.’

Support for violent extremism for political/religious/noble reasons

A Gallup study (2009) reported that German Muslims (80%) and French Muslims (75%) are more likely than British Muslims (48%) to feel that ‘violence for a noble cause’ ‘cannot be justified’. However, there is little variance across countries in the proportion of people who think that such acts are ‘completely justifiable’ with response levels at 6 per cent for British Muslims, 5 per cent for French Muslims and 2 per cent for German Muslims.

An earlier Gallup poll in 2006 reported in the above study (2008) found that 94 per cent of Berlin Muslims, 77 per cent of Paris Muslims and 81 per cent of London Muslims felt that the use of violence for a noble cause was unjustifiable.

Attitudes of radical Muslim protestors across eight European cities on Jerusalem Day in 2002

Schbley and McCauley (2005) surveyed 2,619 respondents across eight European cities\(^{43}\) to sift and identify those that were more radical in their views regarding martyrdom, Middle East conflicts and degree of religiosity amongst other items\(^{44}\). From this initial survey 722 were solicited to complete a second survey which aimed to learn more about political and religious opinions and personality in relation to motivation for martyrdom and the willingness to use chemical, biological and nuclear (CBN) weapons in order to defend Islam.

Results indicated that of the 722 respondents to the second survey, 31 per cent strongly agreed and 51 per cent agreed that they would be willing to use CBN weapons to defend Islam. Similarly, 50 per cent strongly agreed and 23 per cent agreed that ‘to become a martyr is a privilege I have applied for and pray to achieve.’ However, there was no correlation between these two items which means that willingness to attack a perceived ‘enemy’ in defence of Islam was independent of willingness to sacrifice oneself.

Additionally, respondents who reported having a charismatic religious leader\(^{45}\) were more willing to use CBN weapons to defend Islam. On the other hand, high degrees of religiosity\(^{46}\) were not related to willingness to use CBN weapons or interest in martyrdom.

The authors conclude that ‘the most important implication of our results is negative: religion and religiosity were not useful predictors of any important differences among our militant respondents’ and that ‘at least among our militant respondents, then, it is not helpful to think of propensity to terrorist behaviour as linked to individual differences in religion or religious intensity.’\(^{47}\)

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44 Respondents were asked to respond to statements: martyrdom is a duty; I will serve Allah with my life worldwide if called upon; all Middle-and Near-Eastern countries must be united under the banner of Islam; religious obligations consume more than 40 per cent of daily activities; member of Hizbullah, Islamic Brotherhood, or other Islamic movement; and military/combat training other than compulsory national guard training.

45 Charismatic leadership was assessed by responses to statements about the ‘Marja/Ulama’ as charismatic, committed to absolute service to Allah, and receives inspiration directly from Allah. Associated with this charisma is the message that judgment day is coming and jihad justifies any means.

46 High degree of religiosity – memorising surahs and possessing samah (forehead callus).

47 Schbley, A; McCauley, C (2005): pg 569.
4.2 Objective 2: Understanding of violent extremism

Key themes

A small number of attitudinal surveys, polls and local level qualitative studies have explored Muslim respondents’ understanding of violent extremism. The evidence suggests that there is a significant concern about the terminology associated with violent extremism. There is also a lack of understanding of the different terminology. These findings have been discussed in further detail below under the following themes:

- radicalism and extremism as not necessarily violent
  - ‘radicalism’ versus ‘violent extremism’
  - ‘extremism’ versus ‘violent extremism’.
- definitions of terrorism and extremism
  - defining ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’
  - using terms such as ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ interchangeably
- violent extremism as criminal acts.

4.2.1 RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM AS NOT NECESSARILY VIOLENT

In one attitudinal survey and one local level qualitative study, Muslim respondents expressed the view that concepts such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ should not be confused with ‘violent extremism’. The attitudinal survey did not include any sub-group analysis. The local qualitative study was conducted with Muslim community leaders in Redbridge. The studies were of low to medium quality with individual assessments as follows: 1990 Trust, 2006: Low; Redbridge Faith Forum, 2009: Medium.

‘Radicalism’ versus ‘violent extremism’

A survey of Muslims by the 1990 Trust (2006) asked respondents to consider ‘what form radicalisation takes’ and the findings indicated that a majority (65%) felt that radicalism was not linked to violent action. Forty-six per cent of respondents felt radicalism meant ‘greater involvement in politics’ and 19 per cent felt that it meant ‘disillusionment with politics’. Only 2.5 per cent felt that radicalism meant ‘involvement in violent action’.

A further 23 per cent felt that it meant a ‘bit of both, that is, more involvement in politics and violent action’.

Respondents were also asked to consider whether radicalism was Muslim community specific. Only 14 per cent of respondents thought that Muslims were exclusively affected by radicalism, whilst 73 per cent thought that it affected other parts of society, for example, members of the Left or hard Left.
‘Extremism’ versus ‘violent extremism’

In a local study conducted by Redbridge Faith Forum (2009), Muslim community leaders were eager to emphasise the differences between ‘extremism’ and ‘violence’ and that extremism itself was not in fact a problem. They made comparisons between religious extremists and football fanatics who also may or may not become violent. Respondents also referred to members of the British National Party who are often regarded as extreme but not necessarily violent.

4.2.2 DEFINITIONS OF ‘TERRORISM’ AND ‘EXTREMISM’

A small number of attitudinal surveys (2) and one qualitative local level study suggest that there is a considerable amount of concern in the Muslim community about the definitions of terms such as terrorism and extremism. The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Gohir, 2006: Medium; Belur and Begum, 2008: Low.

Defining ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’

A FOSIS survey of British Muslim students (2005) asked respondents how they would define ‘religious extremism’. The survey did not provide a definition of extremism, and thus the respondents provided a wide range of definitions, ranging from ‘someone who practices Islam fully’ to ‘violence towards innocent lives, using religion as an excuse’. FOSIS argue that varying interpretations of the term have an effect on the way that society, media and the government view Muslims. The lack of defining parameters means that it is difficult to know who is and is not an ‘extremist’. For FOSIS this means that when the government issues guidance or legislation:

‘the first thing it must do is provide a clear definition of the terminology, a process that must involve the Muslim community so that they feel that the definition is accurate. This will avoid much of the criticism currently facing new Government legislation.”

Concern about the use of the word ‘terrorism’ was also reported by respondents in a survey conducted by Gohir (2006) in the UK which compared the opinions of Muslim respondents with those classified as the ‘general public’ and as ‘Jewish respondents’. Eighty-six per cent of Muslim respondents felt that powerful states are deliberately misrepresenting terrorism, state terrorism and wars of liberation. This compares to 52 per cent of respondents classified as the ‘general public’ and 47 per cent of respondents classified as ‘Jewish respondents’. This difference in proportion of Muslim respondents agreeing with statement compared to proportions of ‘general public’ and ‘Jewish’ respondents was interpreted as a significant problem affecting relations between the West and the Muslim world. The author argues that ‘this highlights the need for a definition of terror and terrorism which is accepted by the West as well as the Muslim world.’

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48 FOSIS (2005): pg 42.
Using terms such as ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ interchangeably

In one local study conducted in Barking and Dagenham, the authors Belur and Begum (2008) felt it was important to point out that the members of the Muslim communities they consulted with often used the terms terrorism and extremism interchangeably. The authors go on to argue that the terms are not in fact synonymous and that there are ‘value judgements involved in establishing the definition of extremism’ which may differ depending on the point of view of the person making the judgement.

4.2.3 VIOLENT EXTREMISM AS CRIMINAL ACTS

One local level qualitative engagement study by McDonald et al (2008) of medium quality provided evidence that suggests that Muslim communities in two local areas regard violent extremism as criminal acts.

The authors reported that respondents from the Pakistani community in Redbridge viewed such terrorist acts as criminal, while respondents from the Somali community in Ealing felt that, irrespective of beliefs and background, acts of terrorism against all people were in fact criminal acts that went against the teachings of Islam. They referred to individuals who carry out such acts as ‘extremist criminals.’

4.3 Objective 3: Reasons for supporting/condemning violent extremism

Key themes

A considerable number of attitudinal surveys, polls and local level qualitative studies have explored Muslim respondents’ reasons for supporting or condemning violent extremism. The key themes that will be explored in this section are:

- Islam as a reason for condemnation
- defending Islam as a reason for support
  - general acts of violence
  - attacks on Danish embassies.
- foreign policies as a reason for support/cause of violent extremism
  - 7/7 attacks and the US ‘war on terror’
  - British invasion of Iraq as reason for 7/7 attacks
  - British foreign policy in general and across a range of countries.
- degree of religiosity and condemnation/support for violent extremism
- discrimination, deprivation and empowerment as reasons for support/causes of violent extremism.

50 Belur, J; Begum, B (2008): pg 16.
4.3.1 ISLAM AS A REASON FOR CONDEMNATION

A small number of qualitative engagement studies in Redbridge (2) have explored different local Muslim communities’ understanding of violent extremism and its causes. The studies were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN, 2008a: Low; 2008b: Medium. When the respondents in these studies were asked to elaborate on the reasons for their condemnation of violent extremism the communities emphasise that Islam in fact demands such condemnation. This was in addition to such acts being perceived as criminal in nature.

In one local study with the Pakistani community in Redbridge by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008a), participants were open in their condemnation of violent extremism. They expressed anger and concern that violent extremists distorted Islam to promote intolerance, anger and hatred, and then used this unrepresentative version of Islam to recruit vulnerable young people. They considered this an abuse of their faith and were extremely concerned about the damage done to the reputation and image of Islam by violent extremists. They emphasised that as a religion, Islam is about peace and tolerance and that acts of violence against others as well as taking one’s own life ‘is not permitted’52.

Similar views were expressed by Muslim participants in another local study in Redbridge by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008b). They emphasised that Islam as a religion does not permit violence or preach hatred and in fact emphasises tolerance and democracy.

4.3.2 DEFENDING ISLAM AS REASON FOR SUPPORT

A small number of polls and attitudinal surveys (2) have asked Muslim respondents to consider the extent to which violent acts are justifiable in order to defend Islam from perceived hostiles. Some surveys focus on general acts of violence whereas others refer to specific instances of violence, for example the attacks on Danish embassies after the publication of the cartoons depicting Mohammed. The studies were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: ICM, 2005: Low; Pew, 2006: Medium.

General acts of violence

A Pew global attitudes survey (2006) reports that 3 and 12 per cent of Muslim respondents felt that ‘suicide bombings against civilian targets’ could ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ (respectively) be justified ‘in order to defend Islam’. However, the addition of the clause ‘in order to defend Islam’ could potentially have encouraged emotive responses or imply the existence of a state of war or conflict. For example, a similar question in a 1990 Trust survey (2006) which omitted the clause and asked Muslim respondents about the extent to which ‘acts of terrorism against civilians’ were justifiable found that only 2 per cent of respondents agreed.

52 International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008a): pg 49.
An ICM poll of Muslims for the Telegraph in 2006 asked respondents whether it was ‘right or wrong’ for ‘Muslim demonstrators to carry placards calling for the killing of those who insult Islam.’ A significant majority (82%) of respondents felt that it was ‘wrong’ with only 12 per cent responding that it was ‘right’. However, without any context or knowledge of the extent to which respondents interpret the question from a freedom of expression perspective it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the 12 per cent level of support. The poll also asked respondents whether it was right or wrong to exercise violence against those who are deemed by religious leaders to have insulted them with 79 per cent responding it was ‘wrong’ and 13 per cent responding it was ‘right’. A further 7 per cent responded ‘don’t know’ and 1 per cent ‘refused’.

Attacks on Danish embassies

The 2006 ICM poll for the Telegraph discussed above also asked respondents whether it was ‘right or wrong’ for Muslims to ‘attack Danish embassies in Muslim countries as a result of the publication of the cartoons’ with a majority of 82 per cent thinking it was wrong and 14 per cent thinking it was right.

4.3.3 FOREIGN POLICY AS A REASON FOR SUPPORT/CAUSE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (4) have asked Muslim respondents to consider whether violent extremism is caused by or justifiable because of Britain’s foreign policies, for example support for the US ‘war on terror’ or the situation in Palestine. Additionally, a number of local level qualitative studies (3) have also explored Muslim communities’ understanding of the extent to which Britain’s foreign policies contribute to the causes of and support for violent extremism. It is important to note that in the attitudinal studies and the local level qualitative studies, respondents are often expressing opinions about causes of violent extremism rather than indicating their own support for violent extremism as a result of Britain’s foreign policies. Studies have asked respondents to consider a range of foreign policies and the evidence indicates that attitudes vary across these policies. The majority of studies did not focus on any particular sub-groups. However, the FOSIS (2005) survey focused on British Muslim students.

7/7 attacks and the US ‘war on terror’

A GfK NOP survey of Muslims (2006) of medium quality asked respondents to consider the extent to which they agreed that the 7/7 bombings were ‘justified’ because of ‘British support for the US war on terror’. Sixty-one per cent of respondents disagreed (strongly disagree and tend to disagree) and 22 per cent agreed (strongly agree and tend to agree). Young people between the ages of 18-24 years were more likely to strongly agree (16%) than those between the ages of 25-44 years (10%) and those over 45 years (7%). There was also a comparatively high number of ‘don’t know’ responses to this question: 17 per cent overall, with the figure rising to 20 per cent for women.
**British invasion of Iraq as reason for 7/7 attacks**

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Populus, 2006: Low.

The Populus poll of Muslims (2006) asked respondents the extent to which they agreed that ‘the British invasion of Iraq was the principal reason for the London bomb attacks’. Half the respondents agreed with 31 per cent strongly agreeing and 19 per cent tending to agree.

Similarly, a FOSIS (2005) survey of British Muslim students indicated that almost two-thirds (62%) of respondents felt that British foreign policy played a ‘major’ or ‘complete’ role in ‘causing the London bombings’. The author argues that:

‘a primary concern is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which feeds widespread frustration at the inaction of the international community in the face of repeated Israeli aggression’

and that:

‘a common perception is that while Western states frequently declare their disdain over human rights abuses and the repression of political opposition by these regimes, oil interests are more important.\(^5^3\)

Please note that the findings from the FOSIS survey should be interpreted with caution as the authors are clear that the sample was not meant to be representative and that convenience and ‘snowball’ sampling methodologies were used. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the findings from both these studies simply indicate respondents’ opinions about the cause of the attacks rather than any support they may have for the attacks for reasons based on foreign policy.

**British foreign policy in general and across a range of countries**

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with individual quality assessments as follows: 1990 Trust, 2006: Low; Hamid, 2007: Low; Mogahed, 2007: Low; International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN, 2008: Low; 2008b: Medium; Ryan et al, 2008: Medium.

A survey of Muslims by the 1990 Trust (2006) asked respondents who felt that there was an increased threat of terrorism in the UK since the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 9 September 2001 (9/11) (79% of their sample) why they thought this was so. ‘Disagreement with Britain’s foreign policy’ accounted for 61 per cent of the responses from this group. Additionally, 74 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘if American and British troops were to leave Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat of terrorism in the UK would decrease’.

\(^5^3\) FOSIS (2005): pg 48.
The respondents were also asked whether ‘the situation in Palestine was a cause for radicalisation in the UK’. Approximately eight out of ten (78%) respondents agreed. The author argues that:

‘although it cannot be specified exactly how much influence it bears on Muslim thinking…there is a definite perceived feeling that the situation in Palestine has not been effectively dealt with by the main players, including the West. "

However, this again indicates opinions about the causes of the increased threat of terrorism and radicalisation rather than personal reasons for support.

A study by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN in Ealing (2008) reported that local Muslim communities regarded foreign policy as a contributing factor to young people’s vulnerability to support for violent extremism. The authors report that an:

‘invocation of injustice of British/Western foreign policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East is a means by which individuals were persuaded into support for and into joining causes of violent extremism.""

This view was also echoed by an ex-member of Hizb ut-Tahrir in a qualitative study by Hamid (2007) who argued that ‘a heightened perception of Muslims and Muslim countries being unjustly attacked" was one reason that Muslims joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain.

A study by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN in Redbridge (2008b) found that respondents felt that the issue of British Foreign policy was often exploited by violent extremists to ‘increase credence for and interest in their cause.""

Additionally, Ryan et al (2008) report that young Muslims in Barnet also agree that a sense of frustration with the ongoing situation in Iraq may make people more vulnerable to violent extremism.

In his review of polls and surveys, Saggar (2006) argues that one of the main reasons that:

‘threats of religious and political extremism can be mapped to’ is ‘the proximity of international Islamic political grievance. There has been a rapid absorption of collective grievance which, in turn has been distilled into a common bond of faith. Thus, conflict in Israel/Palestine is linked to Kashmir, and to Aceh, Chechnya, Bosnia and beyond – all too often by the click of a mouse.""
Finally, Mogahed (2007) argues that:

‘the real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others who condemn them is about politics, not religion or culture. This theme pervades the Islamic world’s views of the West: Muslims’ negative views fall along political, not cultural or religious lines. While many in the Muslim world tend to have unfavourable rather than favourable opinions of the United States and Great Britain, they tend to have neutral to favourable opinions of France, Germany, and especially Canada.’

This notion of ‘collective grievance’ and the political nature of support for violent extremism indicates that British foreign policy in its entirety and across a range of countries may also contribute to compounding levels of support.

4.3.4 DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AND CONDEMNATION/SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A number of attitudinal surveys and polls (3) that have asked Muslim respondents about the extent to which violent extremism is justifiable across a range of contexts have also reported on levels of religiosity and the extent to which this has an impact on levels of support and condemnation. The studies were of low to medium quality with the following individual quality assessments: GfK NOP, 2006: Medium; Mogahed, 2007: Low; Gallup, 2009: Medium.

**Condemnation of attacks against civilians**

The results of the 2009 Gallup global study of interfaith relations in Britain, France and Germany indicated that British Muslims for whom religion is important were at least as likely (90%) as British Muslims for whom religion is not important (87%) to say that ‘attacks against civilians’ cannot be ‘morally justified.’

A survey conducted by Mogahed (2007) reports that London Muslims were just as likely (88%) as the general public (92%) to feel that such attacks were ‘never morally justified’. This study also reported a high degree of religiosity amongst Muslim respondents with 88 per cent reporting that ‘religion was an important part of their lives’ and 69 per cent identifying ‘extremely’ or ‘very strongly’ with their religion.

**Condemnation of attacks for a noble cause**

The Gallup study of interfaith relations (2009) discussed above also found that British Muslims for whom religion is an important part of life were at least as likely (49%) as those for whom it is not important (42%) to think that ‘violence for a noble cause’ ‘cannot be justified’. Once again, this implies that degree of religiosity does not appear to be a factor in supporting or condemning violent extremism.

Condemnation of violence for political ends

A GfK NOP (2006) survey of Muslims reported that respondents that never attend mosques were more likely to strongly disagree (77%) with the statement that it was ‘acceptable for religious or political groups to use violence for political ends’ than those who attend at least once a week (69%). On the other hand, there was no real difference amongst respondents for whom religion was important (73% strongly disagreed) and for whom religion was not important (71% strongly disagreed).

Foreign policy as reason for support

The GfK NOP survey of Muslims (2006) discussed above also asked respondents to consider the extent to which they agreed that the July bombings were ‘justified’ because of ‘British support for the US war on terror’. Those respondents that attended mosque at least once a week were more likely to strongly disagree (55%) than those that never attended mosque (45%).

These findings do not imply a clear relationship between religiosity and supporting or condemning violent extremism. In some instances religiosity does appear to slightly reduce levels of support. However, the extent to which these differences between the sub-groups reported above are statistically significant is not clear as there is a lack of reporting or discussion about the statistical significance of findings across the survey reports.

4.3.5 DISCRIMINATION, DEPRIVATION AND EMPOWERMENT AS REASONS FOR SUPPORT/CAUSE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A number of local level qualitative studies (4) explored different local Muslim communities’ understanding of the causes of violent extremism and factors that contribute to support for it. Amongst the factors discussed are discrimination, deprivation and empowerment. In a few of these studies, the respondents condemn violent extremism openly whereas in other studies there seems to be the assumption by the authors that respondents reject violent extremism. Additionally, respondents tend to use the terminology ‘causes of’ and ‘support for’ violent extremism almost interchangeably. As before, the evidence presented in this section needs to be interpreted with the caveat that perceptions of the causes of extremism are not necessarily the same as reasons for support of violent extremism.

Discrimination and deprivation

The studies discussed in this section were all of low quality: Sanghera and Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert, 2007: Low; International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN, 2008, 2008a: Low.

Discrimination and deprivation were often viewed by the local Muslim communities as factors that can increase young people’s vulnerability to support, and be recruited by, violent extremists.
A local Muslim study in Ealing, reported on by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN (2008), found that respondents felt that violent extremism and Islamophobia were ‘two sides of the same coin’ with the latter providing the ‘hunting ground’ for the former. Additionally, deprivation was thought to make people more vulnerable because they are more likely to be ‘weak’, ‘left out’, ‘in need’ or ‘not have any future’. However, the respondents also felt that ‘support for violent extremism is not exclusively an issue of poverty or deprivation’ as they recognised that a number of violent extremists have had professional backgrounds.

A study by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at UCLAN in Redbridge (2008a) found that respondents felt that deprivation and discrimination made young people more vulnerable by excluding them and undermining their connection with and commitment to the society and state.

A qualitative study by Sanghera and Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert (2007) with young men and women between the ages of 16 and 27 in Bradford found that young men often talk about turning ‘towards [extremist] groups’ as a reaction to Islamophobia whereas young women felt it was more important to educate people and challenge negative stereotypes and prejudices.

**Empowerment**

The studies discussed in this section were both of low quality: Lewis, 2007: Low; Hamid, 2007: Low.

Lewis (2007) reviews the case of Shiraz Maher who was once the Leeds regional organiser for Hizb ut-Tahrir and reports that young people turn to such groups as a means of empowerment as they encourage participation in public life, education and political activism. Shiraz argues that support for the group stems from young people’s desire to break free of the Biradari system which some perceive as subjugating young people to the community and to elders. Turning to groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is thus an empowering process as they encourage participation in public life, education and political activism. Lewis reports that the same was true of another young woman from the East End for whom radical Islam became attractive as it offered clear messages and served as away to break free from a traditional patriarchal structure.

Hamid (2007) reports that a number of ex-members of Hizb ut-Tahrir agree that their attraction to the group was a result of personal insecurities and feeling disempowered. For one ex-member:

‘the idea of being part of an elite group, who appeared intellectual, focused...was very attractive. It felt as if I was part of something big. This party was going somewhere and it was exciting to be part of it.’

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61 ibid: pg 26.
62 Ibid: pg 27.
Selective international evidence

This section presents selective evidence from a handful of international documents in order to provide a snapshot of reasons for supporting or condemning violent extremism across Europe. As mentioned earlier, these findings are meant to present alternative perspectives and are not necessarily generalisable or translatable to the UK context.

Islam as a reason for condemnation of violent extremism

A Change Institute qualitative study (2008) reported that respondents from Denmark unanimously condemned the London bombings and 9/11 which they saw as being a result of ‘jihadi’ thinking and a deliberate misinterpretation of Islam. They also expressed anger at Al-Qaeda who they felt were abusing their faith for political and ideological causes that had nothing to do with religion. In Buijs’ (2009) study with self-identified Salafi Muslims he reports that apolitical Salafis condemned 9/11 and the Van Gogh murder on the grounds that it was un-Islamic. They felt that there was no place for politics in religion, and that the perpetrators were not in fact Muslims and that violence itself is counter-productive.

Defending Islam as a reason for support

A Pew global attitudes study (2006) found that 16% per cent of Muslim respondents in France and Spain, respectively, felt that ‘violence against civilian targets’ can ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ ‘be justified to defend Islam’. The level of support fell to 7 per cent for German Muslim respondents. As discussed earlier, in France and Spain, the addition of the clause ‘defend Islam against its enemies’ can potentially have encouraged emotive responses or imply the existence of a state of conflict.

Foreign policy as a reason for support/cause of violent extremism

In Pargeter’s work (2006) with North African immigrants across Europe she found that Europe’s continuing economic and trade relationship with Algeria regardless of the abuse of human rights by the existing regime was a cause of frustration amongst Algerian radicals. However, the author argues that ‘although these radicals have a strong dislike for the West in general, attacking it or its targets is still viewed by these individuals primarily as a means of effecting change in their countries of origin.’

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4.4 Objective 4: Patterns of change in attitudes

Gaps identified

There is no coverage in the literature of how attitudes have changed and the reasons for change. Additionally, given the challenges associated with data and methods elaborated on in Section 2 of this report, it is difficult to compare findings across studies to identify any patterns of change.

4.5 Objective 5: Attitudes and the link to behaviour

Key themes

A small number of studies, primarily local level qualitative studies, explored the extent to which a rejection of violent extremism would result in speaking out against or reporting violent extremist activity. The respondents in these studies identified a number of reasons for not reporting or speaking out against any known violent extremist activity:

- a lack of trust in police and other authorities
  - lack of trust and fear of police
  - responsibility of Muslims to report planning of acts of terrorism.
- other reasons for not reporting (sense of loyalty to other Muslims).

These are discussed in more detail opposite.
4.5.1 LACK OF TRUST IN POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

A number of local qualitative studies (3) found that Muslim respondents were wary of the police and unsure as to whether they would report any suspected violent extremist activity. This was also the case in a small number of attitudinal surveys (2) that asked Muslims to consider how they would behave if they had a knowledge of violent extremist activity. This reluctance to report such activity was often due to respondents’ fear of the potential negative impact on their lives.

Lack of trust and fear of police

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with the individual quality assessments as follows: FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Blick et al, 2006: Low; Ryan et al, 2009: Medium; Belur and Begum, 2008: Low.

A survey of British Muslim students by FOSIS (2005) found that the majority (72%) of respondents would ‘inform the police straight away’ if they thought ‘a fellow Muslim was planning an attack’ and that 48 per cent of the rest would ‘try to talk them out of it and then inform the police.’

One local study by Belur and Begum (2008) in Barking and Dagenham asked Muslim respondents to consider whether or not they would inform the police if they suspected any violent extremist activity in the area. Results indicated that the local Muslim community had over-riding mistrust in, as well as fear of, the police. This is in line with much of the wider literature on the sometimes troubled relationship between the police and ethnic minority groups.67,68,69,70 The authors reported that the lack of trust was a result of previous negative experiences with the police where the suspicions the respondents had reported had been dismissed almost immediately because of lack of proof. This discouraged respondents from approaching the police in the future with any further suspicions they may have. Respondents also often reported that troubled relations and conflict with police in their countries of origins had led to their reluctance to engage with the police. For other respondents, their status as illegal immigrants also meant that they were reluctant to approach the police. Finally, some respondents reported having no confidence or trust in the police’s ability to tackle other crimes, let alone violent extremist activity. However, it is important to remember that these findings reflect the views of a group of people in one local area and there is thus a need to be cautious in the interpretation of the findings and the extent to which they are representative of wider Muslim communities.

In another study, Blick et al. (2006) found that young Muslims feared that the police may over-react or misuse their powers. The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 was an example of the kind of over-reaction that the young people feared. Young people feared that they would be subjected to long interrogations and perhaps have their houses raided as a result of police thinking they were also part of the activity. One respondent indicated that there was a need for the authorities to demonstrate convincingly that those reporting any suspicions of violent extremist activity would not themselves be treated with suspicion. The study also reported that respondents were concerned about their own safety and feared that the reported extremist’s associates may target them.

In their engagement with young people in Barnet, Ryan et al. (2008) reported that respondents were often unwilling to speak out against other people as the police were commonly seen as the ‘enemy’.71

Responsibility of Muslims to report planning of acts of terrorism

A medium quality survey of Muslims by GfK NOP (2006) asked respondents what they thought of ‘a Muslim that knew about an act of terrorism that was being planned by a Muslim and did not report it to the authorities’. The majority felt that Muslims who did not report it to the authorities had some degree of culpability in the act. Nearly half (47%) felt that the Muslims who did not report it to the authorities would be ‘as much to blame as those involved in the planning of it’. A further 30 per cent felt that Muslims who did not report the planning of an act of terrorism would not be ‘as much to blame as those involved in planning the terrorist act, but still to blame for not reporting it’. Only 9 per cent felt that Muslims who did not report the planning of an act of terrorism would not be ‘at all to blame’. Respondents identified as ‘first generation Muslims’ were more likely (11%) than those identified as ‘second generation Muslims’ (7%) to think they were not at all to blame, although the report does not make it clear whether ‘first generation Muslims’ refers to people born outside of the UK. This was also the case for those respondents that attend mosque at least once a week (12%) compared to those that never attend (7%).

4.5.2 OTHER REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING

The studies discussed in this section were of low to medium quality with the following individual quality assessments: FOSIS, 2005: Medium; Saggar, 2006: Low.

A FOSIS survey (2005) found that 20 per cent of Muslims would not inform the police of any known extremist activity, with 2 per cent reporting that this was because they ‘would never grass on a Muslim’,72 6 per cent not specifying why, 10 per cent giving no response, and 2 per cent reporting fear or mistrust of the police. The findings from the FOSIS survey should be treated with caution due to the authors’ own admission that:

‘the student sample may have been biased towards those Muslim students who are of a more religious inclination: those who are involved in their own Islamic society, who have had previous contact with FOSIS, or who attended one or more Islamic conference.’73
4.6 Gaps identified

In assessing the extent to which existing literature provided evidence against each of the CLG’s stated needs, a number of key gaps are identified below:

**Objective 1: Attitudes towards violent extremism**

- The studies reviewed assess support and condemnation of violent extremism across a range of specific contexts. For example, national versus international violence, the 7/7 bombings and violence for political/noble reasons. Levels of support vary across these contexts and thus it is difficult to create an overall picture.
- Additionally, there is a lack of correlation between different sets of individually-reported findings, so difficult to establish whether responses to one finding explains variances in responses to another.
- Although there is some sub-group analysis, for example by age, gender, religiosity, there is very limited indication or discussion of sampling methodologies and statistical precision and thus the significance of observed differences in the findings.
- There is limited sub-group analysis, with little to no analysis by, for example, socio-economic factors, ethnicity, sects, local areas, all of which were outlined as areas of interest in CLG’s specification for the review.
- The findings have indicated some differences in attitudes relating to mosque attendance and preference for Shariah law. However, these findings are based on studies for which sampling methodologies and statistical precision are unclear. Further research would need to be done to identify the extent to which these findings are real.
- The variability in the terminology used across the literature as well as the variability in the response options available in attitudinal surveys and polls has made it difficult to compare across studies.

**Objective 2: Understanding of violent extremism**

- There is no coverage in the literature of the factors that influence Muslim communities’ understanding of violent extremism. However, findings for objective 3 indicate that Islam is often cited as a reason for condemning violent extremism as criminal acts. This implies that religion is a source of understanding violent extremism as ‘criminal’.
- The wide range of terminology used (terrorism, radicalisation etc) have made it difficult for Muslim communities to understand or define violent extremism themselves.
Objective 3: Reasons for support/condemnation

- As discussed above, the studies reviewed explore reasons for support and condemnation of violent extremism across a range of contexts. For example, to defend Islam or state of war in foreign Muslim countries. As levels of support due to these reasons are tied to particular contexts, it is not possible to generalise and compare findings across contexts.

- As identified in the findings, there is a need to understand the nuances of the Muslim communities’ understanding of the causes of violent extremism and the reasons for supporting violent extremism.

- It is difficult to identify specific reasons for supporting violent extremism as the ‘act of supporting’ is a dynamic process which can involve the interaction of a number of contextual factors. The literature tends to focus on the process of radicalisation or third party perspectives on the causes that lead an individual to use violence to promote extremist ideology with limited discussion about the reasons for support for violent extremism.

Objective 4: Patterns of change

- There is no coverage in the literature of how attitudes have changed and the reasons for change.

- Given the challenges associated with data and methods elaborated on in Section 2 of this report, it is difficult to compare findings across studies to identify any patterns of change.

Objective 5: Attitudes and the link to behaviour

- There has been very little research done about the link between attitudes and behaviour. It is mostly covered in local level qualitative studies and the findings are thus not generalisable.

- The little coverage there is, seems to be related to perceptions of future behaviour. There is no clarity about whether the findings are related to perceived or actual behaviours. That is, respondents who reject violent extremism think that given any knowledge of violent extremist activity, they would report it OR respondents who reject violent extremism have known about extremist activity and have reported it.

- There is no coverage in the literature reviewed of the context surrounding the link between attitudes and behaviours. For example, reporting suspected violent extremist activity can also depend on who the perpetrators are and how much the informers may know or not know.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and key learning points

Gaps in the evidence base

This literature review has described in depth the paucity of high quality evidence on the attitudes of Muslim communities towards violent extremism. This creates particular challenges at this stage, and without further research, for policy development on how to effectively address, and necessarily challenge, support for violent extremism. There appear to be particular gaps in the following areas of evidence:

- High quality quantitative survey evidence which explores the views of a representative sample of Muslims, including representative sub groups of Muslim communities.
- High quality qualitative research studies, which adopt a rigorous approach to sampling, thereby taking into account the enormous heterogeneity of the Muslim community.
- High quality studies which explore current approaches being used by practitioners to challenge the views of violent extremists and the relative success of these. This could include, for example, rigorous evaluations which explore ‘what works’ in challenging and undermining these views where they arise. This pragmatic focus can provide much needed balance to the theoretical and conceptual literature.
- High quality studies which explore the link, and the factors which support, people moving from a view which is supportive of violent extremism toward becoming actively involved in violent extremist groups.

Language

There is some evidence that there is a lack of a common understanding or language which defines violent extremism:

‘the first thing it (the government) must do is provide a clear definition of the terminology, a process that must involve the Muslim community so that they feel that the definition is accurate. This will avoid much of the criticism currently facing new government legislation.’

74 FOSIS (2005): Pg 42.
This misuse of the terminology around violent extremism can lead some in the Muslim community to argue that Islam is often linked with violent extremism, even though the majority of Muslims condemn violent extremism and use Islam, and its focus on peacefulness and acceptance of others, to condemn violence. As discussed in the findings, this misuse of terminology can have a negative impact on Muslims communities. Terms such as ‘radicalism’, ‘extreme’, ‘Islamist’ and ‘fundamentalism’ are too often conflated to mean ‘violent extremism’, even though those who ascribe to one of these terms do not necessarily support, or engage, in violence. Equally, those who engage in right wing extremism are not necessarily violent. A key learning point to consider is:

- Prevent practitioners should ensure that publications, guidance, commissioned research, communications materials are checked to ensure that a consistent terminology is applied in relation to violent extremism.

Working with Muslim communities

There is evidence in the literature that many in Muslim communities seek to be actively involved in assisting with any future work that seeks to challenge those who support violent extremism, with some believing that research in the past has been ‘done to them’ not with them. The evidence shows that Islam and those who practice the faith, are themselves the most important challenge to those who may support violent extremism, using the faith and the Quran to counter the arguments posed by those who support violence. A key learning point to consider is:

- It is important for further research studies relevant to violent extremism to actively involve Muslims at all levels in the design and delivery of research, involving those with a deep understanding of the community and the religion to identify ways to counter those who support violent extremism.

Factors that are related to attitudes to violent extremism

Due to the limitations of the evidence, we are not in the position to generalise about most of the factors associated with attitudes about violent extremism. However, the issue of foreign policy and the perceived injustices against Muslims abroad appears to arise most often as a factor which contributes to attitudes. In our work elsewhere on the Prevent agenda, we have consistently found that, while some people will never agree with aspects of UK foreign policy, they are more likely to understand the position of the government, if they are actively enabled to engage in the debate, receive clear communications and rationale for policies, and feel they have a voice. A key learning point to consider is:

75 For example: West London Alliance: Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism pathfinder activity, 2007-08.
It is important to ensure that foreign policy is communicated by providing clear messages about policies and why certain decisions have been taken, using a range of channels to communicate with different parts of the community, particularly young people, and providing safe spaces in which people can air their grievances.

Layers of influence

It is clear that the factors and contexts related to attitudes towards violent extremism are extremely complex. There are also significant gaps in the evidence base. One useful conceptual model through which to view the varying factors recognises that people as individuals exist in a nested hierarchy of social aggregates. The model is visualised in the diagram below.

---

In the centre of the diagram is an ‘individual’ with his or her set of characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status etc). The next circle represents immediate networks such as ‘family and household’. The characteristics of the family and household, the family structure, strength of family relationships are all important here. The circle around this is the ‘local community’ where a range of community characteristics will be important such as levels of community cohesion, levels of civic participation, strength of community leadership, levels of deprivation, geographical location, etc. The next circle is ‘organisations and institutions’ where characteristics such as types and membership are also of importance (mosques, youth clubs, community organisations etc.) Lastly, the outer circle represents wider society, attitudes and behaviours, which could include attitudes towards foreign policy, the role of police and criminal justice, and levels of tolerance and attitudes to race and faith.

The utility of this conceptual model is that it draws attention to the fact that attitudes and behaviours are not pre-determined by any inherent characteristics of an individual or some other organisation or groups of people. Instead the linkages can be complex and are influenced by the interactions across the different ‘layers’. The key learning point to consider is:

- Seeking to understand how attitudes, whether supportive or condemnatory, towards violent extremism are shaped requires an approach to research that explores all of these layers and the relationship between them. This can also lend itself to providing greater clarity about the contexts and issues on which Muslim attitudes are sought. Research that explores a range of potential relationships between these layers of factors and particular individuals who are at risk from, or are already with, extremists could provide powerful evidence of the relative importance of, and links between, different factors and people’s behaviours.
### Appendices – Appendix 1

#### Search terms used

**Broad Search Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 1: What Muslim communities’ attitudes are towards violent extremism</th>
<th>Objective 3: The reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2: What Muslim communities understand by ‘violent extremism’ and how this understanding is shaped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Attitude
- Islam
- Discrimination
- Violent
- Extremism
- Ideology
- Support
- Challenge
- Condemn
- Reject
- Agree
- Understand
- Aware
- Perception
- Argument
- Media
- Terror
- Radical

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<th>Sub-Group 1: Types of Reasons</th>
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<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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<td>- Deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Faith</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Dispute</td>
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<td>- Tension</td>
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<td>- Integration</td>
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<td>- Segregation</td>
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<td><strong>National</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Policy</td>
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<td>- Immigration</td>
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<table>
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<th>Sub-Group 2: Terminology</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Reason</td>
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<td>- Motive</td>
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77 At CEBPP’s recommendation, only search terms listed under objective 1 and 2 were included in the initial search in order to not be too restrictive.

78 Please note that search terms are used in a way that allows for all potential prefixes and suffixes to be included in the search.
### Revised Search Terms

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<th>Injustice</th>
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<td>Martyr</td>
<td>• Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convert</td>
<td>• Fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>• Al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
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Appendix 2
Database search results
### Initial database searches

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<th>Search strategy</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Total number of items identified</th>
<th>Number of items selected for exporting</th>
<th>Other comments</th>
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## Initial database searches

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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIP Evidence Bank</td>
<td>03.06.09</td>
<td>Limited search facility so could not use detailed search strategy. AG used terrorism, extremism or fundamentalism all in separate searches.</td>
<td>2000-09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No references.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google Scholar</td>
<td>03.06.09</td>
<td>((Islam* or muslim*) and (Injustice or martyr* or convert* or prejudice or marginal or Ummah or jihad or fundamental* or ‘al Qaeda’)) not (asia* or africa* or india* or turk* or china* or middle east or iran or iraq or indonesia or algeria or afghan* or Lebanon or Singapore Serbia or Israel or libya* or america* or united states or canada or egypt* or antisemit* or russia* or pakistan*)</td>
<td>2000-09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Search engine ignores ‘NOT’ set. Over 15,000 hits. No references selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</td>
<td>16.06.09</td>
<td>(Islam* or muslim*) and (Injustice or martyr* or convert* or prejudice or marginal or Ummah or jihad or fundamental* or ‘al Qaeda’)) not (asia* or africa* or india* or turk* or china* or middle east or iran or iraq or indonesia or algeria or afghan* or Lebanon or Singapore Serbia or Israel or libya* or america* or united states or canada or egypt* or antisemit* or russia* or pakistan*)</td>
<td>2007-09</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>36 (selected from first 160)</td>
<td>Duplications. International material,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsychInfo</td>
<td>16.06.09</td>
<td>(Islam* or muslim*) and (Injustice or martyr* or convert* or prejudice or marginal or Ummah or jihad or fundamental* or ‘al Qaeda’)) not (asia* or africa* or india* or turk* or china* or middle east or iran or iraq or indonesia or algeria or afghan* or Lebanon or Singapore Serbia or Israel or libya* or america* or united states or canada or egypt* or antisemit* or russia* or pakistan*)</td>
<td>2002-09</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Duplications, socio-psychological explorations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database/catalogue/searched</td>
<td>Date of search</td>
<td>Search strategy</td>
<td>Time period</td>
<td>Total number of items identified</td>
<td>Number of items selected for exporting</td>
<td>Other comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scopus</td>
<td>16.06.09</td>
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<td>2000-09</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Duplications, experience of racism/discrimination, paths to radicalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planex</td>
<td>17.06.09</td>
<td>((Islam* or muslim*) and (Injustice or martyr* or convert* or prejudice or marginal or Ummah or jihad or fundamental* or al Qaeda))</td>
<td>2000-09</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Government strategies, reviews of national local strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbadoc</td>
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<td>((Islam* or muslim*) and (Injustice or martyr* or convert* or prejudice or marginal or Ummah or jihad or fundamental* or ‘al Qaeda’))</td>
<td>2000-09</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Historical perspectives on radicalisation, home office documents and duplications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL catalogue</td>
<td>25.06.09</td>
<td>(Islam* or Muslim*) and (martyr* or fundamental*) and England</td>
<td>2000-09</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not relevant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix 3
## Website search results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tanks/NGOs/Centres</th>
<th>Report Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement and Development Agency</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Public Policy Research</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hiranthi Jayaweera and Tufyal Choudhury (2008) Immigration, faith and cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust</td>
<td>Andrew Blick, Tufyal Choudhury and Stuart Weir. The Rules of the Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy exchange</td>
<td>Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton (2009) Choosing our friends wisely: Criteria for engagement with Muslim groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOS</td>
<td>Jamie Bartlett. ‘Wicked’ jihad and the appeal of violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iCoCo</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Association</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Local Government Network</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Network</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Foundation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Policy Studies</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council for Voluntary Organisations</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR)</td>
<td>Fair (2004) A Submission to the Home Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into Terrorism and Social Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks/NGOs/Centres</td>
<td>Report Titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence,</td>
<td>None (great deal of International material)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre of Social Cohesion</td>
<td>Dr H. A. Hellyer (2007) <em>Ruminations and Reflections on British Muslims and Islam post 7 July</em> in <em>Islamic Political Radicalism in Europe</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sadek Hamid (2007) <em>Islamic Political Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizbut Tahrir</em> in Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Comparativ*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Muslim Research Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Government departments/                                      | Report Titles                                                                                                                                 |
| public bodies                                                |                                                                                                                                               |
| CLG                                                          | <strong>Tufyal Choudhury</strong> (April 2007) <em>The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation</em>                                                |
| DCSF                                                         | None                                                                                                                                          |
| Ministry of Justice                                          | None                                                                                                                                          |
| DIUS                                                         | <strong>DIUS, Association of Colleges</strong> (2008) <em>The Role of Further Education Providers in Promoting Community Cohesion, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism</em> |
| DCMS                                                        | None                                                                                                                                          |
| Audit Commission                                             | <strong>Audit Commission</strong> (Oct 2008) <em>Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise</em>                                           |
| Youth Justice Board                                          | None                                                                                                                                          |
| Metropolitan Police                                          | None                                                                                                                                          |
| Counter-terrorism Command                                    | None                                                                                                                                          |
| (Metropolitan Police Special Operations)                     | None                                                                                                                                          |
| NETCU                                                        | None                                                                                                                                          |
| PVE community of practice                                    | None (but has links to reports already on database)                                                                                         |
| Home affairs select committee reports                        | None (text of Hansard debates, but not particularly relevant to the central concerns of the review)                                        |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market research organisations</th>
<th>Report Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ipsos MORI,                   | Kully Kaur-Ballagan & Julia Pye (November 2007), *Muslim Attitudes – The Real Story*  
Julia Clark, Ben Marshall, Helen Coombs, Ben Page (February 2006), *Perception of Cartoons of Prophet Muhammad* |
| BMRB                          | None          |
| BMG                           | None          |
| GfK NOP                       | None          |
| Ecotec                        | None          |
| Tavistock Institute           | None          |
| Policy Studies Institute      | None          |
Appendix 4
Quality Standards for review

1. Census Bureau Standard: Minimal Information to Accompany any Report of Survey or Census Data
   1. The organizational sponsor(s) of a survey.
   2. The organization(s) that conducted it.
   3. The wording of questions asked and description of derived measures that are the subject of the report.
   4. A definition of the population under study, and a description of the sampling frame used to identify this population.
   5. A description of the sample design.
   6. The size of sample, and disposition of sample cases (e.g., numbers of interviewed cases, ineligible cases, and nonresponding cases).
   7. If applicable, information on eligibility criteria and screening procedures.
   8. A discussion of the statistical precision of the results, at least for the major estimates.
      This could include estimates of sampling variances, standard errors, or coefficients of variation, or presentation of confidence intervals.
   9. Description of estimation procedures, including weighting, editing, and imputation methods.
   10. If applicable, clear indication of which results are based on parts of the sample, rather than on the total sample.
   11. Method and dates of data collection.
   12. Discussion of nonsampling errors that may (or are known to) affect the data.
   13. Discussion of methods employed to ensure data quality.

2. EPPI Centre – Qualitative research quality standards
   1. Aims clearly stated.
   2. Context of study clearly described.
   3. Sample clearly described.
   4. Methods clearly described.
   5. Attempts to establish reliability and/or validity of data analysis.
## Appendix 5

### Data extraction sheet

**Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism among Muslim communities in the UK – Data extraction template**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date published</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID Number (from spreadsheet)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date document analysed by OPM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology** – consider
- the research questions/hypotheses posed;
- the research design;
- the sampling strategy (including sample size and response rates in quantitative research);
- the nature and quality of the fieldwork;
- the process of analysis; and
- the nature and robustness of findings.

**Sector background of published document** – (e.g. academic discipline, health, organisational development, policy guidance etc)

**Sample group discussed**, e.g.
- age
- gender
- ethnicity
- country of birth
- level of religious affiliation
- denomination

**Geographical focus**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence/information relating to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• What Muslim communities’ attitudes are towards violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What people understand by ‘violent extremism’ and how this understanding is shaped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism. (e.g. do feelings of condemnation for violent extremism lead to people actively challenge extremist ideology?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key conclusions of study**

Additional references to obtain *(add to spreadsheet)*
Appendix 6
Searching and reviewing methodology

1. Initial and revised search of databases

Representatives from CLG and OPM agreed that a flexible approach needed to be adopted towards database searches, underpinned by an iterative process of progressive and informed filtering based on the findings of preceding searches and decisions that are co-generated by both parties. The review was initiated by conducting a series of broad searches to ascertain the broad contours of the terrain. It was agreed that the aim of these broad searches was to identify the extent and type of relevant literature available on the databases after which more informed decisions could be taken about the direction of the review.

It was also agreed that search terms used at this initial stage need to be sufficiently broad and avoid, as far as possible, the uncritical use of implicitly value-laden search terms that may have been developed by practitioners and others in the discourse around the Prevent agenda. At the same time the searches were conducted with the aim of ensuring that none of the critical items are missed.

The initial broad search terms were developed in accordance with the aims and objectives of the project and compiled by OPM and our literature search expert at CEBPP with contributions from various individuals from the CLG. At the initial stage a number of superficially more obvious search terms were not used (e.g. Iraq, Israel, mosque, madrassah). This was because material that would have been index or coded to these would almost certainly have been indexed/coded to one or more of the broader search terms. Through this process, OPM’s and CLG’s specialist and specific understanding of Prevent and of the Muslim communities within the UK added value to the search process. A full list of search terms used can be found in Appendix 1.

Our search expert conducted a total of 19 searches across 11 databases at this stage in the project. Searching involved a number of iterations where initial trawls are conducted to assess the usefulness of search terms. The experience of the initial searches fed into the refinement of search terms. Three general search strategies were used at this stage:

- General Full Search Strategy: For example, (Islam, Muslim etc) + (violence, extremism, fundamental, radical, terror) + (support, defend, condemn, agree, aware, understand etc).

- General Shortened Search Strategy: For example, (Islam, Muslim etc) + (violence, extremism, fundamental, radical, terror)

- General Simple Search Strategy: For example, (Violence) + (Extremism).
All material identified in each of the search iterations was shared with the CLG so as to inform timely decision-making around sharpening the focus of the search and subsequent review. As expected, there was a lack of empirical material. The majority of the literature was theoretical in nature (philosophical, policy or theoretical debates and explorations) rather than empirical (primary and secondary research/analyses). Although theoretical research provides useful framing narratives, it is the ‘data-driven’ empirical studies that are particularly relevant for this review. Appendix 2 illustrates the databases that were searched, the specific search strategies that were used and the results obtained.

At this stage, OPM produced a technical interim report that outlined the search methodologies and the literature identified. Following from this report, OPM and CLG worked collaboratively to take decisions about the best strategy to secure relevant material for the review.

A further attempt at searching databases was conducted using revised and new search terms suggested by CLG and narrowed down through further discussions with OPM. A full list of revised search terms used can be found in Appendix 1. Furthermore, a number of additional databases to be searched were identified by CLG, some which had already been searched as part of larger databases but which were searched using the new search terms and revised strategy. A total of 18 searches across 17 databases were conducted at this stage. The general search strategy used at this stage was:

- General Revised Search Strategy: For example, (Islam, Muslim etc) + (injustice, martyr, convert, prejudice, marginal, Ummah, jihad, fundamental, al Qaeda).

As expected, very little potentially relevant material was identified from the searches. Appendix 2 illustrates the databases that were searched, the specific search strategies that were used and the results obtained.

The search and reviewing process had thus been designed in a way that is robust, and where every effort has been made to ensure that no relevant item has been omitted erroneously. Nonetheless, preferring to err on the side of caution, OPM decided to review a larger number of documents identified even when they have been assessed as not being relevant from an initial assessment of keywords and abstract. This was to assure ourselves that we have not excluded anything potentially relevant erroneously. Although the process of searching and sifting had been rigorous and robust, it is widely recognised that abstracts can at times be poor reflections of the true content of the literature.

---

79 Please note that the division between ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ is not always hard and fast as most ‘empirical’ material contain an introductory theoretical discussion.
2. Input from experts and Prevent leads

OPM had initially proposed consulting with five experts involved in the generation and use of research and evidence in relation to attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK. These were intended to include practitioners, academics, policy makers and representatives from community groups.

A key member of our partnership, Asima Shaikh, has an extensive and established network of contacts of various key stakeholder groups particularly those from the community.

Consultation with experts is often a very effective way of identifying key sources of material (particularly grey literature) and is also effective for identifying very recent material that may not have been included on bibliographic search engines yet. Experts, particularly when they are drawn from a variety of background, can often give good indications of the importance of various sources of material (and different individual items).

However, as the search of databases pointed clearly to the fact that there is a dearth of relevant material indexed for inclusion on databases and following the submission of the interim report decisions were taken with CLG to expand the consultation with experts. Thirteen experts were contacted in total of which nine were academics based at universities across the UK and four were members of community networks and groups. They were asked for their assistance in providing the following types of relevant literature for the review:

- Engagement and fieldwork that has been undertaken with Muslims in the UK (e.g. consultations, focus groups, research, etc)
- Evaluations and reviews of Prevent projects
- Attitude studies and surveys.

OPM and CLG also agreed that consulting with Prevent leads across the UK could prove to be a valuable source of grey literature, particularly local level studies and evaluations. OPM directly contacted Prevent leads with whom we have existing relationships asking for assistance in providing the types of literature listed above. Fourteen regional Prevent leads were contacted and asked to forward the request for literature to local Prevent leads.

3. CLG and OPM documents

OPM were able to identify 21 studies and articles that had been collected over the course of a number of Prevent agenda projects. These consisted of a combination of attitudinal surveys, theoretical think pieces and small scale qualitative research studies. Additionally, CLG provided OPM with 18 research studies and articles which consisted of a number of polls, articles or very recently published reports and thus would not have been identified in our search.
4. Selective website searches

In light of the limited number of items identified, OPM and CLG agreed on a selective number of websites of a number of government departments, public bodies, think tanks, research centres, and market research organisations to search for potentially relevant grey literature. Thirty-eight websites were searched in total, a full list and results of which can be found in Appendix 3.

5. Defining inclusion and exclusion criteria

Following the broader search and initial input from experts, a set of inclusion/exclusion criteria was developed to generate a short-list of relevant material to be included in the review.

While there are examples of inclusion and exclusion standards being set prior to initial searches, this was not felt to be appropriate for the purpose of this literature review. Inclusion/exclusion standards were helpfully informed by initial searches as the latter yielded helpful clues as to the relative distribution of various sources of material and their likely content/quality. In searching and reviewing less well-researched areas, the imposition of objective inclusion/exclusion standards prior to any search being carried out can mean that potentially useful material is excluded. It can also mean that too few or too much literature is included in the review.\(^{80}\)

The eventual set of inclusion/exclusion criteria was agreed in consultation with CLG and included:

- Focus on project aims.
- Published between 2000-09.
- About Muslim communities in the UK.

As mentioned earlier, a handful of international documents identified in the searches would be included in order to provide CLG with a snapshot of attitudes towards violent extremism across Europe.

6. Review of evidence against quality standards

It was agreed that due to the lack of empirical data identified and the fact that the reporting of empirical studies that were identified did not always allow for a full assessment of quality, using stringent quality standards to exclude literature could potentially result in a very small number of documents for review. Decisions were made that OPM would review the full shortlist of literature identified but that all literature would be assessed against agreed quality standards in order to develop appropriate caveats for the interpretation of findings.

Material that met the inclusion standards was read and reviewed in full. To facilitate systematic extraction of key information, Data Extraction Sheets (DES) designed purposefully for this review was be used so that all relevant evidence is identified consistently, and in a way that facilitates answering the key review questions. The DES was designed in collaboration with CLG. A copy of the blank DES is provided in Appendix 5.

CLG had specified the need to consider the strengths and weaknesses of each identified study, including:

- The sampling strategy;
- The research questions/hypotheses posed;
- The research design;
- The nature and quality of the fieldwork; and
- The analysis.

Due to the diversity of material identified, different quality standards were used to assess reliability and validity of different studies, recognising the wider debates around appropriateness of standards in relation to different types of studies. 81,82,83

Recognising that surveys are often poorly reported it was agreed in consultation with CLG that the quantitative studies would be assessed using US Census Bureau standards (13 standards)84 on the minimal information to accompany any report of survey or census data. Similarly, given that the majority of qualitative studies were small local level studies, a set of five simple standards recommended by the EPPI-Centre (University of London, Institute of Education) were agreed with CLG to be most appropriate standards for the review. The full list of quality standards can be found in Appendix 4.

The quantitative studies reviewed were scored out of 13 and assigned ratings of low, medium or high quality based on comparative scoring. The rating categories were as follows:

- Low: >0 and \( \leq 8 \)
- Medium: > 8 and \( \leq 11 \)
- High: >11.


84 US Census Bureau (2006), Minimal information to accompany any report of survey or census data (http://www.census.gov/quality/S12-0_v1.2_Minimal_Info.pdf)
The qualitative studies reviewed were scored out of 5 and assigned ratings of low, medium and high quality as well:

- Low: $>0$ and $<3$
- Medium: $\geq 3$ and $\leq 4$
- High: $>4$

These rating categories were defined by considering the relative weight of the quality standards. A number of standards referred to very basic information that tends to accompany all studies and does not in fact shed very much light on the quality of the study.

For the quantitative studies these included: organisational sponsor of a survey; organisation that conducted it; the wording of the questions asked; and methods and dates of collection. For the qualitative studies these included: aims clearly stated, context clearly stated. These standards were thus given less weight when defining the rating categories of low, medium and high.

The more significant standards are those that shed more light on the quality of the study and are also less likely to accompany study reports. For the quantitative studies these included a discussion of the statistical precision of the results; description of estimation procedures; discussion of non-sampling errors and discussion of methods employed to ensure data quality. For the qualitative studies these included: attempts to establish reliability; methods clearly described.

Based on this assessment, it was felt that the categories defined above would ensure that studies that only met the less significant standards were not assigned an inflated rating and that studies that also met the more significant standards received an appropriate rating.

7. Final synthesis

The reviewed material was subjected to broad content analysis, with key themes and associations drawn out. The framework for synthesis and analysis was guided by research specification.

It is also worth noting that due to the paucity of robust empirical literature, OPM has reported on findings that may not be directly relevant to the objectives of the review but do in fact provide some valuable learning. For example, in section 4.3 we have included third party perspectives on the reasons for support/condemnation of violent extremism. Similarly, in section 4.4 we have included findings relating to how respondents who largely condemn violent extremism think they might behave if they became aware of violent extremist activity.
Appendix 7
Literature sift and shortlist process

Websites Searches
- 38 websites searched
- 16 potentially relevant
- 7 shortlisted

CLG documents
- 18 documents received
- 7 potentially relevant
- 3 shortlisted

Prevent Leads
- 14 regional leads contacted
- 4 responses
- 19 documents received
- 8 potentially relevant
- 5 shortlisted

Prevent experts
- 13 experts contacted
- 9 responses
- 15 documents received
- 14 potentially relevant
- 6 shortlisted

CEBBP database searches
- 18 databases searched
- 37 searches conducted
- 376 results sifted (abstracts)
- 18 potentially relevant
- 7 shortlisted

Documents held by
OPM documents
- 21 potentially relevant
- 11 shortlisted

4 shortlisted
376 shortlisted documents
21 wider selection
14 potentially relevant
15 documents received
19 responses
4 experts contacted
13 regional leads contacted
18 databases searched
37 searches conducted
376 results sifted (abstracts)
18 potentially relevant
7 shortlisted
Appendix 8

Material reviewed

Quantitative methodologies quality assessment categories: Low: >0 and ≤8; Medium: >8 and ≤11; High: >11

Qualitative and secondary methodologies quality assessment categories: Low: >0 and <3; Medium: ≥3 and ≤4; High: >4

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85 A number of unpublished reports have been included in this review, for which consent was obtained from the authors of the reports.

86 Studies were categorised as being of ‘low’ and ‘medium’ quality studies because they are not always reported in a way that allows a full assessment of ‘quality’ as defined for this review. This meant that methods used, the quality of data generated, the statistical significance of findings etc were often not clearly reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID number</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Published by</th>
<th>Type of evidence</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Geographical coverage</th>
<th>Quality assessment score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>FOSIS</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The voice of Muslim students</td>
<td>FOSIS</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey of British Muslim students. Convenience sampling. Participants recruited at Islamic seminars and conferences. Survey distributed via email to networks and contacts</td>
<td>466 – 45% male, 49% female</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Quant: 10/13, Medium: Qual: 2/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ICM Research</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Muslim Poll</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Dataset</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey of Muslims dataset. No information on methodology</td>
<td>500 Muslim respondents, 238 male, 262 female</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5/13, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Schbley, Ayla, McCauley, Clark</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Political, religious, and psychological characteristics of Muslim protest marchers in eight European cities: Jerusalem day 2002</td>
<td>Terrorism &amp; political violence. 17:4. pp.551-572. 2005 (Autumn)</td>
<td>Journal article</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey of Jerusalem day protest marchers. Respondents to first short survey that were most radical were chosen for the second survey</td>
<td>722 respondents to second survey, 72 Christian, Alevite, Druze, Druze, or other (dropped from sample). 380 Shia and 270 Sunni.</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>12/13 – High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>Geographical coverage</td>
<td>Quality assessment score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GfK NOP</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Attitudes To Living In Britain</td>
<td>GfK NOP</td>
<td>Presentation Dataset</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey. British Muslims 18+: Probability sample in neighborhoods where Muslim penetration was 5% or more. Random Digit Dialing</td>
<td>1,000 Muslims, 500 male, 500 female</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>9/13 – Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Gohir Shaista</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Understanding the other perspective: Muslim and non-Muslim relations</td>
<td>Muslim Voice UK</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey with Adults 18+. Randomly selected quota system on GMI’s Net-MR® market research platform for age, gender and geographical region. MVUK surveyed Muslim community</td>
<td>GMI: 1306, MVUK: 242 surveys Muslims</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10/13 – Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>ICM Research</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Muslim poll</td>
<td>The Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>Dataset</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey of Muslims dataset. No information on methodology</td>
<td>500 Muslim respondents, 250 male, 250 female</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5/13, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mascini, Peter</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Can the violent jihad do without sympathizers?</td>
<td>Paper presented at 'De dag van de Sociologie' in Tilburg, the Netherlands, 8 June 2006</td>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>Theoretical</td>
<td>Theoretical</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>Geographical coverage</td>
<td>Quality assessment score</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Saggar, Shamit</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The one per cent world: Managing the myth of Muslim religious extremism</td>
<td>JA Political science</td>
<td>Journal article</td>
<td>Theoretical and empirical. Secondary review of polls and surveys</td>
<td>Three polls/surveys reviewed</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.5/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The 1990 Trust</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects</td>
<td>The 1990 Trust</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey of Muslims. Convenience sampling. Posted on various Muslim websites</td>
<td>1,213 Muslim responses. 59% of respondents were male and 41% female</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7.5/13 – Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Hamid, Sadek</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Islamic Political Radical Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’</td>
<td>In Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective. Editor: T. Abbas</td>
<td>Chapter in book</td>
<td>Empirical. Qualitative research including interviews with six ex members of Hizb ut-Tahrir</td>
<td>Three male and three female ex-members of Hizb ut-Tahrir</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2.5/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
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<td>Quality assessment score</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Institute of Community Cohesion</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>A window on extremism: young people in Hounslow – a study of identity, social pressures, extremism and social exclusion</td>
<td>London borough of Hounslow</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Qualitative. In-depth interviews with community leaders. Focus groups with young Muslims</td>
<td>38 interviews, 19 focus group with total of 200 young people</td>
<td>London borough of Hounslow</td>
<td>2.5/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mogahed, Dalia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Beyond Multiculturalism vs. Assimilation</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey. London Muslims 15+: Probability sample in neighborhoods where Muslim penetration was 5% or more; General public 15+: Random Digit Dialing</td>
<td>London Muslims 500 interviews, General public – 1,200 interview</td>
<td>London Muslims and Great Britain</td>
<td>8/13 – Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Sanghera, Gurchathen and -Bjorkert, Suruchi Thapar</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Because I am Pakistani … and I am Muslim' Gendering Political Radicalism: Young femininities in Bradford’</td>
<td>In Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective, Editor: T. Abbas</td>
<td>Chapter in book</td>
<td>Empirical. Qualitative research including interviews with young men and women in Bradford</td>
<td>54 interviews with young men and women in Bradford. 25 male, 29 women age 16 – 27</td>
<td>Inner city Bradford</td>
<td>2.5/5, Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Atkins</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism Evaluation of ADAB in Bury</td>
<td>Atkins</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Qualitative evaluation of ADAB. Workshops, focus groups and observations of people involved with ADAB</td>
<td>Young people's workshop: 30 attendants</td>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>3/5, Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Change Institute for European Commission</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives</td>
<td>Change Institute for European Commission</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Empirical. Literature review and Qualitative research. Interviews across Denmark, France, Germany, UK with Muslim activists and radicals. Extensive stakeholder consultation to map the key issues, themes and actors in the UK which enabled access to interviewees</td>
<td>UK: 30, Denmark: 29, France: 26, Germany: 30</td>
<td>Denmark, France, Germany, UK</td>
<td>5/5, High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>Geographical coverage</td>
<td>Sample quality assessment score</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at the University of Central Lancashire</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>MPS Pathfinder Programme: Phase 2 Consultation Findings in UK – Somali Youth Union</td>
<td>Unpublished Report</td>
<td>Empirical, Qualitative research</td>
<td>Consultation with Muslim community in Ealing. Recruited by Somali Youth Union Rights and – Somali Youth Union</td>
<td>Three focus groups: 21, 18-59 years, 11 males, ten females, 14 in-depth interviews, 19-45 years, six female, eight males.</td>
<td>London borough of Ealing</td>
<td>1.5/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at the University of Central Lancashire</td>
<td>2008a</td>
<td>MPS Pathfinder Programme: Phase 2 Consultation Findings in Redbridge – League of British Muslims</td>
<td>Unpublished Report</td>
<td>Empirical, Qualitative research</td>
<td>Consultation with Muslim community in Redbridge. Recruited by League of British Muslims.</td>
<td>16 Pakistani Muslims: seven female, nine male; Aged 18-55 years</td>
<td>London borough of Redbridge</td>
<td>1.5/5, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at the University of Central Lancashire</td>
<td>2008b</td>
<td>Redbridge Muslim Communities Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Unpublished Report</td>
<td>Empirical, Qualitative research</td>
<td>In-depth interviews using bespoke consultation tool</td>
<td>23 respondents from Redbridge: 18 male, 11 female; Aged 23-60 years</td>
<td>London borough of Redbridge</td>
<td>4/5, Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>Geographical coverage</td>
<td>Quality assessment score</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Gallup/ Coexist Foundation</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>A Global Study of Interfaith Relations with an in-depth analysis of Muslim integration in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Gallup/Coexist Foundation</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Quantitative survey in Germany, France and Great Britain. British Muslims: Face-to-face interviews, 18+, in areas where the Muslim population was 5% or more based on 2001 British census. British Public: 15+, households contacted via Random Digital Dial (RDD) and individual with most recent birthday selected.</td>
<td>British Muslims: 504 completed interviews. General public: 1,001</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>10.5/13, Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Published by</td>
<td>Type of evidence</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Redbridge Faith Forum</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Conversations with Muslim Community leaders in Redbridge about the Preventing Violent Extremism Agenda</td>
<td>Redbridge Safer Communities Partnership</td>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Empirical Qualitative research. Semi-structured interviews with a targeted group using a check list of questions</td>
<td>Nine interviews with Muslim Community Leaders &amp; Councilors in Redbridge</td>
<td>London borough of Redbridge</td>
<td>4/5, Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Saggar, Shamit</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Extremism and Reputational politics</td>
<td>In: Pariah politics understanding Western radical Islamism and what should be done. Oxford University Press 2006</td>
<td>Chapter in book</td>
<td>Theoretical and empirical. Secondary review of polls and surveys</td>
<td>Five polls/surveys reviewed</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.5/5, Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spalek, B; Awa, S El; McDonald, L</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Police-Muslim engagement and partnerships for the purposes of counter-terrorism</td>
<td>University of Birmingham</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Empirical. Qualitative research. Two case studies with Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF). Semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and participant observations of meetings.</td>
<td>42 individuals were interviewed. 13 police officers, 29 members of Muslim communities and organisations involved in partnership/engagement work with the police</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4/5, Medium</td>
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</tbody>
</table>