Emergency Preparedness

Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, its associated Regulations and non-statutory arrangements

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Summary

• This volume of guidance, together with the accompanying *Emergency Response and Recovery*, sets out the generic framework for civil protection. As such, it deals with pre-emergency elements of integrated emergency management – anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation (paragraphs 1.4 and 1.42).

• There is a standard structure for most chapters of this volume of guidance. The structure is: details of what the legislation (the Act and the Regulations) requires; good practice guidance on how Category 1 and 2 responders can carry out their duties to comply with the legislation; and useful information that is not governed by the legislation (paragraphs 1.9–1.10).

• Some issues in common underpin the main chapters:
  – the definition of emergency;
  – the importance of Category 1 and 2 responders’ functions;
  – the distinction between Category 1 and 2 responders; and
  – the links between the duties (paragraphs 1.14–1.35).

• Annexes are collected at the end of the document.
1.1 Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ("the Act") establishes a consistent level of civil protection activity across the UK. Greater consistency is sought too in the way the function is carried out between the local Category 1 and 2 responders as partners covered by the Act and in different parts of the country.

1.2 The Act provides a basic framework defining what tasks should be performed and how co-operation should be conducted. The Government does not consider that it is necessary to radically change the way things were done prior to civil protection being placed on a statutory basis. It aims to consolidate and strengthen what exists.

1.3 Working to a common framework, local responders will make their own decisions in the light of local circumstances and priorities about what planning arrangements are appropriate in their areas.

### Purpose


1.5 This guidance sets out how the civil protection duties should be carried out in England and Wales.

1.6 This guidance also sets out how the civil protection duties should be carried out by certain bodies in Scotland, namely the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Health and Safety Executive and the British Transport Police. These bodies exercise functions which are largely reserved on a UK-wide basis and it is appropriate for them to be subject to guidance made by a Minister of the Crown. The Scottish Ministers make separate regulations and guidance which apply to other Scottish Category 1 and 2 responders which fall within devolved competence.

1.7 This guidance also applies to certain bodies in Northern Ireland, namely the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and telecommunications providers. Neither this guidance nor the Act applies to other bodies in Northern Ireland. Arrangements similar to those established under the Act, the Regulations and this guidance will be set up in Northern Ireland on a non-statutory basis.

1.8 The guidance will support those individuals and organisations which have a role to play in the civil protection framework, and in particular those organisations subject to duties under the Act.

1.9 The guidance in this volume is divided into chapters. Each chapter deals with a specific aspect of preparedness within the civil protection framework. The main chapters (Chapters 2–8) describe the chief obligations imposed by the Act on Category 1 responders. Others (for example, Chapters 10–12, 16–18) provide guidance which places work at the local level in the context of regional and UK arrangements, including variations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is hoped that Category 1 and 2 responders will find these chapters helpful in understanding and delivering the wider civil protection framework.

1.10 Each chapter in this volume has a broadly similar format:

- summary;
- guidance on what the Act and the Regulations require of Category 1 and 2 responders;
- guidance on how to carry out the requirements of the legislation; and
- other information which may be helpful (much of which is contained in lined text boxes).

Supporting the chapters are:

- a self-assessment sheet (these are identified by chapter number and collected in one place at Chapter 13); and
- annexes, a glossary and a bibliography (collected at the end of this volume).

1.11 This guidance includes a number of boxes setting out additional information. The type of box used indicates the type of information contained within it.

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1 Throughout the footnotes of this document the Regulations are referred to as regulation(s) with the appropriate number. The term s. refers to the sections of the Civil Contingencies Act.
What the Act and the Regulations require

1.12 While the civil protection duties are detailed on the face of the Act, the detail of what those duties mean, and how they should be performed, is delivered through the Regulations. The Act and Regulations are supported too by this guidance document, which includes guidance to which the organisations covered by the Act must have regard.

1.13 However, all the duties specified in Part 1 of the Act are contingent on the definition of “emergency”.

The definition of “emergency”

1.14 “Emergency” is defined in Part 1 of the Act as: An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.

1.15 The definition of “emergency” is concerned with consequences, rather than with cause or source. Therefore, an emergency inside or outside the UK is covered by the definition, provided it has consequences inside the UK.

1.16 An emergency is considered to have consequences inside the UK if the serious damage is within the territorial sea of the UK. The territorial sea is the area of sea up to 12 nautical miles to seaward of the UK coast (or, more accurately, to seaward of the coastal baseline established by statute).

1.17 A place in the UK may be anything from a small village to a town square to a large city. It may also include a part of a region or an entire region.

1.18 Determination of when an emergency has occurred, or is likely to occur, is addressed in three ways. The Act provides:

• a specification of the kinds of event or situation which may cause “damage”; and
• two tests for determining whether an event or situation threatening such damage constitutes an emergency (one of which must be met).

The Regulations require:

• Category 1 responders to adopt a standard procedure for making the decision to activate a business continuity or emergency plan.

Damage

1.19 The Act sets out a list of events or situations which may be considered to pose a threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or security.

Two tests as to whether a response is required

1.20 A Category 1 responder must perform its duties under the Act only in relation to two situations, either of which poses a considerable test for that organisation’s ability to perform its functions.

1.21 In this way, the Act narrows the range of events or situations to which the duties apply to those which test the Category 1 responder.

1.22 The two tests are:

• where the emergency would be likely to seriously obstruct its ability to perform its functions;
• where the Category 1 responder:

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1 s. 2(3). See also s. 4 and s. 6
2 s. 3
3 s. 1
4 s. 1(5)
5 s. 18(2)
6 s. 1(1)-(3)
7 s. 2(1)(a)-(b)
8 regulation 24
9 s. 1(2)-(3)
10 s. 2(2)
11 s. 2(2)(a)
would consider it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate the emergency’s effects, or otherwise take action; and

– would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.\textsuperscript{13}

One of these two tests must be met for the main duties of the Act to apply.

Procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred

1.23 A procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred must be written into business continuity and emergency plans. The procedure should enable the person who will make the judgement to be identified, and state how they will be advised and whom they must inform.\textsuperscript{14} The person will usually be a post-holder identified by their role or job title.

The importance of Category 1 responder functions

1.24 The Act requires Category 1 responders to take up their civil protection duties by reference to their functions. Functions are defined as “any power or duty whether conferred by virtue of an enactment or otherwise”.\textsuperscript{15} The reference covers statutory powers and duties, as well as common law powers.

1.25 The functions of Category 1 responders are called into play when an emergency occurs or is likely to occur.

1.26 Category 1 and Category 2 responders are referred to in the Act.\textsuperscript{16} The term “responder” is not defined. However, a main purpose of the legislation is to ensure that Category 1 responders are able to perform their functions so far as necessary or desirable to respond to an emergency.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13}s. 2(2)(b)
\textsuperscript{14}regulation 24
\textsuperscript{15}s. 18(1)
\textsuperscript{16}s. 3(4)–(5)
\textsuperscript{17}s. 2(1)(d)
## Integrated emergency management and the guidance

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### The role of Category 1 and Category 2 responders

1.27 Category 1 responders are listed in Schedule 1 to the Act.\(^{18}\) They are the main organisations involved in most emergencies at the local level: for example, the emergency services.

1.28 Category 2 responders are also listed in Schedule 1.\(^{19}\) They are likely to be heavily involved in some emergencies: for example, utilities and transport companies.

1.29 The Act brings both groups within its framework to ensure greater consistency and co-operation at the local level.

### The links between the duties

1.30 The main civil protection duties fall on the Category 1 responders as follows:\(^{20}\)
- risk assessment;
- business continuity management (BCM);
- emergency planning; and
- maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public.

1.31 A fifth duty applies to local authorities alone:\(^{21}\)
- provision of advice and assistance to the commercial sector and voluntary organisations.

1.32 Two further duties are prescribed in the Regulations:\(^ {22}\)
- co-operation; and
- information sharing. They cement local-level partnership between Category 1 and Category 2 responders in support of Category 1 bodies in performing all their main duties effectively.

1.33 Risk assessment, supported by a collective process, provides the fundamental grounding for delivering the substantive elements of the Act.

1.34 Emergency planning is supported by BCM, and is underpinned by the risk assessment. Its purpose is to ensure that Category 1 responders can perform their functions effectively in an emergency. It supports public awareness work and also shapes arrangements for warning and informing the public. Category 1 and 2 responders must co-operate and share information in fulfilling these duties.

1.35 Provision of advice and assistance to the local business community and voluntary organisations by the local authority is likely to be linked to emergency plans and to draw on risk assessments. It will also be supported by co-operation and information sharing with partners.

### Other statutory regimes in the field of civil protection

1.36 A particular set of risks is excluded from consideration under the legislation.\(^{23}\) These risks are subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999, the Pipelines Safety...
Regulations 1996 or the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 and their Northern Ireland counterparts. Category 1 responders are not required to exercise their duties under the Act and Regulations in relation to emergencies which are covered by these provisions.

1.37 However, Category 1 responders may use the Act regime to support or supplement these separate regimes where they consider this appropriate. For example, if Category 1 responders wish to include COMAH risks in the Community Risk Register, this is acceptable. They can also make information requests under the Regulations to support the COMAH duties, if they wish.

1.38 One disadvantage of a separation between the two regimes, the one supported by the Act, the other by the Health and Safety Executive, is addressed by the inclusion of the Health and Safety Executive in Schedule 1 as a Category 2 responder.

How the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

1.39 Chapters 10, 11 and 12 detail how the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In addition, each of the chapters dealing with how the duties under the Act are to be performed contains information about how that particular duty is to be performed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Note that the Regulations and this guidance do not apply to those responders in Scotland who are within devolved competence. 24

1.40 Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between Category 1 and 2 responders. They should also be conducted according to a practical doctrine beginning with anticipation and assessment of risk and concluding with effective response and recovery arrangements.

1.41 The Act focuses on emergency preparedness but its requirements should be seen in the context of integrated emergency management (IEM).

Integrated emergency management and the Act

1.42 The following six activities are fundamental to an integrated approach:
• anticipation;
• assessment;
• prevention;
• preparation;
• response; and
• recovery management.

1.43 The Act focuses on two of these – assessment and preparation – and they are covered extensively in this volume of guidance on preparing for emergencies. The other volume, Emergency Response and Recovery, covers the final two – response and recovery management. (See box above.)

1.44 Anticipation is sometimes called horizon-scanning. Category 1 responders should aim to be aware of new hazards and threats which might affect their locality and be ready to revise their risk assessments and plans accordingly.

1.45 Prevention is an important component of integrated emergency management. The Act does not deal with it to any great extent because it is largely a matter for other legislation, for example fire safety and industrial safety, building regulations, flood defence, maritime safety or health protection. Prevention under the Act is limited to actions that help prevent an emergency which may be about to occur. For example, activating an emergency plan in advance of a major public event.

1.46 Response and recovery management are addressed in Emergency Response and Recovery because they are not covered directly in the Act. They are concerned with managing the consequences of an emergency, rather than preparing to deal with one.

24 The Regulations and this guidance apply to those responders listed in Parts 1 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are referred to in the Regulations as “General responders” but for ease of reference they are referred to in this guidance as “Category 1 and Category 2 responders”. Parts 2 and 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act list the responders that exercise functions which fall within the competence of the Scottish Ministers. These responders are referred to in the Regulations as “Scottish Category 1 responders” and “Scottish Category 2 responders”
1.47 Although the Act focuses on preparedness for response to emergencies, it should be seen in the wider context of safety, risk and threat management. Also, although the discussion of preparedness under the Act concentrates on the maintenance of planning arrangements, effective management is the aim. Planning is a process of preparing a Category 1 responder, its managers and personnel for the act of managing an emergency.

1.48 The wide concept of IEM within and across Category 1 responders is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. If the response is to be truly effective in meeting the needs of everyone affected by an emergency, then all leaders of the community, industry and commerce should be aware of the contributions of local responders and other organisations.

1.49 In an extended emergency, the amount of work may be overwhelming, while provision of everyday services will also need to continue. Category 1 responders should explore all options for maintaining critical services, not only during the response but also throughout the recovery and aftermath proceedings, which may be lengthy.

Monitoring and ministerial directions

1.50 If, however, the framework does not bed down successfully – or if in some areas civil protection arrangements are felt not to address particular hazards or threats to the satisfaction of the Government – the Act permits the Minister to issue new regulations or to make an order or issue a direction. These powers are discussed in Chapter 16.

1.51 Chapter 13 describes the audit and monitoring regimes which will help the Government to identify whether there are areas where government action needs to be taken.
Chapter 2
Co-operation

Summary

• Category 1 and 2 responders are obliged to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in response in the same local resilience area. Each local resilience area (with the exception of London) is based on a police area (paragraphs 2.1–2.3).

• The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation between Category 1 responders is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). The LRF is not a statutory body, but it is a statutory process (paragraphs 2.4–2.8).

• Category 1 responders can draw on the guidance on membership and effective operation of an LRF and existing examples of good practice to help them (paragraphs 2.44–2.58).

• The involvement of Category 2 responders in LRFs will be more limited than that of Category 1 responders. They will participate in the LRF process on a ‘right to attend, right to invite’ basis. Category 1 responders need to understand the way Category 2 responders are involved (paragraphs 2.15–2.19).

• Subgroups will probably be formed within LRFs to allow effective use of time. The number and composition of these subgroups will be decided locally (paragraphs 2.59–2.63).

• Organisations that do not have a duty to co-operate under the Act can – and should – still be as fully involved as possible. How LRFs choose to involve them will depend on local circumstances (paragraphs 2.108–2.111).

• Category 1 responders are also encouraged to co-operate outside the LRF framework. Available models for co-operation include bilateral co-operation; joint discharge of functions; identification of lead responders; and cross-border co-operation between LRFs (paragraphs 2.20–2.39).
What the Act and the Regulations require

2.1 Co-operation at the response phase has been long practised by the emergency services – police, fire and ambulance. Emergency services liaison on matters of policy and planning – and in live exercises – has also existed for many years. Other agencies also co-operate closely, for example maritime search and rescue services and those organisations involved in the response to maritime pollution incidents. Utilities companies have also established links with the local authorities and the emergency services.

2.2 Local authorities have joined the emergency services in formal strategic liaison arrangements at the policy and planning stage over the past 20 years – and gradually in recent years most of the Category 1 responders covered by the Act have been pulled into strategic groups at the local (ie police area) level.

2.3 These strategic multi-agency groups exist everywhere in England and Wales, particularly since they were recommended as good practice in the first edition of Dealing with Disaster in 1992. Furthermore, there are a number of standing groups which deal with specific issues such as search and rescue. On a day-to-day basis, direct co-operation between Category 1 responders is the lifeblood of civil protection work – with visits and seminars, phone calls and e-mails, and joint projects including exercises. Much of this existing work, including established groups and processes, will form the basis for the new framework.¹

The Local Resilience Forum

2.4 The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Act is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF),² based on each police area.³ The forum is a process by which the organisations on which the duty falls co-operate with each other. It does not have a separate legal personality, it does not have powers to direct its members.

2.5 The main forum must meet at least once every six months.⁴ The aim should be to space these meetings evenly, and to develop a regular cycle. Meetings can be held more frequently if LRF members agree that is necessary.

2.6 In establishing a regular cycle, forums should have regard to the needs of those members who are likely to be participating in more than one forum. For example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) operates across a number of LRF areas and may attend them all.

2.7 The purpose of the LRF process is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. In particular, the LRF process should deliver:

- the compilation of agreed risk profiles for the area, through a Community Risk Register;⁵
- a systematic, planned and co-ordinated approach to encourage Category 1 responders, according to their functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation to:
  - risk;
  - planning for emergencies;
  - planning for business continuity management;
  - publishing information about risk assessments and plans;
  - arrangements to warn and inform the public; and
  - other aspects of the civil protection duty, including the promotion of business continuity management by local authorities; and
- support for the preparation by all or some of its members of multi-agency plans and other documents, including protocols and agreements⁷ and the co-ordination of multi-agency exercises and other training events.

2.8 Other optional objectives for the LRF process are set out in paragraph 2.57 below. Model terms of reference are attached at Annex 2A.

¹ s. 2(5)(h)
² regulation 4(2)(b) and 4(3)
³ regulation 3
⁴ regulation 4(4)
⁵ regulation 15
⁶ regulation 4(1)
⁷ regulation 7
Effective representation of Category 1 responders in the LRF process

2.9 The Regulations further qualify the participation in the process of co-operation. In particular, they address the way in which individual Category 1 and 2 responders are represented. The optimum number for attendance is likely to be smaller than the number of Category 1 and Category 2 responders in any given police area. Larger numbers may make the meetings inefficient.

2.10 A key requirement of the Regulations is that Category 1 responders attend meetings of the LRF “or arrange… to be effectively represented”.8 ‘Effective representation’ has a number of elements to it:

- not every organisation needs to be represented directly at every meeting;
- organisations do need to be represented at meetings of the main LRF where their involvement in local civil protection work will be discussed; and
- Category 1 responders need to be represented by individuals who have the right combination of seniority and expertise to be able to speak with authority.

2.11 It is particularly important that representatives do represent their sector and are responsive to the views of Category 1 responders in their sector who are not able to attend the LRF meetings. There are a number of tests which can be applied to judge effectiveness of representation. An effective representative organisation:

- has the authorisation of the other local members of its sector to take part in the LRF on their behalf;
- is aware of the proceedings of the LRF subgroups and ready to take forward to the LRF issues raised by local members of its sector in the subgroups;
- is able to explain current structures, policies, priorities and events in the area of civil protection affecting its sector; and
- ensures that the other local members of its class whom it represents are kept fully informed of issues discussed at the LRF and are invited to submit their comments, or to attend particular LRF meetings as appropriate.

Category 2 responders

2.12 The Act broadens the range of organisations that will be regularly and consistently involved in civil protection at the local level. This is particularly true for Category 2 responders, some of which were not included, or did not engage, in a consistent way before the Act. It is important that all Category 1 responders bear this in mind, and allow for the narrower obligations that flow from Category 2 status. Category 2 organisations should be engaged when they can add value, and not drawn into discussions when they cannot. In addition, the organisations should be engaged through the mechanisms established for this purpose.

2.13 In return, Category 2 responders must recognise the clear intention in the Act that all Category 2 responders should play a part in civil protection at the local level. They must respond to reasonable requests, and they must adhere to the principles of effective representation.

2.14 In order to maximise the benefits of the participation of Category 2 responders, while still maintaining a coherent framework, Category 2 responders will not be obliged to attend all LRF meetings. Instead, attendance will be determined on the basis of two complementary principles: the right to attend and the right to invite.

The right to attend

2.15 Category 2 responders in some instances are keen to be part of the main forum – and see the co-operation duty as entitling them to join it. This expectation should be facilitated wherever practical and appropriate.

2.16 The Regulations provide that Category 2 responders can send representatives to any meeting of the LRF as they deem necessary.9 Alternatively, one Category 2 responder can ask another Category 2 responder to represent them at the meeting. Category 2 responders will make that decision on the basis of the proposed agenda for the LRF meeting.

2.17 Category 1 responders need to develop effective relationships with Category 2 responders and agree those areas in which the Category 2 responders:

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8 regulation 4(4)
9 regulation 4(6)
– have statutory responsibilities, which the Category 1 responders will recognise and support as appropriate; or
– have expertise that can aid their co-operation with and provision of information to Category 1 responders.

The right to invite

2.18 The right to invite flows from the concept of effective representation. In setting the agenda for meetings of the LRF, Category 1 responders will be working towards the delivery of the objectives set out in paragraph 2.7. If, as a result, the agenda is likely to include discussion of matters relating to a particular Category 2 responder, that responder (or class of responders) needs to make arrangements to attend or be effectively represented.

2.19 Neither the right to attend nor the right to invite extend to participation in subgroups of the LRF. However, local agreements may be reached between responders to engage Category 2 responders in the subgroup process. Participation in the LRF process will help to identify where this might make sense.

Other forms of co-operation

Direct and bilateral co-operation

2.20 Co-operation will also be expected between Category 1 responders outside the framework of the LRF in performance of their duties under the Act. For example, the police and the local authority may co-operate in the development of a multi-agency evacuation plan for a city centre, and later in exercises to validate the plan. Equally, the Environment Agency is likely to promote flood and pollution prevention by working with key Category 1 responders, such as local authorities.

2.21 Direct or bilateral co-operation is also likely in practice between Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Category 2 responders must co-operate with Category 1 responders in, for example, the development of their risk assessments and plans. They may also be involved with activities to maintain and improve those plans. For example, Category 2 responders must take part in exercises under the legislation on request, if that request is reasonable. The test of reasonableness includes not simply whether the Category 1 responder requires this involvement to exercise its plan effectively, but also the number of other exercises the Category 2 responder is being asked to take part in and the extent of attendance and participation requested.

Joint discharge and delegation of functions

2.22 Category 2 responders may be expected to help Category 1 responders in all aspects of the duty; but not to the extent that the demands of the Category 1 responder effectively place a Category 1 responsibility on them ‘by the back door’. For example, if the Category 2 responder has not undertaken a risk assessment in relation to a particular hazard, it cannot be compelled to do so by a Category 1 responder seeking information or co-operation.

2.23 Of course, many Category 2 responders have pre-existing requirements on them under other legislation (including, for example, their licence conditions from the regulator, or by direction of the Minister) to assess risk and to prepare planning arrangements. The regime under the Act is not intended to duplicate these responsibilities, but instead to connect specific regulatory frameworks into generic civil protection work at the local level. Under the Act, Category 2 responders may expect to be asked to share information about what they have done.

10regulation 4(2)(a)
11regulation 4(5)
12regulation 8(a)
• delegating responsibilities entirely. For example, a local authority might decide to delegate its responsibilities to the local Fire and Rescue Authority.\textsuperscript{13}

2.25 In both these instances, both Category 1 responders would have to agree that joint arrangements are appropriate, and make associated agreements in terms of transfer of funding and other resources.

Protocols

2.26 The Regulations permit Category 1 responders to develop protocols which support co-operation between them in the performance of their duties.\textsuperscript{14}

2.27 Category 2 responders may also be included in protocols which underpin co-operation in performance of the Category 1 responders’ duties.\textsuperscript{15}

2.28 Protocols of the same type are also permitted on a cross-boundary basis between Category 1 responders in England and Scotland.\textsuperscript{16} It is important that when Category 1 responders develop “local” protocols that these are not contradictory to national protocols or those of neighbouring regions. Consultation is therefore essential to reduce potential confusion and conflict.

2.29 A protocol is a formal agreement between Category 1 responders detailing how they will undertake or allocate responsibilities to deliver a task. Protocols may cover matters of broad agreement or detailed procedures for working together, including how to hand over tasks or obtain additional resources. Protocols may or may not be legally binding, depending on the nature of the agreement reached between the parties.

2.30 Protocols may be useful to cement co-operation in relation to all aspects of civil protection under the Act, but are likely to be particularly relevant in relation to (but not exclusively):

• multi-agency emergency planning arrangements; and

b) communications planning generally
  – for managing response to an emergency;
  – communicating with the public.

2.31 The Regulations outline three aspects of co-operation which are likely to be covered in protocols:

• its timing;
• its form; and
• contact details for individuals involved.\textsuperscript{17}

The lead responder principle

2.32 The main duties of the Act fall equally on all those Category 1 responders whose functions are likely to be seriously obstructed by an emergency or who would consider it necessary or desirable to take action to deal with the emergency through a special deployment of resources.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, there is a risk that Category 1 responders may duplicate each other's work when, for example, carrying out their duty of risk assessment or providing warnings when an emergency occurs.

2.33 The problem is particularly acute in relation to communicating with the public. It would not be sensible for a number of Category 1 responders each to be arranging to publish the same or similar messages about risks and planning arrangements to the same members of the public. Also it might be dangerous if several organisations were maintaining arrangements simultaneously to issue public warnings about an emergency in an unco-ordinated fashion. To address this difficulty, the Regulations require a particular model to be adopted.\textsuperscript{19} These Regulations are described in Chapter 7.

2.34 However, there is a further difficulty where several Category 1 responders in the same LRF each decide they are obliged to assess the same risk or the impact of that risk (for example, severe weather). Or, for example, where more than one Category 1 responder believes it necessary to develop an emergency mortuary plan or a coastal pollution plan. Regulations address these potential problems by permitting all those Category 1 responders whose

\textsuperscript{13} regulation 8(b)
\textsuperscript{14} regulation 4(1), regulation 7(1)
\textsuperscript{15} regulation 4(1)–(5), regulation 7(1)
\textsuperscript{16} regulations 4(2), 4(4), 5, 7(1) and 7(2)
\textsuperscript{17} regulation 7(3)
\textsuperscript{18} s. 2(2)
\textsuperscript{19} regulations 32–34
functions are exercisable in relation to a particular duty (other than the duties to communicate with the public) to identify one of their number as lead responder. The lead responder is the Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for performing a given duty in relation to a given emergency, or an emergency of a particular kind, in that local resilience area.²⁰

2.35 The other Category 1 responders party to the decision are referred to as non-lead Category 1 responders.²¹

2.36 Regulations outline the requirements on a lead Category 1 responder.²² They must:

• take the lead responsibility in that local resilience area;
• consult the non-lead Category 1 responders in performance of the duty;
• keep the non-lead Category 1 responders informed about how they are fulfilling the duty; and
• as far as reasonably practicable, obtain approval from the non-lead Category 1 responders for the way they are performing the duty.

2.37 Regulations also specify the role of the non-lead Category 1 responders.²³ They must:

• co-operate with the lead Category 1 responder in performance of the duty;
• provide information to the lead Category 1 responder which will assist in performance of the duty; and
• assist the lead responder in any exercises or training in connection with the duty.

However, the non-lead Category 1 responders do not themselves need to perform the duty to an extent that would unnecessarily duplicate what the lead Category 1 responder is doing.²⁴

2.38 A decision by the relevant local Category 1 responders not to co-operate to identify a lead responder in relation to a particular duty leaves them potentially all equally responsible for the performance of that duty. Agreement between them to cut back and allocate the responsibility between them under the lead responder principle will ensure proper co-ordination of risk assessment and multi-agency emergency planning and, under the separate regulations, communication with the public.

Cross-border co-operation

2.39 It is commonplace as a sensible element of civil protection work for individual organisations to plan to work with neighbouring authorities, should that be required to respond effectively to an emergency. The Regulations permit this to happen between authorities in Scotland and England and Wales, thus ensuring that planning can be joined up in border areas.

How the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Scotland

2.40 The provisions of the Regulations relating to co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland are largely the same as the provisions for England and Wales. The main point of difference is that in Scotland, the LRF is called the strategic co-ordinating group.²⁵ The Regulations require the Category 1 responders in Scotland which are subject to the Regulations to attend or be effectively represented at the strategic co-ordinating group. The Regulations also provide for attendance at strategic co-ordinating groups by Category 2 responders to whom the Regulations apply on a right to attend, right to invite basis. Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland who are subject to the Regulations may also engage in the other forms of co-operation outlined above, both with each other and with Scottish Category 1 and Scottish Category 2 responders in Scotland which fall within devolved competence.²⁶

2.41 Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers make provision for how Scottish Category 1 and Scottish Category 2 responders within devolved competence should co-operate with each other and

²⁰regulation 9
²¹regulation 9(4)
²²regulation 10
²³regulation 11
²⁴regulation 11(2)(d)
²⁵regulation 5
²⁶See Parts 2 and 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act
with Category 1 and 2 responders in the course of carrying out their duties under the Act.

Wales

2.42 The Act and the Regulations apply in Wales in the same way as they apply in England.

Northern Ireland

2.43 As the Act and the Regulations only apply to a limited number of the bodies in Northern Ireland which are engaged in civil protection, it would not be appropriate for the Regulations to require Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland to establish LRFs in Northern Ireland. However, Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland are required to co-operate with each other in the discharge of their duties under the Act. The Regulations also require Category 1 and 2 responders exercising functions in Northern Ireland to “have regard” to the activities of other specified bodies involved in civil protection. In addition, Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland may delegate their duties under the Act to other bodies in Northern Ireland who are engaged in civil protection but who are not Category 1 or 2 responders, or may perform their duties jointly with such bodies in much the same way as outlined in paragraphs 2.20 to 2.25. The “lead responder model” does not apply in Northern Ireland.  

How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

2.44 This section provides guidance on good practice that should enable Category 1 responders to make the LRF process work.

2.45 The LRF works alongside other elements of the multi-agency planning framework at the local, regional and central government levels. However, this framework is generally not a hierarchy. The LRF is not subordinate to the Regional Resilience Forum (or Welsh Resilience Forum), which in turn is not subordinate to central government. Direction and support should flow in both directions. For example, LRFs may pass issues with wider strategic implications up to the regional forum, which may in turn pass them up to the central level. Likewise, requests for information or planning work or advice may be cascaded downwards.

Making the LRF process work in practice

Process

2.46 The LRF itself is a strategic co-ordinating group. It matches, in the anticipation, prevention and planning phases, the Gold group usually established by the police during the response and recovery phases of an emergency. (The configuration of the Gold group during the response and recovery phase, including how it builds on the LRF, is set out in Emergency Response and Recovery.) It also reflects the key principle of UK civil protection arrangements that the initial response to most emergencies is delivered at the local level.

2.47 Because of its importance, the LRF should attract a sufficiently senior level of representation. For example, local authority representatives should be at chief executive or deputy chief executive level, and police representatives should be chief constables or their deputies. Because the discussions are strategic, the LRFs should meet relatively infrequently and the meetings should be thoroughly prepared so that the time of senior officers is used well.

2.48 It is critically important that the co-operation process is well organised and achieves its aims. The meetings should have a clear agenda and papers should be circulated sufficiently in advance to allow for proper discussion. A clear record of meetings should be kept, and minutes circulated promptly.

2.49 Regardless of the way in which organisations are represented in the LRF process, all papers should be copied to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area (and any standing members of the LRF which are not Category 1 or 2 responders). This will allow Category 1 and 2 responders to make the right decisions about participation, and for non-attending bodies to be properly engaged in the LRF process.

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\(^{27}\) regulation 6

\(^{28}\) Part 10 of the Regulations

\(^{29}\) regulation 2
Leadership

2.50 There are two aspects of leadership: chairing the forum and supporting its work.

2.51 The task of chairing the meetings does not necessarily need to fall to a particular Category 1 responder. Traditionally, in many areas, this role has fallen to the police – and the matching of the LRF boundary to police boundaries reflects the police’s co-ordinating role in many types of emergency. Even so, there is no requirement on the LRF to follow this procedure. The choice of chair is a matter for local determination.

2.52 A number of broad principles should determine the choice. The chair should be able to:
• take on the job on a permanent basis;
• speak with authority about the forum area (because their organisation covers the whole area or a critical part of it);
• speak with authority about civil protection issues because of involvement in strategic-level exercises and other events; and
• commit sufficient time to prepare fully for the forum meetings.

2.53 The chair will also be the lead point of contact for some of the information cascaded down from the regional and national levels.

2.54 The secretariat support role is crucial in ensuring that the LRF performs effectively. This role is also one that can fall to any of the member bodies. However, the expectation is that a local authority (or a number of local authorities working together) will take on this role. It includes a number of key tasks:
• fixing the dates of meetings;
• agreeing the agenda and attendance with LRF members;
• organising the production of any discussion papers and presentations that the LRF has deemed necessary;
• briefing the chair;
• taking the minutes of the meeting;
• following up matters arising and action points;
• disseminating papers before and after the meeting to both Category 1 and 2 responders in the area (and other bodies which are part of the LRF);
• ensuring that meetings of the various LRF subgroups (see paragraphs 2.59 to 2.63 below) are:
  – effectively organised and recorded; and
  – scheduled to fit with the meeting cycle of the strategic LRF group; and
  – ensuring that relevant matters from these subgroups’ proceedings are brought to the attention of the strategic group.

2.55 The task of providing secretariat support to the LRF may fall to a single organisation, or – particularly given the probable number of subgroups – to several working together. In some cases, it may be appropriate for the chair’s own organisation to provide the administrative support. Again, a number of principles should help to determine the choice of secretariat. Those taking up the task should:
• be able to take on the job on a permanent basis;
• be of a level of seniority or competence to support the chair at meetings of the strategic-level forum;
• have the back-up of an administration team within their organisation or from a partner body which, as necessary, can produce and circulate documents quickly; and
• be competent to organise, or to support, officers from other organisations, or their own, administering the work of the subgroups.

2.56 Regardless of the individuals and organisations which take on the chair and secretariat functions, it is vital they build a close working relationship.

Additional tasks

2.57 Over and above the statutory obligations set out in paragraph 2.7 above, the LRF process can also deliver a number of useful additional outcomes. These include:
• sharing, wherever appropriate, of lessons learned from emergencies and exercises in other parts of the UK and overseas, and making sure those lessons are acted upon to improve arrangements where relevant;
• consideration of policy initiatives in the area of civil protection from regional and central government and all other relevant sources, with Regional Resilience Teams acting as one of the principal conduits for information; and
• a place within the formal civil protection framework for organisations that have an important role in civil protection but are not captured by the duty as Category 1 or 2 responders, for example voluntary organisations, Control of Major Accident Hazards...
Regulations (COMAH) operators or other private businesses.

2.58 These useful outcomes are reflected in the model terms of reference attached at Annex 2A.

Subgroups

2.59 The time constraints on the main LRF and the strategic level of their discussions are likely to necessitate the formation of subgroups. These groups will operate at the middle management level, with Category 1 and 2 responders represented by individuals usually employed solely or in part to work in the field of civil protection. On the one hand, they will often take forward action points from the main LRF and discuss specialist civil protection topics in the necessary detail. On the other, they will ‘feed up’ matters for information, decision or endorsement by the strategic group.

2.60 Decisions about the number and composition of subgroups should be made locally. Nevertheless, there are several examples of subgroups that might be useful:

- **General working group:** This group would replicate the broad membership of the LRF and discuss in advance and in more detail proposals to be taken to the strategic group for their decision or endorsement. It would provide a process at the ‘working level’ through which multi-agency planning could be delivered. For example, this group would work on multi-agency emergency plans, training and exercising programmes.

- **Risk group:** This group would lead the work to develop and maintain the multi-agency Community Risk Register.

- **Capabilities groups:** These groups would lead the work to develop generic capabilities within the overall generic planning framework. For example, groups might be created on dealing with fatalities, or site clearance, or decontamination.

- **Area groups:** These groups would be established on the basis of administrative areas underneath the LRF area. For example, a large police area might be made up of a number of counties. Each county could have its own area group. Membership would be determined locally, but it would probably be local authority-led and cover the generality of civil protection issues.

- **Responder groups by sector:** These groups would bring together all the organisations of a particular type within an LRF area. Examples include a local authorities group, an NHS group, a maritime group, a utilities group, a transport group, a business group or a voluntary sector group.

- **Specialist groups:** These groups would bring together organisations with an interest in a particular aspect of civil protection. Examples include chemicals, exercises, events, welfare support for victims, media relations or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards (CBRN).

- **Existing standing groups:** In many areas, some groups will already exist to deliver certain aspects of civil protection, for example local search and rescue committees, flooding and environment groups (part of the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution). Category 1 responders may agree that the most appropriate way for these groups to operate will be as formal subgroups within the LRF structure.

- **Project groups:** These groups would be formed on an ad hoc, temporary basis to bring together Category 1 and 2 responders to develop a multi-agency approach to a particular short-term priority. Examples include a particular multi-agency exercise, a specific large public event, or an urgent and unforeseen new planning requirement.

2.61 Subgroups should only be established with the approval of the LRF. Care should be taken to ensure that the number of subgroups is kept to a reasonable level, and that each has a clear purpose connected to the overall strategic priorities set by the LRF. Particular care should be taken when proposing groups which might be expected to be mainly made up of Category 2 responders or other organisations engaged in response not covered by the Act.

2.62 Although the aim of the LRF is to ensure co-ordination between the main organisations undertaking civil protection work within a given police area, it is unlikely to be possible to bring every single Category 1 and 2 responder around one table. On the one hand, there are standing arrangements for, say, COMAH sites or nuclear power stations which lie outside the Act. On the other, there are fixed sites or planned events which require detailed arrangements, where it is not appropriate to bring all the parties to a general forum, since most of the business will not be relevant to them. Examples of this type of standing or temporary group include those for airports, sports stadiums, town and city centres, festivals and
concerts. The important consideration is that the LRF should receive reports from those of its members involved in the activities of these separate emergency planning groups, not that they be drawn directly under its umbrella. Some formal relationship with existing standing groups may be sought, though. A formal relationship with relevant existing standing groups which do not themselves become part of the LRF structure should be established and maintained.

2.63 LRF members who do not attend the main group (whether because they are effectively represented by another Category 1 responder or because they are Category 2 responders who do not routinely attend under the ‘right to attend, right to invite’ principle) should be encouraged to take part in the subgroups. Membership of these should be open to all responders, including both Category 1 and Category 2, as appropriate. However, representation at this level is also permitted.

Representation at the LRF

2.64 This section looks at how participation in the LRF process is likely to be organised in practice for different classes of organisation. The descriptions below are guides rather than definitive structures, and will need to be tailored to reflect local circumstances. But they do represent what Category 1 and 2 responders have indicated as reasonable expectations at the local level.

Category 1 responders

2.65 Local authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions which are likely to be called upon in support of the emergency services during an emergency, including key statutory responsibilities such as environmental health, housing, social services and highways. As the response phase comes to an end, the impact on the community becomes a key issue. At this stage, the recovery phase, the local authority is likely to take the lead co-ordination role as part of its wider community leadership responsibility.

2.66 Each local authority retains the right to attend the LRF. But it may not be practical for every local authority in any given LRF area to be a member of the full LRF. Despite their legal autonomy and individual approaches to civil protection, it will probably make sense for local authorities to find ways of nominating one or more of their number to act as effective representatives on the LRF. The new duty should ensure a greater consistency between them that will support sound representation.

2.67 Police forces co-ordinate the response to most emergencies on land. Their key role in co-ordinating response is based not only on the need to protect the scene for emergency workers and vehicles and preserve evidence of a potential crime; the police are also often expected to co-ordinate information to the public about the emergency, including dealings with the media. This strong presence in co-ordinating response has meant that the police are often called upon to co-ordinate multi-agency policy work at the strategic level as well.

2.68 As the LRFs have been based by definition on police areas, there will be a single local police force member for each LRF. Each police force will have a single representative, though it may have a second if it has taken on the role as chair.

2.69 The British Transport Police (BTP) plays a role akin to local police forces, albeit in a more specialist and limited environment. It takes responsibility for the management of incidents on the rail network and at train stations.

2.70 In most LRFs, the local police force will represent the BTP. The exceptions to this are likely to be those meetings where particular consideration is given to rail transport issues, including risk assessments and plans.

2.71 Fire and rescue authorities are key Category 1 responders. They have a pivotal role to play in the risk assessment and response to a wide range of emergencies, both fire and non-fire related. Their co-ordination role of fire and rescue generally is restricted to operations inside the inner cordon. Their expertise and equipment for dealing with chemical emergencies, including decontamination, and their search and rescue capabilities, give them a key role in multi-agency planning.

2.72 In many cases, the boundaries of the local fire and rescue authority will be coterminous with or very similar to the LRF area. It will generally be appropriate for the fire and rescue authorities to have a single representative. Any other fire and rescue authorities which also fall within the same LRF area will be most
efficiently represented by the lead authority, with that authority taking responsibility for keeping its colleagues informed of LRF deliberations.

2.73 Although a part of the NHS, the ambulance services have a distinct place within the multi-agency civil protection effort. As one of the emergency services, they are at the vanguard of emergency response.

2.74 If a number of ambulance trusts operate within the same LRF area, it will probably be appropriate to agree a lead trust (reflecting both the geographical coverage within the LRF area and commitments with other LRFs). In Wales, there is a single ambulance trust covering all four police areas.

2.75 The National Health Service (NHS) is a large and diffuse organisation. A range of NHS bodies are subject to duties under the Act, including Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), hospital trusts, local health boards (LHBs) and Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs).

2.76 The NHS should endeavour to have a single representative in the LRF process (in addition to the ambulance service), with this responsibility probably falling to a Strategic Health Authority (see paragraph 2.107), lead PCT or LHB. With a number of PCTs, SHAs or LHBs in each LRF area, a lead organisation should be agreed (reflecting both the geographical coverage within the LRF area and commitments with other LRFs).

2.77 Notwithstanding its close links with the NHS, the Health Protection Agency (HPA) should be represented separately.

2.78 Port health authorities are concerned with the prospect of human, animal and crop diseases being imported into the UK at seaports and airports.

2.79 Port health authorities are unlikely to be directly represented on the LRF. Generally, they will be represented by the local authority or (in some circumstances) the HPA. Like the BTP, they will be expected to attend the LRF meetings when issues relating to their functions are discussed.

2.80 The Environment Agency has responsibilities for environmental protection in England and Wales and as such plays an important supporting role in planning for and responding to emergencies. In particular the Environment Agency has a key role in relation to flooding, where it is the lead agency for warning those at risk and maintaining and improving flood defences.

2.81 The Environment Agency has eight regions and 26 operational areas across England and Wales and will be directly represented by the Environment Agency area in which the LRF area is located. Should the LRF fall across an Environment Agency area boundary, the Environment Agency has agreed to nominate a lead area and thus a single representative.

2.82 The Environment Agency will be represented by the area manager or nominated deputy from the lead area and will provide advice and information on all aspects of the environment for which the Agency has a statutory responsibility.

2.83 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is responsible for the initiation and co-ordination of civil maritime search and rescue within the UK Search and Rescue Region, and as such is an emergency service. This role is described in the Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

2.84 The MCA also leads the response to maritime pollution incidents in the UK Pollution Control Zone. It manages a multi-level plan, the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations, for co-ordinating responder organisations dealing with pollution at sea or on the coast.

2.85 The MCA will be required to take part in the LRF process only in those areas where the MCA operates. Its regional and area boundaries do not coincide with coastal police areas. It will usually be represented at each relevant LRF by a nominated operations manager from the area concerned. These operations managers will be able to provide advice and information on all maritime emergency response matters.

Category 2 responders

2.86 Electricity distributors and transmitters are covered by the Act. During an emergency affecting electricity supplies, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.
Electricity companies operating within a given LRF area may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. They are likely to be represented by one of their number, who will report back to them.

Gas distributors are covered by the Act. Currently, Transco is the main company affected by the Act but this may change over time. During an emergency affecting gas supplies, the company retains control of the operation and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that its planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

Planning in relation to oil and gas pipelines is covered by the Pipelines Safety Regulations. These arrangements, including exercises, are likely to be reported to the LRF.

The main gas distribution company in an area may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. It may act as a representative for other gas distributors, and report back to them.

Planning in relation to oil and gas pipelines is covered by the Pipelines Safety Regulations. These arrangements, including exercises, are likely to be reported to the LRF.

The main gas distribution company in an area may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. It may act as a representative for other gas distributors, and report back to them.

Water and sewerage undertakers. During an emergency affecting water or sewerage, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their legal obligations. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

In many cases there will be one water company operating within an LRF area. It will attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. Where there is more than one company, they may be represented by one of their number, which could report back to them.

Telephone service providers, fixed and mobile. There are many providers of landline services. There are five mobile telephone operators, each organised on a national basis. During an emergency affecting fixed or mobile telephone supplies, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

Fixed-line and mobile companies operating within a given LRF area may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. They are likely to be represented by one of their number, which will report back to them.

Railway operators. Responsibility for operation and maintenance of the railway track rests currently with Network Rail. There are a number of train operating companies, organised on a national and regional basis and dealing with passengers and freight. During an emergency affecting the railways, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. Network Rail and some train operating companies are also responsible for operating mainline stations. It is crucial that these planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

Freight train operators will in most cases be represented by Network Rail. In some instances it may be appropriate for passenger train operating companies to be represented by Network Rail.

Airport operators. Not every LRF area will have an airport within it. And not every airport will be subject to the obligations. Only “relevant airport operators” are covered by the Act. “Relevant airport operators” are defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 50,000 passengers or 10,000 tonnes of freight.

During an emergency affecting an airport, the airport retains control of its operations and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that its planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

Each airport is likely to represent itself directly in the LRF process, either at the main group or at a relevant subgroup.

\[\text{regulation 3}\]
2.100 **Ports.** Not every LRF area will have a port within it. And not every port will be subject to the obligations. “Relevant harbour authorities” are defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 200,000 passengers or 1.5 million tonnes of freight. During an emergency affecting a port, the harbour authority retains control of its operations and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the Secretary of State. It is crucial that its planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.101 If more than one relevant harbour authority operates within an LRF area, they are likely to nominate a lead operator to attend either the main LRF group or a relevant subgroup. This role may be taken on by a representative of the British Ports Association.

2.102 The **Highways Agency** is responsible for managing the major roads network, including both maintenance and management of traffic on those roads. In any local area, the Highways Agency is likely to be responsible for motorways and some of the A-roads. The Agency will have a particular interest in partnership with the police, responding to certain incidents and dealing with any recovery issues where appropriate on their roads, with the primary aim of getting road users moving again as quickly as possible.

2.103 The Highways Agency is an English body and an executive agency of the Department for Transport, divided into a number of operational areas covering the strategic road network. The Highways Agency may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’.

2.104 The **Health and Safety Executive** (HSE) has a crucial role to play in certain aspects of the LRF process. In particular, the HSE has a significant input to make in the assessment of risk, and the development of the Community Risk Register. The HSE also has a role in relation to offshore oil and gas installations.

2.105 The HSE may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’.

2.106 **Strategic Health Authorities** (SHAs) have an important co-ordination role in relation to contingency planning. SHAs are the local headquarters of the NHS in England. As such they are able to mobilise and commit resources across the authority area and are responsible for co-ordination of health services in the event of an emergency. All NHS organisations – including Primary Care Trusts and Acute Trusts – are part of a single structure and are accountable through the SHAs. As part of their role they are responsible for leading local strategic planning, and ensuring that local plans are consistent with NHS guidance and other relevant legislation and guidance.

2.107 SHAs also act as a liaison point with other partner organisations outside the NHS and in many areas may represent NHS bodies (except for Ambulance Trusts) on the LRF. SHA boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with LRF boundaries. Where there is more than one SHA in a given local resilience area, neighbouring SHAs may enter into agreements for one of them to be the "lead SHA" to effectively represent others.

**Other co-operating bodies**

2.108 **Regional Resilience Teams** (RRTs) and the **National Assembly for Wales** (NAW) are responsible for ensuring that there is good two-way communication between Category 1 responders and central government, that planning is co-ordinated where necessary and that Category 1 responders have the support they need. RRTs and NAW need a full understanding of the work of LRFs, not least because of the requirement to develop plans for emergencies beyond the local level.

2.109 RRTs and NAW can be expected to be standing members of the LRFs in their area. They will generally attend only as observers, though they will be able to add value in a number of ways, including offering advice on the national and regional pictures, and encouraging cross-boundary working and the sharing of best practice.

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11 regulation 3
2.110 The **armed forces** do not play a permanent role in local civil protection. They can, however, under exceptional circumstances, provide an element of the support central government can provide to Category 1 responders when responding to a disaster or emergency. They also play an important part in certain specific scenarios such as search and rescue (including mountain rescue) and explosive ordnance disposal. It is important that Category 1 responders establish close links with the armed forces in their area. Through the medium of LRFs (and Regional Resilience Forums), Category 1 responders will develop a greater understanding of how the armed forces might support a response to an emergency. It is therefore important that the Regional Brigade is represented at the appropriate level on LRFs.

2.111 The **voluntary sector** is organised nationally and locally. It has a key support role to offer the emergency services during emergencies and, in certain circumstances such as rescue at sea, an operational role. Further detail on the voluntary sector’s work is set out in Chapter 14.

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**LRF membership – an example**

This example is not intended to present a definitive picture of what an LRF should look like. Decisions about membership should be taken locally. But it does give a flavour of the size and spread of membership which local responders should aim for.

Reflecting the key role of the police in local civil protection, the Chief Constable of the local police force is in the chair.

Category 1 responders have agreed between themselves a standing membership of the LRF, striking a balance between representing the key sectors and maintaining a manageable group:

- Assistant Chief Constable (Operations), local police force
- Chief Executive, County Council
- Chief Executive, District Council
- Chief Fire Officer, local Fire and Rescue Service
- Chief Ambulance Officer, lead ambulance trust
- Chief Executive, lead PCT/LHB/SHA
- HPA representative
- Area Manager, Environment Agency
- Area Operations Manager, MCA

In addition, the range of issues for discussion at the meeting in question has prompted the attendance of a number of Category 2 responders:

- Electricity and gas representatives
- Emergency planning manager, local water company
- Representative from Network Rail
- Area manager, Highways Agency
- Representative from HSE

At the meeting in the example, there are no representatives of the Telecommunications sector because no relevant issues are on the agenda.

Furthermore, the LRF has three additional standing members which are not Category 1 or 2 responders:

- Appointed representative of the Regional Brigade Commander
- Regional Resilience Director, Government Office
- A representative of the British Red Cross, who sits on the LRF’s Voluntary Sector Subgroup

The secretariat to the LRF is provided by the Emergency Planning Unit of the County Council, with the Chief Emergency Planning Officer at the table as Secretary to the LRF.
Summary
• Under the Civil Contingencies Act, Category 1 and 2 responders have a duty to share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Information sharing is also encouraged as being good practice.
• Information sharing is a crucial element of civil protection work, underpinning all forms of co-operation. Category 1 and 2 responders should share information formally and as part of a culture of co-operation (paragraphs 3.1–3.6 and Chapter 2).
• The initial presumption is that all information should be shared, but the release of some information, and of information to some audiences, may need to be controlled. Category 1 and 2 responders need to understand what should be controlled (paragraphs 3.7–3.15).
• Category 1 responders need to know how to categorise types of information; how the different types of information can be used; how to obtain consent; and the limits on disclosure (paragraphs 3.16–3.31).
• Category 1 and 2 responders need to know about the impact of other legislation, such as the Freedom of Information and Data Protection Acts, on their information sharing (paragraphs 3.48–3.58).
What the Act and the Regulations require

Purpose and scope

3.1 Information is shared between Category 1 and 2 responders as they work together to perform their duties under the Act. Information sharing is a crucial element of civil protection work, underpinning all forms of co-operation. It may involve simple liaison between bodies keeping each other up to date on their current arrangements and future plans. Such activities may be carried out through the proposed forums, and more informally.

3.2 Information sharing may also involve direct contacts, formal or informal, between Category 1 and 2 responders seeking knowledge of hazards, risk assessments or planning arrangements (including warning procedures) and other matters, where the information is in the possession of one, and the other believes it needs the information to fulfil its civil protection duties.

3.3 The process of sharing information is crucial to other elements of the duty:
- Sound risk assessment relies on obtaining accurate information about the nature of the hazard, the probability of a hazardous event occurring, and the potential effects and impact on the community if it does. Each of these elements may involve some specialist knowledge and calculation and the information required may be privileged or sensitive and not generally in the public domain.
- Business continuity management largely involves knowledge of the vulnerabilities of one’s own organisation – but it also examines linkages to and dependencies on suppliers and contractors, where information may be harder to obtain.
- Emergency planning relies essentially on knowledge of how each of your partners in response has planned to perform – what their aims and contribution will be, how they will organise and co-ordinate their efforts with those of other bodies, and how contacts will be managed before and during the event. All these details are constantly changing as plans are revised, organisations are restructured or their roles redefined, and individuals and teams are replaced.

3.4 Information sharing is necessary so that Category 1 and 2 responders are able to make the right judgements. If Category 1 and 2 responders have access to all the information they need, they can make the right decisions about how to plan and what to plan for. If they do not have access to all information, their planning will be weakened. They will be less well placed to make judgements around cost-benefit analysis – what to plan for and what not to plan for.

3.5 But the picture is complicated because each individual Category 1 or 2 responder needs to get its planning right and this has to be balanced against the needs of others. For example, sharing a piece of information which helps the planning of one Category 1 or 2 responder could harm the interests of another Category 1 or 2 responder. Also, the perspective of an individual organisation on a single piece of information can be affected by its own position, so an organisation can interpret information in a way that seems correct but is actually wrong. For example, a Category 1 or 2 responder might interpret something to be a risk, but another Category 1 or 2 responder with greater expertise might be less concerned. And in some circumstances, Category 1 or 2 responders will not be able to appreciate the bigger picture into which the information fits. For example, a seemingly innocuous piece of information might have implications for national security.

3.6 These two competing factors point towards a framework in which the initial presumption is that information should be shared, but that some information should be controlled if its release would be counterproductive or damaging in some other way.

When information should not be formally requested

3.7 In most instances, information will pass freely between Category 1 and 2 responders, as part of a more general process of dialogue and co-operation. This is the means by which the overwhelming majority of information sharing should happen and has happened. If this is not the case, it is probably evidence of a wider systemic failing in the way the Act is operating in the local area in question.
3.8 As a consequence, the Regulations' require Category 1 and 2 responders to consider alternative routes before pursuing a formal information request. This ensures that Category 1 and 2 responders make proper efforts to use existing and informal routes to gather information. The aim of this provision is to avoid over-bureaucratization of the information-sharing process, and reinforce the message that the information-sharing mechanisms under the Act should be regarded as a fallback rather than as the first option.

3.9 Firstly, the Category 1 or 2 responder must be satisfied that it does not already hold the information, either by virtue of a previous request or because of informal information exchange. Category 1 and 2 responders should, as a consequence, marshal the information they hold in such a way as to ensure they can make a judgement on this point.

3.10 Secondly, the Category 1 or 2 responder must satisfy itself that the information is not reasonably accessible to the public – that is to say, is not put out generally by the Category 1 or 2 responder as part of its wider information policy. Examples of this would include material made available in annual reports or accounts, or material on websites (both those of individual Category 1 or 2 responders and general websites with generic information such as http://www.ukreliance.info).

3.11 Thirdly, the Category 1 or 2 responder must satisfy itself that the information cannot be obtained by other means. This includes all forms of informal dialogue and information sharing, and obliges Category 1 and 2 responders to work together in the first instance to agree information flows that meet the need of those organisations involved. These will include many of the informal information-sharing agreements that exist at the local level. Category 1 and 2 responders also have or may have pre-existing requirements on them under other legislation (including, for example, their licence conditions from a regulator, or by direction of a minister) to assess risk and to prepare planning arrangements for emergencies. This may mean that relationships and information-sharing routes are already established. Where possible, these should be built on and complemented, rather than duplicated.

Formal procedures for requesting information

Procedure for making a request

3.12 But there are still some instances in which the supply of information will be more controlled. Under the Regulations, any Category 1 or 2 responder can request information from another Category 1 or 2 responder, so long as it is for the purpose of fulfilling responsibilities under the Act, or the performance of another function which relates to an emergency. This should be seen very much as a fallback option, and every effort should be made to maintain relationships between Category 1 and 2 responders that allow information to be shared without recourse to formal requests. But should formal requests be necessary, there are a number of procedures that need to be followed in order to make the system work.

3.13 In any instance of information sharing, one or more Category 1 or 2 responders will request the information and one or more will receive the request. They are known respectively as “the requesting Category 1 or 2 responder” and “the receiving Category 1 or 2 responder.”

3.14 A full explanation of the formal procedures for requesting information is set out at Annex 3A.

3.15 Templates for making and replying to information requests can be found at Annex 3B.

Sensitive information

3.16 Not all information can be shared, and Category 1 and 2 responders can claim exceptions in certain circumstances (and thus not supply information as requested). Exceptions under this Act and the Regulations relate to sensitive information only. Where the exceptions apply, a Category 1 or 2 responder must not disclose the information:

- **Exception where disclosure would prejudice sensitive information:** A Category 1 or 2 responder must refuse to comply with an information request if the information is sensitive

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1 regulation 47(3)(b)
2 regulation 47
3 regulation 47
and if it has reasonable grounds to believe that complying with the request would compromise that information. If a Category 1 or 2 responder refuses to disclose information on this basis, it must give reasons for so doing, unless the information is sensitive by virtue of its impact on national security. For example, one Category 1 or 2 responder might be unwilling to pass sensitive information to another Category 1 or 2 responder because the latter was known to have problems with its employees leaking information to the media. It should be noted, however, that this exception is only rarely likely to be available, as generally there will be no robust reason to expect that information would be passed on.

- **Exception where information has been supplied by the intelligence services:** Where a Category 1 or 2 responder receives an information request in relation to information which has been supplied directly or indirectly by the intelligence services (the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters or National Criminal Intelligence Service), the responder must not comply with the request unless the relevant intelligence service consents to the disclosure of the information. The intelligence service may impose conditions on its consent.

3.17 There are four different kinds of sensitive information as defined by the Regulations:

- **Information prejudicial to national security** – information, the disclosure of which to the public would adversely affect national security.
- **Information prejudicial to public safety** – information, the disclosure of which to the public would adversely affect public safety.
- **Commercially sensitive information** – information which relates to the business or other affairs of a person or organisation, and disclosure of which to the public would prejudice the legitimate business interests of the person or organisation to whom the information relates.
- **Personal information** – information which is personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), disclosure of which to the public would breach any of the data protection principles or section 10 of the DPA.

3.18 It will be for individual Category 1 or 2 responders to reach a decision about whether the information they hold is sensitive. But there are a number of general points that should affect the decision:

- All Category 1 and 2 responders should work on the presumption that information requested should be disclosed. Non-disclosure should only occur in exceptional cases, such as where there are national security implications.
- Where the Category 1 or 2 responder knows that the information has originated from the intelligence services and that disclosure to the public would threaten national security, then the information must not be disclosed. Where the Category 1 or 2 responder suspects that the information has originated from the intelligence services or that it may be sensitive for reasons of national security, it should consult with the originator of the information. However, material that originates from the intelligence services is not, as a matter of course, sensitive information.
- In considering national security implications, note that the test is whether disclosure to the public would threaten national security, not whether disclosure to the requesting Category 1 or 2 responder would threaten national security. A similar test applies in the other categories of sensitive information.
- In the case of information that is sensitive by virtue of its national security implications, a Minister of the Crown may issue a certificate certifying that disclosure of that information to the public would be contrary to the interests of national security. This certificate is conclusive. The Minister can issue a certificate in relation to a class of information or a specific piece of information. Note, however, that absence of a certificate does not mean that the information cannot be sensitive on national security grounds.
- Where a request relates to information, part of which is sensitive and part of which is not, the exception only applies to the sensitive information. (In other words, the application of an exception does not necessarily enable a Category 1 or 2 responder to refuse an information request in its entirety.)

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4 regulation 45(1)  
5 regulation 49(4)  
6 regulation 45(1)  
7 regulation 46
Using non-sensitive information

Use within the planning process

3.19 The Act and Regulations do not impose any limits on the use of information obtained under the Act which is not sensitive. However, use of non-sensitive information may be limited by duties of confidence, by other enactment or by contract.

3.20 There are unlikely to be any restrictions on the use to which a Category 1 or 2 responder can put non-sensitive information which it creates in the course of carrying on its duties under the Act (eg an emergency plan – though an emergency plan may contain information that has been supplied by another Category 1 or 2 responder, and the use to which this information may be put may be subject to limits). It is also important to be mindful that information is sensitive within different environments, and whilst some information may be suitable for sharing among Category 1 or 2 responders it might not be suitable for the wider public.

Disclosure

3.21 Neither the Act nor the Regulations place any restriction on the disclosure of non-sensitive information that is obtained under the Act. Nor do the Act or Regulations create any restriction on disclosure of non-sensitive information that is created by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the course of carrying out its functions under the Act. However, non-sensitive information which is received from other Category 1 or 2 responders or third parties may be subject to a duty of confidence or contractual restrictions on disclosure. Category 1 or 2 responders may also be subject to other statutory restrictions on disclosure.

3.22 Just because there is no restriction on disclosure, this does not necessarily mean that the Category 1 or 2 responder will be obliged to disclose the information. But some Category 1 or 2 responders may be under a legal obligation to disclose certain information – in particular, under the Act (see, for example, the duty to arrange to publish in part the plans and risk assessments), the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.

Using sensitive information

Use within the planning process

3.23 Sensitive information reasonably requested by a Category 1 responder in performance of its functions to deal with an emergency may only be used for the purpose of performing the function for which it was requested. In other words, if a Category 1 responder asks for sensitive information for the purpose of performing a particular function under its regulatory regime, that information may only be used for that purpose. The effect of this will be to limit the circulation of information within Category 1 responder organisations. For example, information about the robustness of mobile phone coverage in the event of an emergency, legitimately obtained by one part of an organisation for use in emergency plans, should not be shared with another part of the organisation responsible for the organisation’s contractual relationship with its mobile phone provider.

3.24 If a Category 1 or 2 responder wishes to use sensitive information it has received by virtue of an information request under the Act for a different purpose, it must obtain the consent of the relevant person or organisation. The relevant person or organisation for different types of sensitive information is set out in Figure 3.1.

3.25 The use of sensitive information may be further restricted by duties of confidence, by other enactment or by contract.

3.26 Restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information which is created by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the course of carrying out its duties under the Act are dealt with below. This is likely to limit the way in which sensitive information created by a Category 1 or 2 responder is used.

Disclosure

3.27 The Regulations prohibit any Category 1 and 2 responder from publishing or otherwise disclosing...
any sensitive information which it has received by virtue of the Act. The Regulations also prohibit disclosure of any sensitive information which the Category 1 or 2 responder has created in the course of discharging its duties under the Act. For example, a risk assessment might identify that a local authority’s planning to evacuate a city centre was deficient, and would exacerbate the effects of a terrorist attack. Putting the information into the public domain could expose a weakness that might encourage an attack. If this information was obtained by virtue of an information request made under the Act, or created in the course of a Category 1 or 2 responder discharging its duties under the Act, the sensitive information must not be disclosed, even if it would otherwise fall within the Category 1 responder’s duty to publish a risk assessment/plan or its duty to warn, inform and advise the public.

3.28 There are two exceptions in the Regulations to the prohibition on disclosure. Where the exceptions apply, the Category 1 or 2 responder may disclose. But unless the Category 1 or 2 responder is subject to an obligation under the Act to disclose the information (eg as part of the obligation to publish risk assessments), it is not obliged to do so:

- Consent for the publication or disclosure is obtained. Consent should be obtained from the person identified in Figure 3.1. Note that the consent may be given subject to conditions.
- The information is commercially sensitive or personal data, but the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of the person or organisation concerned. This exception does not apply if the information is sensitive by virtue of its national security or public safety implications. When relying on this exception, the Category 1 or 2 responder must inform the person or organisation to whom the information relates of its intention to disclose the information and provide reasons why it is satisfied that the public interest in disclosure outweighs their interests.

3.29 The prohibition on disclosure only applies when the Category 1 or 2 responder is discharging its...
duties under the Act or any other function that it has in relation to an emergency. However, note that the restrictions on the use of information mean that in most cases sensitive information should not be used for other purposes. The prohibition does not apply where a Category 1 or 2 responder is dealing with an information request or contributing to the Community Risk Register (CRR).^{16}

3.30 The prohibition will not apply where the Category 1 or 2 responder receives an information request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. In such circumstances, Category 1 or 2 responders must consider the relevant enactment to determine whether or not the information should be released. (The right to information under each of those enactments is subject to limitations on disclosure. In many cases they will apply to sensitive information; but Category 1 or 2 responders should consider each case on its merits.)

3.31 The Regulations^{17} deal with the sharing of risk assessments to form the CRR. Where the risk assessment contains sensitive information, the Category 1 or 2 responder need not provide that information to the CRR where it considers that to do so would impair the confidentiality of that information or compromise the information. Note that there is no obligation under the Regulations to publish the CRR in its entirety. It is possible for a Category 1 or 2 responder to contribute a risk assessment to the CRR on condition that its risk assessment is not published.

How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

3.32 This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.^{18}

Types of information

3.33 It may be helpful for Category 1 and 2 responders to think about their use of information in the round, and consider how streams of information interact.

3.34 There are various types of information. Information may be suitable for some audiences, but not others. And the circulation of information can be limited to certain classes of organisation or individual.

3.35 It is important not to think of information as being either public or private. The picture is much more nuanced, with a spectrum which runs from limited-access information (even within organisations) through to information intended to be absorbed and understood by the public.

3.36 However, there are certainly controls on the free flow of information. Access is limited in a range of ways including physical access, restrictive markings, circulation lists, the ‘need-to-know’ principle and targeting particular audiences.

Category 2 responders

3.37 As with co-operation obligations, it is important for Category 1 responders to be realistic about what information is requested from Category 2 responders. Information sharing has the potential to be very burdensome if it is not handled responsibly.

3.38 Category 2 responders often put information about their activities into the public domain. Information about the overall regulatory regime for Category 2 responders such as the utility and transport sectors is also widely available. In the first instance, Category 1 responders should seek information about the civil protection arrangements of Category 2 responders from these open sources. To facilitate this, the Government will work with Category 2 responders to put as much information as practical about their industry’s civil protection arrangements into the public domain.

3.39 Beyond these generic arrangements, Category 1 responders can generally expect to be making information requests in a limited number of areas:

• information about local configuration of national arrangements;
• information about specific local facilities; and
• contact details of key staff.

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^{16} regulation 51(1)
^{17} regulation 15(3)
^{18} s. cfp.283(3)(b)
Box 3.1: The Government’s protective marking system

One of the most common systems for the protection of documents is the Government’s own document classification regime. The classification system is designed to protect valuable property or information, by labelling it with classifications, also known as protective markings. The system is operated by Government, and is linked to vetting overall security policy. As such it is not readily transferable to the local level, and should not provide the basis for any form of universally applicable system. And it should also be noted that even highly classified material may not be exempt from FOI requests. But it will be used by some Category 1 and 2 responders. There are four classifications:

• Restricted
• Confidential
• Secret
• Top Secret.

These classifications relate to the level of protection needed for the property or document. This operates on a sliding scale, and is based on:

• the damage that would be caused if it were lost, stolen or seen by an unauthorised person; and
• the subject of the document.

For example, loss of a Restricted document might cause distress to individuals or reveal confidential third-party information, whereas loss of a Top Secret document might cause very serious damage to UK armed forces or severe long-term damage to the UK economy.

The classification determines who can see the property or information, how it is stored and how it is transported or sent. But it should be noted that each item is classified on its own merits, and so it is not possible to say that all examples of a particular type of document – for example, an emergency plan – would be classified at a particular level.

In relation to access, classified documents are far less inaccessible than many people believe:

• To access Restricted information, you do not necessarily need any clearance but, in some cases, you may need a counter terrorist check (CTC).
• To access Confidential information, you may only need a basic check (BC). In some cases you may also need a CTC or a security check (SC).
• To access Secret information you must have an SC.
• To access Top Secret information you must have developed vetting (DV) clearance. But in some cases you may only need SC.

Category 1 and 2 responders should be willing to challenge organisations which over-classify material, or demand unwarranted levels of clearance.

3.40 Of course, this list is not exclusive. If a Category 1 responder wants information in order to discharge its duties under the Act it should approach the Category 2 responder in question and begin a dialogue about access. If that is not possible, or is unsuccessful, and the Category 1 responder believes the request to be reasonable and appropriate, it should make the request in accordance with the procedures set out in Annex A.

3.41 Where possible, Category 1 responders should seek to channel requests through as small a number of routes as possible so as to avoid duplication of effort. There are several ways in which Category 1 responders can request access to information to make the process more efficient:

• Where the information is required by a number of Category 1 responders, the request may be co-ordinated through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), with the information shared between LRF members if appropriate. This is particularly relevant if the questions relate to local arrangements.
• Across a region, the request could be co-ordinated through the Regional Resilience Forum.
• Where a type of information request comes up repeatedly, a Category 1 responder should consider raising this with its national representative body, or the sponsoring government department, or
through the national representative body for the Category 2 sector in question. This will allow the sector to consider whether adjustment might be made to the scope of publicly available information to remove the need for future requests.

3.42 In terms of sensitive information, most Category 2 responders are particularly likely to rely on exceptions that relate to commercial confidentiality. This reflects the fact that many of the Category 2 responders are private sector bodies, who may be in competition with other Category 2 responders within the same area. It is important that these needs are respected. For example, two mobile phone operators in the same LRF area might not want to expose details of their network coverage to each other, or to the public.

3.43 This would obviously be less true of those Category 2 responders from the public sector.

3.44 Category 1 responders should also bear in mind that information may be available to their organisation by virtue of existing commercial relationships with a Category 2 responder, or that information might be shared under the Act which would affect a commercial relationship. For example, an electricity supplier might have a contract to supply a local authority, but civil protection work might reveal problems with the resilience of that supply.

3.45 It is important that Category 1 responders respect the circumstances under which such information is obtained, and abide carefully by any restrictions on its use. Should Category 1 responders not handle information properly, the sanctions set out in the Act 18 would be available to the Category 2 responder in question. In addition, Category 1 or 2 responders may also be able to rely on the law of confidence. In practice, any Category 1 responders acting inappropriately would be likely to receive additional advice from central government departments or Regional Resilience Teams.

3.46 In return for responsible use of these powers to request information, Category 2 responders should ensure that they can deal with reasonable requests made by Category 1 responders.

Other legislative requirements

3.47 Although there are many pieces of legislation which affect the use of information within individual sectors, there are three which have a wider-ranging impact and of which, as a consequence, Category 1 and 2 responders should be aware. It is for each Category 1 or 2 responder to make the final judgements about the detailed implications of each of these pieces of legislation and how they interface with the Act.

Freedom of Information Act 2000

3.48 The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) provides a mechanism by which members of the public can access information held by public sector bodies.

3.49 The FOIA aims to increase the transparency of public bodies and the way in which such bodies carry out their work, and to increase accountability. For Category 1 and 2 responders which are Public Authorities as defined by the FOIA – broadly speaking that is a UK-wide public authority or a public sector body in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (similar legislation exists in Scotland) – the FOIA imposes certain duties to communicate information which is requested by any person (subject to procedural requirements and exemptions). These duties are not affected by the Act.

3.50 Although as a matter of law the FOIA could be used by one Public Authority to extract information from another, the FOIA is not primarily intended to be used for that purpose. Public Authorities have an implicit duty of co-operation in the discharge of public functions which should facilitate information flow. As such, Public Authorities which are Category 1 and 2 responders should not regard the FOIA as the principal basis for making requests from each other about civil protection matters. And Category 2 responders which are not Public Authorities should also not rely on the provisions of the FOIA as the principal basis to acquire information for civil protection purposes.

3.51 Instead, Category 1 and 2 responders should follow the two-stage process set out in earlier paragraphs. In the first instance, they should consider...
3.52 It is only if the information is not publicly available that Category 1 or 2 responders should seek to use the formal mechanisms set out above. But this remains a last resort.

3.53 In most respects, the information-sharing provisions in the Act and Regulations are broader than those in the FOIA. The FOIA recognises that the information will enter the public domain. The Act recognises that the information stays within the civil protection community. As a result, the Act allows certain types of sensitive information to be shared which would be unlikely to be disclosed under FOIA.

3.54 Detailed guidance on the FOIA can be found on the Department for Constitutional Affairs website at http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/guidance/index.htm

Environmental Information Regulations 2004

3.55 The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 provide for the freedom of access to information on the environment, subject to certain conditions, and must be taken into account when carrying out duties under the Act and Regulations.

3.56 Further information is available through the website of the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, at http://www.defra.gov.uk

Data Protection Act 1998

3.57 The Data Protection Act 1998 provides certain rights to individuals to request information from public bodies about personal data held by them which relates to that individual. It also provides limits on the use or processing of such data by public authorities. The Data Protection Act must be considered in relation to the duties imposed under the Act and Regulations.

Summary

- Risk assessment is the first step in the emergency planning and business continuity planning processes. It ensures that Category 1 responders make plans that are sound and proportionate to risks (paragraphs 4.1–4.5).
- The Act places a duty on all Category 1 responders to carry out risk assessment. Multi-agency co-operation in maintaining a Community Risk Register is also a statutory duty (paragraphs 4.9–4.10).
- There is a six-step process for risk assessment that reflects widely accepted good practice. It involves a cycle of identifying potential hazards within the local context, assessing the risks, and considering how those risks should be managed. Responders can use these steps to assist their own planning (paragraphs 4.29–4.54 and Box 4.4).
- It should be possible for local risk assessments to inform regional and national assessments, and vice versa. Increasingly, Category 1 responders will be able to draw on generic risk assessments that are provided by central government, while local risk assessments will be shared with Regional Resilience Teams and used to inform regional and national risk assessments (Boxes 4.2 and 4.3).
- Category 1 responders have a statutory duty to publish their risk assessments, to the extent necessary to reduce the impact of an emergency on the community (paragraphs 4.14 and 4.56).
What the Act and the Regulations require

4.1 The Act places a risk assessment duty on all Category 1 responders. The purpose of the duty is to:

- ensure that Category 1 responders have an accurate and shared understanding of the risks that they face so that planning has a sound foundation and is proportionate to the risks;
- provide a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives and work programmes and the allocation of resources;
- enable Category 1 responders to assess the adequacy of their plans and capabilities, highlight existing measures that are appropriate, and allow gaps to be identified;
- facilitate joined-up local planning, based on consistent planning assumptions;
- enable Category 1 responders to provide an accessible overview of the emergency planning and business continuity planning context for the public and officials; and
- inform and reflect regional and national risk assessments that support emergency planning and capability development at those levels.

Assess the risk of an emergency

4.2 There is a duty on Category 1 responders to assess the risk of an emergency within, or affecting, a geographical area for which each Category 1 responder is responsible. Emergency as defined in the Act is an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom. It must also meet either of the following criteria:

- The threat or hazard is of a sufficient scale and nature that it is likely to seriously obstruct a Category 1 responder in the performance of its functions.

- The threat or hazard requires the Category 1 responder to exercise its functions and undertake a special mobilisation.

4.3 Challenges which do not constitute an emergency as defined under the Act lie outside the scope of the risk assessment duty. As part of business continuity management (BCM), Category 1 responders will need to risk-assess their emergency planning arrangements and their ability to deliver their critical functions during those emergencies for which the risks are assessed to be significant. Henceforth in this chapter ‘hazards’ and ‘threats’ are events which may result in an emergency, as defined above.

Modification of plans

4.4 Category 1 responders are required to consider whether plans should be modified in light of the risk assessment.

Plan for response to an emergency

4.5 Category 1 responders need only perform a risk assessment in relation to emergencies which would or might affect the geographical area for which they are responsible.

Minister of the Crown

4.6 The Regulations enable a Minister of the Crown to issue Category 1 responders with guidance on the risk of a particular emergency. This guidance will usually take the form of likelihood assessments although it might also refer to impacts. The Minister may provide that Category 1 responders must adopt that assessment as their own. In general, this is the approach that will be used for the assessment of risks associated with threats; central government will provide a generic threat statement – within the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG) – that identifies threat challenges for Category 1 responders. Implicitly, these statements will indicate that there is assessed to be a significant – though usually very low – likelihood of the threat occurring. In such a case,

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1The use of the words ‘region’, ‘regional’ or ‘regionally’ in the context of this guidance includes Wales
2s. 2(1)(a)–(b), regulation 13
3s. 1
4s. 2(2)
5s. 2(1)(e)
6Regulation 13
a responder must not assess the likelihood of that emergency occurring itself; it must rely on the Ministerial assessment.

4.7 Alternatively, the Minister may provide that Category 1 responders must “have regard” to the Ministerial assessment. In such cases, responders must conduct a subsequent risk assessment of their own. They must take the Ministerial assessment into account, but if there are particular reasons to depart from that assessment (e.g. because there are peculiar local features which have not been taken into account in the Ministerial assessment), a responder may do so. This is how generic local likelihood assessments of hazards – in the form of the LRAG – will be provided to Category 1 responders in the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) by the government departments and agencies that are best placed to make those assessments (e.g. the Environment Agency for coastal flooding, and the Health and Safety Executive for industrial accidents).

Frequency

4.8 The Act also states that the risk assessment should be updated “from time to time”.⁷ This must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the risk assessment duty and the duty on responders to perform their duties under the Act in a “reasonable fashion”. Thus, Category 1 responders should assess risk as often as is necessary to ensure that they are in a reasonable position to maintain and update their emergency plans and to perform the civil protection duties under the Act, including the duty to maintain BC plans. However, the risk assessment should respond quickly to changes in the risk environment so that plans can be updated accordingly.⁸ This means that the process should be iterative and contain risk monitoring and updating mechanisms (see paragraph 4.54).

Co-operation

4.9 As part of the LRF process, Category 1 responders must co-operate with each other in maintaining the Community Risk Register (CRR).⁹ The CRR provides an agreed position on the risks affecting a local area and on the planning and resourcing priorities required to prepare for those risks. Its purpose is to enable each Category 1 responder to:

- be fully informed of the risks of emergency in its area;
- benefit from the range of views on risk of its partners on the LRF;
- identify collectively the main local emergency plans and capabilities which appear to be needed across all the Category 1 responders;
- decide which of the plans and capabilities should properly fall to it;¹⁰ and
- know which of its partners in the LRF acknowledges responsibility for developing plans and capabilities against the various risks.

4.10 According to the Regulations, the CRR should be shared with LRFs with whom a boundary is shared.¹¹ A copy of the CRR should also be provided to the Regional Resilience Team for the area.¹² Category 1 responders should also consider whether there are any specific risks which should be communicated to any LRFs in any other local areas.¹³

4.11 While the Act imposes a duty on each Category 1 responder to assess risk, it is recognised that requiring each Category 1 responder to perform this duty in isolation would lead to a wasteful duplication of resources. It is more efficient for individual Category 1 responders to fulfil their risk assessment duties by participating in a collaborative exercise that results in a single, collective risk assessment. This ensures that each local risk is only assessed once and allows the workload to be shared between Category 1 responders. It also helps to streamline the relationship between Category 1 responders and the government departments and agencies that are able to support the risk assessments.

4.12 In light of this, the Regulations enable the risk assessment duty to be exercised in different ways. The Act provides that Category 1 responders may fulfil the

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¹ s. 2(1)(a)–(b)
² s. 2(1)(e)
³ regulation 15
⁴ s. 2(1)(b)
⁵ regulation 16
⁶ regulation 16
⁷ regulation 18
duty to assess risk jointly.\textsuperscript{14} For example, a number of Category 1 responders in the form of a subgroup of the LRF might collectively assess the risk of a particular emergency occurring. Alternatively, the Act enables one Category 1 responder to be identified with lead responsibility.\textsuperscript{15} This is the mechanism that may be used by LRF members to share the risk assessment activity between them, with each member taking lead responsibility for a number of the risks. However, as outlined below, it will be for each Category 1 responder to assess whether a given risk poses a challenge for that particular responder.

\textbf{4.13} In addition, a Category 1 responder may engage a third party (eg an external consultant) to provide it with advice that relates to the risk of a particular emergency occurring. The Category 1 responder may then rely on this advice in making its own risk assessment. However, Category 1 responders should remember the benefits of conducting this process themselves: increased stakeholder engagement, a deeper understanding of the risk assessment, and enhanced credibility when communicating and explaining the assessment.

\section*{Publication of risk assessments}

\textbf{4.14} The Act requires each Category 1 responder to arrange to publish all or part of its risk assessments.\textsuperscript{16} It can do this (by agreement with its LRF partners) by publishing all or part of the CRR. It may also fulfil the duty by publishing all or part of a plan, where the part published includes a summary of the risk assessment on which the plan is based. When deciding what may be published, the security classification of information and any restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information should be taken into consideration (see paragraph 4.49).

\section*{How the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland}

\textbf{4.15} The extent of the risk assessment duty under the Act and the application of this guidance differ between the devolved administrations.

\section*{Scotland}

\textbf{4.16} Category 1 responders in Scotland have a duty to undertake risk assessment. Scottish Executive departments will be working with a Scottish risk assessment group, which includes representatives of strategic co-ordinating groups (LRFs), and will issue guidance in due course.

\textbf{4.17} Generic threat statements and information on hazard likelihood for the UK will be provided to Scottish Ministers – in the form of the LRAG – who will consider distribution to Scottish Category 1 responders with devolved competences as appropriate. This material will be issued direct by a Minister to Category 1 responders which fall outside devolved competence.

\section*{Wales}

\textbf{4.18} The Act, Regulations and guidance extend to Wales. To assist Category 1 responders to fulfil their risk assessment duty, generic threat statements and information on hazard likelihood – in the form of the LRAG – will be provided to the Welsh Assembly Government to cascade to Category 1 responders in Wales. The Assembly may issue its own risk assessments to responders in Wales, with the consent of the Minister of the Crown. In certain circumstances, a Minister of the Crown may also provide guidance direct to Category 1 responders in Wales. From time to time, the CRR should also be shared with LRFs with whom a boundary is shared, and a copy provided to the Welsh Assembly Government.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{tcolorbox}
\textbf{Box 4.1: Further advice and information}

Also included in this chapter is further advice about risk assessment and useful information that is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

\textsuperscript{14} regulation 8
\textsuperscript{15} regulations 9–11
\textsuperscript{16}s. 2(1)(f)
\textsuperscript{17}regulation 16
**Northern Ireland**

4.19 In Northern Ireland, only a limited number of organisations have duties under Part 1 of the Act. The Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are Category 1 responders in Northern Ireland, and telecommunications operators are Category 2 responders.

4.20 To assist those Category 1 responders who do have a duty to undertake risk assessment, generic threat statements and information on hazard likelihood – in the form of the LRAG – will be provided to them direct. They will also be provided to the Central Emergency Planning Unit for information purposes.

4.21 Because these organisations do not represent the full spectrum of responders, not all the duties placed on organisations elsewhere will be appropriate in Northern Ireland. In particular, the provisions in the Regulations relating to the LRF and its activities, including the production of a CRR, do not apply to responders in Northern Ireland.

4.22 However, the Category 1 responders are expected to carry out individual risk assessments in relation to their own functions, and in doing so they should co-operate, as appropriate, with each other. The Category 2 responders should also co-operate with the Category 1 responders as required.¹⁹ In carrying out their risk assessment, Category 1 responders must have regard to any assessment of which they are aware by one of the specified Northern Ireland public service bodies and may adopt or rely on that work.¹⁹

4.23 Organisations in Northern Ireland which deliver relevant transferred functions are not subject to the duties in Part 1 of the Act, but carry out their civil contingencies activities in line with the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework.²⁰

4.24 The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework requires organisations to carry out individual risk assessments in relation to their functions. The methodology specified in the Framework is similar to that used by Category 1 responders. The Framework encourages organisations to co-operate in producing risk assessments and to

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**Figure 4.1: Risk as a product of likelihood and impact**

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¹⁹ regulation 6
²⁰ Part 10 of the Regulations
²¹ in Part 10 of the Regulations
share information at local level. Further information can be found on the Central Emergency Planning Unit website, [http://cepu.nics.gov.uk](http://cepu.nics.gov.uk).

### How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

4.25 This section provides guidance on good practice that should enable Category 1 responders to perform the risk assessment duty effectively, with co-operation as appropriate from Category 2 responders. It is important to note that this guidance is consistent with regional and national risk assessment mechanisms and should facilitate a two-way dialogue about risks between these levels.

### Terminology

4.26 Key terms applying to the process are defined in the Glossary. Risk terminology is notoriously varied. However, this chapter aims to be consistent with the main standards relating to risk management (see Bibliography).

4.27 It should be noted that, in the Act, risk itself is defined solely as the probability of an emergency.²¹

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²¹s. 2(1)(a)

### Figure 4.2: The general risk management process
The definition of risk used in this chapter is aligned with a more common definition in use but is to all intents and purposes consistent. Here, risk is defined as a product of the likelihood and impact of a given hazard or threat.

4.28 Generally, higher risks are associated with hazards or threats that have a higher impact and medium to high likelihood. Conversely, low risks will reflect hazards and threats where the impact is low and the likelihood is low to medium. The more difficult cases are those hazards and threats where the likelihood is low and the impact very high, or vice versa. These risks defy simple categorisation. They require a more sophisticated means of measurement involving judgements about the overall risk associated with certain combinations of likelihood and impact. Typically, these judgements are presented in a risk matrix, as seen in Annex 4F.

The risk assessment process

4.29 The six-step risk assessment process recommended in this chapter is consistent with the standard used in Australia and New Zealand, which is widely recognised as being good practice. Here, risk assessment is one component of the general risk management process as set out in Figure 4.2. The dashed line represents transitions from one phase to another: the first phase is ‘contextualisation’, the second ‘risk evaluation’ and the third ‘risk treatment’. It should be noted that there is no statutory requirement for Category 1 responders to perform the risk treatment step. However, it is described below for completeness and because, in practice, Category 1 responders are likely to use this step as a bridge to the emergency planning duty.

4.30 The risk assessment phases can be described as follows:

- **Contextualisation** involves defining the nature and scope of the risk and agreeing how the risk management process will be undertaken.
- **Risk evaluation** covers the identification of those threats and hazards that present significant risks, analysis of their likelihood and impacts, and the combination of these values to produce overall risk scores.
- **Risk treatment** involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high, developing plans and strategies to mitigate these risks, and then testing the plans and any associated capabilities. However, in relation to the latter, it is important to note that the Act does not require Category 1
responders to take action to reduce the likelihood of threats and hazards. Category 1 responders may decide to do this as part of their treatment of assessed risks but the Act only requires that emergency plans be developed; prevention and pre-emption lie outside its scope.

4.31 All three phases should be cyclical and interactive, involving the full range of stakeholders and allowing for review and updating. Moreover, the entire risk management process must be cyclical if it is to retain currency. Risks vary with changes in the context, changes in the hazards and threats, and changes in available emergency plans and capabilities. Thus, periodic reviews are required to ensure that these changes are captured, and then reflected in the risk assessment and emergency planning processes (see step 6, Annex 4A).

Supporting the planning process

4.32 As Figure 4.3 illustrates, risk assessment should drive a standard emergency planning process, informing emergency plans (and BC plans) which are then tested through audit and validation exercises. Regular updating of the risk assessment in turn leads to the revision of plans and further testing. A fundamental principle of emergency planning and business continuity planning is to address common consequences rather than different causes. As far as possible, flexible, generic plans may be developed to deliver the response capabilities for managing these consequences, whatever causes them. However, to ensure that these generic plans are commensurate with the risks, it is important that planning is underpinned by a risk assessment that evaluates and prioritises those hazards and threats according to their associated risks.

Organisation and accountability

4.33 It is likely that the LRF would wish to set up a risk assessment working group (RAWG), composed of a representative group of emergency planning officers from Category 1 responders, to undertake this work under a chair appointed by the LRF. As with the LRF, this working group is simply a forum for co-operation on risk assessment and is not a...
legal entity. Accordingly, the CRR is not owned by the LRF but by Category 1 responders in the LRF collectively.

Rigour and proportionality

4.34 The risk assessment process should be based on a sound methodology using the best available evidence and judgement. Category 1 responders should be supported in their assessment by Category 2 responders, local bodies, and regional and national organisations sharing information and co-operating as appropriate. However, as far as possible, the amount of effort given to any risk should be proportionate to its potential severity.

The six-step process

(See also Annex 4A)

Step 1: Contextualisation

4.35 In an initial discussion at the RAWG, Category 1 responders should begin by defining the scope of the risk management activity in the context of the Act and supporting guidance. They should review the process that they will adopt and identify the project's stakeholders. Key stakeholder groups must include the Category 1 responders who share the risk assessment duty, and may include Category 2 organisations with a contribution to the risk assessment process as well as groups in the community with a particular interest in the results of the work. It is important that Category 1 responders understand, at the outset, the principles and criteria with which risks will be evaluated and prioritised (see Annexes 4D and 4F). This should prepare them for later stages of the process in which they will need to decide which risks are acceptable and those which must be tolerated, including those which require planning.

4.36 An important part of step 1 is for Category 1 responders to describe the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. This is to understand the context better, as well as to establish the vulnerability and resilience of the area to emergencies. To do this Category 1 responders should reflect on the following aspects of their area, considering emerging trends and future events, in addition to the current situation. For example:

- **Social**: What is the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community? Are there any particularly vulnerable groups in the community? How are the various communities geographically distributed within the local area? How experienced is the community at coping with different types of emergencies?
- **Environment**: Are there any particular local vulnerabilities (eg poor coastal defences against flooding)? Is the area urbanised, rural or mixed? Are there any Sites of Special Scientific Interest?
- **Infrastructure**: How is the infrastructure configured in the area (transport, utilities, business, etc)? What are the critical supply networks in the area? Are there any sites in the area that are particularly critical for local, regional and national essential services (eg telecommunications hubs, health, finance, legal, etc)? What type of economy does it have?
- **Hazardous sites**: What potentially hazardous sites exist in the area? Where are they in relation to communities or sensitive environmental sites?

Step 2: Hazard review and allocation for assessment

**Hazards**

4.37 Taking into account centrally provided guidance in the form of the LRAG (see Box 4.3), each Category 1 responder should consider the local context as described during step 1 and identify those non-malicious hazards that, in their view, present significant risks (ie could give rise to an emergency) in their areas over the next five years. These hazards will be identified on the basis of experience, research or other information and they are likely to present consequences to which a special mobilisation by the Category 1 responder is required.

4.38 The RAWG should share and discuss these hazards at a meeting of the LRF with a view to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed. The LRF should endorse the list of hazards, and determine which Category 1 responder will lead the assessment of each hazard on behalf of the group. The LRF will also need to decide how any additional hazards proposed by the RAWG should be assessed, whether by the appointment of a lead, delegation or otherwise.

4.39 When overall risk scores are calculated at a later stage, events that are low in likelihood but high in impact will score highly, implying a need for
planning. It is important therefore to exclude at this stage events that are so low in likelihood that planning cannot be justified (e.g., asteroids hitting the earth). This is not to say that all low-likelihood, high-impact events should be excluded, but a careful judgement is needed about the likelihood below which events will be excluded from the assessment. It would be good practice to maintain a register of excluded risks as an appendix to the CRR; this would allow Category 1 responders to demonstrate that certain risks were considered at the outset but were then discounted for specified reasons (e.g., an assumption that the likelihood was so small that the hazard did not warrant further attention).

4.40 The responsibilities of the lead assessors would be to:

- assess the likelihood and impact of each hazard, based on the knowledge of RAWG members, the generic likelihood assessment (where available) and any other relevant information;
- liaise with the relevant government departments or agencies, as required;
- document assessments using the individual risk assessment example (Annex 4C), which will support the CRR, containing more detailed information on the assessment;
- present the likelihood assessment to the LRF and make changes as necessary;
- capture the results of the LRF risk assessment in the CRR; and
- ensure that the assessment is adequately described in the CRR.

Threats

4.41 Central government will provide Category 1 responders with a local threat statement containing assumptions about the types and outcomes of threats for which it would be appropriate to plan. These will be in the LRAG. No assessment of likelihood will be provided and no assessment of impact need be made by Category 1 responders since the risk of these events will not be assessed in the same way as for hazards. The capability and response implications of the threat assumptions will be considered alongside the other risks during the risk evaluation phase of the process (see step 4).

Step 3: Risk analysis

Assessing the likelihood of hazards

4.42 The RAWG lead assessors should consider the likelihood of the hazards occurring within the next five years (the same timescale adopted by the UK and regional assessments). The LRAG from central government should provide a basis for this work but the local knowledge available in the RAWG and other local organisations (including Category 2 responders)
should allow the RAWG to elaborate the assessment, and even to change it, if necessary.

4.43 When assessing the likelihood of a hazard it is necessary to refer to the description of an outcome of an incident. Without defining the outcome it is more difficult to assess likelihood. For example, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of flooding in the next five years without defining the size of the flood incident to be assessed (small-scale floods are more likely than larger-scale floods). The outcome can be defined in various ways. For flooding, it may be appropriate to talk in terms of the area flooded. For many incidents it may be necessary to use numbers of fatalities. Although both measures — area flooded and fatalities — are consequences of the hazards, they are immediate or primary consequences that can be used as proxy measures to describe the outcome of the hazard.

4.44 The outcome of a hazard is not the same as its (wider) impact, which is considered later in the process, although there will usually be a close relationship between the two. For example, in the case of flooding, two flood events could have the same outcome (e.g., 100 square miles flooded) but very different impacts, depending on the precise location of the flooding.

4.45 Where there is a considerable range in the foreseeable outcomes of a potential hazard, it may be necessary to assess the likelihood (and subsequently impact) of the hazard at multiple outcomes. Consequently, the individual risk assessment example at Annex 4C allows the lead assessors to record multiple outcomes for each hazard. Although a variety of outcomes may be considered for a particular type of risk, the LRF may decide that only a small number need to be captured in the CRR.

4.46 Each assessment should be carried out by a group of professionals with a pragmatic mix of evidence and judgement, which should be documented as far as possible. Where appropriate, the assessments of likelihood will be informed by studies on the vulnerability (i.e., susceptibility to damage or harm) and resilience (ability to withstand damage or harm) of the relevant sites, systems and communities. The assessments of likelihood and of impact should adopt the scales provided at Annex 4D.

4.47 It is possible that the generic local assessments of likelihood provided by central government in the LRAG will refer to outcomes of hazard that were not identified by the Category 1 responders. Category 1 responders can adopt different outcomes if they feel that this is necessary, but should document their reasons for doing so. It will not be possible for central government to re-issue the generic assessments with the revised outcomes, but it should be possible to take account of the new outcomes when agreeing the national risk assessment framework in subsequent years.

Assessing the impact of hazards

4.48 The next stage is to assess the impacts of the hazards. At Annex 4B, a generic framework is provided for assessing the local impacts of events in a consistent way. Using the impact scales provided, the lead assessors should assess the impact of hazards in their local areas.

4.49 Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in response should not share risk assessments (either through the LRF or otherwise) if the information in the assessment is sensitive (e.g., commercially sensitive or relating to national security) and the responder has reason to believe that to do so would compromise the information. Chapter 3 provides further guidance.

4.50 The lead assessors should capture the agreed likelihood and impact assessments in the Individual Risk Assessment Forms for consideration by the RAWG.

Step 4: Risk evaluation

4.51 Once the RAWG has agreed the individual risk assessment forms, the results should be collated and incorporated in the CRR, unless sensitive. The level of risk can then be determined by plotting likelihood and impact scores for each hazard on a risk matrix (see Annex 4F). The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the risk assessment process. Not only does it enable the risk analysis to be interpreted against pre-defined criteria, but it greatly facilitates the communication of the risk assessment. Annex 4F provides descriptions of the four risk ratings (‘Very high’, ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’) and addresses their relative significance for directing emergency planning.
**Box 4.4: Risk treatment**

Although not a statutory duty under the Act, risk treatment is the next step in the risk management process and Category 1 responders are encouraged to adopt the recommended practice.

**Step 5: Risk treatment**

CRRs are not an end in themselves, but serve as a means for ensuring a common starting point for responders in their approach to integrated emergency management – the adoption of coherent strategies and systems for the harmonisation of contingency plans and procedures.

In this stage of the risk assessment process, the LRF should prioritise risk reduction measures in accordance with the size of the risks and the gaps in the capabilities required to respond to those risks. They should set the risk priorities and, having evaluated the treatment options, agree a risk treatment plan. All such judgements should be recorded in the CRR.

The process has a number of stages that are described below. The results of each stage should be recorded in the CRR:

a) Assess the type and extent of the capabilities required to manage and respond to the hazards.

b) Identify the capabilities that are already in place.

c) Considering the gap and the extent of the risk, rate the risk priority.

d) Identify the additional treatments required to close the capability gap and manage the risk more effectively.

e) Identify whose responsibility it is to provide the treatment. Note that this may involve a transfer of the risk to an organisation outside the local area.

f) The prioritisation of risk reduction measures for threats follows the same process as for hazards, except that likelihood and impact will not be in the CRR. Nevertheless, a risk priority should be attributed to the treatment required to deal with these threats on the basis of existing capability gaps.

**4.52** Note that in this risk matrix the impact score is given a slightly greater weighting than the likelihood score. For example, an ‘Unlikely’ (2) but ‘Catastrophic’ (5) risk scores ‘Very high’, whereas a ‘Probable’ (5) but ‘Minor impact’ (2) risk scores ‘Medium’. The formula used to combine likelihood and impact scores varies from one risk assessment approach to another. The guidance presented here is consistent with a number of the major standards, and consistency in the application of this risk matrix is essential if the results of the local risk assessments are to be easily compared.

**4.53** It is at this stage that the RAWG should incorporate into the CRR the threat statement provided by central government in the threat section of the LRAG. This statement must be adopted by Category 1 responders, and Category 1 responders should therefore not seek to duplicate that work by assessing the likelihood of that particular threat occurring. See Box 4.4.

**Step 5: Risk treatment**

(See Box 4.4)

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**Box 4.5: Access under the Freedom of Information Act**

Members of the public may make requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to see the LRAG, CRR or any of the individual risk assessments. Category 1 responders who are presented with such requests will need to consider what must be released using available guidance (including guidance issued by the Department for Constitutional Affairs). The exemptions relating to national security, commercial sensitivity and policy formulation may be particularly relevant to these deliberations (subject, where appropriate, to the public interest balancing test). Given the relatively short timeframe in which information must be provided, it would be helpful for Category 1 responders to consider in advance how such requests would be handled. However, as each request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 must be considered on a case-by-case basis, it may not be possible to form a firm view on how to handle a request in advance of a request being received.
Step 6: Monitoring and reviewing

4.54 Risks should be reviewed regularly. Although there is no statutory requirement, a full and formal review of all risks on a four-yearly cycle is recommended. However, the risks should be monitored continuously and, where information suggests a potential change in the risks, a risk assessment should be performed and the CRR updated accordingly. This may require special meetings of the LRF, although risk assessment should be a standing item on the agendas of the LRFs. The CRR will also need to be updated periodically to reflect changes in the response capability (i.e., resilience). Consequently, the CRR should be seen as a living document and the work of the LRF as a rolling project.

Sharing risk assessments

4.55 Regulations require CRRs to be shared with LRFs in neighbouring local areas with whom a boundary is shared. In addition, Category 1 responders should consider whether there are any specific risks which should be communicated to any LRFs in any other local areas. The Regional Resilience Forums should be a particularly useful venue for the sharing of risk assessments between local areas.

Publishing risk assessments

4.56 Category 1 responders may be able to fulfil their statutory duty to publish all or part of their risk assessments by publishing all or part of the CRR or publishing all or all or part of a plan, where the part published includes a summary of the risk assessment on which the plan is based. They should do so where such information would allow members of the public to mitigate the consequences of particular risks. They should also take into account the principles of effective risk communication as documented on the UK resilience website (http://www.ukresilience.info) and consider the security classification of the information and the restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information (information disclosure of which would be damaging to national security or public safety or information which would be harmful to individuals or the commercial interests of any business entity).

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23 s. 2(1)(f)
Chapter 5
Emergency planning

Summary

• Emergency planning is at the heart of the civil protection duty on Category 1 responders. The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans for preventing emergencies; reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies; and taking other action in the event of emergencies (paragraphs 5.1–5.16).
• The Regulations require plans to contain a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred; provision for training key staff; and provision for exercising the plan to ensure it is effective. Procedures should also be put in place to ensure that the plan is reviewed periodically and kept up to date (paragraphs 5.17–5.20, 5.34–5.36 and 5.41–5.44).
• Category 1 responders must have regard to assessments of risk when deciding which plans are required and developing and reviewing the contents of them (paragraph 5.21).
• Emergency plans may take the form of generic plans – which set out the core of a Category 1 responder’s response to any emergency – or specific plans dealing with particular hazards or sites. Category 1 responders will probably adopt a combination of the two (paragraphs 5.23–5.25).
• Multi-agency plans can consolidate partnership working. Multi-agency plans are permitted, and Category 1 responders are required to consider whether it would be appropriate to develop multi-agency plans (paragraphs 5.26–5.28).
• Category 1 responders should involve Category 2 responders – and organisations which are not subject to the Act’s requirements – as appropriate throughout the planning process. Category 1 responders are specifically required to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations when developing plans (paragraphs 5.32 and 5.58–5.61).
• This chapter outlines a cycle for developing, exercising and reviewing plans. It also sets out good practice in presenting plans (paragraphs 5.46–5.175).
What the Act and the Regulations require

5.1 The chief requirement of the Act in regard to emergency planning is to maintain plans to ensure that, if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur, each Category 1 responder body can deliver its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency, reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects, or taking other action in connection with it.¹

5.2 Three aspects of performing the organisation’s functions in an emergency are identified:
- maintaining plans for preventing the emergency;
- maintaining plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; and
- maintaining plans for taking other action in connection with the emergency.

Maintain plans for preventing an emergency

5.3 The first part of the duty to maintain plans deals with the short time before an emergency occurs, when it might be avoided by prompt or decisive action. Plans should be maintained for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency is likely to occur, the organisation can perform its functions to prevent the emergency.²

5.4 Prevention, in this context, means carrying out the functions of the organisation in such a way as to prevent an emergency which is imminent, or which might be predicted, from occurring at all. Emergencies under this aspect of the Act should be ‘nipped in the bud’ in the way that fire-fighters stop a fire from spreading. Preventative actions may be identified from dynamic risk assessments at the time of an emergency.

5.5 Other examples of prevention include actions such as those taken by the ambulance service and other emergency services when they mobilise proactively on New Year’s Eve, so as to be ready to deal with potential incidents. Public health organisations taking action proactively to immunise against the spread of influenza in the winter months would be a further example in this context of prevention.

5.6 What the Act does not do is impose a duty on Category 1 responders to prevent all emergencies, nor does it require these organisations to undertake remedial works which might prevent a possible emergency at some future date. Such actions may be desirable and they may be a logical outcome of the risk assessment process at the risk treatment stage, but they are not required by the Act.

Maintain plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency

5.7 The central part of the main planning duty under the Act is to ensure that the organisation can perform its functions so as to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of an emergency.³

5.8 Plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency begin by addressing the disruption which is the impact of the event. This may be an event having a sudden impact or one which has a slow build-up. The effects of the emergency will be reduced by the remedial actions taken by the Category 1 responders. These will include actions to stem the emergency at source, such as fighting fires, or combating the release of toxic chemicals, the spread of disease or the extent of floods. Plans may specify the use of local teams with specialist equipment to perform these tasks.

5.9 The plan aims to bring order to the response operation. It is concerned with providing a framework for management, co-ordination and control within which teams of local specialists can go about their work. It identifies:
- the roles and responsibilities of teams (Gold, Silver and Bronze) from within the organisation and from partner organisations;
- how their activities are co-ordinated;
- the communications plan and contact details;
- the alerting and mobilising procedures;
- the facilities and equipment available, and their locations;
- how additional resources may be obtained, if required;

¹ s. 2(1)(d)
² s. 2(1)(d)(i)
³ s. 2(1)(d)(ii)
• how to support and protect staff; and
• a crisis management strategy from response through to recovery.¹

5.10 Plans for ensuring that the effects of an emergency are mitigated ensure direct interventions which, for example, protect or remove people from the full impact of the emergency. For instance, by rescuing people from the scene, or evacuating them and treating their injuries, or providing them with shelter and comfort, or arranging for an orderly return to the scene when it is safe. Again, plans may need to specify specialist teams and procedures to achieve this.

5.11 Recovery plans also mitigate the effects of an emergency. They are invoked and begin to operate at the same time as response plans. An outline of recovery planning is contained in the government publication, Recovery: An Emergency Management Guide.²

Maintain plans for taking other action in connection with an emergency

5.12 The distinction between mitigating the effects of an emergency and dealing with its secondary impacts is not clear-cut. Also, some subordinate arrangements and procedures in support of emergency plans might not be captured by the earlier two requirements. What the Act achieves by including a third duty to maintain plans for taking other action in connection with an emergency is to ensure that there can be no doubt that these types of secondary plan and supportive procedure are required by statute.

5.13 For example, not all actions to be taken in preparing for an emergency are directly concerned with controlling, reducing or mitigating its effects. Emergency planning has to concern itself not only with the immediate response to, and extended recovery from, an emergency, but also with its secondary impacts. The wave of reaction can be quite overwhelming in terms of, for example, media attention and public response. Handling public interest in how the Category 1 responders are tackling the emergency, and assisting in recovery from it, can be almost as demanding for the responders as the emergency itself. Most of these issues are dealt with in Chapter 7.

5.14 The procedures required under this provision of the Act in support of plans may also include subordinate or incidental arrangements necessary to the development of effective response plans. For example, procedures may be needed variously to:
• develop emergency control centres;
• develop reliable internal communications or information management systems for effective response;
• bind private contractors into the emergency plans;
• ensure the welfare of staff engaged in response; and
• ensure that sufficient resources (e.g. human, material, financial) are available when needed.

Plan maintenance procedures

5.15 The maintenance of plans involves more than their preparation. Once a plan has been prepared, it must be maintained for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs, or is likely to occur, the Category 1 responder is able to perform its functions to deal with it.³

5.16 Plan maintenance procedures must be developed to ensure that plans are kept up to date.

Procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred to which a Category 1 responder should respond

5.17 The definition of emergency in section 1 of the Act is concerned with the scale of consequences in terms of serious damage to human welfare, the environment and security.⁴ An exercise of judgement is required to determine whether or not an event or situation falls within the definition.

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¹A similar list is provided in The Lead Government Department and Its Role: Guidance and Best Practice, Chapter 6, where it describes roles and responsibilities for lead government departments (p23, para 2), (Cabinet Office, March 2004)
³s. 2(1)(d)
⁴s. 1(1)
5.18 Accordingly, as described in Chapter 1, the Act imposes a duty to maintain an emergency plan only if it is likely, in the face of the emergency, that the Category 1 responder:

- would consider it necessary or desirable to respond; and
- would be unable to do so without redeploying or obtaining additional resources.  

5.19 Any emergency plan maintained by a Category 1 responder must include a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred that makes it necessary or desirable for it to perform its functions for the purpose of dealing with an emergency.  

5.20 The procedure required is spelt out in the Regulations.  It must:

- enable the identification of the person who should determine whether an emergency has occurred – this will usually be a person qualified by position or training and identified as a post-holder by title or role;
- specify the procedure which that person should adopt in taking that decision;
- specify any persons who should be consulted about the decision; and
- specify the persons who should be informed about the decision.

Have regard to risk assessment

5.21 The Act requires Category 1 responders from time to time to assess whether the risk of an emergency might make it necessary or expedient for them to perform any of their functions.  Plans must be maintained to ensure that they are able to perform those functions when necessary or desirable for the purpose of dealing with an emergency, if one occurs or is likely to occur.  The Regulations explicitly link the two duties. They require a Category 1 responder to have regard to any relevant assessment of risk when performing its duty to maintain its emergency plans (and also its business continuity plans – see Chapter 6).  

Have regard to arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public

5.22 The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency.  In developing and maintaining their emergency plans, Category 1 responders must have regard to their relevant warning arrangements and provisions for informing and advising the public.  

Generic and specific plans

5.23 Annex 4B contains a classification of hazards and threats. It identifies a small number of generic hazards or threats and a much larger number of examples of each. It would not be sensible to require Category 1 responders to prepare a specific plan for each of these possible events. Therefore, the Regulations distinguish between a single plan which relates to any emergency and plans which relate to a particular emergency or a particular kind of emergency.  

5.24 Generic plans are the core plans which enable a Category 1 responder to perform its functions in relation to a wide range of possible scenarios.  

5.25 A plan which relates to a particular emergency or a particular kind of emergency is usually known as a specific plan. Specific plans are a detailed set of arrangements designed to go beyond the generic arrangements when the latter are likely to prove insufficient in a particular case. A specific plan usually relies on a generic plan. Category 1 responders should use assessments of the nature of the risk to decide whether specific plans are necessary or desirable.

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8 s. 2(2)(b)  
9 regulation 24(2)  
10 regulation 24(3)  
11 s. 2(1)(b)  
12 s. 2(1)(d)  
13 regulation 19  
14 regulation 20  
15 regulation 21(b)  
16 regulation 21(a)
Multi-agency plans

5.26 A multi-agency plan is a plan maintained by more than one Category 1 responder acting jointly.17 Multi-agency plans are developed in a situation where the partners agree that, for a successful combined response, they need a formal set of procedures governing them all.

5.27 These plans may be generic, as when they describe the control and co-ordination procedures for combined response to an emergency, including, for example, the procedures for setting up joint strategic or tactical control centres. They may also be specific. Thus evacuation by the police of a central area may be unworkable without the carefully pre-planned co-operation of various other Category 1 responders, such as fire and ambulance services and the highways department of the local authority, and the involvement too of some Category 2 responders, including transport organisations, such as train and bus companies, under their own regulations.

5.28 Category 1 responders within an LRF whose functions are engaged by a particular emergency must consider whether the appropriate way to perform their duty to maintain an emergency plan is by way of a multi-agency plan.18

Joint discharge of functions and other forms of collaborative working

5.29 The duty to maintain plans for preventing, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of, or taking other action in connection with, an emergency falls on all Category 1 responders. But the Regulations permit them to collaborate with others in delivering the duty.

5.30 There are several options for Category 1 responders in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility.19 They may decide to undertake the task:

- on their own;
- collaboratively, by agreeing with partners to act under the leadership of a lead responder;20
- jointly, by making arrangements with another Category 1 or Category 2 responder;21
- by delegating the task to another Category 1 or Category 2 responder.22

5.31 They may also support collaborative arrangements with the use of protocols.23

Have regard to voluntary organisations

5.32 Category 1 responders are required to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations when developing plans. They should ensure that the capabilities of voluntary organisations are considered early on in the plan formulation process. These should be reflected in emergency plans and training and exercising regimes where appropriate.

5.33 Further guidance on how to involve the voluntary sector in planning frameworks can be found in Chapter 14.

Plan revision

5.34 The Act requires Category 1 responders to consider whether a new risk assessment carried out from time to time makes it necessary or expedient to add to or modify their emergency plans.24 This is a specific route which the Act identifies requiring the revision of plans, in addition to the general requirement to maintain plans.

5.35 Regulations address the situation where a Minister of the Crown or a devolved administration issues guidance or an assessment in regard to the risk of an emergency. Where the Minister does so, then Category 1 responders must consider whether that makes it necessary or expedient for them to revise

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17 regulation 22
18 regulation 22
19 regulation 23
20 regulations 9–11
21 regulation 8(a)
22 regulation 8(b)
23 regulation 7
24 s. 21(1)(e)
their plans. An example might be guidance or an assessment about a terrorist threat.

5.36 The powers of the Minister are considered further in Chapter 16.

Arrange for the publication of all or part of plans

5.37 Category 1 responders are required to arrange for the publication of all or part of plans maintained under the Act in so far as publication is necessary or desirable for the purpose of dealing with an emergency.

5.38 Category 1 responders may choose to publish the whole of an emergency plan, or only part of that plan, in so far as publication in either case will help in, for example, mitigating an emergency. Effectively, this means that the decision to publish may be focused on those parts of the plan which it is useful for the public to know. Where the plan contains a summary of the risk assessment on which it is based, publication of this summary also may satisfy the requirement to publish a part of the risk assessment. These matters are discussed further in Chapter 7.

Existing emergency planning duties

5.39 The Regulations identify three pieces of legislation pre-dating this Act which were introduced separately in Britain and Northern Ireland under sector-specific legislation operated by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and HSE Northern Ireland. These relate to major accident hazards at industrial establishments (Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH)), to hazardous pipelines ( Pipelines Safety Regulations) and to radiation hazards (Radiation (Emergency Preparation and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR)).

5.40 These sector-specific Regulations have established multi-agency emergency planning regimes in co-operation with the operators, which are specific, well defined and in some respects more prescriptive than the emergency planning requirements contained in this Act. To avoid duplication, the Regulations provide that the duty to maintain plans under the Act does not apply to emergencies which are dealt with by these pieces of legislation.

Training and exercises

5.41 The Regulations require a plan to include provision for the carrying out of exercises and for the training of staff or other persons. This means that relevant planning documents must contain a statement about the nature of the training and exercising to be provided and its frequency.

5.42 The Regulations clarify the requirement in regard to arrangements for exercises. Exercises should ensure that the emergency plans are effective.

5.43 The Regulations also clarify the requirement in regard to arrangements for training. Training should be provided for:
- an appropriate number of suitable personnel of the Category 1 responder; and
- other persons whom the responder considers necessary. This could include contractors with a role in the plans and also civil protection partners, both statutory and non-statutory, who have a role in the plans.

5.44 The same or similar requirements for exercising and training apply too to Business Continuity plans (as discussed in Chapter 6) and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public (as discussed in Chapter 7).
How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

5.45 This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.5

The cycle of emergency planning

5.46 Emergency planning is a systematic and ongoing process, preparing organisations for response to emergencies. It evolves as lessons are learnt and circumstances change.

5.47 It is usual to view emergency planning as part of a cycle of activities beginning with establishing a risk profile to help determine what should be the priorities for developing plans and ending with review and revision, which then re-starts the whole cycle. Figure 5.1 has been adapted from earlier versions of the same diagram.6 The lower circle outlines the plan preparation process and the upper circle the life of the plan once it is issued and circulated. Embedding the plans within the management culture of the organisation is vital to ensuring effective response on the day of an emergency. Equally vital is to maintain the plans as circumstances change and to ensure that awareness of the plans is renewed as they are revised.

5.48 Both circles of the ‘figure of eight’ in Figure 5.1 can stand independently of each other. In other words, the plan preparation cycle in the lower circle is continuous and repeated until the plan is ready for dissemination. And the life cycle of the plan after circulation continues several times round the upper circle until a review indicates the need to prepare a new version. The occurrence of an emergency provides, of course, the true test of the plan, including how far managers and operational personnel are guided by it.

5.49 All the various elements of this cycle are explored in the following guidance and in the previous chapter on risk assessment. Broadly, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and on the basis of initial hazard analysis and risk assessment, and their experience of local emergencies, the Category 1 responders’ senior management defines the purpose of the plan. It determines whether a plan is needed and what priority should be given to it. More detailed risk assessment is part of the information-gathering process, which also includes liaison and co-operation with partner organisations to clarify their respective roles and the availability of resources. Consultation within the organisation and with partners takes place throughout the plan preparation process. It continues around the lower circle of the ‘figure of eight’ until the plan is agreed and is ready to be issued.

5.50 The next paragraphs discuss the purpose of plans and the implications of deriving them more firmly from risk assessment. There is then an extensive discussion of the different types of plan and in what ways they are useful. The lower circle of Figure 5.1 is then completed by some suggestions on how to prepare a plan.

Defining the purpose of a plan

5.51 The purpose of an emergency plan is to serve organisations engaged in response, within the local community at the time of an emergency. Its aim is to increase resilience by ensuring that all those charged with tackling the emergency on behalf of the community:

• know their role;
• are competent to carry out the tasks assigned to them;
• have access to available resources and facilities; and
• have confidence that their partners in response are similarly prepared.

Box 5.1: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice about emergency planning and useful information that is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

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5. See, for example, The Lead Government Department and Its Role, pp20–22, which contains a full description of the cycle
A further aim is to ensure that the members of the community affected by the emergency:
- are aware of what may happen;
- have confidence in the emergency responders; and
- know what they themselves should do.

5.52 There is an obligation on the management of Category 1 responders when identifying the need for an emergency plan, or the modification of an existing one, to assess the extent to which the emergency will place particular demands on their resources and capacity. It will require flexible use of what they have and arrangements to mobilise assistance from wherever it is available.

5.53 In deciding whether to prepare a new emergency plan – or to revise or maintain an existing one – the Category 1 responder should examine its existing generic and specific emergency planning arrangements and see to what extent these meet the circumstances or the scenario under discussion.

5.54 Where plans are developed in partnership across Category 1 responders, co-ordination and co-operation at management level are essential.

5.55 Once the decision to prepare or modify an emergency plan has been made, the following considerations may be helpful. A written plan and associated support material can assist internal management of emergency arrangements by serving as:
- a concise description of how a special mobilisation of Category 1 responders, divisions, departments, teams and officers will be carried out;
- a record of key decisions agreed with and between the main parties to the plan, which will evolve and change over a number of years;34
- a guide for briefing, training or exercising personnel so that they are prepared for an emergency and know what has been agreed;
- a series of checklists, references or aides-memoire for senior officers to use at the time of an emergency, if they need it; and

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34The plan should be supported in files by records of decisions agreed at meetings over the years.
Box 5.2: Emergency planning, resources and capabilities

The planning process may throw up some areas where existing capabilities to deal with an emergency are deemed insufficient and additional resources appear to be needed to provide the level of capability desired.

A tension may be revealed between what Category 1 responders consider to be desirable as a result of the risk assessment and plan preparation process, and what the Act actually requires.

Planning should be realistic and based on what the responder can actually provide from the totality of its existing resources, including contractors and dormant contracts, and from mutual aid agreements and other assistance from partner organisations. The Act does not require the Category 1 responders to find from within its own resources whatever level of capability the risk assessment and planning process may suggest is needed.

From a legal perspective, a plan which cannot be implemented will not discharge the legal duty to maintain plans. There is an implied duty to maintain a plan which is effective. It follows that it is better to have a less ambitious plan which works, than a fully comprehensive plan which cannot be implemented for lack of resources.

Please see further discussion of this topic in:
• Box 5.4: Risk assessment and local responder capabilities;
• Box 5.6: Generic capabilities and procedures; and
• Box 5.9: UK Capabilities Programme.

5.56 Each Category 1 responder’s plans are its own responsibility. But it is vital that their various plans to deliver particular capabilities fit together and complement each other.

5.57 Planning for a genuinely combined response across local organisational and cultural boundaries is not an easy task. But the legal framework of the Act and the practical co-operation which it encourages through multi-agency plans and the local resilience forums are both designed to improve consistency.

5.58 Category 2 responders, such as utilities and transport companies, are governed by their own legislation and regulations in regard to emergency planning.

5.59 However, the requirements of the Act are that they should co-operate with Category 1 responders in the performance of the Category 1 responders’ duties and provide information to them in connection with those duties. In consequence, Category 2 responders may be expected to assist the Category 1 responders in all aspects of plan preparation and maintenance. Category 2 responders can be invited to play a part in multi-agency plans and to take part in multi-agency exercises. Requests should seek to minimise the burdens on Category 2 responders who, in turn, should consider them carefully and in a positive manner.

5.60 The lists in Schedule 1 of the Act of the organisations on which the statutory duties fall is by no means exhaustive of all the organisations that may be called upon in an emergency to assist with response.
5.61 An organisation engaged in response that is not named in Schedule 1 is not subject to the requirements of the Act. But this does not mean that it should be discouraged or excluded from co-operation with the Category 1 and 2 responders in developing planning arrangements. On the contrary, where appropriate, it should be included in the Category 1 responders’ development of plans. (See also Chapters 14 and 15.)

**Risk assessment and planning**

5.62 Risk assessment under the Act is about the likelihood of an emergency occurring. The only risks with which the Act is concerned and for which plans must be maintained are those which threaten serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security. The aim is to provide each Category 1 responder with the best possible basis from which to fulfil its duty to prepare emergency plans.

5.63 The various types of emergency, the scale of their effects and their likelihood of occurrence are addressed in Annex 4B. Category 1 responders should identify the capabilities required to deal with the different types of emergency and allocate these between generic and specific plans.

5.64 Thus, for example, treating the casualties from a prolonged cold weather emergency might require a rapid surge in the health service capacity for providing intensive care. But a rapid expansion in the provision of intensive care is a generic capability that may be required across a number of different types of emergency, including, for example, train crashes or a major industrial accident. The Primary Care Trusts and acute hospitals (and Local Health Boards in Wales) will build this capability into their generic plans, according to the potential demand demonstrated by the risk assessment.

5.65 As a result of the risk assessment process, Category 1 responders should review their existing emergency plans. The review is likely to:
- highlight weaknesses in some of their existing plans or procedures;
- suggest areas where further work is needed in order to match the type and level of risks identified; and
- reveal the need for new plans, procedures or supporting capabilities in areas where preparations do not currently exist or are clearly inadequate.

The process recurs continually and should be repeated as risk assessments change.

5.66 Emergency planning tends to be concerned more with consequences than with causes. Emergencies can be grouped according to the type of response their different sets of consequences require, as shown in the table opposite. Response arrangements will be determined by whether resources tend to be concentrated at a single main location or series of locations, or dispersed over a wide area. A further consideration is whether the emergency has a sudden impact or a slow onset.

5.67 By grouping possible emergencies in this way, responders can use the table as a framework for assessing whether their existing planning arrangements are sound or need improvement. Where a range of emergencies stemming from different causes requires a similar type of plan, this is likely to be a generic plan. Where the emergency requires its own individual plan, this will be a specific plan. The duration of an emergency is a further factor for consideration.

5.68 A full review of plans will, of course, require reference to the complete taxonomy of emergencies contained in Annex 4B on risk assessment.

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38 What the Act actually says is that Category 1 responders “shall from time to time assess the risk of an emergency occurring” (s. 2(1)(a)). In legal terms, this means the likelihood of an event or situation which threatens serious damage (s. 1(1)).

39 s. 2(1)(e)
Types of plan

5.69 The following section describes:
- generic plans;
- specific plans; and
- single-agency, multi-agency and multi-level plans.

5.70 Most Category 1 responders have a mixture of generic and specific plans. The two work together, with specific plans supported by the generic plan.

5.71 A danger of relying too much on a generic plan built round generic capabilities is that detailed understanding and preparations in relation to particular hazards and threats could be neglected. Lessons learned from dealing with particular emergencies may not be recorded and built subsequently into revised planning arrangements.

5.72 A danger of relying too much on specific plans and the capabilities which deliver them is that of inconsistency and duplication, including inefficient use of resources. With specific plans, there can be a further danger of not establishing a clear set of central, corporate capabilities and procedures, transferable across emergencies and easily understood internally and by partner agencies.

5.73 The table at Annex 5A identifies generic and specific plans, as follows, and gives a few examples:
- **generic** – the core plan for mobilising staff and resources in response to an emergency;
- **generic capability or procedure** – a wide range of capabilities, procedures and teams which may need to be developed in support of the core generic plan;
- **specific hazard or contingency** – plans for particular types of event or situation, identified through the risk assessment, which may occur widely across the local area; and
- **specific site or location** – plans for particular sites or locations in the local area, also identified through the risk assessment.

### Generic plans

5.74 Generic plans are core plans which enable a Category 1 responder to perform its functions in relation to a wide range of possible scenarios. General in nature, generic plans are, in the first instance, single-agency plans and are seen as the most important plans for that organisation. But each organisation’s generic plan should fit with the generic plans of its partner agencies and may contain references to them. In some local areas, multi-agency

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65Some of these generic capabilities, such as the provision of rest centres or an emergency mortuary, are often considered to be specific plans. They are included here as part of the generic plan because they support the generic plan.
CHAPTER 5 EMERGENCY PLANNING

generic plans have been developed as part of core planning for a combined response.

5.75 For a Category 1 responder, generic plans deliver four key practical benefits:

• a recognised corporate basis of response for the organisation to any type, or most types, of emergency;

• key supporting elements (that is, capabilities and management procedures) which can be selected from and combined as necessary, depending on the nature of the emergency – and which can be drawn on, too, in support of specific plans;

• a recognised corporate management framework for:
  – awareness-raising throughout the organisation;
  – developing training and exercising throughout the organisation;
  – building ownership of civil protection throughout the organisation; and
  – mainstreaming civil protection within the organisation;

• a recognised corporate management framework for participating with other local partner organisations in the combined response.

A checklist of the minimum number of elements that one would normally expect to see covered in the core generic plan is contained in Annex 5B.

5.76 Similar benefits from a consistent and standard approach can, of course, be realised across a number of organisations where they combine in developing a multi-agency generic plan.

5.77 Most Category 1 responders will carry out their main emergency planning responsibility under the Act by preparing a generic plan.

Specific plans

5.79 Specific plans enable a Category 1 responder to move from the general to the particular.

5.80 The development of a specific plan is a matter for decision by the Category 1 responder.\textsuperscript{41} Where the local risk assessment indicates clearly that it is desirable for a particular risk to be addressed in a plan, the Category 1 responder should consider whether a generic plan and supporting capabilities are adequate or should be improved. When changes are needed and a generic plan is not the right place to include them, then a specific plan may be appropriate.

\textsuperscript{41} regulation 21
5.81 Many specific plans, such as for flooding, oil pollution or a stadium incident, are likely to be multi-agency plans. This gives them a particular importance, supported as they are by the core generic plans. It is important that specific plans dovetail and are compatible with those of partner agencies. A checklist of the minimum number of elements which one would expect to see contained in a specific plan is contained at Annex 5C.

5.82 Specific emergency plans deliver three key practical benefits:

- a more detailed set of procedures designed to go beyond the standard generic procedures, when these are likely to prove inadequate in a particular case;
- a basis for integrated emergency response to a particular situation or scenario across a number of partner organisations; and

Variations in the delivery of emergency planning arrangements

Some responders (such as the Environment Agency) have moved away from emergency plans as such, and rely on a standard set of incident management procedures. These are applied uniformly across the organisation and engage different levels of management in a standard response procedure depending on the scale and nature of the incident. For the purposes of the Act, these should be treated as generic planning arrangements. Of course, the Act is concerned with emergencies only, rather than with the whole range of incidents.

The National Health Service maintains its emergency planning arrangements through the use of template plans. In practice, its local emergency plans are developed as templates at a national level. These templates are then completed and issued at the local level to reflect the details of the local organisational context. They consist of a combination of generic and specific plans.

Box 5.5: Emergencies and major incidents

The main planning responsibility required under the Act relates to emergencies which seriously obstruct the normal functions of the responder or demand that action be taken and require a special deployment of resources. Each Category 1 responder must have a plan capable of dealing with an event of this scale, and it must have procedures for activating the plan on a 24-hour basis. This generic plan is supported by a range of generic capabilities.

Hitherto, such events have been known in the UK context as major incidents. When incidents are of such a nature that they severely test the response arrangements of the emergency services and require a special mobilisation of their resources, most are likely to declare a major incident. Partner organisations are immediately informed – and they often (though not always) will declare a major incident too, as part of a combined response.

The Act, the Regulations and this guidance consistently use the term emergency, but there is nothing in the legislation that prevents a responder from continuing to use the term “major incident” in its planning arrangements for response.

The well-established principles which define a major incident have been replicated by various provisions in the Act. The concept of a major incident is captured, in particular, by the test for deciding when the duty to prepare an emergency plan applies (section 2(2)). The Act defines an emergency in such a way as effectively to require a major incident response from one or more of the Category 1 responders. The definition of an emergency provides a defined threshold for emergency planning similar to the major incident concept. It does not require plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of events or situations below this threshold.
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Box 5.6: Generic capabilities and procedures

Capability is the ability to do what is required in an emergency situation.

Generic capabilities and procedures in support of local responders’ generic plans deserve particular attention, to ensure that what the generic plan promises can address successfully a wide range of emergencies. For example, in the context of an emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a single block of flats (usually, a minor evacuation) or to evacuate a whole neighbourhood (a major evacuation). Generic capabilities may be needed to be able to deal with both types of demand.

Capability is originally a military term: it covers the people mobilised by a plan, their equipment and training, and also the planning, doctrinal and control frameworks for their actions.

The UK Capabilities Programme has been developed by central government to address the most serious disruptive challenges requiring support from central government. It leads to some capabilities being developed at the local level in support of UK-wide resilience planning, but these are a matter of current government policy and are not a specific requirement of the Act.

See also: Box 5.9 on the UK Capabilities Programme.

- a framework for specific emergency-planning training and exercising addressed to particular situations or scenarios.

Plans for specific hazards or contingencies

5.83 Certain types of emergency require additional knowledge or procedures, which it would be inappropriate to include in a generic plan.

5.84 For example, an influenza pandemic requires major specialist interventions within the health service, but also draws on a range of Category 1 responders and others. As a result, local multi-agency contingency plans have been promoted by the Department of Health. Again, chemical hazards on the roads, including spillages, may require specialist fire service and chemical industry expertise and equipment, or treatment by private specialist waste firms.

5.85 Wide-area emergencies, such as major storms, generalised flooding or widespread contamination, build on the standard, generic approach, but can benefit from specific contingency planning. So, too, can slow-building wide-area emergencies, such as severe and prolonged cold weather, drought, or a foot-and-mouth emergency.

Plans for specific sites or locations

5.86 A second type of specific plan can be appropriate for specific sites or locations, where the consequences and impact at the known location are more easily predictable. It is possible to develop detailed plans which, as a result of exercises, can be constantly tested and improved, and changed as physical and organisational arrangements change.

COMAH, REPPiR and the Pipeline Regulations

These statutory planning arrangements are for major industrial hazard sites, nuclear power stations (including MOD nuclear installations subject to Defence Major Accident Control Regulations) and oil and gas pipeline installations.

The Act places no requirement on Category 1 responders to prepare plans for these events, because the essential relevant organisations already have this statutory responsibility under the HSE legislation. In the event of a COMAH, REPPiR or pipeline event with consequences beyond those that, under HSE legislation, must be prepared for, there is no requirement under the Act for Category 1 responders to prepare plans for this emergency.

However, it is considered that, in practice, Category 1 responders will want voluntarily to integrate planning arrangements under the different statutory regimes at the LRF.
5.87 The best known examples of site-specific plans are not covered by the duty under the Act to maintain plans because they are covered by sector-specific legislation operated by the HSE.  

5.88 There are other types of specific site, permanent or temporary, where emergency plans may be needed. For example, airports, sports grounds, hospitals, public events or areas where flooding is likely. Particular locations may also need specific plans, such as town or city centres, or coastal areas most vulnerable to pollution from major oil spills.

Multi-agency plans and the role of a lead Category 1 responder

5.89 The Act places duties on individual Category 1 responders to prepare emergency plans. However, planning for emergencies is rarely an autonomous activity. There are occasions when Category 1 responders will want to cement integrated emergency management by developing multi-agency plans.

5.90 The Regulations:
- require Category 1 responders who have a duty in relation to the same emergency to consider whether a multi-agency plan should be developed; and
- permit Category 1 responders to co-operate for the purpose of identifying which of them will take lead responsibility where more than one of them have functions that are exercisable in relation to the same emergency or the same type of emergency.

5.91 Generally, it will be appropriate for a lead responder to be appointed to develop a multi-agency plan. However, such plans can also be developed by joint working or by delegation.

5.92 Where they are unable to agree that a multi-agency plan is needed, or which organisation should take the lead responsibility, each has a duty to maintain its own plan.

Box 5.7: Multi-level plans and the role of the lead government department

A multi-level plan is a plan covering more than one level of government – for example, a national or regional plan. National plans have been or are being developed, for example, for foot-and-mouth, anthrax, rabies, influenza pandemic, marine and coastal pollution and fuel shortages. There is also a national plan for Wales. Regional plans could relate to flooding, severe weather or a crisis affecting a utility.

Ownership of their part of these plans is the responsibility of each of the relevant Category 1 responders, but co-ordination or leadership in the development and execution of these plans is likely to be taken by a national or regional organisation, perhaps relying on one of the local partners (eg the police) to co-ordinate.

The lead government departments will take steps as a matter of policy to publicise these plans, as necessary, to their local partners and ensure that arrangements dovetail. Annex 5A indicates in a number of places the involvement of local, regional and national levels in the development of plans. Some of these relate to specific sectoral concerns, such as foot-and-mouth; others to generic capabilities which are required to support national plans for coping with catastrophic incidents.

See also: Box 5.9 on the UK Capabilities Programme.
Box 5.8: Day-to-day incident procedures

It is generally accepted as good practice that procedures which relate to events that fall short of an emergency should be removed from the core generic plan for emergencies, because they do not require a special mobilisation.

Day-to-day incident procedures are not covered by the Act. Nonetheless, they deserve particular attention, so as to give greater coherence to response arrangements. It is sometimes difficult for the emergency services, such as the police, when they arrive at the scene of an incident, to know who are the responsible individuals representing partner organisations with whom they should co-ordinate. When an organisation has several functions called into play by an incident, a number of officers representing key disciplines may be called to the scene. Integrated incident management with partner organisations is improved if procedures are in place for co-ordinating staff at the scene of a day-to-day incident (by, for example, appointing a Lead Incident Officer or a Liaison Officer).

Sound procedures developed and practised at the day-to-day incident level ensure there will be greater confidence when the event to be dealt with is an emergency. Emergency planners and the relevant managers need to examine day-to-day procedures, and, where necessary, revise them or bring them into a corporate framework. Day-to-day procedures need to link seamlessly into the emergency planning procedures.

5.93 A multi-agency plan may be developed by:
• one or more of the Category 1 members of the LRF on behalf of all or some of its members across the whole LRF area. For example, a plan for an emergency mortuary;
• one or more of the Category 1 members of the LRF across the boundaries between two or more LRFs, particularly where there is a hazard which affects communities on both sides of a boundary, such as an airport; or
• one or more of the Category 1 responders directly on their own behalf, without relying on the LRF as such and not covering the whole LRF area. For example, a plan for a local shopping centre or entertainment complex or for a sports stadium.

5.94 A multi-level plan is a further example of a multi-agency plan, involving different levels of government, such as the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution (see also Box 5.7).

5.95 Where the boundaries of the LRF coincide with those of the organisation(s) initiating a multi-agency plan, it is not the LRF which is responsible for the plan. Each of the participating organisations takes direct responsibility for the plan.

Plan content

5.96 The definition of emergency in section 1 of the Act covers a wide range of events or situations threatening serious damage in the areas of human welfare, the environment and security. These situations are listed in detail in Annex 4B which provides a classification of hazards and threats. But the number of generic capabilities and specific emergency plans which a responder body may choose to develop is not specified in the Act.

5.97 Even so the Government considers that plans should have regard to two groupings of people, the vulnerable and survivors, in a wide range of situations. A further grouping, emergency responder personnel, is also indicated in this guidance as deserving special consideration.

The vulnerable

5.98 Vulnerable people are one set of people to whom all emergency plans must have regard. (The particular needs of the vulnerable are also considered in Chapter 7).

5.99 Having regard to the vulnerable means that people who are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency must be given special...
consideration in plans. Frequently, a distinction is made between the self-reliant and the vulnerable. It is assumed generally that self-reliant people will be able to respond to the requirements of an emergency promptly, while the vulnerable are likely to require special assistance in taking appropriate actions.

5.100 Sometimes the planning required of the Category 1 responder may be as simple as making arrangements to emphasise to the public that they should adopt a good-neighbourly attitude, keep an eye on vulnerable neighbours and offer help where needed.

5.101 However, making direct contact is relatively easy when such people live or are present at vulnerable establishments, such as nursing homes, day centres or schools. It is harder when they live or are present in the community as individuals. In these cases, the local authority and the health authority are likely to have relevant lists – such as of people on dialysis machines in their homes. Subject to the provisions in the Data Protection Act, arrangements can be made in the plans of relevant Category 1 responders for access to these lists at the time of an emergency. Plans should refer to these information sources. Utility companies also hold similar but more limited lists on their “help registers”.

5.102 Special provision also needs to be made in plans for people with disabilities. This provision may include special transport, such as local authority social services or voluntary sector vehicles, or taxis, to help in the evacuation of people with mobility problems. Other provision may include plans for the availability of electric wheelchairs in town and shopping centres to facilitate evacuation when needed.

5.103 It is not easy to define in advance and for planning purposes who are the vulnerable people to whom special consideration should be given in plans. Those who are vulnerable will vary depending on the nature of the emergency, for example people with breathing difficulties in face of toxic fumes. For planning purposes there are broadly three categories which should be considered:

- those who, for whatever reason, have mobility difficulties, including people with physical disabilities or a medical condition and even pregnant women;
- those with mental health difficulties; and
- others who are dependent, such as children.

Further consideration of how best to communicate with those who are especially vulnerable in emergencies is contained in Chapter 7.

Victims, including survivors, family and friends

5.104 A second grouping of people to be given a place in plans are the victims of an emergency. These include not only those directly affected by the emergency, but also those who, as family and friends, suffer bereavement or the anxiety of not knowing what has happened. There is a full discussion of the particular information needs of these groups in Chapter 7.

5.105 Planned procedures at the scene of an emergency – and at secondary centres like hospitals and the emergency mortuary – should pay particular attention to the needs of this grouping. Information planning should be designed to meet their needs. Recovery plans should contain commitments to respond sensitively to the needs of survivor groups – for example, to hold a review meeting within a short time to assess the need for longer-term initiatives – and, if necessary, to develop medium and long-term support programmes, as were adopted by Liverpool City Council following the Hillsborough stadium football disaster and in North Wales after the Towyn floods.

5.106 Category 1 responders should consider developing a specific multi-agency plan for offering social and psychological support to survivors, the bereaved and the wider community following an emergency. Such a plan for a multi-agency crisis support team would be likely to include local social services, health authorities, police family liaison officers and voluntary organisations. As recommended by the inquiry into the Marchioness disaster, a lead responder may be needed to coordinate the planning, which would generally be the local authority.

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49 While each situation must be assessed on its own facts, there are particular provisions in the Data Protection Act which will be relevant in this kind of situation, for example Schedule 2 which contains a list of conditions that must be satisfied before information is disclosed and deals with situations where disclosure of the information is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.

50 Lord Justice Clark’s Inquiry into the Marchioness Disaster, 2001
Box 5.9: UK Capabilities Programme

The UK Capabilities Programme is a government programme. Its purpose is to deliver a number of generic capabilities to provide government with the assurance that effective response can be made at a national, devolved administration, regional or local level to a number of the most serious disruptive challenges.

The programme relies on the framework of the Act to provide a basic structure for civil protection and resilience at the local level. However, the expectations of the UK Capabilities Programme are a matter of government policy and not a requirement of the Act.

The UK Capabilities Programme lists workstreams concerned with the maintenance of essential services, for example:

- health;
- environment – water, food, sewerage, flood defence;
- transport;
- utilities; and
- financial services.

Other functional workstreams address potential consequences of a major disruptive challenge, for example:

- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN);
- human infectious diseases;
- animal and plant infectious diseases;
- mass casualties;
- mass fatalities;
- mass evacuation;
- site clearance; and
- warning and informing the public.

For more information on the programme, see: http://www.ukresilience.info/contingencies/capabilities.htm

Responder personnel

5.107 Sometimes plans prepared for emergencies place unrealistic expectations on management and personnel. The emergency services have health and safety procedures which determine shift patterns and check for levels of stress. They also have rules about exposing personnel to danger. It is important that all Category 1 responders should build proper consideration for the welfare of this third grouping, their own personnel, into all their plans.

Plan presentation and plan making

5.108 Greater consistency in planning documents, and the terminology used, will ensure improved cooperation between responders at the local level. It will also lead to improved understanding at all levels and among the public.

5.109 Some Category 1 responders will focus more on training and developing an effective management culture, with the emphasis on inculcating an awareness of management’s role in responding effectively to emergencies, than on the production of written plans. All will rely on written plans, however, to a greater or lesser extent.

5.110 An important consideration in writing an emergency plan is that it should introduce the reader to the topic by logical steps. It should also be as concise as possible. The table opposite provides an example of a standard format which may be followed. Other formats begin with “activation” because plans are response documents and activation is the most important element.
Presentation of an emergency plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>In summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General information</td>
<td>A short, overall description of the plan. Its purpose. Some reference to the risk assessment on which the plan is based (with more detail as necessary in an annex).</td>
<td>Why the plan is needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management, control and co-ordination</td>
<td>Control arrangements. The main elements of the plan in a hierarchy of importance. The main emergency teams, their roles and responsibilities. The key concepts, doctrine and terminology. The main facilities, locations and communications.</td>
<td>How the plan works Who has a role in the plan – (1) by title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activation, including alert and standby</td>
<td>The procedures for alerting, placing on standby and then activating the key teams named in the Control and Co-ordination section. This includes the procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred.</td>
<td>When the plan is activated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Specific actions to be undertaken, as their contribution to the overall response, by the key organisations, divisions, departments and officers in the hierarchy. Key officer checklists can be abstracted from here.</td>
<td>What the plan says will be done and by whom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>Call-out lists (related to the key teams). Resource lists. Further information, including: • more on the risk assessment, as necessary; and • a policy statement on carrying out training and exercises.</td>
<td>Who has a role in the plan – (2) contact details</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The process of preparing plans

5.111 It is important that planning should be seen as a collective process involving, at all stages, those who will be responsible for delivering the plan’s objectives on the day of an emergency.

5.112 The cycle of emergency planning shown in Figure 5.1 identifies (in the lower circle of the ‘figure of eight’) four phases in developing and maintaining plans. This section looks at the process of preparing plans in more detail. It suggests, in addition, that a specific project plan should be developed as part of the planning process, to ensure that the emergency plan is delivered on schedule and with all the necessary elements complete.

Step 1: risk profile

5.113 The first step carries the treatment of risks, that is, the final stage of the risk assessment process, over into the emergency planning process. Under the terms of the Act, risk treatment focuses on emergency planning only, and does not directly address other aspects. The aim is to define the situations or scenarios for which response capabilities are needed, in accordance with the responder’s functions. It is important to imagine and select from the risk profile all the possible circumstances. For example:
• What is most likely to happen?
• Who might be affected by the impact of the emergency? or
• What are the different things that might go wrong with the response?

5.114 As a result of this stage, an overview is achieved of the scenarios which the plan is designed to address.

Step 2: objectives, including capabilities

5.115 The basic scenarios delivered by the risk assessment then need to be translated (or operationalised) into a series of objectives – including a first assessment of the capabilities needed to meet them. This is the most important stage of the entire plan-making process. Key operational officers at middle-management level need to be asked how they would expect to deal with relevant scenarios. They should be talked to individually, to try to get them to think honestly ‘outside the box’ about emergencies
CHAPTER 5 EMERGENCY PLANNING

Figure 5.2: The five steps for preparing an emergency plan

that are likely to test to its limits their professional experience and the competence of their organisation. They should be encouraged to take their time to think about all the issues:

- How would they go about it?
- What capabilities and resources have they got?
- What numbers of casualties should the plan be able to deal with?
- What are the priorities?
- What are the likely problems to be overcome? and
- What standard of response is required?

5.116 At a certain point, the key professionals from various disciplines should be brought together to agree these objectives between themselves, and to confirm that all are thinking along the same lines in terms of an agreed set of planning assumptions and capabilities. As the questions are answered, so the objectives for the plan are clarified and if possible quantified.

5.117 Once the objectives are agreed in terms of the need to develop capabilities, the scope and ambition of the plan are determined. The remaining steps are systematic to achieve a final scheme. Even so, as difficulties are encountered or new considerations emerge, the objectives themselves may have to be refined or changed as part of the cycle of emergency planning.

5.118 The next three steps are placed in the order in which the plan is thought through (not how they will appear in the written document). While for a suggested order for the written document, see the table on page 65.

Step 3: tasks and resources

5.119 The logistics of the plan follow directly from determining its objectives. The function-based capabilities of the organisation should be determined, as should the risk-based capability that appears to be required (see also Box 5.4). The basic questions are:

- What are we going to have to do?
- How are we going to do it?
- Do we have the right teams, the right numbers, the right skills, the right training?
- Are the management and communication structures in place to do it?
- Who might be called upon to reinforce the local capability? Are our resources of facilities, materials, vehicles, and equipment sufficient? If not, where do we get them from?

5.120 These questions should be pursued with the key staff in each functional area. As a result of this
Starting a project plan – two sets of planning objectives

At Step 3 of the process, what becomes absolutely vital is a project plan, a structured process for managing all the work that needs to be done to deliver a completed emergency plan, including a work programme and timeline.

Two separate sets of planning objectives should be distinguished at this point:

- the objectives of the emergency plan itself – already established at Step 2; and
- the objectives of the project plan – namely, the actions that need to be finished, and the capabilities that need to be in place, before the emergency plan itself is completed.

Those organisations that wish to apply project management techniques across a wider range of their civil protection duties should look at the Office of Government Commerce website on Centres of Excellence, which recommends use of PRINCE2: [http://www.ogc.gov.uk](http://www.ogc.gov.uk).

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Stage in the process, a detailed list is created of all the many activities which will need to be undertaken successfully during an emergency.

Step 4: organisation

5.121 The large number of emergency tasks identified at Step 3 above needs to be pulled into a proper management framework for dealing with response. No useful purpose is served by reinventing satisfactory control and co-ordination arrangements which already exist. However, the following questions may be asked to ensure that the organisational framework is fit for purpose:

- What is the hierarchy of control needed to avoid duplication and ensure that everyone knows what to do?
- Can existing management structures within the organisation be utilised in an emergency setting effectively – or do new management structures need to be created specifically to deliver the capability required for an emergency?
- Does a joint structure need to be created across a number of responders to enable all the tasks to be properly managed in a coherent way – or does such a structure for emergencies already exist in a form that can be drawn upon in the face of the scenarios defined, and the objectives of the plan?
- Where does the authorisation lie for prompt expenditure decisions? and
- How will the different teams and groups identified above be organised so that they share a common understanding as to how they will operate?

Step 5: responsibilities

5.122 Finally, as the organisational framework of the plan is addressed, so the allocation of responsibilities across teams and responders can be firmed up. A detailed spelling out of who does what becomes possible. Responsibilities can be clearly assigned, with emergency objectives and tasks spelled out and an organisational framework agreed for pulling all the capabilities together.

5.123 As these questions are answered, so the plan takes shape. Task lists can be prepared, allocated by responsibility. All the actions needed to meet all the plan’s objectives will be allocated securely.

5.124 The whole process is ongoing and should be reviewed as the plan develops and as circumstances change. For example, if there are insufficient resources available to deliver the plan’s objectives – and it is not possible to obtain more – then the objectives must be revisited. Here again close attention should be paid to the requirement to perform the responder’s functions “so far as necessary and desirable” in an emergency.12

5.125 The key to an effective planning process is to be clear about its objectives. There should be buy-in to those objectives from all the responders and their key staff affected by the plan. This is one of the main reasons why simply writing the plan, getting it approved and issuing it to staff is not sufficient. A sound process for developing the plan is likely to involve regular consultation with key representatives

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12 See s. 2(1)(d) and Box 5.4
of all the teams to be mobilised by it, until the plan is finished. This ensures a degree of preliminary validation.

5.126 However, it should be made absolutely clear that this suggested process for developing a plan is not the same as the way in which the plan is presented.\(^3\)

5.127 Once the final draft of the plan has been agreed and approved between all the parties, the relevant senior officers should sign off the plan.

### Maintaining and embedding the plans

5.128 So far, the guidance has considered the lower circle in Figure 5.1, the cycle of emergency planning. The next sections move the process into the top half of the ‘figure of eight’ and examine how a completed plan is validated, maintained and quality-assured as a living document. In the real world, it will be exposed to emergencies. Managers will assess how far the principles and procedures contained help them in a real event. Partner organisations will also form their own views on the effectiveness of each organisation’s plan, or its contribution to a multi-agency plan.

### Plan publication (internal)

5.129 The publication and dissemination of an emergency plan for internal purposes (that is, for the organisations, teams and officers covered by the plan) is an important part of plan validation. A plan is not valid if it only exists in draft form.

5.130 For a plan to be valid, it must be accepted as the stated policy of the organisation or Category 1 responders on whose behalf it has been produced. For this to happen, the key decision makers in an organisation must have an awareness of the plan and, through sign-off and other initiatives, have accepted part ownership of it.

5.131 Persons responsible for carrying out roles in the plan must be aware of those roles. Internal publication of the plan is often accompanied by awareness-raising events designed to promote the plan to those ‘who need to know’.

5.132 There should also be a general level of awareness throughout the Category 1 responder that the plan exists and that the Category 1 responder has a commitment to carry out its agreed responsibilities under the plan.

### Plan training

5.133 The Regulations require provisions for the training of staff or other persons to be included in plans.\(^4\) This is likely to go beyond much current practice, because it means that the plans themselves should include a schedule for training. This training should extend beyond those employed by the responder and include contractors and the staff of voluntary organisations who might be used in support of the plan.

5.134 Training, as such, as distinct from exercises, is broadly about raising the awareness of the participants (who are those named in the plan or mobilised by it) about what the emergency is that they may face and giving them confidence in the procedures and their ability to carry them out successfully. It is particularly important that participants in training understand the objectives of the plan and their part in delivering them.

5.135 It is also important that people taking part in exercises should be trained beforehand, so that they know what is expected of them.

### Completion of the project plan

The completion of the project plan ensures that all the objectives of the emergency plan are supported by firm arrangements, adequate resources and facilities, an agreed allocation of responsibilities, and so on.

Of course, the plan still needs to be validated.

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3 See paragraphs 5.108–5.110 above

4 regulation 25(b)
5.136 Training may address the specific skills needed to perform roles under the plan. Generally, however, plans should aim to place individuals in positions where, in an emergency, they carry out tasks they are used to performing in their normal work.

General raising of awareness

5.137 There are also many ways by which an organisation can raise awareness internally of the existence of an emergency plan and its contents. These include:
- ensuring that emergency planning arrangements are part of induction training for all relevant staff;
- putting the plans on the intranet;
- producing information leaflets for personnel;
- publishing an informal newsletter; and
- holding an awareness-raising seminar.

Plan exercising

5.138 Regulations require that plans include provisions for carrying out exercises. This is perhaps a step beyond much current planning practice. It means that the plan itself must include reference to an exercise programme, which will maintain its currency and validity.

5.139 When developing an exercise programme across a number of plans and over a period of time it may be helpful to focus on:
- all aspects of the main generic plan;
- plans which address the most probable risks and are most likely to be used;
- those divisions, departments or teams which are weakest;
- those plans or parts of plans where the least training and exercising has been done; and
- co-ordination with the exercise programmes of other key partners.

5.140 People writing and delivering exercises and training should be suitably experienced or qualified.

5.141 In many local areas, it is accepted that the combined response is strengthened if responders are aware of each other's exercises and are invited, where appropriate, to play a part in them. Multi-agency exercise and training programmes can be publicised through the Local Resilience Forum.

The role of Category 2 responders in exercises

5.142 The requirements of the Regulations in regard to exercising apply to Category 1 responders, but Category 2 responders are obliged to co-operate with them in the delivery of their civil protection duties. In seeking co-operation from Category 2 responders in their exercise programmes, Category 1 responders should ensure that their requests are reasonable and do not overburden them.

The purpose of exercises

5.143 Generally, participants in exercises should have an awareness of their roles and be reasonably comfortable with them, before they are subject to the stresses of an exercise. Exercising is not to catch people out. It tests procedures, not people. If staff are underprepared, they may blame the plan, when they should blame their lack of preparation and training. An important aim of an exercise should be to make people feel more comfortable in their roles and to build morale.

5.144 Exercises have three main purposes:
- to validate plans (validation);
- to develop staff competencies and give them practice in carrying out their roles in the plans (training); and
- to test well-established procedures (testing).

Most exercises will have some elements of all three.

Plan testing

5.145 Not all aspects of an emergency plan can be tested, but some crucial elements can, such as:
- the contact list;
- the activation process;
- communications equipment;
- the setting-up procedures; and
- information management.

The purpose of this type of exercise may be to test how well the arrangements are working or to demonstrate their effectiveness.

5.146 Ringing the relevant numbers on a regular basis (some responders do this every three months) can test the contact details of each person named in the plan.

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56 regulation 25(a)
5.147 The activation process can be examined by running a short test, in which the staff responsible for triggering a plan activation are physically asked to do so. This should be done at least annually.

5.148 Communications equipment needs to be tested for reliability, capacity and reach, that is, the conditions where it is effective and where it begins to fail. Personnel who are not involved habitually, for example, with a particular radio system or channel, also need to be tested regularly.

5.149 The setting-up procedures for control centres and other key facilities should be tested at least annually. This includes provision of necessary emergency supplies and equipment (for example, any IT equipment, stationery, message forms, log books, whiteboards, financial record forms, etc) and ensuring that they can be located quickly and placed in the right positions where they are needed. This can be done as one starting point for a larger exercise.

5.150 There are considerable overlaps between plan testing of this sort and exercising for business continuity planning (see Chapter 6).

Exercise design

5.151 The design of an exercise should be driven by its objectives. There will be:

- overall objectives for the exercise set by the exercise directing staff;
- specific objectives for each of the main players (who may, for example, want to examine their ability to contact officers and mobilise resources in real time); and
- potentially, in a multi-agency exercise, several sets of objectives. There will be a core overall set, and each organisation may have its own. Any conflicts in objectives should be ironed out early in the design process.

5.152 Once the objectives are meshed into a single design, everything in the exercise should be determined by them. The scenario is simply a means of setting up situations which test the exercise objectives. It is important that the scenario should be realistic, so that people do not think their time is being wasted, and it should have enough in it to provide a challenge. However, the details of the scenario can sometimes take up too much time in exercise preparation.

Exercise types

5.153 There are three main types of exercise:

- discussion-based;
- table top; and
- live.

(A fourth category combines elements of the other three.) The choice of which one to adopt depends on what the purpose of the exercise is. It is also a question of lead-in time and available resources.\[56\]

5.154 A discussion-based exercise is cheapest to run and easiest to prepare. It can be used at the policy-formulation stage as a ‘talk-through’ of how to finalise the plan. More often, it is based on a completed plan and is used to develop awareness about the plan through discussion. In this respect, it is often used for training purposes.

5.155 A table-top exercise is based on simulation, not necessarily literally around a table top. Usually, it involves a realistic scenario and a time line, which may be real time or may speed time up. Usually table tops are run in a single room, or in a series of linked rooms which simulate the divisions between responders who need to communicate and be co-ordinated. The players are expected to know the plan and they are invited to test how the plan works as the scenario unfolds. This type of exercise is particularly useful for validation purposes, particularly for exploring weaknesses in procedures. Table-top exercises are relatively cheap to run, except in the use of staff time. They demand careful preparation.

5.156 A live exercise is a live rehearsal for implementing the plan. Such exercises are particularly useful for testing logistics, communications and physical capabilities. They also make excellent training events from the point of view of experiential learning, helping participants develop confidence in their skills and providing experience of what it would be like to use the plan’s procedures in a real event. Where the latter purposes are, in fact, the main objective of the exercise, then it is essentially a training exercise or practice drill. Live exercises are expensive to set up on the day and demand the most extensive preparation.

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\[56\] For a slightly different presentation, see also The Exercise Planner’s Guide, Home Office, 1998
5.157 The three types of exercise can be used for single- or multi-agency plans and multi-level plans.

Preparations for an exercise

5.158 During the planning stage for an exercise, it is important to bring in any necessary expertise to the working group. Members of this group should not be players in the exercise and must keep all information confidential. The membership of the planning group will become the exercise-directing team and numbers should be kept relatively small. Wider planning meetings, with attendees from all organisations taking part, can also be used as part of the exercise planning process.

5.159 Initial planning meetings should include discussion of the following:
• objective-setting and agreement – these may change in the light of later decisions;
• scope of exercise – will it cover the first few hours or weeks? will it cover all responders or only some? – determined by the objectives;
• the scenario – get an expert (in-house, if possible) to help on this;
• identify the teams and organisations that will be playing;
• determine who or how many will play from each organisation;
• what type and structure of exercise is suitable – again depending on the objectives;
• what accommodation or locations are needed;
• whether players will bring their communications equipment, or be provided with phones, or whether paper and runners are sufficient; and
• what the name of the exercise is.

Exercise documentation

5.160 A large amount of documentation is likely to be needed by the exercise-directing team. Most of this will be confidential:
• aims and objectives of the exercise;
• storyline: an overview of everything that will happen in the exercise (similar to the stage director's notes alongside the text of a theatrical play);
• structure and methodology;
• text of the initial briefings (for players, observers, umpires);
• basic scenario (to be given to players at the start);
• overall scenario as it develops over time (for the exercise-directing team);
• checklist of key points (for the exercise-directing team – to enable them to note during the play whether the exercise objectives have been met);
• scene-setting information (for the players, to be sent out in advance);
• specific injects or feeds (issued to the players as the scenario unfolds); and
• evaluation forms (to be given to the players at the end of the exercise).

5.161 Generally, the exercise should be ended by the directing staff when they consider that the bulk of the exercise objectives (whether they are for plan validation, training or testing) have been met.

Debrief and evaluation

5.162 Frequently, the players – who as far as possible should be the individuals and teams likely to be mobilised in the event of a real emergency – are the best judges of whether the procedures 'work' or not. In a plan validation exercise, the main purpose is, therefore, to provide players with the opportunity to carry out the procedures and to offer their comments on whether they are sound or might be improved.

5.163 The conduct by the exercise director of the ‘hot’ debrief immediately after the event – and obtaining written assessments later from the key players taking part – deserves pre-planning as much as the exercise itself, so as to get the maximum benefit from what is a time-consuming and costly event. Comments may also be sought from expert observers.

5.164 Written assessments are useful for the formal debrief some time after the exercise (which may be a single- or multi-agency event) when considered judgements about the lessons learned are offered – and also as source material for the exercise report.

5.165 Frequently, in the debrief, exercise ‘players’ find it difficult to distinguish between:
• problems they have encountered with the realism and design of the exercise itself (exercise mechanics); and
• what the exercise has told them about the effectiveness of the plan in delivering its objectives (plan validation) or taught them in
terms of improved awareness, confidence and competencies (training).
The exercise director, when running a hot debrief afterwards, should always provide a short, separate slot for players to comment on the exercise mechanics. However, the two evaluations should be kept separate, so as to avoid confusion and time-wasting during the crucial plan validation discussion.

Lessons learned

5.166 A post-exercise report should include recommendations for improvement in the plan in question. Preparation of the exercise report draws on the debrief and on written comments from the key players.

5.167 Within 12 months of the exercise, an implementation report should be produced, indicating which of the exercise report’s recommendations have been carried out in the form of revisions to procedures in the plans.

5.168 Lessons learned from multi-agency exercises should be publicised through the Local Resilience Forum.

Generation of further exercises

5.169 Where an exercise of whatever type (plan validation, training or testing) indicates that there are problems with the procedures or their execution, further simulations may be held to train in, or examine, specific aspects of the plan. Perhaps the call-out procedures or the message-recording system need testing further. It is not then necessary to hold a comprehensive exercise. The particular procedure causing difficulties may be isolated and tested, or practised, again and again until it is right.

Plan maintenance procedures and revision

5.170 Plans should be revised if a new risk assessment indicates that the plan is out of date, or a new risk is identified.  

5.171 Other factors which may require the revision of plans include:

- **Lessons learned from experience of emergencies**: These might effectively draw attention to new risks not previously identified, or they may demonstrate that better procedures are needed, or that organisations not previously involved need to be brought into the plans.

- **Lessons learned from exercises**: The lessons learned from exercises are likely to be similar to those from real events; the difference is that exercises are controlled events, specifically designed to test procedures and they can be repeated again and again until sound arrangements are in place.

- **Restructuring and other changes in organisations, their procedures and technical systems identified in the plans**: Plans must be adjusted regularly to reflect organisational changes, including restructurings, changed methods of delivery of functions, redefinitions of an organisation’s mission and of its role in emergencies, new policies and protocols, and changes in technology and facilities, such as communications equipment or control centres.

- **Changes in key personnel**: Plans – or their supporting annexes – must continually reflect changes in the details of key personnel, including names, job titles and contact arrangements.

5.172 It is good practice to follow a standard cycle for the revision and reissue of those plans which are in hard copy, as follows:

- issuing of corrections to contact details in plans every three months;  
- review of all plans periodically;  
- issuing of revised or new plans as soon as practicable; and  
- where all plans are contained within a single volume or handbook, its comprehensive reissue in a new edition (perhaps once every one to two years).

5.173 Where plans are maintained and circulated electronically, corrections and changes can, of course, be made as they occur. But the same regular cycle of plan maintenance activities (as outlined above) should

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57 s. 2(1)(e)

58 Many plan writers exclude contact details as far as possible from the planning document and include them in a separate annex for ease of revision

59 This procedure does not, of course, require a reissue of the plan itself. Corrections can be inserted directly into web-based versions of the plan or circulated by letter for insertion by the plan copy-holder in hard copy. To make this regular updating task manageable, the onus should lie on key staff and departments named in the plans to inform the plan manager of corrections and other changes to contact details.
be sustained as part of a comprehensive emergency plan review programme. Major revisions should be advertised by a ‘publication’ announcement to the key personnel, divisions and departments affected. Up-to-date versions of electronic plans should also be kept in hard copy in case of IT failure.

5.174 Plan maintenance requires systematic procedures for:
- recording and amending details of personnel, job titles or ranks, departmental or divisional names, headquarters and contact points of organisations, and so on;
- ensuring version control, so that the dates of all amendments of whatever size and extent are clearly identified on each page;
- reviewing plan objectives and standards, roles, policies, frameworks;
- holding training events, recording who has been trained and how often;
- holding exercises to validate plans, recording lessons learned, and ensuring that lessons learned are acted upon in terms of amendments to plans;
- maintaining a cycle of exercises to validate plans and ensure preparedness of staff;
- recording who has attended exercises;
- noting lessons learned from emergencies and other incidents, and taking action on them;
- publishing and circulating plans, ensuring that they reach the people who should have them, maintaining records of those who hold them, testing that those who hold them have read them and know what they mean for their role;
- delivering regular awareness sessions for senior officers, key partners, elected members and so on;
- liaising with all partners continually and consistently to maintain awareness and ensure the continued relevance of the plans as organisations change; and
- keeping track of developments nationally and locally.

5.175 For an example of a plan maintenance matrix see Annex 5D.
Chapter 6
Business continuity management

Summary

• The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency so far as is reasonably practicable. The duty relates to all functions, not just their emergency response functions (paragraphs 6.1–6.13).
• Category 1 responders must have regard to assessments of both internal and external risks when developing and reviewing business continuity plans (BCPs) (paragraphs 6.14–6.16).
• Business continuity plans may take the form of generic plans – which set out the core of a Category 1 responder’s response to any BCM event – or specific plans dealing with particular risks, sites or services (paragraphs 6.17–6.19).
• There must be a clear procedure for invoking the business continuity plan (paragraph 6.20).
• BCPs must include arrangements for exercises for the purpose of ensuring the plan is effective, and arrangements for the provision of training to those involved in implementing the plan. Plans must be reviewed and kept up to date (paragraphs 6.21–6.28).
• Category 1 responders are required to publish aspects of their BCPs insofar as making this information available is necessary or desirable for the purposes of dealing with emergencies (paragraphs 6.29–6.31).
• The Business Continuity Institute’s five-stage business continuity management cycle provides a useful framework to help Category 1 responders to fulfil their duties. However, responders may adopt other models to deliver the legal requirements where there is a compelling case for doing so (paragraphs 6.43–6.46).
• Examples of good practice drawn from Category 1 responders already active in business continuity management may help others with developing and reviewing their own BCPs (paragraphs 6.38–6.118).
What the Act and the Regulations require

Scope of the duty

6.1 The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to perform their functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable.¹

6.2 This duty relates to all the functions of a Category 1 responder, not just its civil protection functions. For Category 1 responders to help others in the event of an emergency, they first need to be able to keep their own crisis response capabilities going. However, Category 1 responders also need to be able to continue to deliver critical aspects of their day-to-day functions (eg law enforcement, looking after vulnerable people, attending minor fires) in the event of an emergency, if the impact on the community is to be kept to a minimum.

6.3 It may, therefore, be helpful to think of the business continuity management (BCM) duty in the Act as being separated into two strands. In practice, the Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can:

- **Continue to exercise their civil protection functions:** The legislation requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to deal with emergencies (see Chapter 5) and put in place arrangements to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency (see Chapter 7). The BCM duty requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can deliver these capabilities when they are required.

- **Continue to perform their ordinary functions:** Category 1 responders perform a range of functions that are important to the human welfare and security of the community and its environment (eg provision of health care, detection of crime, fighting fires). This is particularly true in an emergency situation, where operational demands often increase and the operating environment can become more challenging. The legislation requires Category 1 responders to make provision for ensuring that their ordinary functions can be continued to the extent required.

6.4 It is an established tenet of BCM that organisations should not only look at the resilience of internal structures and processes, but also those of organisations they rely on, or deliver services through.

6.5 The Act requires Category 1 responders to put in place plans to ensure that they can continue their functions in the event of an emergency.² This requires them to ensure that those organisations delivering services on their behalf (eg contracted-out services) or capabilities which underpin service provision (eg information technology and telecommunications providers) can deliver to the extent required in the event of an emergency. This is because services remain part of an organisation’s functions even if they do not directly provide them.

Limits on the duty

Definition of emergency

6.6 BCM is a flexible framework designed to help organisations to continue operating in the face of a wide range of different types of disruptions right the way along the spectrum of severity.

6.7 However, the BCM duty is determined by the definition of emergency in the Act. The Act therefore imposes a duty on Category 1 responders to put in place plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of a much narrower range of disruptive challenges.³

6.8 The duty applies only to those events or situations defined as an emergency in section 1 of the Act – events or situations that threaten serious damage to the human welfare, environment or security of a place in the United Kingdom. This should be read in conjunction with section 2(2) of the Act, which provides that an event or situation is only an emergency when it overwhelms existing response arrangements, and cannot be dealt with within existing resources or procedures (see Chapter 1 for an in-depth description of the definition of “emergency” underpinning Part 1 of the Act).

6.9 While the duty focuses on the most challenging situations, it is likely that plans put in place to fulfil their duty under the Act will help Category 1

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¹ s. 2(1)(c)
² s. 2(1)(c)
³ s. 2(1)(c)
responders to prepare for a much wider range of
day-to-day (ie non-emergency) interruptions. By
putting in place plans to keep themselves going in
the event of an emergency, Category 1 responders
will build resilience to a wider range of less serious
events.

**Practicability**

6.10 Ideally, Category 1 responders would be able
to continue all of their functions at ordinary service
levels in the event of an emergency. In practice,
this may not prove possible, and therefore the duty
is qualified.

6.11 The Act requires Category 1 responders to put
in place arrangements to ensure that they continue
to exercise their functions in the event of an
emergency so far as is reasonably practicable.

6.12 The qualification “so far as is reasonably
practicable” has three elements to it:

- **Criticality:** Category 1 responders should focus
  on ensuring that they can deliver critical
  functions. Which of its functions are critical is a
  matter that can be determined only by the
  organisation itself, and may depend on the nature
  of the emergency in question. Category 1
  responders should not lose sight of the common
  supporting infrastructure underpinning these
  functions. The following guiding principles should
  be used when deciding whether or not a
  service or activity is critical. It is not intended to
  be a definitive list, but rather a series of
  useful indicators:

  - **Emergency management/civil protection:**
    Functions that underpin the Category 1
    responder’s capability to respond to the
    emergency itself, and take effective action to
    reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the
    emergency.

  - **Impact on human welfare, the
    environment and security:** The significance
    of services to the effective functioning of the
    community in the event of an emergency.

  - **Legal implications:** Statutory requirements
    on Category 1 responders and the threat of
    litigation if a service is not delivered, or is
    delivered inadequately.

  - **Financial implications:** Loss of revenue and
    payment of compensation.

- **Reputation:** Functions that impact on the
  credibility and public perception of a
  Category 1 responder.

- **Service levels:** The Act does not require
  Category 1 responders to continue to deliver their
  functions at ordinary levels in the event of an
  emergency. Some critical functions may need to
  be scaled up, while others (which are non-critical)
  may need to be scaled down or suspended.
  Acceptable levels of service in the event of an
  emergency are a matter for the Category 1
  responder itself to determine in the light of its
  capabilities, constraints and the needs of the
  community.

- **Balance of investments:** No organisation will be
  in a position to commit unlimited resources to
  BCM. It is the role of the Category 1 responder
  itself to decide the level of protection sought in the
  light of resource availability and appetite for risk.

6.13 Category 1 responders must therefore put in
place a process for effectively managing the
prioritisation of services – and getting high-level
endorsement for these decisions – prior to an
emergency occurring. The Business Impact Analysis
process described later in this chapter gives a
methodology for undertaking this work.

**Risk assessment**

6.14 It is important that Category 1 responders
identify the significant risks threatening the
performance of critical functions in the event of an
emergency, as this will enable them to focus
resources in the right areas, and develop appropriate
continuity strategies.

6.15 In this context, there are two strands to risk
assessment, relating to external threats (ie risk of an
emergency occurring) and internal risks (ie business
risks) that could cause loss or disruption of critical
services required to control, reduce or mitigate the
effects of an emergency.

6.16 The Act requires Category 1 responders to
identify and assess significant risks of an emergency
occurring in their area" – in accordance with their
particular functions – as a basis for performing their other civil protection duties (see Chapter 4). The Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to assessments of risk maintained pursuant to the Act when developing BCPs. The Act requires Category 1 responders to consider whether a risk assessment makes it necessary or desirable to review a BCP.

**Generic and specific plans**

6.17 As with emergency plans, the Regulations provide that Category 1 responders may use generic plans, specific plans, or a combination of the two in business continuity planning. A generic plan is a core plan which enables a Category 1 responder to respond to a wide range of possible scenarios, setting out the common elements of the response to any disruption (eg invocation procedure, command and control, access to financial resources).

6.18 Specific plans may be required in relation to specific risks, sites or services. Specific plans provide a detailed set of arrangements designed to go beyond the generic arrangements when these are unlikely to prove sufficient.

6.19 Specific plans will usually operate within the framework established by the generic plan. It is a matter for Category 1 responders themselves to decide – in the light of assessments of risk – what, if any, specific plans are required.

**Plan invocation**

6.20 The Regulations specifically require Category 1 responders to establish a procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred which affects its ability to continue to perform its functions. In other words, there must be a clear procedure for invoking the plan. Where continuity of key functions is threatened in the event of an emergency, there should be a clearly laid out escalation procedure. This should be identified, agreed and documented within the plan. The Regulations specifically require this procedure to:

- specify the procedure that person should adopt in taking that decision;
- specify the persons who should be consulted before such a decision is taken; and
- specify the persons who should be informed once a decision has been taken.

**Exercising BCPs**

6.21 A BCP cannot be considered reliable until it is exercised and has proved to be workable, especially since false confidence may be placed in its integrity.

6.22 The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place arrangements for exercising BCPs in order to ensure that they are effective. These arrangements should encompass the three principal purposes of exercising:

- validating plans – to verify that the plan works;
- rehearsing key staff – to familiarise key staff with what is expected of them in a crisis and preparing them for crisis conditions; and
- testing systems – to ensure that systems relied upon to deliver resilience (eg uninterrupted power supply) function correctly and offer the degree of protection expected.

6.23 The frequency of exercises will depend on the Category 1 responder’s need and the environment in which it operates. But the exercising programme should be flexible, and the focus and frequency of exercises should be responsive to:

- the rate of change – where the pace of change (eg to the organisation or risk profile) is particularly rapid, exercises may need to be more frequent; and
- outcomes of previous exercises – the identification of particular weaknesses and subsequent changes to plans may necessitate further exercising.

**Training key staff**

6.24 It is important to ensure that relevant people across the Category 1 responder – and in other organisations where appropriate – are confident and competent concerning the plan. It is particularly important that staff receive appropriate training prior
to exercising. This will ensure that they are adequately prepared for what can be a challenging experience.

6.25 The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place a training programme for those directly involved in the execution of the BCP should it be invoked.\(^ {10} \) This should be reflected in plans. This should cover:

- **the contents of the plan** – How is the plan invoked? What are the key decision-making processes? Who else needs to be involved?
- **their role in implementing the plan** – What is expected of them? How do they fit into the wider picture?
- **key skills and knowledge required in crisis response.**

Reviewing and maintaining BCPs

6.26 The Act specifically requires Category 1 responders to maintain business continuity plans to ensure that they can continue to deliver key services in the event of an emergency.\(^ {11} \) This means that Category 1 responders must not only put plans in place, but ensure that they are reviewed and kept up to date.

6.27 Category 1 responders exist in a dynamic environment – organisations themselves and the environment they operate in are subject to change. BCPs need to be reviewed and updated to ensure that they remain valid. The following aspects of plans should be reviewed:

- **personnel** – staff turnover means that contact details will need constant updating;
- **the responsibilities of the Category 1 responder** – where a Category 1 responder takes on new functions or delivers new services, this should be reflected;
- **organisational structures** – where responders have experienced restructuring this may need to be reflected in plans;
- **suppliers or contractors** – ensuring that the details of suppliers and contractors are kept up to date;
- **risk assessments** – the Act requires Category 1 responders to review plans in the light of changes to risk assessments;\(^ {12} \) and
- **business objectives/processes.**

6.28 The frequency of plan review will depend on the rate of change within the organisation and the environment it operates within. Plan maintenance should take place on an ongoing basis, but all business continuity plans should be comprehensively reviewed at appropriate intervals.

Publication of BCPs

6.29 Communication with customers or service users – who may need information about service continuity in the event of an emergency – is important to community resilience. Emergencies cause serious disruption to people's lives and increase reliance on public sector bodies – provision of information about what they can and can't expect from Category 1 responders in the event of an emergency may help to minimise this disruption.

6.30 The Act requires the publication of aspects of BCM plans in so far as this is necessary or desirable for the purposes of preventing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency or otherwise responding to the emergency.\(^ {13} \)

6.31 Category 1 responders need only publish information where there is a positive benefit in doing so. For example, a Category 1 responder need not publish internal management information which would be of little relevance or interest to the public. Furthermore, the Regulations prohibit the publication of sensitive information (eg commercially confidential information, personal data) where consent has not been received from the originator of the information, or where the

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\(^{10}\) regulation 25(b)

\(^{11}\) s. 2(1)(c)

\(^{12}\) s. 2(1)(e)

\(^{13}\) s. 2(1)(f)

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**Box 6.1: Further advice and information**

Also included in this chapter is further advice about BCM and useful information that is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.
public interest in disclosure fails to outweigh the interests of the organisation or individual concerned.

How the Act and Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Scotland
6.32 The Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland to bodies outside devolved competence in the same way as they apply in England.

6.33 The Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers make provision as to how Category 1 responders in Scotland that fall within devolved competence should exercise their duty under the Act to maintain business continuity plans.

Wales
6.34 The Act and the Regulations apply in Wales in the same way as they apply in England.

Northern Ireland
6.35 The Act and the Regulations apply to Category 1 responders exercising functions in Northern Ireland in the same way as they apply in England.

Delivering BCM in partnership

Humber Emergency Planning Service provides a comprehensive emergency planning service to all four councils in the Humber area and encourages them to address business continuity collaboratively, both internally within each council and collectively by working together on specific issues. This has enabled good practice, lessons learned and plan development to be shared between the four councils and other stakeholders.

Business continuity has become an integral part of the council-wide, multi-directorate emergency planning groups established in each of the councils in the Humber area. Senior officer representatives from each directorate/department with specialist knowledge of their particular disciplines, along with emergency planning professionals, come together on a quarterly basis to discuss and progress emergency planning matters. Included in this process is the development of internal business continuity arrangements that fit within each council’s emergency management arrangements.

All four councils in the Humber area have been encouraged by the Humber Emergency Planning Service to develop their service area emergency plans to include business continuity arrangements to ensure that essential council services can be maintained in emergency and crisis situations. It is recognised that those responsible for delivering a service must be responsible for ensuring its continuity in the event of an emergency.

John Whiteman, Emergency Planning Manager, Humber Emergency Planning Service

Collaborative arrangements
6.36 The Government is keen to give Category 1 responders the flexibility to make the best use of the resources and expertise available to them. The Regulations permit Category 1 responders to enter into collaborative arrangements in order to fulfil the BCM duty\(^8\). Category 1 responders may:
- deliver the duty separately;
- deliver the duty jointly (e.g., by forming a joint BCM unit or resource);
- agree that one Category 1 responder will facilitate the delivery of a BCM programme on behalf of a number of other Category 1 responders; or
- enter into collaborative arrangements in which one or more Category 1 responder gives assistance to others in fulfilling their BCM duties (e.g., managing the overarching programme, developing framework plans).

6.37 However, BCM must be owned and driven within the organisation itself – and engage the expertise and resources of its staff – in order to be effective. While collaborative arrangements can be used to make use of BCM expertise or resources in other Category 1 responders, responsibility for the robustness of BCM arrangements must remain within the organisation.

\(^8\)regulation 8
CHAPTER 6  BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT

How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

6.38 This section provides practical guidance on taking forward a BCM programme within a Category 1 responder. It will:
- describe the discipline of BCM;
- outline a methodology for implementing it; and
- highlight good practice examples drawn from Category 1 responders who are already active in the business continuity area.

Category 1 responders must have regard to this material and may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. While the Government considers this to be a sound approach, Category 1 responders may use other models to deliver statutory requirements in this area where there are compelling reasons for doing so.

What is BCM?

6.39 BCM is a management process that helps manage the risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring it can continue to operate to the extent required in the event of a disruption. These risks could be from the external environment (e.g., power outages, severe weather) or from within an organisation (e.g., systems failure, loss of key staff).

6.40 BCM provides the strategic framework for improving an organisation’s resilience to interruption. Its purpose is to facilitate the recovery of key business systems and processes within agreed time frames, while maintaining the Category 1 responder’s critical functions and the delivery of its vital services.

6.41 BCM is an ongoing process that helps organisations anticipate, prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disruptions, whatever their source and whatever aspect of the business they affect.

6.42 BCM is a generic management framework that is valid across the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is about maintaining the essential business deliverables of an organisation in an emergency. The primary ‘business’ of private sector organisations is the generation of profit, a process that BCM seeks to protect. Category 1 responders provide services to the public, and it is equally important that these are protected and resilient.

BCM methodology

6.43 The Business Continuity Institute has developed a five-stage process, which has become widely accepted and has been incorporated into a British Standards Institute Publicly Available Specification – PAS 56. This model provides a generic framework that is applicable across the public, private and voluntary sectors.

6.44 Figure 6.1 illustrates this approach. The rest of the chapter describes this process, and outlines how a Category 1 responder can use this framework to fulfil its duties under the Act.

6.45 Work is underway to integrate the methodology set out in PAS 56 into a British Standard. This work is not expected to change radically the five-stage process set out in this guidance. However, Category 1 responders should familiarise themselves with subsequent developments in good practice and reflect on the implications for their BCM work.

Effective BCM is built on ‘seven Ps’

| 1 Programme – proactively managing the process |
| 2 People – roles and responsibilities, awareness and education |
| 3 Processes – all organisational processes, including ICT |
| 4 Premises – buildings and facilities |
| 5 Providers – supply chain, including outsourcing |
| 6 Profile – brand, image and reputation |
| 7 Performance – benchmarking, evaluation and audit |

Business Continuity Institute, 2003
As Figure 6.1 shows, the five stages of the process are:

- **Stage 1: Understanding your business**: Using business impact and risk assessments to identify the Category 1 responder’s critical deliverables, evaluate recovery priorities and assess the risks that could lead to a disruption to service delivery.
- **Stage 2: BCM strategies**: Identifying the alternative strategies available to the Category 1 responder to mitigate loss, assessing their potential effectiveness in maintaining the Category 1 responder’s ability to deliver its critical functions.
- **Stage 3: Developing and implementing a BCM response**: Developing the response to business continuity challenges and the plans underpinning this.
- **Stage 4: Establishing a BCM culture**: This stage looks at the need for Category 1 responders to ensure that a continuity culture is embedded in their organisation by raising awareness throughout the organisation and its key stakeholders, and offering training to key staff on BCM issues.
- **Stage 5: Maintaining and auditing BCM**: Ensuring plans are fit for purpose, kept up to date and quality assured.

**Delivering BCM arrangements**

**Programme management**

- **6.47** In order to be successful, BCM must be regarded as an integral part of a Category 1 responder’s normal management processes.
- **6.48** Achieving top-level buy-in is vital to developing robust BCM arrangements. Engaging senior officers is critical to gaining the commitment and support necessary for successful implementation.

**Figure 6.1: The BCM model**

- **Understanding your business**: Business impact and risk assessment tools are used to identify the critical deliverables and enablers in your business, evaluating recovery priorities and assessing the risks which could lead to business interruption and/or damage to your organisation’s reputation.
- **BCM strategies**: Determining the selection of alternative strategies available to mitigate loss, assessing the relative merits of these against the business environment and their likely effectiveness in maintaining the organisation’s critical functions.
- **Developing the response**: Improving the risk profile through improvements to operational procedures and practices, implementing alternative business strategies, using risk financing measures (including insurance) and building BCPs.
- **Exercising and plan maintenance**: Ongoing plan testing, audit and change management of the BCP and its processes.
- **Establishing the continuity culture**: Introduction of the BCM process by education and awareness of all stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers and shareholders.

*Business Continuity Institute, 2002*
crucial to the success of any major programme because of the influence they have over resource allocation and the culture of an organisation. However, the commitment of the top level is particularly important in relation to BCM because:

- it requires the leverage they exert across the organisation in order to be effective;
- it requires decisions about attitudes to risk and service prioritisation that can only be taken at the top level; and
- the top team is responsible for ensuring that effective governance arrangements are in place.

**Leadership**

6.49 Experience has shown that there is merit in giving a member of the executive management board overall responsibility for the BCM process by being appointed as the champion within the organisation. This will ensure that the profile of BCM issues is increased and decisions are made at the appropriate level.

6.50 BCM is an ongoing process and it is important to gain the support and endorsement of the board at the end of each stage of the cycle. Critically, it should be the responsibility of senior management to provide the assurance that BCM arrangements are robust and meet the requirements of the Act.

**BCM co-ordinator**

6.51 Experience has also demonstrated the importance of clearly establishing working-level responsibility for taking the programme forward. The best approach for programme management will vary by organisation, but the programme is most likely to succeed if:

- an overall BCM co-ordinator is appointed, and reports directly to the executive member responsible for BCM. This person would ideally be someone who has:
  - a good understanding of the critical aspects of the business and its key personnel and dependencies;
  - an understanding of BCM methodology and awareness of emergency management issues;
  - an awareness of relationships with other Category 1 responders; and
  - good programme management, communication, interpersonal and leadership skills; and

- BCM is part of every manager’s normal responsibilities. The BCM co-ordinator must ensure that all senior managers (eg service heads) understand the importance of BCM, the Category 1 responder’s approach to BCM and their responsibilities in relation to BCM. Ultimately, senior managers themselves must be responsible for embedding the programme within their service areas.

**BCM team**

6.52 For larger operations, it may be appropriate to consider a ‘matrix’ approach to managing the BCM process within an organisation. If this approach is employed, it is to be expected that the network of responsible officers will not be full-time members but will be required to dedicate appropriate time to the BCM process, and have this reflected in their job descriptions.

6.53 The team should be drawn from existing managers within key divisions and/or locations within the organisation. Consideration should be given to the composition of the team. It should contain the right mix of skills and experience and comprise individuals with the authority to make decisions and commit resources on behalf of services.

6.54 Figure 6.2 illustrates how the Metropolitan Police Service manages its BCM programme.

**The BCM life cycle**

6.55 The BCM life cycle is a phased, iterative process consisting of five stages. These stages are illustrated in Figure 6.3.

**Stage 1: Understanding your business**

6.56 An accurate assessment of the Category 1 responder’s organisation and its business is critical, as it will provide the basis upon which all subsequent BCM policies and processes are based.

6.57 As described in the first section of this chapter, it is important that Category 1 responders put in place a process for identifying critical functions, and identifying acceptable levels of service provision. If a declared set of aims and objectives exists, this will help identify the critical functions the BCM process
should focus upon. BCM is also about understanding the inputs, infrastructure and processes that delivery of these critical functions depends on.

6.58 Category 1 responders have many dependencies both internally and externally that support their critical processes and functions. It is important to identify these at an early stage. The involvement of representatives from these key dependencies – which can include suppliers, service contractors and other partners – will add value to the process.

6.59 Category 1 responders have many external influences that can affect the critical processes and functions. These can include other government departments, regulators, competitors, trade bodies and pressure groups. It is important to identify these at an early stage and to take their influence into account.

6.60 Having identified the critical processes and functions, it is important to determine what the impact would be upon the Category 1 responder’s goals if these were disrupted or lost – this stage is known as business impact analysis (BIA). BIA is the crucial first stage in implementing BCM, and helps measure the impact of disruptions on the organisation. It will provide information that will underpin later decisions about business continuity strategies.

6.61 The Gloucestershire County Council experience, for example, has demonstrated that there are four key elements to the BIA process:

- defining business processes;
- mapping the distinct stages of the process;
- determining the impacts of a disruption; and
- defining recovery objectives and minimum resources needed to meet these objectives.

6.62 Once those critical processes and functions have been identified, a risk assessment can be conducted to identify the potential threats to these processes – this is the next stage of the process.

6.63 Potential sources of disruption to a Category 1 responder’s operations are almost limitless. However, the impacts of any disruption are much fewer in number, for example: loss of critical system(s), denial of access to premises, damage to premises, loss of key...
staff and key resources, all of which produce similar disruption. To this end, the BIA enables the Category 1 responder to focus its efforts on key areas that threaten the continuity of the responder’s work in the event of an emergency, rather than adopting a scattergun approach.

6.64 The process will also take into account the time sensitivity of each business function/process to disruption, and this information will determine the recovery objectives.

6.65 It is necessary to rate the impact of these disruptions upon the critical objectives of the business in the event of an emergency. The rating given may be based on high, medium, low or a scoring system of 1–5. The impact of potential disruptions should be measured with reference to the following (non-exhaustive) list of factors:
- implications for service delivery;
- health, welfare and safety of stakeholders;
- environmental implications;
- statutory duties and legal obligations;
- financial cost to the Category 1 responder;
- resources required to remedy the situation;

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**Figure 6.3: The BCM life cycle**

![BCM life cycle diagram]

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Adapted from Business Continuity Management: Good Practice Guidelines, edited by Dr David Smith, Business Continuity Institute, 2002
• impact of disruption on partners; and
• reputation.

6.66 It is important that all those involved in the critical processes/functions have input to the BIA. Very often these processes are cross-function/division and agreement must be reached on the ratings.

6.67 At this stage the BCM co-ordinator should gain agreement from the board-level/executive sponsor responsible for BCM on the output of the BIA because it identifies the organisation’s key vulnerabilities in the event of an emergency, and narrows down the focus of the next stage of the process – risk assessment.

6.68 Risk is a measure of the potential consequences of a contingency against the likelihood of it occurring. The greater the potential consequences and likelihood, the greater the risk. It is important that Category 1 responders identify the significant risks threatening the performance of critical functions in the event of an emergency, as this will enable them to focus resources in the right areas, and develop appropriate continuity strategies.

6.69 In this context, there are two strands to risk assessment, relating to external threats (ie risk of an emergency occurring) and internal risks (ie business risks) that could cause loss or disruption of critical services required to control, reduce or mitigate the effects of an emergency.

6.70 The Act requires Category 1 responders to assess the risk of emergencies occurring (“emergency risk assessment”) and use these assessments to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning (see Chapter 4).15 The development of Community Risk Registers will mean that Category 1 responders have access to up-to-date information about risks in their area. Contingencies that seriously disrupt the activities of the community may also limit the ability to respond to them effectively.

6.71 In order to respond effectively to an emergency, Category 1 responders need to ensure that their systems and processes are resilient to the range of internal risks (“business risks”). Loss of IT, communications or key staff from disruptions internal to the organisation can also undermine the ability of the Category 1 responder to take effective action in the event of an emergency, and the risk of this occurring must therefore be assessed.

6.72 Utilising recognised risk techniques, a scoring can be achieved. Guidance on conducting risk assessments can be found in Chapter 4 of this guidance. Annex 4F sets out a risk matrix that can be used to score impacts.

6.73 It is now possible to combine findings from the BIA and risk assessment to produce a ranking system identifying those areas where the initial BCM effort should be concentrated. Agreement should be sought from the board or executive member responsible for the rankings produced.

Stage 2: BCM strategies

6.74 Having identified those areas where the Category 1 responder is most at risk, a decision has to be made as to what approach is to be taken to protect the operation.

6.75 As Annex 4F explains, the nature of the risk – defined in terms of its likelihood and impact – will determine which business continuity strategy is appropriate and what, if any, action is required. At one end of the spectrum, disruptions that are low likelihood and low impact may require no specific action, and may merely be dealt with through generic arrangements. Risks that are high impact and high probability, on the other hand, may point to the development of specific plans and risk mitigation strategies.

6.76 A number of the strategies that could be adopted are given below:
• do nothing – in some instances top-level management may consider the risk to be acceptable;
• change, transfer or end the process – such decisions to alter business process must be taken with regard to the organisation’s key objectives and statutory responsibilities;
• insure – may provide some financial recompense or support but will not aid the organisation’s response and will not meet all losses (eg reputation and other non-financial impacts, human consequences);

15 s. 2(1)(a), (b) and (e)
• **mitigate loss** – tangible procedures to eliminate or reduce risk within the business; and
• **plan for business continuity** – an approach that seeks to improve the Category 1 and 2 responders’ resilience to interruption, allowing for the recovery of key business and systems processes within the recovery time frame objective, while maintaining their critical functions.

6.77 Any strategy must recognise the internal and external dependencies of the organisation and must have general acceptance by management functions involved. The continuity strategies adopted here will shape the ability of a Category 1 responder to perform its critical functions in the event of an emergency, and it is important that these decisions are taken by the appropriate officers in the full light of the facts.

6.78 It is important to note that the Act only requires Category 1 responders to undertake business continuity planning. While it may be the logical outcome of the business continuity management process, the Act does not require a Category 1 responder to take other action to mitigate the risks to its business continuity (eg purchase equipment).

**Stage 3: Developing and implementing a BCM response**

6.79 The BCP is at the heart of the BCM process. The BCP provides the framework in which the Category 1 responder mobilises its response to a BCM challenge in the event of an emergency.

6.80 The BCP is also likely to address:
• **solutions** – how will the BCM event be managed?
• **objectives** – what are the recovery objectives and when should they be achieved by?
• **tasks and activities** – what needs to be done in order to meet recovery objectives?
• **procedures and processes** – what is the route-map for delivering the response?
• **personnel** – who is involved in delivering the response? What are their roles and responsibilities? How will they be notified?
• **command and control** – who has the authority to make which decisions? How will these be communicated?

6.81 In defining and reflecting the recovery objectives of the organisation, the BCP should have regard to the key resources which underpin the delivery of its critical functions. The box below shows some of these key resources.

6.82 In the event of an emergency some (non-critical) functions may need to be enhanced, reduced or suspended, depending on the nature of the function and the emergency that is taking place. The plan needs to describe the management process for making these decisions (eg how will the prioritisation be made? Who makes this decision and on what basis?), and then the operational process for implementing them:
• Where a service needs to be enhanced in the event of an emergency, where will the additional resources come from?
• Where a service needs to be scaled down, how will demands on it be managed?
• Where a service is withdrawn, how will staff and customers be informed?

6.83 In developing the plan, consideration should be given to:
• **keeping it short, simple and user-friendly** – it will need to be read and understood in challenging and pressured circumstances;
• **ensuring the assumptions contained are realistic** – eg numbers of staff directly affected by the incident, the effect of the ‘backlog trap’ (ie the impact of the accumulation of tasks left uncompleted on recovery);
• **references to other sources of information and supporting documentation** – eg guidance, databases, lists of key contacts, resources and suppliers;
• what **action plans and checklists** should be provided;
• **ownership of key tasks** – these should be reflected in job descriptions;
• **pro-formas** – giving templates and model documentation;
• **version control** – the need to implement document management procedures, including a list of all plan holders, which has to be maintained, together with a distribution and change control process; and
• **communications** – effective communication with stakeholders and, where appropriate, the media is crucial to an effective response.
The structure, content and detail of the BCP will depend on the nature of the Category 1 responder, risk and the environment in which it operates. In particularly large or complex organisations, it may be necessary to have departmental plans which integrate into one high-level plan. Further advice on plan presentation can be found in Chapter 5.

Stage 4: Building and embedding a BCM culture

Documenting the BCP is one element of developing a BCM strategy. Its success, however, depends upon:

- implementation of the recommendations made, across the entire Category 1 responder;
- a programme of training for those directly involved in the execution of the plan; and
- an education and awareness programme to ensure understanding and adoption of the plan in relevant parts of the organisation – this applies to both internal and external stakeholders (eg employees and suppliers).

It is essential to commit to implementing all recommendations and strategies identified in the BCP, otherwise investment made in its preparation will be redundant.

Similarly, Category 1 responders should deliver a programme of training and awareness to ensure that the relevant parts of the organisation are confident and competent concerning the plan. All parties must appreciate the importance of BCM to the operation’s survival and their role in this process. This means that business continuity issues should be ‘mainstreamed’ in emergency management issues and should be a core element of the emergency planning culture the Act establishes.

As the first part of this chapter notes, the Regulations require Category 1 responders to give appropriate training to those involved in implementing BCPs. That section of the chapter also sets out the objectives of such training programmes and what they should cover.

Training will need to be done on a rolling basis to cover staff turnover. BCM co-ordinators should consider establishing a training database to monitor the take-up of training opportunities.

It is also important to ensure that awareness of BCM issues is raised throughout the organisation, to ensure that all relevant staff have confidence in its ability to manage in a crisis, and know how they should respond in the event of a disruption. For example, some organisations distribute ‘z-cards’ to all staff, setting out what they should do in the event of a range of contingencies (eg details of secondary sites or evacuation points). The box below sets out some of the key messages and the means of getting them across.

The challenge of building and embedding a continuity culture requires a programme of activity not only within the organisation itself, but also with key stakeholders (eg suppliers, contractors, partners, customers).

Category 1 responders should extend their awareness-raising activities to those third parties upon whom the Category 1 responder depends in both normal and crisis operations. They need to be aware of how the response will develop when a BCM event occurs, and what this will mean for them.

Category 1 responders also have an interest in ensuring that their suppliers and contractors have in

Key resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key resource</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>The use, location and protection of critical information and documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>The requirements for workspace covering critical functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>The information and communications technology (ICT) requirements of the operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>The essential personnel requirements to deliver the agreed level of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>The equipment requirement, who supplies it and where it is stored for each critical activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{regulation 25(b)}\]
It is important to build BCM into procurement and contract management processes. The Office of Government Commerce provides detailed advice on these issues which is freely available on its website: http://www.ogc.gov.uk

6.94 Civil protection is very much a multi-agency activity, where Category 1 responders must work together – and understand each other’s capabilities and vulnerabilities – if they are going to be effective.

6.95 In the emergency planning area, it is essential for Category 1 responders to be aware of each other’s plans. BCM arrangements underpin emergency management capabilities – it is important that Category 1 responders have an awareness of the continuity issues facing their partners in the event of an emergency. Which functions will be discontinued? How will functions be scaled down or up in the event of an emergency? Where are partners’ contingency sites?

6.96 The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) provides a framework for dialogue about business continuity issues. Category 1 responders should consider using the LRF process as a means of raising mutual awareness, ensuring that plans dovetail, developing frameworks for mutual assistance, and sharing best practice.

6.97 The Act requires Category 1 responders to publish aspects of their BCPs in so far as this is necessary or desirable for the purposes of dealing with emergencies. For Category 1 responders to help others, they first have to be able to keep themselves going in the face of a disruption. BCM will help ensure that they can mobilise the capabilities they need to deal with the emergency. It will also help ensure that the impact of the emergency on the day-to-day functions of the Category 1 responder is kept to a minimum, and that disruptions to vital services do not deepen the impact of the emergency on the wider community.

6.98 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that Category 1 responders make relevant information available to the public about what will happen in the event of an emergency. There are three principal classes of information which Category 1 responders should consider communicating to the public:

- a descriptive account of the business continuity plans they have in place for the purposes of reassuring the public;
- information about the implications of emergencies for the continuity of a Category 1 responder.

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Box 6.2: The business case for BCM

Part of embedding a ‘continuity culture’ within an organisation is to convince senior staff of the business case for BCM. It makes sense to put in place BCM arrangements because they help to:

- **develop a clearer understanding of how the organisation works.** To ensure the continuity of an organisation, you first have to understand how it works. The process of analysing the business can yield sources of increased operational effectiveness and efficiency;

- **protect the organisation, ensuring that Category 1 responders can help others in an emergency.** For Category 1 responders to help others, they first have to be able to keep themselves going in the face of a disruption. BCM will help ensure that they can mobilise the capabilities they need to deal with the emergency. It will also help ensure that the impact of the emergency on the day-to-day functions of the Category 1 responder is kept to a minimum, and that disruptions to vital services do not deepen the impact of the emergency on the wider community;

- **protect the reputation of the Category 1 responder.** The community expects continuity of critical services, even in the most challenging of circumstances. They expect you to be fully in control, and to be seen to be in control – your organisation’s reputation is at risk if you are not. Maintaining the reputation of statutory services in an emergency is a vital element for public reassurance;

- **produce clear cost benefits.** Identifying, preventing and managing disruptions in advance can reduce the costs to an organisation in terms of financial expenditure and management time. The demands of the insurance market have also increasingly become an important driver; and

- **ensure compliance and corporate governance.** Category 1 responders are – to varying degrees – subject to performance standards, corporate governance requirements and in some cases specific requirements to do BCM (eg NHS Trusts). Establishing BCM arrangements pursuant to the requirements of the Act will help ensure compliance with this wider framework of responsibilities and expectations.

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17 s. 2(1)(f)
The importance of training in implementing BCM

“Training senior staff is a crucial step in implementing BCM within a local authority. Gloucestershire County Council’s Emergency Management Service instituted a training programme in three key stages:
1. giving chief officers an understanding of how BCM would fit into the set of ‘management tools’ already in use;
2. piloting training with service managers on a one-to-one basis, which helped to raise awareness of the benefits the process can deliver; and
3. delivering a half-day training course for all senior managers. The aim of these sessions is to set the overall context of BCM within local authorities, demonstrate its effectiveness as one of a series of management tools and to give an illustration of how it can add value in practice (through a discussion exercise).

“Feedback from the training was extremely positive. Gloucestershire County Council has now agreed a priority list of critical services, and BCM delivery has now been built into the authority’s performance management process.

“As part of this process, the Emergency Management Service will give service delivery managers further training and support. This will enable us to ensure consistency of approach in preparing the overall authority-wide plan. The lessons identified in the process of training staff and implementing BCM across the authority will be fed back into the training and implementation process, ensuring consistent improvement.

“Gloucestershire County Council Emergency Management Service has produced an information video and a booklet explaining their BCM process. A copy was sent in autumn 2004 to every local authority in England and Wales.”

Maddi Bali, Senior Emergency Management Officer, Gloucestershire County Council

6.99 This communication can take place through a variety of means, including websites and other publications. This could also be achieved by integrating business continuity issues within mission statements, statements of service and other public information brochures, relating either to the authority as a whole or to individual services.

Stage 5: Maintaining and auditing BCM

6.100 The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place arrangements to exercise BCPs to ensure they are effective. The objectives of the exercise programme and the frequency with which exercises should be undertaken is dealt with in the first part of this chapter.

6.101 When developing a BCM exercise programme, Category 1 responders will need to consider:
- the focus of the programme;
- types of exercise to be used;
- the involvement of senior management in developing, executing and quality-assuring the programme;
- the process for delivering exercises; and
- the relationship between the BCM exercise programme and the exercising of emergency plans.

6.102 Exercises should focus on impacts and test capabilities. While there is an infinite number of scenarios and possible responses, the list of impacts...
CHAPTER 6 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT

Key messages for staff

**Key messages**
- BCM is important.
- Who is involved (BCM team).
- What to do in the event of a plan being invoked.
- The level of service that will be provided at the time of an emergency.
- Support from senior executives.
- Examples of where BCM has been effective in the organisation or similar bodies.

**Techniques for raising awareness**
- Incorporating BCM in the staff induction process.
- Items in staff newspapers.
- E-mail bulletins.
- Intranet pages.
- Workshops and exercises to coincide with the National Business Continuity Awareness Week.
- Videos.
- Booklets and prompt cards.
- Posters, mousemats, other promotional items.
- Contact details on building passes.

and capabilities is limited. This will help Category 1 responders extract maximum value from the programme. A non-exhaustive list of the impacts and capabilities Category 1 responders will need to consider testing is set out in the box below.

6.103 Exercising can take various forms, from a test of the communications plan, a desk-top walk-through, to a live exercise. Chapter 5 sets out in more detail the range of exercise types and discusses when each type might be applicable. Chapter 5 also sets out the documentation that Category 1 responders may need to produce in support of exercises.

6.104 The exercise programme should have the full support of the executive lead for business continuity issues. But the involvement of senior management should not be limited to defining the structure of the programme. In addition to taking part in exercises, senior management should be involved in quality-assuring the exercise programme and endorsing the outcomes.

6.105 Figure 6.5 suggests a process for carrying out an exercise programme. Exercising is not about ‘passing’ or ‘failing’, it is all about learning lessons. There should be a debrief after each exercise in order to capture the experience of all the participants. What is important is that the captured data is recorded and considered as part of the post-exercise analysis.

6.106 In the event of a live crisis occurring, it may (depending upon circumstances) be expedient to defer (or even cancel) a planned exercise until the live crisis has been dealt with, a debriefing session held and the lessons identified and incorporated into the learning cycle. The decision to either reschedule or cancel a planned exercise will rest with senior management.

6.107 The post-exercise analysis is usually undertaken individually by the exercise manager or as a meeting of the exercise-planning group. The analysis considers the objectives and aims of the exercise against the data captured in the debrief(s) and from it a ‘lessons learned’ report can be compiled.

6.108 The ‘lessons learned’ report will highlight the essential parts of the post-exercise analysis that will drive the implementation of changes to the BCP, as well as form part of any future exercising programme by the business continuity managers.

6.109 The ‘lessons learned’ report will form the key supporting evidence of the post-exercise report. This will combine all the captured data, post-exercise analysis and ‘lessons learned’ report into a report to the executive lead for business continuity within the Category 1 responder. It will make recommendations that the executive lead will be asked to approve, or support, through the Category 1 responder’s approval procedure.
Once approval has been obtained, the changes can be implemented to the BCP. The process described will have provided the audit trail of BCP maintenance and testing.

Once the cycle has been obtained, it will be time to consider the next programme of exercises that will test the plan, or parts of the plan, that have been changed or have thus far gone untested. The process described is flexible – a simple table-top or syndicate exercise of a small part of the plan can follow the same process.

The output may be a simple memorandum to the effect that the test was completed satisfactorily (ie a post-exercise analysis) and the section tested is current (ie a ‘lessons learned’ report), and listing any changes that may be required (a post-exercise report). For example, a call-out cascade exercise that tests the contacts listed within the plan for activation may result in a memo to the organisation’s executive lead for business continuity that the test took place, was completed satisfactorily and that all the contacts listed in the BCP are correct. The memo has therefore created the audit trail of that aspect of plan testing.

Category 1 responders should not forget the close synergies between emergency plans and BCPs when learning the lessons of exercises and making changes as a result. Business continuity exercises may have implications for emergency plans, and the exercising of emergency plans may highlight issues in relation to business continuity.

The purpose of this exercise programme is to test the robustness of BCPs in the event of an emergency – will it enable the Category 1 responder to cope effectively with disruptions to the provision of critical services? One such critical function will be the emergency response function itself.

It is important that business continuity planning and exercising are not done in isolation from wider emergency planning work. In part, BCPs are in place to ensure that Category 1 responders are able to deliver their emergency response function in the event of an emergency. The exercising of emergency plans should have regard to business continuity issues, and aspects of both classes of plan can be exercised at the same time where appropriate.

The Act specifically requires Category 1 responders to maintain BCM plans to ensure that they can continue to deliver key services in the event of an emergency. This means that Category 1 responders must not only put plans in place, but also ensure that they are reviewed and kept up to date.

A process should be established whereby the BCM team is informed of relevant changes and developments, and that these are incorporated into the plan. Effective version control procedures should be implemented to ensure that relevant members of staff are working from the correct edition of the plan.

Plan maintenance should therefore be an ongoing process. It is good practice to undertake a comprehensive review of the state of the plan periodically.

### Impacts and capabilities

**Impacts**
- Denial of access or damage to facilities.
- Loss of key staff/skills.
- Loss of critical systems.
- Loss of key resources.

**Capabilities**
- Mobilisation (eg invoking plan and assembling key players).
- Command and control (eg crisis management).
- Communications (eg media and stakeholder communications).
Figure 6.4: Exercising your BCP – the learning cycle

**Business Continuity Plan**

- **Exercise**: This can be a test of a part or the whole of the plan.
- **Debrief**: There should be a debrief after each exercise in order to capture the experience of all the participants.
- **Post-Exercise Analysis**: This post-exercise report should collate the output of all debriefs with the post-exercise analysis of the exercise outcomes.
- **Audit BCP**: The BCP should be audited against the LLR and necessary changes identified.

**Review Plan**

- **Implement changes**: Changes must be clearly understood and embraced by the service areas upon which they impact.
- **Post-Exercise Report**: Approval and acceptance of recommendations by business continuity strategic lead with organisation.

**Lessons Learned**

- **Report**: This report closes the exercise programme and outlines the full outcome of the programme. It makes recommendations for changes to BCP.

Having made changes to the BCP, it is important to review the plan in its entirety before disseminating the ‘current version’.
Chapter 7
Communicating with the public

Summary

- Category 1 responders’ duties to communicate with the public under the Act are based on the belief that a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and to minimise the impact of the emergency on the community (paragraph 7.4).
- The Act includes public awareness and warning and informing as two distinct legal duties for Category 1 responders – advising the public of risks before an emergency and warning and keeping it informed in the event of an emergency (paragraph 7.1).
- Arrangements for warning and informing the public must have regard to emergency planning arrangements (paragraph 7.21)
- In the same way that Category 1 responders must ensure that their emergency plans are appropriate to the scale and type of risks involved, communications arrangements should be appropriate to the message and the kind of audience (paragraph 7.82).
- Category 1 responders need both to plan their communications and to test that their communications arrangements are effective (paragraph 7.87).
CHAPTER 7  COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC

What the Act and the Regulations require

7.1 There are two aspects of the duty in relation to communicating with the public. The first is that the public be made aware of the risks of emergencies and how Category 1 responders are prepared to deal with them if they occur. The second is that the public be warned and provided with information and advice as necessary at the time of an emergency.

Arrange for the publication of assessments and plans

7.2 The duties to assess risks and to prepare plans are followed by a further duty on Category 1 responders to arrange for the publication of all or part of risk assessments and plans they have made, where publication is necessary or desirable to prevent, reduce, control, mitigate or take other action in connection with an emergency.\(^1\)

7.3 Arranging for publication means that the Category 1 responders do not necessarily have to publish these documents themselves but that they must arrange for them to be published.

7.4 The duty is not necessarily to arrange to publish the whole of a risk assessment or a complete plan but only those parts which it is necessary or desirable to publish. What it is necessary or desirable to publish is determined by whether publication will assist in dealing with an emergency. Research suggests that if the public is better informed about the risks and the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, the emergency response will be improved.

Avoid alarming the public unnecessarily

7.5 At the same time, when publishing assessments and plans, the Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to the need not to alarm the public unnecessarily.\(^2\)

Sensitive information

7.6 Where risk assessments or plans contain sensitive information,\(^3\) then only edited or summary versions of all or part of the document should be published.

Joint discharge of functions and other forms of collaborative working

7.7 The duty to arrange for the publication of all or part of assessments and plans falls on all Category 1 responders. But the Regulations permit them to collaborate with others in delivering the duty.

7.8 There are several options for Category 1 responders in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility. They may decide to undertake the task:
- on their own;
- collaboratively, by agreeing with partners to act under the leadership of a lead responder;\(^4\)
- jointly, by making arrangements with another Category 1 responder;\(^5\) and
- by delegating the task to another Category 1 responder.\(^6\)

7.9 They may also support collaborative arrangements with the use of protocols.\(^7\)

Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public

7.10 Category 1 responders are required to maintain arrangements to warn the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred. In addition to warning, they must also have arrangements to provide information and advice to the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred.\(^8\)

7.11 The Act does not place a duty on Category 1 responders to warn, but to maintain arrangements to warn. This reserves the decision about when to issue warnings to the local Category 1 responders themselves. At the same time, there is an implied expectation that the arrangements to warn will be utilised where an emergency has occurred, making it necessary or desirable for the responder to take action.

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\(^1\) s. 2(1)(f)
\(^2\) regulation 27
\(^3\) See regulation 45 and the discussion in Chapter 3
\(^4\) regulations 9–11
\(^5\) regulation 8(a)
\(^6\) regulation 8(b)
\(^7\) regulation 7
\(^8\) s.21(1)(g)
Identification of Category 1 responder with lead responsibility

7.12 The duty to maintain arrangements to warn applies to all Category 1 responders whose functions are likely seriously to be obstructed by an emergency or who consider it necessary or desirable to take action in relation to that emergency and would require a redeployment of resources or additional resources to do so.9

7.13 Confusion would be caused, however, if more than one Category 1 responder were to plan to warn the public about the same risk at the same time to the same extent. To avoid duplication, the Regulations effectively give Category 1 responders the ability to cut back the duty by requiring those Category 1 responders whose functions are affected by an emergency to co-operate for the purpose of identifying which organisation will take lead responsibility for maintaining arrangements to warn in regard to that particular emergency.10

7.14 If agreement cannot be reached, each of them must maintain these arrangements separately.

7.15 The Regulations envisage two ways in which a lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public may be chosen:
• by identification before an emergency;11 or
• by adopting a procedure to be followed at the time of emergency.12

In addition, a procedure may be adopted by which the role of lead responder may be changed from one Category 1 responder to another during the course of an emergency, including the recovery period.13

Co-operation to identify the lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public must identify which of these procedures has been chosen in relation to the particular emergency.

7.16 Arrangements must ensure that at the time of an emergency the Category 1 responder which has accepted the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising the public:
• is able to contact the other Category 1 responders whose functions are exercisable in relation to that emergency;14
• informs those Category 1 responders of the actions it is taking;15 and
• is able to collaborate with those Category 1 responders in warning, informing and advising the public.16

7.17 The Regulations clearly envisage that the Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising the public will collaborate with its partners in fulfilling its role. There is no question of the lead responder assuming sole responsibility for carrying out the task. The Regulations place a reciprocal responsibility on those Category 1 responders which are not the lead responder, but which also have a duty to warn, inform and advise the public in relation to a particular emergency. They must maintain arrangements to:
• consult with the lead responder in relation to that emergency on a regular basis;17 and
• inform the lead responder of the actions which they are taking and proposing to take in relation to warning, informing and advising the public.18

The critical element in the effective delivery of information to the public will be the partnership established between the responder bodies involved.

Joint discharge of functions

7.18 Category 1 responders may also decide to deliver their responsibility to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public by:
• making arrangements to operate jointly with another Category 1 responder;19 and
• delegating the task to another Category 1 responder.20

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9 s. 2(2)
10 regulations 32–34
11 regulation 32(3)(a)
12 regulation 32(3)(b)
13 regulation 32(3)(c)
14 regulation 32(3)(d)
15 regulation 33(2)(a)
16 regulation 33(2)(b)
17 regulation 33(2)(c)
18 regulation 33(2)(d)
19 regulation 34(a)
20 regulation 34(b)
21 regulation 8(a)
22 regulation 8(b)
7.19 These collaborative arrangements, including the identification of a lead Category 1 responder for warning and informing, may be supported with the use of protocols.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Category 2 responders and other bodies}

7.20 Category 1 responders are not the sole responder bodies likely to be involved in arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public. The Regulations recognise that some Category 2 responders, such as utilities, have a duty under their own regulatory frameworks to provide warning, information and advice in certain circumstances when their services are interrupted. Similarly, the Meteorological Office, the Food Standards Agency and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which are not covered by the Act, also provide a warning service for severe weather emergencies. Accordingly, the Regulations require that Category 1 responders in performing their duty to warn, inform and advise:

- should have regard to these arrangements;\textsuperscript{22} and
- need not duplicate them unnecessarily.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Have regard to emergency plans}

7.21 Warning, informing and advising the public is not a stand-alone duty. The Regulations require that a Category 1 responder in carrying out its duties in this respect must have regard to its emergency plans.\textsuperscript{24} As with any other part of planning for response to an emergency, the communications strategy – either direct with the public, or via the media – should be fully integrated into the responder’s emergency plans. Equally, in maintaining its emergency plans, it must have regard to its warning and informing duties.

\textbf{Generic and specific arrangements}

7.22 In regard to emergency planning, the Regulations distinguish between generic and specific plans. Similarly, in relation to the duty to have arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public, the Regulations recognise that these may be generic or specific.\textsuperscript{25} Which arrangements are chosen will depend on the type of emergency being planned for and the particular circumstances in a locality.

\textbf{Avoid alarming the public}

7.23 As with regulation 28 which requires Category 1 responders when publishing assessments and plans to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily, there is a similar duty to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily when making arrangements to warn, inform and advise them.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Training and exercises}

7.24 Emergency plans are required to include arrangements for provision of training and carrying out of exercises.\textsuperscript{27} Similarly, the Regulations in regard to warning and informing the public also require arrangements to include provision for training and exercises.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out}

7.25 The previous section has described the nature of the legislation and what it permits and requires

\textbf{Box 7.1: Further advice and information}

Also included in this chapter is further advice about communicating with the public and useful information which is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

\textsuperscript{21} regulation 7
\textsuperscript{22} regulation 35(1)(a)
\textsuperscript{23} regulation 35(1)(b)
\textsuperscript{24} regulation 28
\textsuperscript{25} regulation 30
\textsuperscript{26} regulation 25
\textsuperscript{27} regulation 31
Public communications timeline: what responders’ plans need to achieve

PUBLIC AWARENESS (pre-event):
Informing and educating the public about risks and preparedness

PUBLIC WARNING (at the time of an event or when one is likely):
alerting by all appropriate means the members of a community whose immediate safety is at risk

INFORMING AND ADVISING THE PUBLIC (immediate and long-term post-event):
providing relevant and timely information about the nature of the unfolding event –
• immediate actions being taken by responders to minimise the risk to human or animal health and welfare, the environment or property;
• actions being taken by responders to assist the recovery phase;
• actions the public themselves can take to minimise the impact of the emergency;
• how further information can be obtained; and
• end of emergency and return to normal arrangements.

Category 1 responders to do. This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.29

7.26 The timely provision of relevant information and appropriate warnings and advice is a crucial part of the effort to promote and foster resilient communities.

Public awareness – developing understanding and preparedness before an emergency

What the public needs to know

7.27 Once Category 1 responders have identified the emergencies that will trigger their public communication duties, they should consider what information is already in the public domain. This will help them determine what additional information from the risk assessments and plans they have made it will be “necessary or desirable”30 to publish to meet the requirements of their duties.

7.28 The generic material is likely to be supported by the Community Risk Register (CRR) and Category 1 responders’ generic planning arrangements. Specific plans, prepared in relation to specific risks and also supported by the CRR, are likely to include a requirement for much more detailed advice to the public on what may happen.

7.29 Many local authorities and other bodies have websites and literature which provide either generic advice on emergencies, or detailed advice specific to their own areas of responsibility (see Boxes 7.3 and 7.4).

7.30 Each decision will clearly have to be based on a balance of assessment. Two types of publication may be found to be necessary:
• generic advice referring to the risks of emergencies in the locality; and
• specific advice linked to particular risks and plans.

How much to publish

7.31 The objective of this duty under the Act needs to be kept in mind. At all stages of the decision-making process, Category 1 responders should ask themselves whether the material published will enhance the public’s response in an emergency. In this regard, the mere fact of publication may have a beneficial effect on public confidence. Research suggests that people look to the authorities to ‘do something’, and that they will be relieved and reassured to see that plans are in place.

29s. 3(3)(b)
30s. 2(1)(f)
7.32 Any inclination towards full disclosure may be tempered by the requirement to “have regard to the need to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily”. However, there is comprehensive guidance available on how best to communicate about risks to the public without causing disproportionate concern, and Category 1 responders should be familiar with this.

How to publish

7.33 The simplest and most cost-effective solution may be to make all or part of the relevant documents available in downloadable web format. But for those who do not have internet access, paper copies can also be made available on request and in the reference sections of public libraries.

Box 7.2: Awareness-raising: what the public should do in an emergency

The Act requires information to be published about the risks and plans. Under the Act, plans describe the actions the Category 1 responders themselves will take in the event of an emergency. However, in practice, Category 1 responders may also want to attach to their plans details of possible prudent actions that the public are expected to take. These may include obtaining in advance useful protective or preventive materials or other items to ensure community resilience in an emergency. It makes sense for public awareness messages to include what the public should do in the face of the risk of emergency, so as to complement the actions that the Category 1 responders themselves propose to take.

Box 7.3: Public information produced by central government and national bodies

The Government has published general advice in the form of a booklet delivered to all households. The booklet has been promoted through TV and press advertising. It covers a number of types of emergency, including terrorist-related emergencies. Other sources of information include:

- http://www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk
- http://www.ukresilience.info
- http://www.mi5.gov.uk
- travel advice on http://www.fco.gov.uk
- business continuity advice on http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk
- severe weather warnings from the Meteorological Office on http://www.meto.gov.uk
- flood warnings and advice from the Environment Agency on http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk

Box 7.4: Examples of locally produced or topical information

National Steering Committee Warning and Informing the Public: http://www.nscwip.info
Local authority material, for example Surrey Alert information: http://www.surreyalert.info
Emergency Planning Unit websites
Control of Major Accident Hazards: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/comahind.htm
Nuclear calendars: public information calendars provided by the nuclear industry: http://www.niauk.org
Emergency services outreach work in schools and youth groups
Crucial Crew scheme aimed at children to warn them of risks: http://www.crucial-crew.org
First aid material from: British Red Cross – http://www.redcross.org.uk
St John Ambulance – http://www.sja.org.uk
St Andrew’s Ambulance Association – http://www.firstaid.org.uk

31 regulations 27, 30
7.34 Available information should be identified clearly in the responder body’s Freedom of Information Publication Scheme.\(^{25}\)

**Design and distribution**

7.35 All material produced should look interesting and attractive enough for people to want to read it – otherwise it will be a waste of resources.

7.36 It is a good idea to seek professional design and editing assistance. If professional support is not available, advice on good practice is available online and in published manuals.\(^{26}\)

7.37 Once a product is available, the public will need to know about it. Unless it is going to be mailed directly to householders, people will need to be told how to get copies. This may be achieved by the conventional range of publicity methods.

7.38 Avoiding duplication of effort is important. Good communication between responder bodies should include development of joint programmes for the production of general information material.

7.39 It is good professional practice to evaluate the effectiveness of every information campaign. If this is done, evaluation should include research which shows how well any specialist versions have met the needs of vulnerable members of the community.

**Reaching vulnerable persons and those who have difficulty understanding the message**

7.40 The needs will be evident in some areas, which have, for example, a high proportion of elderly residents who may welcome the option of a large print version of a document, or where there may be significant numbers who speak a minority ethnic language. Where vulnerable members of the community are in the care of an institution such as a school or old people’s home, the most effective delivery of information will be through the management.

7.41 It may be that the most effective communications route is a single leaflet expressed in very simple language (or more than one language) backed up with pictures and symbols, which includes a request that the reader should share the information with family, friends and neighbours who are not able to read the information themselves. Research shows that it can be particularly effective to communicate with children, who then act as a conduit for the message to reach other family members.

**Review and renewal**

7.42 The provision of public information should be an ongoing process. Any information that is produced should be in a reasonably durable format, whether paper or electronic, and available over time.

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**Box 7.5: Working with the Freedom of Information Act**

- There may well be significant public interest in plans when information first becomes available, and some may want to see the detail. Where only summary or edited versions have been published, this may lead to requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to have access to all the information in the document. Those preparing published versions should be familiar with the terms of the legislation so that they can handle subsequent freedom of information requests quickly and accurately.
- In particular, the publication of generic plans may well encourage people to ask for further information to be made available under the Freedom of Information Act about plans for particular institutions in the area (schools, hospitals, old people’s homes, prisons, animal shelters, zoos, museums, airports, ferry terminals, etc). Responder bodies may find that they will need to address these specific aspects in the planning process.

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\(^{25}\) The Freedom of Information Act requires each public authority to adopt and maintain a publication scheme setting out details of information it will routinely make available, how the information can be obtained and whether there is any charge for it. A publication scheme is therefore both a public commitment to make certain information available and a guide to how that information can be obtained. All publication schemes have to be approved by the Information Commissioner and should be reviewed by authorities periodically to ensure they are accurate and up to date. More information can be found at [http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk](http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk).

\(^{26}\) For example, advice on publications, design and new media in the “PR in Practice” series of textbooks published by Kogan Page in partnership with the Institute of Public Relations (see [http://www.ipr.org.uk](http://www.ipr.org.uk)).
It should be regularly reviewed and renewed whenever necessary in the light of changing circumstances.

7.43 This will mean that published material will need to be looked at afresh every time the CRR or an individual risk assessment or plan changes. Only new information which is “necessary or desirable” for prevention or mitigation of an emergency will require a new version to be produced.

Warning, informing and advising the public – communications during and after an emergency

Co-ordinating activity

7.44 The second part of the communications duty relates to arrangements for warning, informing and advising the public at the time of an emergency. Arrangements for complementary and co-ordinated public warnings, advice and media facilities should be carefully managed between the various bodies. This will enhance public safety and information will be delivered more effectively.

Identifying a lead responder

7.45 It is preferable, in relation to a particular type of emergency, if a lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public is identified and agreed beforehand by the Category 1 responders. Annex 7B provides an indicative list of which Category 1 responders are likely to lead in a range of examples. (The list is advisory only.)

7.46 In many instances, the lead Category 1 responder for warning and informing the public will be the organisation which leads on the response to an emergency. In a number of instances, this role is likely to be filled by the police, but it should not be assumed that this will always be the case.

7.47 The box on the next page provides a case example of a wide-area emergency, caused by flooding, where it is clear that the role of lead Category 1 responder for warning, informing and advising, which is likely to fall to the Environment Agency, does not absolve non-lead responders from playing their part. In similar wide-area examples, such as health emergencies, the lead Category 1 responder with responsibility for warning and informing will be a health organisation, such as the Health Protection Agency (HPA), but it will also require assistance from other Category 1 responders.

7.48 Where identification of the Category 1 organisation taking the lead responder role for warning, informing and advising cannot be done in advance, the Regulations permit a procedure to be established for identifying at the time who should be the lead responder. However, choosing this option may cause unwanted delay and confusion. A possible example where Category 1 responders might want to delay identifying a lead responder could be a severe weather emergency. Even so, in Annex 7B, it is suggested that the police should be identified in advance for the lead role in this type of wide-area emergency, where the likely impact is on road traffic. They, of course, would expect to be supported by a range of other Category 1 responders.

7.49 Procedures may also be adopted for changing the lead responder with the warning, informing and advising responsibility during the course of an emergency. On land, the police, and in maritime emergencies, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, are likely to co-ordinate warning and information strategies in the early stages of many emergencies. But in the later stages, the lead in distributing information and advice about longer-term issues, to do with, say, health or the environment, may be handed over to the relevant expert organisation.

Use of protocols

7.50 Options for collaborative arrangements, including the identification of a lead responder for warning and informing, were discussed earlier (see paragraphs 7.12–7.17). Category 1 responders are likely to want to support these arrangements with protocols.35 (A checklist of possible protocols appears at Annex 7C.) These may be negotiated directly or through the Local Resilience Forum. Some work in this area has already been done by the Regional Media Emergency Forums (RMEFs) and agreements have already been reached (see Box 7.8).
7.51 Any protocols should be recorded formally and in some detail, so that they can be implemented immediately an emergency happens. They should also describe the process which they will use to identify stages in the emergency when lead communicator responsibility ought to be changed and the point at which normal operating practices should be resumed.

Role of the lead responder

7.52 The planning arrangements of the lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public are likely to include:

- Procedures and a capability for:
  - contacting other relevant responder organisations and informing them of action being undertaken or proposed;
  - delivering urgent emergency warnings, or ensuring they are delivered;
  - co-ordinating all communications activity at the time of an emergency, so that public information is consistent, timely and without unnecessary duplication;
  - delivering information and advice in relation to its functional areas of responsibility;
  - assisting other participating responder organisations to deliver information and provide advice in relation to their functional responsibilities.
- Provision of:
  - a media facility;
  - a lead spokesperson to work with the media;
  - facilities for staff from different responder organisations to work together on a public information service.

Warning arrangements

7.53 The methods available to deliver urgent information to members of the public are extremely varied (see table ‘Possible public warning methods’). Some depend on the availability of power supplies or phone lines. Some may require careful consideration of the risks to human life and health, in case at the time of an emergency staff or members of the public are exposed to hazardous substances while they are warning or being warned.

7.54 The process of reaching agreement on the warning process is shown schematically in Figure 7.1.

Generic and specific warnings

7.55 Some systems are defined as ‘generic’ arrangements, in that they can be called into play in a range of scenarios. Others have only limited use, or are capable of delivering only a closely targeted message.

Responder with lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising the public: an example

- The Environment Agency’s (EA) powers are mainly permissive. They maintain a flood warning system, but the Agency has not previously had a statutory duty to warn the public. The Act places a general duty on the EA to maintain arrangements to warn the public and provide advice and information about flooding.
- However that duty to warn does not apply solely to the Environment Agency. When a potential flood impinges on the functions of another Category 1 body then it too has a duty to warn. The Agency provides warnings as much to other responders, who must make decisions on, for example, evacuation, as it does to the public.
- Not every local authority or police force will have a duty to warn and advise in relation to every flood. But where it is likely that the flood will require a response from the local authority or the police (eg because the flood will impact on the delivery of education or the welfare of clients on a social services care list – or, in the case of the police, because lives and property will be at risk), the authority and police will have a duty to warn, inform and advise.
- In this example, it is likely to be appropriate for the Category 1 responders to identify the Environment Agency and agree that it should be the lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public.

\*regulation 29
## Existing publication and warning regimes

- Some organisations, excluded from the Act because they have existing statutorily defined emergency procedures, also have an important role in generating public awareness about emergencies and issuing warnings when necessary.
- The management of emergencies on nuclear and major industrial sites, including communicating with the public, is already regulated. Site operators have well-established procedures for communicating with the public in the vicinity of their sites. The new legal framework does not override existing ones.
- It will be important to ensure that plans made by Category 1 responders do not duplicate existing arrangements. Category 1 responders may choose to cover in their communications planning the potential for an emergency to spread beyond the scope of individual site plans produced under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, Radiation (Emergency Preparation and Public Information) Regulations or pipeline regimes, but this is not an explicit requirement of the Act.

### Who is ‘the public’?

- **7.61** Category 1 responders are, of course, required in the Act to make local arrangements for delivering information and advice about an emergency to the public with the purpose of mitigating the effects and aiding recovery. They should plan to be able to meet the needs of many different audiences (see box on next page).

### Survivors (Group A) and other possible victims (Group B)

- **7.62** The needs of these two groups are the main focus of attention in the first hour of an incident and beyond.

- **7.63** Providing information to Group A is, in effect, an extension of the warning phase. Those at the scene are under direct instruction from the emergency services. Those in charge of operations are best placed to decide what advice or instructions are required, by whom and how quickly.

- **7.64** Similarly, Group B urgently need to know what they need to do immediately – this may be a message to stay indoors and shut windows, to evacuate, to follow decontamination instructions, or to report somewhere for medical checks. Planning should address these issues. Group B may also need (and certainly will want) to know why the advice is being given.

- **7.65** In the earliest moments following an incident, vital operational decisions are often made by the first police officers, emergency workers or even members of the public at the scene. Pre-planning should ensure that decisions about the nature and timing of advice to the public have a prominent place among the urgent matters to be dealt with.

### Warning vulnerable persons and those who have difficulty understanding the message

- **7.57** Vulnerable persons who live in residential homes or sheltered accommodation or attend day centres are relatively easy to warn during an emergency because the establishment will be known to local authorities and other responders.

- **7.58** Vulnerable persons living in the community are more difficult to contact. General advice to the public to adopt a ‘good neighbour’ approach to help those less able to help themselves is always advisable; but specific efforts will sometimes be needed by the public authorities to deliver alerts to those vulnerable persons who are known to them.

- **7.59** The Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for communicating with the public will need to be assured that these vulnerable people can be contacted. Arrangements will need to address how information and assistance can be managed by local authorities and health authorities who are in regular contact with the vulnerable individuals.

- **7.60** People who have difficulty understanding the message because they use a different language may require pre-prepared print or broadcast messages in their own language.
**Figure 7.1: Process for developing effective warning procedures**

- **Identify lead responder** – Which organisation is best placed to provide warning?
- **Develop planning assumptions** – In what circumstances will potential victims be warned?
- **Assess capability** – Can warnings be delivered by generic methods or is something specific needed?

**7.66** Responders are unlikely to be able to rely solely on the media to reach the Group B audience. Planning should recognise that targeting will need to be more precise than can be achieved by broadcasters. Procedures should include some form of audit trail of who has or has not been contacted. The media may be used to provide reinforcement of the basic safety messages.

**Local people (Group C), friends and relatives (Group D)**

**7.67** The media quickly swings into full news-gathering mode. But local media can be particularly helpful in addressing Group C, providing general information about the emergency, information on how the public can help and advice on disruption in the area, eg traffic bulletins. It is important for communications planning to ensure that Group C in particular can get access to regular updates of how management of the emergency is progressing.

**7.68** Category 1 responders should work closely with the media, especially local radio, ahead of time to prepare useful standard material. The text of announcements should, where possible, be agreed with broadcasters in advance, to avoid unnecessary questions of editorial control under pressure.

**7.69** Group D will usually be alerted to an emergency through the national media. The most likely first response is to phone the people they know in the area, either to find out if they are safe or to get more information.

**7.70** There is evidence from past disasters that the emotional impact of watching events unfold which

**Warning the public in emergencies: audience types**

**Casualties and other possible victims**
- **Group A**: Survivors – those in the immediate vicinity and directly affected, possibly as wounded casualties.
- **Group B**: Those close by who may need to take action to avoid further harm.

**Local people, friends and relatives**
- **Group C**: Those in the area who may be disrupted by the consequences of the emergency and the clear-up process.
- **Group D**: Those who are not affected directly but know or are related to those who might be.

**The wider audience**
- **Group E**: Those who are not affected but are concerned, or alarmed about wider implications, or simply interested.
- **Group F**: The news media.

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[37] There are good studies of how this has worked in real emergencies provided on the BBC’s ‘Connecting in a Crisis’ website, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis](http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis)
Types of warning method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible public warning methods</th>
<th>Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mobilising officers to go round on foot and knock on doors</td>
<td>generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• From car or helicopter, by loudhailer or other amplified means</td>
<td>generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Media announcements</td>
<td>generic or specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electronic/variable message boards, eg at the roadside or on motorways</td>
<td>generic or specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct radio broadcasts to shipping (in maritime incidents)</td>
<td>generic or specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PA announcements in public buildings, shopping centres, sports venues, transport systems, etc</td>
<td>generic or specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Automated telephone/fax/e-mail/text messages to subscribers</td>
<td>specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Site sirens</td>
<td>specific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

may be affecting a close relative or friend can be very significant. Where people at a distance can be reasonably sure that a relative or friend is caught up in the incident they will be desperate for information. Communications planning must address this reality.

Helplines and public inquiry points

7.71 The information delivery methods discussed so far have been based upon the Category 1 responders’ decision about what information needs to be provided. However the public, particularly Groups B, C and D, are likely to have all sorts of queries or offers to direct towards the responder bodies. Responders should plan how to make best use of helplines and public inquiry points (which may be telephone, e-mail or SMS based, or multimedia) in any emergency. These can either provide a limited amount of recorded information, or connect with a call centre where people answer individual questions.

7.72 Helplines may already be in place for other purposes. Plans can be developed to take them over and provide their staff with relevant briefing or suitable recorded messages. Facilities run by other operators or companies in the area may also be co-opted into the public information effort as a result of protocols put in place in advance.

7.73 Setting up a dedicated call centre from scratch is a significant undertaking, but may be achieved quite quickly if suitable call-off contracts have been put in place as part of the planning process. Category 1 responders who decide to use this form of communication should also take advice from network providers to avoid risk of overloading the telephone system.

7.74 Such inquiry points are not a panacea. There will always be a significant proportion of dissatisfied callers, whatever the method used – callers for whom the

What information is needed when

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediately when an emergency occurs, and during the first hour . . .</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The PUBLIC NEEDS:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• basic details of the incident – what, where, when (and who, why and how, if possible);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• to know the implications for health and welfare;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• advice and guidance (eg stay indoors, symptoms, preparing for evacuation); and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• reassurance (if necessary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The PUBLIC WANTS to know:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• other practical implications such as the effect on traffic, power supplies, telephones, water supplies, etc;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a helpline number; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• what is being done to resolve the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BROADCASTERS will REQUIRE:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• well-thought-out and joined-up arrangements between the emergency services, local authority and other organisations, capable of providing agreed information at speed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• an immediate telephone contact; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a media rendezvous point at the scene.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from the BBC’s ‘Connecting in a Crisis’)
recorded message is inadequate or unsuitable, or who cannot get answers to their particular questions, or who simply cannot get through because the lines are too busy. Planning should address the expectations of callers to limit irritation and disappointment, by establishing procedures to make it clear what information is available and how busy the lines are.

**The wider audience (Groups E and F)**

7.75 Group E are effectively ‘the public at large’. Their principal source of information is news broadcasts and whatever they can find on websites. While Category 1 responders have little control over the output on news channels, it is important that they plan to agree what the main public messages will be, provide the media with as much relevant material as possible and ensure it is accurate and consistent.

7.76 The media – Group F – are the sixth audience for the information provided by Category 1 responders. They can influence both the short-term handling and the long-term impact of an emergency.

7.77 At the same time as providing useful advice and information to the public, the media are likely to operate in reporting mode. They may well produce round-the-clock rolling news coverage if the emergency is serious enough. It is important that Category 1 responders should have plans to play their part in providing authoritative information and spokespeople for interview, to ensure that the public gets a fair picture of how they are handling the situation.

7.78 Planning should recognise that the media will seize upon any inconsistencies in presentation or message, either between responders at the local level, or between local and national responses. For this reason it is vital that Category 1 responders are equipped to liaise effectively with each other and with regional and UK bodies. Otherwise the operation will look chaotic to the outside world.

7.79 If the media do not get what they want from the Category 1 responders, they are likely to simply go elsewhere for footage and commentary. This may take away the initiative from Category 1 responders, and put them in a position of having to defend themselves against unfounded criticism or inaccurate analysis. Category 1 responders should be aware that the handling of the emergency, as well as the emergency itself, will all be part of the story. No matter how positive relations are with the media ahead of an event, responders must expect to be criticised if events seem to be going badly. They should plan accordingly.

**Working with the media**

7.80 All Category 1 responders should be familiar with the media organisations and outlets in their own

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**Box 7.6: The role of the casualty bureau**

- It is a police function when emergencies occur to consider setting up a casualty bureau. Where one is set up, planning arrangements should ensure that the contact number is publicised as widely as possible, as soon as possible. Information about a casualty bureau should make it clear that this is a way for the police to collect information about people who may have been injured or killed – it does not release information about possible casualties.

- The fact that the casualty bureau does not provide information directly over the phone places an onus on Category 1 responders (for example local authorities), as part of integrated emergency management, to plan to set up a public information line. Such lines do not provide information about casualties, of course, but they may be able to advise relatives and friends who need to come to the area about travel and accommodation. Planning to provide public information lines will help ease the burden on the casualty bureau.

- Planning should also include special arrangements in the local area to provide face-to-face information and support to those bereaved relatives who come to be close to the scene of the emergency. The police are likely to provide Family Liaison Officers who will take on all or part of this role. But special attention needs to be paid to relatives and friends trying to get information at receiving hospitals for the incident; and to those who may be taken to or congregate at the emergency mortuary. Rest and reception centres set up by the local authority with the support of voluntary organisations may also require regularly updated access to information and advice.
area and develop good relations with them. There is a considerable amount of advice on how to achieve this in the BBC’s ‘Connecting in a Crisis’ initiative[38] – which also points out that other media can be equally helpful. Category 1 responders should be fully familiar with its recommendations, which were prepared in full consultation with central government, local government and other practitioners.

Deciding on the message

7.81 There are two cardinal errors in communications which should be protected against:

a) Category 1 responders should not release, without consultation, information or advice which covers the areas of responsibility of partner organisations. The damage done to public confidence by the release of inconsistent or contradictory messages can be hard to repair.

b) Similarly, great damage can be done by speculation about causes or future developments. It is better to say when something is not known than to guess, particularly if this is going to raise the hopes of the affected public – for example, about when they can return to their homes.

7.82 At every stage of the process, the key to effective communication with the public is getting the message right for the right audience. Co-ordination between Category 1 responders is vital. Even when specific information has to be given by one body in a very specialist field, the others involved in the response should be aware of what is being issued, when and to whom. Arrangements to ensure that such co-ordination can take place effectively should be included in the planning process.

7.83 For the most part, though, public information will cover the interests of a number of different Category 1 responders involved in handling the emergency. All those with an interest need to contribute to the development of the information. Apparent conflicts of interest need to be resolved quickly. The stages in the decision-making process should be logged to provide a record which can be examined after the event to identify lessons for the future. Suitable systems should be devised as part of the planning process.

Who delivers?

7.84 How information and advice are delivered can greatly affect how they are received. Category 1 responders should give careful thought to this ahead of any emergency, and should identify individuals who may act as official spokespeople and undertake media interviews. These individuals should receive suitable training.

7.85 Obviously, if the figure is already recognised as a trustworthy and authoritative person, the message will be delivered all the more effectively. This might

Box 7.7: Media planning – some essential elements

Pre-event:

- liaising with other Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not captured by the Act and media/public relations teams;
- identifying potential sites for media centres in the area;
- providing media training for potential spokespeople;
- providing suitable communications equipment for press office staff to work away from office;
- making arrangements for mutual aid to be provided to neighbouring areas; and
- providing for liaison with the appropriate Government News Network (GNN) regional office (the Assembly Press Office in Wales).

On the day:

- establishing a Media Liaison Point at or near the scene of an emergency;
- establishing a Media Liaison Centre close to the strategic co-ordinating group/overall incident commander; and
- liaising with other responder bodies and GNN regarding VIP and ministerial visits to the scene.

[38] http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis
be because they already have a good public profile in the area or are in uniform (research shows that the public have great confidence in spokespeople from the emergency services).

7.86 In addition to those who will be taking on a frontline media role, it is important that other staff who may come into direct contact with the public – receptionists, security and switchboard staff, for example – are provided with at least a basic level of information and can handle inquiries confidently.

Exercise and review

7.87 It is important to exercise arrangements for communicating with the public. Public communications and media planning can be effectively tested in tabletop or full-scale exercises, which should be conducted regularly.

7.88 It will often be beneficial to involve some media as players in the exercise.

7.89 Category 1 responders have always been sensitive to appearing to be underprepared. But with positive relations with the media established in ‘normal’ conditions it should be possible to demonstrate how problems are being identified and remedied ahead of a real event.

7.90 News organisations with a role in reporting emergencies benefit from rehearsing their arrangements too.

7.91 Where the exercise scenario involves security issues, it may not be possible to achieve full media involvement. However, it should in most cases be possible to agree effective rules that allow the media to participate without running news stories about the event.

7.92 In tandem with these arrangements, Category 1 responders should also consider the role of exercises in building public confidence. Research shows that providing the public, through the media, with information about exercises that are taking place and showing pictures of what they may expect to happen can be extremely reassuring.

7.93 When developing exercises, responders should consider inviting local media to cover the story as observers. The ground rules should be agreed in advance, with assistance from the appropriate MEF or RMEF if necessary.

Box 7.8: Regional Media Emergency Forums (RMEFs)

- Category 1 responders should plan to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the Regional Media Emergency Forums. These Forums sit alongside the regional resilience networks, though they are entirely independent.
- RMEFs reflect the function and structure of the national Media Emergency Forum (MEF). This is an ad hoc grouping of senior media editors, government representatives, emergency planners, emergency services and other interested bodies. Wales has its own MEF along the same lines. Arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland are currently slightly different. More information and MEF reports can be found at http://www.ukresilience.info/mefindex.htm
- Discussion with the media ahead of an event helps ensure that all parties can operate more effectively on the day, by preparing useful standard background material in advance, planning practical arrangements and building trust and confidence on all sides.
- In particular, the RMEFs examine national or high-level protocols (for example those covering public safety announcements).
- In many areas, particularly those where there are long-standing known hazards such as nuclear power stations or extensive industrial complexes, there are also local groupings with members from Category 1 and 2 responders, other organisations not covered by the Act, as well as the media. These are quite often chaired by the local police.
- The RMEFs do not get involved, as a body, in the operational aspects of an emergency. But they can be brought together at short notice if emergency services or other organisations need to brief them on the handling of specific anticipated threats, or to review learning points from ‘live’ emergencies for future planning purposes.
Box 7.9: The media role in preparing for and responding to emergencies

- As part of a general information strategy, in advance of an emergency, the media can help to raise public awareness of the issues and provide information about what to do if one occurs.
- More importantly, in the wake of an emergency, the media can deliver specific advice and information to large numbers of affected people more quickly and effectively than any other means of delivery. This can take any form, from short, simple messages repeated across all formats, to explanatory interviews and background material on websites. The written press can deliver complex information and advice which people need to retain over a number of days or weeks.
- The media have ways of quickly reaching many different audiences with specific needs – the deaf, the blind, and those who do not speak English, for example. And radio, in particular, is the most resilient form of mass communication, available even if power and phone lines are down, via battery or wind-up portable radios and car radios.
Chapter 8
Advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations

Summary

- The Act requires local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) in the event of emergencies (as defined by the Act) (paragraphs 8.1–8.7).

- Local authorities must provide general advice and assistance to the business and voluntary sector communities at large; may provide specific advice and assistance to individual organisations; and may give advice and assistance to individual businesses in relation to the engagement of business continuity consultants (paragraphs 8.8–8.22).

- Local authorities may charge for advice and assistance provided on request, on a cost-recovery basis (paragraphs 8.34–8.35).

- Not all voluntary organisations would want – or benefit from – business continuity advice. A local authority may therefore define its own voluntary sector audience, targeting efforts where they will add most value (paragraphs 8.28–8.31).

- Local authorities should have regard to relevant Community Risk Registers (CRRs) when developing an advice and assistance programme (paragraphs 8.36–8.37).

- Local authorities may enter into collaborative arrangements with other Category 1 and 2 responders in fulfilling their duties (paragraphs 8.38–8.41).

- Local authorities within a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area are required to co-operate with each other in performing their duties; other Category 1 and 2 responders within a Local Resilience Forum are required to co-operate with local authorities (paragraphs 8.42–8.45).

- Local authorities are required to have regard to the BCM advice and assistance provided by other Category 1 and 2 responders to business and voluntary organisations in their areas (paragraphs 8.46–8.52).

- Local authorities should consider how to use the arrangements for multi-agency co-operation established by the Act to ensure BCM advice and assistance programmes are co-ordinated and effective (paragraphs 8.80–8.82).

- Local authorities will need time to establish the skills, networks and materials to give advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations. The duty will come fully into force six months after the other duties in the Act (paragraphs 8.53–8.55).

- This chapter also sets out the considerations local authorities should take into account when developing a programme of advice and assistance (eg key messages, established support networks) (paragraphs 8.60–8.79).
Rationale for the duty

8.1 The duty on local authorities to give advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) is an integral part of the Act’s wider contribution to building the UK’s resilience to disruptive challenges.

8.2 In the event of an emergency, Category 1 responders will give all the assistance they can, but there is merit in ensuring that communities themselves are resilient. In particular, it is important to ensure that the impact of an emergency on the continuity of commercial and voluntary organisations is kept to a minimum. This will lessen the economic and social impact of emergencies and speed up recovery.

8.3 Experience from the Bishopsgate and Manchester bombs and the fuel crisis of 2001 has shown that organisations that have business continuity arrangements in place are more likely to stay in business and recover quickly in the event of an emergency than those that do not. Establishing a source of BCM advice and assistance prior to an emergency occurring will raise business continuity awareness in the community, and help organisations to help themselves in case of an incident.

8.4 Taking forward a programme of business continuity advice and assistance will deliver clear benefits to local authorities and other Category 1 and 2 responders. Firstly, by helping to build community resilience, it will reduce reliance on public sector bodies in the event of an emergency, enabling Category 1 and 2 responders to focus their resources on the most vulnerable. Secondly, it will help improve links between Category 1 and 2 responders and the business community and voluntary sector, which are crucial to effective emergency management arrangements. This has been demonstrated clearly by the experience of Leeds City Council.

Advice and assistance duty in context

8.5 As Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates, the business continuity advice and assistance duty is closely related to other duties in the Act, and should not be seen as a stand-alone duty. Developing and exercising emergency plans may require close liaison with organisations that carry out commercial or voluntary activities – for example in the preparation of city centre evacuation plans. There are clear synergies between this work and the duty to give BCM advice and assistance to businesses – in many ways it is a logical extension of this work.

8.6 In fulfilling their duty to assess risks in their area and collaborate in the preparation of the Community Risk Register, local authorities will have a good overview of the risk profile in an area. Furthermore, emergency planning work – and co-operation with other Category 1 and 2 responders through Local Resilience Forums – will leave local authorities well sighted on the arrangements that are in place to deal with emergencies (see Chapters 2 and 4).

8.7 There is also a strong relationship with the warning and informing duty (see Chapter 7). This requires Category 1 responders to publish aspects of risk assessments and contingency plans, and to maintain arrangements to issue advice, information and warnings in the event of an emergency. The section 4 duty builds on this work, by requiring local authorities to provide information, advice and assistance targeted at organisations that carry out commercial activities and voluntary activities.

What the Act and the Regulations require

8.8 The Act requires local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in their areas in relation to BCM in the event of emergencies (as defined in the Act).¹

Box 8.1: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice and useful information about business continuity promotion which is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

¹ s. 4
Generic advice and assistance

8.9 The Regulations specify that local authorities have a duty to provide generic advice and assistance to the business community at large. This is a light-touch duty aimed at raising business continuity awareness among those undertaking commercial activities. The Regulations also require local authorities to provide generic advice and assistance to voluntary organisations.¹

8.10 While the Act imposes a duty on local authorities to offer advice and assistance to those carrying out commercial activities and voluntary organisations, it does not impose a corresponding obligation on those organisations to act upon it.

8.11 In complying with this duty, local authorities must demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps to promote BCM advice in their areas. This will involve developing a strategy that:

- identifies what organisations need to know;
- selects appropriate means of delivery; and
- targets the message at its audience.

Specific advice and assistance

8.12 As a result of local authorities’ generic awareness-raising work, individual firms may turn to the local authority for specific advice and assistance in relation to BCM. The Regulations permit local authorities to provide specific BCM services to organisations or groups of organisations, but do not oblige them to do so.²

8.13 Local authority officials can undertake this type of work themselves if they have the experience and competence to do so. Local authorities can work with individual organisations to establish the nature of the risks they face and the steps they can take to manage these risks. This might include, for example:

- assistance with risk assessment;
- provision of information and advice about local civil protection arrangements; and
- support in the development and validation of plans.

8.14 Local authorities might find it helpful to consider the case studies of other local authorities that are already active in this area.

Signposting third party advice

8.15 Alternatively, the local authority may give advice and assistance to individual organisations to facilitate the engagement of a business continuity consultant, who may be better placed to provide the support required. However, undertaking this work is discretionary, and is not a requirement of the regulations.³

8.16 Outside of large organisations, most of the people responsible for business continuity are not professionals, and may require guidance when purchasing business continuity advice, services or facilities. Experience in the City of London has shown that firms value the role that local authorities can play in acting as an ‘honest broker’ in this way.

8.17 Where it chooses to go down this path, the local authority must remain impartial and take steps to ensure firms are referred to practitioners that have the competence and experience to advise them.⁴ Failure to do so could, in certain circumstances, give rise to a legal challenge.

¹ regulation 39(3)(a)
² regulations 39(3)(b) and 40(3)(b)
³ regulations 39(3)(c) and 40(3)(c)
⁴ regulations 39(4) and 40(4)
Definition of an emergency

8.18 BCM arrangements can be put in place to manage the risks associated with the full range of business interruptions, which could comprise anything from minor supplier or technology failure through to the potentially catastrophic effects of terrorism or natural disaster. BCM is a flexible framework designed to help organisations develop resilience to the full spectrum of events. However, the Act imposes a duty on local authorities to give advice and assistance to commercial and voluntary organisations on developing arrangements to deal with a much narrower range of disruptive challenges.

8.19 The duty applies only to those events or situations defined as an emergency in the Act. It does not extend to the wider range of day-to-day disruptions which can threaten the smooth running – or even the very existence – of an organisation. The Act does not require local authorities to give advice and assistance in managing risks that are purely internal to the organisation (eg technical, commercial or financial aspects of running the organisation). Nor does it require local authorities to give advice on dealing with smaller-scale incidents (eg minor fires or theft).

8.20 An emergency is likely to affect a number of organisations, which may in turn threaten to seriously disrupt the effective functioning of the community at large. Advice and assistance to the business and voluntary sector community at large should therefore focus on generic disruptions that affect a significant part of the community. In this respect, the BCM duty will enhance community resilience by encouraging a local business climate able to withstand the disruptions caused by an emergency.

8.21 A key objective of the BCM duty is to help organisations to link in with practical emergency planning arrangements put in place by Category 1 responders. Local authorities will be particularly well placed to give advice and assistance to organisations in preparing for events or situations whose scale and impact require assessments of risk to be made and emergency plans to be prepared by Category 1 responders.

8.22 However, organisations that recognise the value of BCM planning for emergencies are unlikely to confine their forward thinking to this type of risk only.

Audience

8.23 A key objective of the BCM advice and assistance duty under the Act is to minimise the economic impact of emergencies on the local community. It delivers this by requiring local authorities to encourage greater preparedness among organisations that carry out commercial activities, and providing advice and assistance in improving their resilience.

8.24 “Commercial” is not a straightforward term to define. It should not be taken narrowly to mean only private sector businesses operating for a profit. Charities, for example, may undertake commercial activities in their fundraising work (eg charity shops). Building societies and credit unions, too, carry out commercial activities – although not privately owned, they do operate as a business and generate financial benefits for their members.

8.25 The Regulations provide that the duty to provide BCM advice and assistance to commercial organisations only applies in relation to those who are “resident” or “present” in the local authority area. The duty, therefore, extends to activities that operate in the area for a period of time, but without being resident (eg music festivals or major construction projects) where these have a significant impact on the economy of the area. In many cases, the local authority will be aware of the presence of such activity in its area, for example through planning consents for construction projects, or through the local authority/emergency services Safety Advisory Groups set up to give advice and guidance to event organisers.

8.26 The Act also requires local authorities to give advice and assistance to voluntary organisations in their communities, many of whom will not undertake commercial activities. Voluntary organisations play a critical role in local civil protection arrangements; they also deliver a wide range of services that are crucial to the effective functioning of communities (eg providing

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6 regulation 39(2)
7 s. 4
advice, social care, cultural and spiritual services). Demands on their services are likely to increase in the event of an emergency, and, if they are unable to continue functioning, this could exacerbate its effects.

8.27 Providing business continuity advice to voluntary organisations will help build the resilience of the wider community, and help limit the impact of emergencies on its ability to function effectively.

8.28 However, the voluntary sector is large and diverse, and not all voluntary organisations would want – or indeed benefit from – business continuity advice. A large number of voluntary organisations, for example, do not employ staff or maintain premises. Given the large number of voluntary bodies (c. 600,000) – and the difficulty of reaching out to some of them – it is unrealistic to expect local authorities to proactively provide (even generic) advice and assistance to them all.

8.29 The underlying principles of BCM are common to all organisations. In many instances – particularly where messages are made publicly available via websites – the costs to the local authority of extending their advice to all voluntary organisations will be minimal.

8.30 However, when deciding how to prioritise when taking forward a proactive programme of advice and assistance, local authorities may need to take decisions about which voluntary organisations to approach, and where to target resources.

8.31 The Regulations therefore permit a local authority itself to determine its target audience within the voluntary sector. The Regulations provide that, in so doing, local authorities should have regard to a range of factors, including:

- **Role in relation to emergencies**: A large number of voluntary organisations play a direct role in preventing or responding to emergencies. In order to help others, they will need to be able to keep themselves operating in the event of an emergency.
- **Contribution to the effective functioning of the community**: In the event of an emergency, some organisations will be critical to the health and welfare communities.
- **Economic importance**: Staff numbers and turnover will also be an important consideration in determining target audiences. These will give an indication of an organisation’s importance to the local economy, and the likely value of business continuity planning adding value to an organisation.
- **Geography**: It would not generally be appropriate for a local authority to give BCM advice to a voluntary organisation which does not carry out activities in the area for which the local authority is responsible.

### Charging

8.32 The Regulations permit local authorities to make a charge for business continuity advice and assistance provided on request, where this is appropriate, but do not oblige them to do so.

8.33 It is unlikely that local authorities will be able to charge for promotional materials or awareness-raising materials supplied, which in many cases will not have been requested. However, local authorities may wish to make a charge for a number of activities, including:

- attendance at local authority organised events;
- membership of business continuity forums;
- provision of specific information (eg aspects of risk assessments);
- provision of advice on an ad hoc basis (eg development or review of firms’ own plans); and
- provision of an established BCM service.

8.34 The Regulations also provide that local authorities may only charge for BCM advice and assistance on a cost-recovery basis. Local authorities may charge for the full cost of all the resources used in carrying out activities for which a charge is to be made, and a reasonable share of any research or documentation that underpins this service. The Government does not believe it is appropriate for local authorities to seek to make a profit from activities in this area, and the Regulations do not permit this.
Further guidance on charging policy can be found in the HM Treasury Fees and Charges Guide (see http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk). However, local authorities will also want to consider the impact of their charging policy on the take-up of their advice and assistance.

**Risk assessment**

8.36 The BCM programme should also reflect the risk profile of the area. When developing a BCM promotion strategy and materials, the officer responsible should ask: What possible disruptions do organisations need to know about? What impacts might they have? Are there any locations or firms that are particularly vulnerable?

8.37 The Regulations require local authorities to “have regard” to the Community Risk Register (CRR) agreed by the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) when developing a business continuity promotion programme. It may also be necessary to consider risks outside the area that could impact upon businesses in a local authority area (e.g., major chemical plant in a neighbouring area), hence the requirement to have regard to “any relevant risk register”.

**Developing collaborative arrangements**

**Collaboration with other local authorities**

8.38 The duty to provide advice and assistance in relation to BCM falls on all local authorities. The Regulations permit local authorities to enter into collaborative arrangements with other Category 1 or 2 responders (e.g., a Fire and Rescue Authority) in delivering the duty.

8.39 There is a number of options open to authorities in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility. This permissive approach gives local authorities the flexibility to decide how to make the best use of the skills, expertise, networks and resources available in an area. Working collaboratively could help ensure that efforts are co-ordinated and that economies of scale are achieved.

8.40 However, it remains the responsibility of each authority to ensure that the programme is delivered effectively, and its statutory duties are fulfilled. Whichever option – or mixture of options – is chosen, each authority should ensure that:
- roles and responsibilities are clear;
- clear review and evaluation mechanisms are in place;
- the programme adequately reflects the diverse business needs and risk profile within an LRF area; and
- elected members and senior officers are brought into the process where necessary.

8.41 Delegation, or the appointment of a lead authority, does not absolve the local authority of the duty, but merely transforms the mode of delivery. The local authority remains under a legal duty to ensure the programme is delivered, even when a third party is contracted to complete the work.

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**Partnership working in BCM promotion**

- **Separate programmes:** Local authorities deliver BCM programmes separately, while ensuring the coherence of the message and means of delivery.
- **Delegation:** All or some local authorities in an LRF area delegate the duty to a single authority, which delivers the duty on their behalf. Delegation can be to any Category 1 or 2 responder, not just a local authority.
- **Joint working:** This would involve a single programme being delivered jointly by a number of local authorities.
- **Appointing a “lead authority”:** This involves giving one or more partner authorities a leading role within the delivery of the programme, with other authorities fulfilling a lesser, supporting role. The lead authority could, for example, co-ordinate the content and production of promotional material for others to deliver.
- **Outsourcing:** The duty could be contracted to a third party on a commercial basis, either by an individual authority or collectively.

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12 regulation 38
13 regulations 41(3) and 41(4)
Other Category 1 responders’ work with commercial organisations

The police
The police work with the business community on continuity-related issues in a number of ways:

- **Crime prevention advice**: Most large police stations have dedicated officers proactively providing crime prevention advice to local businesses on crime prevention and security issues (e.g., CCTV). Contact your local police service for further information about the work done in your area.
- **Counter-terrorism advice**: Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) provide advice on demand to the business community on preventing and mitigating the effects of acts of terrorism. They are not resourced to give advice to individual businesses, but may be willing to give advice to groups of businesses, such as a business continuity forum. Their work is co-ordinated by the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office, which published the *Expecting the Unexpected* document in conjunction with London First and the Business Continuity Institute. CTSAs can be contacted via local police headquarters.
- **Advice on emergency response procedures**: Police services seek to raise awareness among local businesses about emergency response procedures (e.g., evacuation procedures, cordonning in the event of an incident).

Fire authorities
Since 1947, fire authorities have been under a duty to provide, on request, information about fire prevention and mitigation. The Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004 confers a new duty on fire authorities to make provision for actively promoting fire safety within their area. This will involve the provision of advice and assistance to local businesses. They will work with occupiers/owners in the business community to offer advice over a broad range of topics — proactively and on request. This work will be undertaken in different ways according to the priorities in the area.

In Hereford and Worcester, specialist Fire Safety Inspecting Officers receive technical training so that they can offer advice and assistance to commercial organisations on issues such as:
- arson reduction;
- business continuity; and
- community fire safety.

Fire-fighters will reinforce this proactive approach to fire prevention by taking forward aspects of this approach in their day-to-day work. They are working closely with other enforcement agencies and bodies providing business continuity advice to explore opportunities for partnership working.

Maritime and Coastguard Agency
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is committed to preventing loss of life, continuously improving maritime safety, and protecting the marine environment. Various aspects of this work involve BCM promotion.

In addition to enforcing contingency planning requirements, the Agency undertakes a range of educational initiatives with the shipping, fishing, and offshore oil and gas industries, as well as with those who visit the sea or coast for leisure. Further information can be found at: [http://www.mcga.gov.uk](http://www.mcga.gov.uk)

Co-ordination of BCM promotion programmes

**8.42** The Regulations require local authorities within an LRF area to co-operate with each other when performing their duties under section 4 of the Act. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that local authorities within an LRF area deliver a coherent programme of advice and assistance to organisations undertaking commercial activities in their communities.

**8.43** This co-operation may take place bilaterally or within a single forum. Whatever form this co-operation takes, authorities will need to take steps to ensure that:

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*regulation 41(1)*
• the message they are giving out is consistent;
• the means of delivery are co-ordinated where appropriate;
• external partners are not unduly burdened; and
• lessons are learned and best practice is shared.

8.44 The BCM promotion programme in an LRF area should be driven by the needs of local organisations, not local authorities’ administrative boundaries. Organisations in an LRF area will often operate across local authority boundaries, hence the importance of delivering a co-ordinated message with promotional or awareness-raising work.

8.45 Local authorities will also want to consider the need to adopt a coherent approach to the provision of specific advice and assistance where this is requested.

Co-ordination with other Category 1 responders’ work

8.46 The duty to provide advice and assistance in relation to BCM falls on local authorities, but this does not mean that other Category 1 responders do not have an interest in such programmes.

8.47 A number of other Category 1 responders are already engaged in providing BCM advice – for example, the police in relation to crime and security issues, the Fire and Rescue Service in relation to fire safety, and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in relation to safety at sea.

8.48 The Regulations require local authorities to have regard to the business continuity assistance work other Category 1 responders are doing in the community. In practice, this means that local authorities are required to develop an awareness of the business continuity work other Category 1 responders undertake with organisations, and consider the implications of this work for their own business continuity advice and assistance programmes.

8.49 This will help local authorities to ensure that programmes complement other work. Local authorities should take steps to ensure that their BCM advice and assistance programmes dovetail with work undertaken by other Category 1 responders, that synergies are exploited, and that they work collaboratively where possible. The Regulations additionally provide that local authorities need not unnecessarily duplicate the work done by other responders with local organisations.16

8.50 Furthermore, BCM awareness material will address public sector response arrangements and risk profiles, which will require the collaboration of other Category 1 responders. It is, therefore, important that local authorities have access to the right information and advice to inform their promotion strategies, and that the assumptions they make about other Category 1 responders’ response arrangements are accurate. The Regulations impose a duty on all Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate and share information on request pursuant to local authorities’ duties under section 4 of the Act.17

8.51 This co-operation may take place bilaterally, as required, or via a subgroup of the LRF.

8.52 Local authorities must observe the limits on sharing sensitive information set out in the Regulations when taking forward their programme of advice and assistance. Local authorities may have access to – or be asked for – personal data or information that relates to national security or public safety. Even where this would assist the local authority in its BCM advice and assistance work, this information should not be disclosed, unless appropriate consent has been obtained or the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of the organisation or individual concerned. The same applies to commercially sensitive information, which must also be treated appropriately. Chapter 3 sets out in more detail the limits on dealing with sensitive information.

Transitional arrangements

8.53 The Government recognises that local authorities will need time to develop the skills, experience, networks and materials to deliver an effective BCM promotion strategy. The duty on local authorities to provide advice and assistance to organisations on BCM will not come fully into force until six months after the other duties in Part 1 of the Act.

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15 regulation 43(1)
16 regulation 41(1)(c)
17 regulations 41(2) and 42
Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum – benefits of partnership-working

“The Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum has demonstrated the benefits of partnership-working between local responders.

“The Berkshire Unitary Authorities facilitate the forum, which operates with the support and co-operation of other local responders. Thames Valley Police Service provides an update on current crime trends and threat assessments, giving local businesses the opportunity to review plans and discuss problems. The Police Service and the Highways Agency also use the forum to disseminate real-time information on local incidents and traffic information.”

Louise Cadle, Emergency Planning Officer, Bracknell Forest Borough Council

Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum – sharing ideas, experiences and best practice

“The Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum provides an invaluable platform for the sharing of ideas, experiences and best practice.

“As a major business with around 20,000 employees throughout the UK, we need to understand our role in our local communities and foster mutually beneficial contacts with the local authorities and the emergency services. We all need to clearly understand what we can expect of each other in an emergency situation. The biggest mistake any of us can make in our Crisis Management or Business Continuity Plans is to rely on assumptions about how a potential incident will be managed and the level of support that will be provided.

“I am recommending that all Siemens businesses in the UK develop similar relationships with the local authorities in their area.”

Julie Viney, Business Continuity Manager, Siemens plc, member of the Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum

8.54 In the meantime, local authorities are required to take steps to ensure that they will be in a position to promote BCM effectively when the duty does come fully into force. In other words, local authorities must develop a robust strategy to ensure that they are fully up to speed on or before the commencement date for the section 4 duty.

8.55 There is, however, nothing to stop local authorities progressing more quickly, if they are able to do so. The Regulations enable local authorities to charge for advice and assistance provided on request in the interim period.11 They will also be able to require information and co-operation from other Category 1 or 2 responders to support the section 4 duty during this time.

How the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Scotland

8.56 The Regulations made by the Minister which relate to the promotion of business continuity do not apply to local authorities in Scotland. The Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers make provision as to how local authorities in Scotland should exercise their duty under the Act to provide advice and assistance in relation to business continuity.

Wales

8.57 The Act and the Regulations apply in Wales in the same way as they apply in England.

11regulations 37 and 44
8.58 The duty to provide advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity does not apply to local authorities in Northern Ireland.

8.59 This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance. 19

8.60 Ultimately, each organisation is responsible for ensuring that its own business continuity arrangements are in place. In promoting business continuity, the first issue that needs to be addressed is motivation – why should organisations commit time and resources to developing, maintaining and validating business continuity arrangements?

8.61 There are two principal motivating factors for all organisations considering whether to adopt BCM arrangements – the risks associated with emergencies and the ability of the individual organisation to positively affect its own position in those circumstances. The role of the local authority is to provide advice and assistance in making these judgements.

8.62 There are four principal classes of information that organisations require when assessing the need for, developing, implementing or reviewing business continuity arrangements:

- the kinds of disruption which could occur, and the impacts they may have (eg loss of utilities or access to premises);
- the arrangements that Category 1 responders have in place to assess the risk of, prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies, and their implications for the business community (eg evacuation or recovery plans);
- the steps individual organisations can take to prepare for, or mitigate the effects of, an emergency (eg implement BCM); and
- sources of warnings, information and advice in the event of an emergency.

8.63 Levels of BCM awareness and activity will vary considerably between organisations. In some cases the challenge will be to get BCM on the agenda, and in others the challenge will be to sell the concept or help organisations already doing BCM to refine their plans. Local authorities need to ensure that the message is suitable for such a diverse audience. Experience has shown that providing timely advice and assistance to organisations in the immediate aftermath of an emergency can assist recovery. While local authorities and other responders may choose to put in place arrangements to provide such advice, the legislation does not require them to do so.

8.64 The Act does not specify which part of the local authority should fulfil the duty to provide BCM advice. On the one hand, staff involved in emergency planning work – who will be familiar with the risks concerned and local response arrangements – are well placed to give advice. On the other hand, staff involved in the economic development or voluntary sector support function will have contacts with local businesses, voluntary bodies and their representatives, and the provision of business continuity advice and assistance may be seen to be a straightforward extension of their work. More probably, a collaborative effort between the two will be required.

8.65 Practical advice in taking forward the duty to provide business continuity advice and assistance is set out below.

Generic advice and assistance

8.66 There are a number of ways of fulfilling the requirement to provide generic advice and assistance to the business community at large, and voluntary

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19 s.3(3)(b)
Ways to give generic advice and assistance

The web
Local authorities could use their own websites as a reference tool for the promotion of business continuity in their area, or set up a dedicated website with local partners. In addition to specific advice on business continuity, the site could direct businesses to other sources of information about civil protection issues, including the CRR and other Category 1 and 2 responders’ sites.

These pages could also reference other sites offering guidance on the development of business continuity arrangements.

Advertorials
Articles in appropriate publications may also be used to raise awareness of business continuity issues, or to direct readers to relevant materials. Local authorities publishing an annual business or voluntary sector directory could use that to get the message across. A further option would be to seek space in publications issued by partner organisations (eg business or social action representative groups).

Press releases
The Berkshire Regional Continuity Forum has found that press releases on the forum’s activities generate interest from the press and radio and television broadcasters.

Mailings
Local authorities have various means of disseminating guidance to the business and voluntary sector communities, eg business rate letters. These could contain existing reference materials on BCM – which are currently available from a wide range of sources, including the Department of Trade and Industry, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Business Continuity Institute – or references to sources of further information. Materials designed specifically for this purpose will be provided to local authorities by central government for this purpose.

Participation in seminars/events
Existing events/seminars targeted at businesses or the voluntary sector, whether organised by the Local Authority Economic Development Department or other local partners, could be used to communicate the message on BCM promotion. These events could also be used to publicise sources of information on BCM, either provided by the local authority or by a third party.

Facilitating or hosting events
Alternatively, local authorities may choose to organise their own BCM events. For example, they could host a regional or local business continuity fair or seminar. They could collaborate with each other to deliver such an event jointly. A seminar or fair could also be used to launch a new BCM forum. The costs incurred by local authorities could be met by charging a small attendance fee, inviting firms to sponsor such events, or by seeking collaboration from business or voluntary sector representative bodies.

Establishing a business continuity forum
Local authorities could facilitate the formation of business continuity forums and encourage members of the business community to join. Not only does such a forum promote business continuity management, it also helps to consolidate a local network, within which businesses can learn from each other and liaise with Category 1 and 2 responders.

Local authorities and the emergency services are often already engaged with the business and voluntary sector communities, for example in planning for evacuation in the face of a threat of flooding or terrorism or the fire prevention work undertaken by the Fire and Rescue Service. These links could provide a strong basis for developing a business forum looking at BCM or emergency planning issues in the round. Such forums could be used to strengthen the links between businesses and LRFs.
organisations. The most suitable methods will depend in part on the expertise, networks and resources available to local authorities, and the willingness of the local business and voluntary sector community to engage.

8.67 There are a number of areas where local authorities have played an active role in facilitating business continuity advice and assistance to businesses and the voluntary sector. It is important to learn the lessons from their experience.

8.68 The experience of the Leeds City Centre Network for Emergency Planning, for example, illustrates how some of the means of delivery can be used (see Box). It also demonstrates the merits of working closely with other Category 1 and 2 responders in taking the programme forward, and engaging with, and involving, a wider range of partners as part of the process.

### Leeds City Centre Network for Emergency Planning

The Leeds City Centre Network developed as a result of the council's involvement in West Yorkshire Police's “Bomb Pager” scheme used for city centre evacuations and engagement with the “critical local infrastructure” during Y2K. It was clear to emergency planners in Leeds that there were problems communicating with the business community and that there were a wide range of issues to engage businesses on. As a result, the Leeds City Council Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) aimed to develop a forum comprising the major organisations operating in the city centre which could meet on a regular basis to develop a “culture of emergency planning”.

The Network met for the first time in October 2000 and has continued to meet formally every six months for a half-day session. This is supplemented by periodic mailshots to an established e-mail list and items on the website. In the beginning, the EPU decided that the best format for meetings would be to have speakers from key Category 1 and 2 responders outlining – and responding to questions on – the basics of emergency planning and BCM, as well as a range of topics with a particular local relevance.

Consequently, presentations explained the roles of the local authority, the police (variously with regard to evacuations and terrorist incidents, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) issues, updates on current security status), the Health Protection Agency and utilities (including BT Commsure on recovering communications). In relation to business continuity planning, each agenda includes presentations from locally based organisations – such as Halifax Bank and Marks and Spencer – on how they undertake business continuity planning. Meetings have also considered a wide range of issues of local interest, including the impact of the October 2000 floods in Leeds.

However, the Network has not just been about key Category 1 and 2 responders giving presentations to a passive audience; it was clear early on that many organisations wanted to get more involved in the development of arrangements that would impact them. This has led to Network meetings evolving to include outline presentations and follow-up workshops to explore how the authority and its partners plan for such matters as post-incident recovery, city centre evacuations (see [http://www.leedsalert.co.uk](http://www.leedsalert.co.uk)), and co-ordinating public transport arrangements in severe weather.

### Specific advice and assistance

8.69 Following the Bishopsgate bomb in 1993, the Corporation of London began giving business continuity advice and assistance to businesses based in the City of London. In addition to arranging presentations, briefings and literature available to the business community at large, the Corporation offers one-to-one advice and assistance to businesses in the City. The business case for this work is clear: to build the resilience of the business community itself, ensuring that firms’ own emergency plans dovetail with those of Category 1 responders, thereby increasing their effectiveness and reducing reliance on Category 1 responders.

8.70 Some of the activities it undertakes are set out in a box below. These have evolved over time, as awareness of BCM issues has improved. In the beginning, it focused on the threat of terrorism, but
it has broadened out over time to a wider range of disruptive challenges.

8.71 The range of services provided by the Corporation has been demand-driven. The Corporation provides services to a wide range of organisations, from large multi-national corporations to small local firms.

Experience has shown that demand is particularly strong for information about the public sector response to emergencies, and what they can expect.

8.72 Current provision of specific business continuity advice and assistance by local authorities is not limited to London and the major cities. Facilitated by the Corporation of London’s approach

Company-specific presentations
These can be tailored to the needs of the company and the particular audience being addressed. These presentations are often intended to either sell a concept (such as the need for business continuity planning or exercising) or to provide information that will help develop and improve existing arrangements (eg likely public sector response to a major incident).

Information
The Corporation of London’s opinion has been sought on issues such as the appropriate distance between primary sites and recovery centres, effective methods of accounting for staff following an evacuation, etc.

The Corporation rarely prescribes a solution, but rather outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches, in order to allow each company to determine the option most appropriate to its circumstances.

Plan review
The Corporation of London will review and comment on the business continuity plans of firms in the City. It does not undertake a full third-party audit of these plans, but gives the company the perspective of an informed outsider. By and large it is the small and medium-sized companies who utilise this service, where the person responsible for business continuity also has other areas of responsibility.

The comments the Corporation makes on these plans tend to be in the following categories:
- **Factual**: Is information contained in plans factually correct? Is it based on a correct interpretation of emergency services procedures?
- **Assumptions**: All business continuity plans are based on certain planning assumptions. Are these assumptions unrealistic (eg no staff members will be affected by the incident, all senior managers are available in their offices 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, etc)?
- **Incident management**: Are plans sufficiently clear on who does what?
- **Communication**: How is the plan communicated to staff in advance of an incident, particularly those with a role in implementing it? How does the call-out system operate? Once an incident occurs, how does the company maintain the appropriate communication channels?

The Corporation does not seek to provide the ‘right’ answer, but rather makes observations and suggestions, and offers constructive challenge. The company will then need to decide for itself if it wishes to address these issues or not.

Exercises
The Corporation of London supports companies wishing to exercise their plans. Experience has shown that exercising is crucial to effective planning, and this is by far the most popular request. The Corporation can provide:
- advice on how to structure and run an exercise;
- advice on scenarios used;
- participation in an exercise; and
- a full exercise service, where it devises, structures and runs an exercise on behalf of a company.
Norfolk County Council, the Norfolk Major Incident Team (NORMIT) is a partnership between public organisations and private companies that focuses on developing the resilience of the business community in Norfolk against the impact of emergencies. NORMIT has three key objectives:

- improving resilience within businesses in Norfolk;
- improving mutual aid between businesses in Norfolk; and
- enhancing co-ordination between businesses and emergency management organisations in Norfolk.

NORMIT has a membership of 94 organisations (as at October 2004). This includes the public sector, voluntary organisations, utility companies and the private sector. Private sector membership ranges from small businesses with only a few employees to large international companies and Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) sites. NORMIT offers a wide range of services and benefits to its members, including:

- plan consultation, auditing and testing;
- exercise development, management and analysis;
- emergency management training;
- seminars and study days;
- members’ mutual-aid database of resources;
- secure area on the website to share information regarding current incidents; and
- quarterly members’ meetings.

8.73 Whichever approach local authorities take to the provision of specific information and advice to businesses or voluntary organisations requesting further support, they should consider developing a documented policy statement, in order to manage the expectations of local organisations and ensure consistency and fairness.

8.74 Local authorities should also be aware of professional liability issues when giving specific advice and assistance. In order to reduce the risk of claims of negligence or breach of contract, local authorities should:

- only become involved in areas where they are competent and experienced enough to give advice and assistance;
- be clear about the status and limits of advice;
- clearly flag up areas of uncertainty or assumptions that have been made; and
- consider the use of disclaimers where appropriate.

8.75 Referring organisations to a third party

8.76 However, liability issues should not deter local authorities from giving detailed advice and assistance. If managed correctly, the risk of legal challenge is limited, and far outweighed by the demand from organisations for support, and the possible benefits in terms of community resilience.

8.77 The local authority should avoid giving definitive recommendations, or endorsing individual consultants. Its role is to direct firms to organisations that could assist them, and suggest the criteria for selecting a service provider. These could include:

- professional qualifications/certification;
- membership of a professional organisation;
- experience in relevant aspects of BCM;
- track record of completing similar tasks; and
- adequate professional indemnity insurance.

8.78 The Business Continuity Institute (BCI) (http://www.thebci.org) provides a certification scheme for business continuity professionals. It publishes a list of consultants it deems to be experienced, qualified and competent in particular areas, and operates a code of practice for members. The Continuity Forum also provides a service designed to help connect consultants with clients – Consultancy Signpost. Consultancy Signpost, which lists individuals and organisations who provide consultancy services covering business continuity and its related disciplines,

The Norfolk Major Incident Team

“NORMIT has helped build and maintain our incident management capability through the provision of effective training, including the planning and management of exercises. The regular members’ meetings have enabled Norwich Union to forge excellent relationships with the emergency services and utility companies, which has proved invaluable in managing incidents.”

Neil Hepple, Security and Business Continuity Manager, Norwich Union
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is publicly available via the front page of the Continuity Forum’s website [http://www.continuityforum.org](http://www.continuityforum.org). The BCI and the Chartered Management Institute are useful sources of advice on commissioning consultants. The local authority can also facilitate the sharing of feedback on consultants by maintaining records of the organisations who have sought its advice about the engagement of a third party.

8.79 Nonetheless, the local authority will need to make it clear to firms that the choice of consultant is their sole responsibility, and that the local authority shall not be liable for any damage or loss suffered as a result.

**BCM advice to the community and the LRF process**

8.80 The arrangements for multi-agency co-operation established by the Act will establish a framework for delivering joined-up and effective civil protection. BCM promotion is an integral part of the wider package of civil protection activity, and requires multi-agency co-operation and information-sharing to be effective.

8.81 Local authorities will want to consider how they use this wider framework to deliver the co-ordination and buy-in required for effective BCM advice and assistance activity. Much can be achieved through informal working-level contact, but there may be some merit in formalising this co-operation. This could take the form of:
- regular discussions at working-level liaison groups;
- establishing a community resilience subgroup of the LRF; or
- discussion at LRF meetings.

8.82 The approach taken will depend, in large part, on the nature of the local authorities’ programmes, the means used to deliver the message, and the extent of the involvement of other agencies in the process. However, the Government believes it is good practice for the full LRF to be given a chance to discuss BCM promotion work once each year.

**Identifying and engaging other external partners**

8.83 Local authorities should also consider engaging partner organisations in the process of providing information, advice and assistance to organisations that carry on commercial activities and to voluntary organisations. This should prove useful in communicating with firms and gaining their buy-in, providing support in organising events or forums, and as a source of BCM expertise.

**Figure 8.1: Network of BCM promotion partners**

![Figure 8.1: Network of BCM promotion partners](image-url)
8.84 Figure 8.1 shows a range of organisations in both the public and private sectors that may be willing to collaborate with local authorities in this work. These are:

- **Inside local authorities:** Local authorities themselves have established links with the business community, which could be utilised when promoting BCM (e.g., Economic Development Units, City Centre Management Units and Community Safety Teams). Local authorities also have close links with voluntary organisations, which are often engaged as partners in service delivery and are recipients of grants.

- **Representative groups:** There are a number of groups that represent the business community or sections of it (e.g., Confederation of British Industry, British Chambers of Commerce, Federation of Small Businesses). Councils for Voluntary Service (CVS) are voluntary organisations which are set up, owned and run by local groups to support, promote and develop local voluntary and community action. CVS support their members by providing them with a range of services and by acting as a voice for the local voluntary and community sector. They provide a useful way to identify the local voluntary sector community. There is a CVS working in almost every district and city in England, and they usually work to the same geographical boundaries as the local authority. To find your local CVS visit: [http://www.nacvs.org.uk](http://www.nacvs.org.uk)

- **Public sector partners:** There are also a number of public sector bodies which provide advice, assistance and support to local organisations. These include the Business Link network, the Regional Development Agencies and a number of area-based initiatives (e.g., Business Improvement Districts). Higher education institutions and colleges of further education could also be effective partners in the promotion of BCM through their business courses. A number of higher education institutions also offer BCM qualification courses which may be useful to local authorities seeking to develop their competence in this area.

- **Professional bodies:** There are a number of organisations that exist to promote the take-up and standards of business continuity in the business community, including the Business Continuity Institute, Continuity Forum and Survive. There are also professional bodies or institutes with a wider remit – including the Chartered Institute of Management and British Institute of Facilities Management – which can provide a way into the business community in an area.

- **Agenda groups:** There are a range of bodies that can act as a conduit for BCM promotion work (e.g., Local Strategic Partnerships, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships).

- **Commercial BCM providers:** Commercial organisations providing a range of BCM services may be willing to sponsor business continuity initiatives or events.

- **Individual businesses:** Experience has shown that gaining the support of larger firms is important in taking forward a BCM promotion programme. Larger firms are more likely to be familiar with the discipline of BCM, and may already have

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**Box 8.2: London Business Resilience Group**

The London Business Resilience Group (LBRG) was created to enable the London Regional Resilience Forum to work closely with the business community in its efforts to contribute to the overall preparedness of the capital.

The purpose of the LBRG is to improve communications between government agencies and departments and business on resilience issues. Two of its key aims are to:

- **encourage businesses to put in place arrangements to deal with the impact of emergencies.** It does this by communicating the need to be prepared, and by providing support materials for businesses wanting to take forward BCM; and

- **enable businesses in London to access up-to-date information about the threats and hazards they face.** It does this by a range of means, including the management of [http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk](http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk)

The London Regional Resilience Forum will work to deliver a co-ordinated pan-London strategy for working with business on resilience issues. This will include providing support to local authorities in London in fulfilling their duties under the Act.
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established relationships with Category 1 and 2 responders. They may provide useful support in establishing business continuity seminars and forums, and give assistance in raising the profile of BCM within the business community (eg through supply-chain leadership, membership of associations). Professional services firms (eg banks, accountants) may be willing to distribute literature to clients.

8.85 It is also important not to forget the role that national and regional government can play in providing information and support for BCM promotion work. Government departments make available a range of information and advice to support contingency planning by businesses, much of which is accessible via https://www.ukresilience.info

8.86 The Welsh Assembly Government has a Business Continuity Unit responsible for ensuring that measures are in place to secure the critical business activities of the Assembly Government, should disruption occur. Where possible, the Unit may be able to provide guidance to assist local authority staff in taking forward a programme of BCM promotion activity.

8.87 Government Offices of the Regions have links with the business communities, and their Regional Resilience Teams may be willing to assist with BCM promotion programmes.

Targeting advice

Size of organisations

8.88 BCM arrangements are crucial to the sustainability of all organisations. Local authorities should not assume that business continuity is well established in the large national or multi-national companies – or large well-established voluntary bodies – in their area. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also crucial to the UK economy, accounting for some 99 per cent of the UK’s four million businesses. They account for 58 per cent of the number in employment in the private sector. They create 66 per cent of all new jobs in the UK and generate 52 per cent of the UK’s total annual turnover, some £1,173 billion (Small Business Service, DTI, December 2004).

8.89 Local authorities should ensure that materials used are appropriate to the needs of businesses, which may vary considerably. While the underpinning principles remain the same, the approach taken when approaching a small owner-managed firm will be different to that taken with a large, well-established firm. Local authorities will need to be proactive in engaging the SME community, and ensure that materials are pitched at the right level.

8.90 It may be helpful to think of the business community in terms of the following definitions used by the Department of Trade and Industry:

- Micro firm: 0–9 employees
- Small firm: 0–49 employees
- Medium firm: 50–249 employees
- Large firm: Over 250 employees

8.91 Where it is not possible to engage smaller businesses directly in a community resilience initiative, it may be possible to include them through a variety of umbrella groups that can disseminate information and advice. In Leeds, this was achieved through groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, Business Link, Leeds Hotels Forum and Leeds Retail Initiative. Voluntary organisations can be reached through local Voluntary Service Councils, Social Councils, Volunteer Bureaux and other local umbrella bodies.

Helping small and medium-sized businesses

“The Emergency Planning Unit at Norfolk County Council has developed the Norfolk Emergency Guidance e-Tool, which provides guidance and simple plan templates to encourage small and medium-sized businesses to enhance their business continuity resilience to emergencies.

“The e-Tool is available in a web-based format (http://www.normit.org), on a business card-sized CD-Rom and as a compact paper guidance document.”

Sarah Alcock, NORMIT Emergency Management Officer, Norfolk County Council
Added value

8.92 Local authorities may wish to focus initially on organisations that may be well placed to give support to the programme by helping to raise awareness or by offering practical support (eg venues). Local authorities may also wish to focus initially on organisations that are able to provide help or resources to other organisations or Category 1 responders in the event of an emergency, or organisations whose activities are crucial to the effective functioning of the wider community (eg food suppliers).

Developing a BCM advice and assistance programme: transitional provisions

8.93 In order to ensure that they can fulfil the requirements of the business continuity advice and assistance duty when it comes fully into force, local authorities will need to undertake the necessary preparations. Figure 8.2 outlines some of the steps local authorities may need to take in developing a programme of business continuity advice and assistance. These are:

- **Step 1 – Identify requirements of the legislation**
  Ensure familiarity with the requirements of the legislation as set out in the Act, the Regulations and guidance. The legislative framework may evolve over time, and it is important to reassess the legal requirements on an ongoing basis.

- **Step 2 – Assess implications of the legislation**
  - Review existing work in the light of the requirements of the Act – are there gaps to be filled? Are there synergies between wider emergency planning work and the requirements under the Act?
  - What are the implications for the skills mix of the local authority? Have existing staff got the skills and experience necessary to undertake the work required?
  - Consider the case for collaborative arrangements with other authorities – establish clear roles and responsibilities where appropriate.

- **Step 3 – Identify audience for the work**
  It is important to build awareness of the ‘audience’ for your work, and identify its needs. What are the patterns of commercial and
voluntary activity in your area? What is the level of awareness of, and commitment to, BCM? This may involve a mixture of desk research and ‘market testing’.

• **Step 4 – Identify partners**
  – There is a wide range of existing networks and partnerships that can give local authorities support in this work. What can partners bring to the table? How will partners work together?
  – Make contact with other Category 1 and 2 responders undertaking business continuity work with businesses. What are they doing? How can Category 1 and 2 responders work together to meet mutual objectives?

• **Step 5 – Identify resource implications**
The availability of resources – human as well as financial – will be a key driver, and it is important to establish the parameters early on. While the duty to promote BCM falls on local authorities, resources may be available from elsewhere. In Norfolk, for example, the local authority has acted as an ‘enabler’ in a public–private partnership. Local authorities will need to ensure that staff undertaking BCM advice and assistance work have the necessary skills and undertake appropriate training.

• **Step 6 – Develop objectives and message**
Clear objectives should be established in consultation with partners in the LRF, and the message and target audience should be defined with reference to the CRR. Are proposed approaches coherent and will they be effective?

• **Step 7 – Assemble promotion materials**
There is a wide range of existing materials illustrating the importance of BCM and how to develop business continuity arrangements. Is there a need to develop further materials tailored to local circumstances? And what form might these take (eg printed, web-based, etc)?

• **Step 8 – Identify means of delivery**
Choose means of delivery in the light of available resources and support from partners. Publicise events and services offered, and formulate charging policy.

• **Step 9 – Delivery**
Begin delivering promotion programme on or before the date when the duty comes fully into force. Authorities may also wish to pilot their promotion programme, or undertake a phased implementation. Take care to collect feedback along the way.

• **Step 10 – Evaluate and review programme**
Has the programme met its stated objectives? Has feedback been positive? How could it be improved or extended? What lessons can be learned from experience elsewhere in the country?

8.94 A business continuity advice and assistance programme is essentially a continuous cycle of assessing the content and delivery of the promotion programme against the requirements of the legislation, assessments of risk, needs of audience, and resources and support mechanisms available.
Summary

- In most respects, the frameworks and duties set out under the Act and the Regulations will apply to London in the same way that they apply everywhere else (paragraph 9.1).
- London has a regional police force, the Metropolitan Police Service. For that reason, it is not appropriate to establish Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in London on a police area basis. Nevertheless, London still has the same need as elsewhere for multi-agency co-operation at the local level (paragraph 9.2).
- To achieve that objective, the Regulations establish groupings of boroughs which will form the basis for the LRFs (paragraphs 9.3–9.5).
- Unlike other areas, London’s local authorities will be supported in discharging their duties under the Act by the fire and rescue authority – in this case, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). LFEPA will take the lead in co-ordinating pan-London planning, support the operation of London LRFs and maintain Community Risk Registers (paragraphs 9.6–9.12).
- The London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) is responsible for multi-agency co-operation on a pan-London level (paragraphs 9.13–9.16). Multi-agency arrangements at individual borough and regional level should work alongside the LRRF (paragraph 9.19).
- As the elected leader of London’s regional government, the Mayor of London plays a full part in supporting the effective implementation of the Act and improving the preparedness of the capital (paragraphs 9.17–9.18).
What the Act and the Regulations require

9.1 In most respects, the frameworks and duties set out under the Act and the Regulations will apply to London in the same way that they apply everywhere else. In terms of the respective functions, Category 1 and 2 responders in London are no different to those in other parts of the country. However, London has particular patterns of public service provision and government which mean that some aspects of civil protection have to be organised differently. And as well as being a region, London is also the capital city, with the effects of any incident felt right across the UK.

Local Resilience Forums in London

9.2 London has a regional police force, the Metropolitan Police Service. For that reason, it is not appropriate to establish Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in London on a police area basis. Nevertheless, London still has the same need as elsewhere for multi-agency co-operation at the local level.

Figure 9.1: Local Resilience Forum groupings in London

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North West LRF</th>
<th>North Central LRF</th>
<th>North East LRF</th>
<th>Central LRF</th>
<th>South East LRF</th>
<th>South West LRF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>Barking &amp; Dagenham</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
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<td>Ealing</td>
<td>Camden</td>
<td>Havering</td>
<td>Kensington &amp; Chelsea</td>
<td>Bromley</td>
<td>Merton</td>
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<td>Hammersmith &amp; Fulham</td>
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<td>Newham</td>
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<td>Hillingdon</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
9.3 To achieve that objective, the Regulations establish groupings of boroughs which will form the basis for the LRFs. These are set out in Figure 9.1.

9.4 These groupings have been drawn up to reflect existing mutual aid groupings, with the addition of a central group. The central group has been added to bring together those boroughs with particular issues in relation to transient population, concentration of business activity, central government and other strategic sites, and transport hubs.

9.5 Each of these LRFs will operate in much the same way as LRFs elsewhere, working to the model set out in Chapter 2. However, the more hierarchical relationship between the London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) and the LRFs in London, set out below, will mean that the model terms of reference in Annex 2A will not be appropriate. London LRFs should have terms of reference that recognise that much of the strategic function will be discharged by the LRRF. In order for these sub-regional forums to work properly, it is essential that the emergency services ensure that they are represented at an appropriate level of seniority, as consistent with the principle of effective representation.\(^{2}\)

The role of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

9.6 Unlike other areas, the Regulations provide\(^{3}\) that London’s local authorities will be supported in discharging their duties under the Act by the Fire and Rescue Authority – in this case, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). LFEPA will take on a number of distinct tasks which might otherwise have been taken on by local authorities.

9.7 In relation to co-operation obligations, LFEPA has agreed to take on responsibility for providing the secretariat to the six LRFs in London.

9.8 LFEPA will also take on responsibility for the production and maintenance of Community Risk Registers. Boroughs will continue to contribute to the risk assessment process.

9.9 In addition, LFEPA will carry out certain emergency planning activities. In particular, LFEPA will support pan-London local authority arrangements:

- **Local authority ‘Gold’:** In the event of the most serious emergencies in London, local authorities would need to work closely together and operate in a consistent way. To deliver this, they have agreed to pool decision-making authority and place it with a single chief executive who will speak for local authorities as the pan-London response is managed. LFEPA will maintain these arrangements, keeping them updated through review and revision.

- **Control centre:** In order to support local authority ‘Gold’, planning will have to be maintained to deliver an effective control centre. Should local authority ‘Gold’ arrangements be required, the centre would collect and disseminate information, and facilitate the collective decision-making process. LFEPA will put in place and maintain these arrangements.

- **Provision of training to support pan-London arrangements:** Certain elements of plans maintained under the Act will be consistent to all London boroughs, and this in turn leads to a consistency of training need. This need will be met by training programmes provided on request by LFEPA.

- **Provision of exercising of pan-London arrangements:** Pan-London local authority plans (including those set out in sub-paragraphs a and b)) need to be validated through exercising. LFEPA will design and deliver an annual programme of exercises to test these arrangements. This programme will include both local authority-only exercises, and multi-agency exercises in which local authority activities are engaged.

9.10 LFEPA is funded separately for this work, with funding top-sliced from London local authorities.

9.11 London boroughs will retain responsibility for discharging all other duties under the Act. However, LFEPA will continue to make an informal input into wider planning work within the framework of multi-agency co-operation. Should boroughs so wish, they may negotiate to delegate further functions to LFEPA.

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\(^{1}\) regulation 3 and Schedule to the Regulations
\(^{2}\) regulation 4 (1)–(4)
\(^{3}\) regulation 56
In discharging its responsibilities as set out above, LFEPA will also need to work closely with those Category 1 responders that are not local authorities. This has long been a matter of standard practice in London, but the Regulations' reinforce this point by requiring co-operation between Category 1 responders and LFEPA at the latter’s request. This obligation is limited to that co-operation necessary for LFEPA to carry out its own obligations in relation to co-ordination of pan-London local authority planning.

How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

The London Regional Resilience Forum

Just as in other regions, London has a Regional Resilience Forum. The London Regional Resilience Forum will generally operate on the same basis as other forums, as described in Chapter 17. The Forum has previously been abbreviated as the LRF, but to avoid confusion with local forums will be known as the LRRF.

The LRRF differs from the model elsewhere in that it is chaired by a Government Minister rather than the regional director. The Mayor takes on the role of deputy chair.

As both a city and a region, London has to ensure that the LRFs operate in a coherent way across London as a whole. The demographics and patterns of service delivery make pan-region coherence a more important element of civil protection in London. As a consequence, the relationship between the regional and the local level should operate in a more obviously hierarchical way. The LRRF will seek to provide strategic direction to the LRFs, cascading information and tasks in relation to the overall London effort. Members of the London Resilience Team (LRT) will sit on all LRFs.

The LRT is larger than those elsewhere, reflecting the wider range of work undertaken at the regional level in London. The LRT has a small core of civil servants but most of its members are specialists seconded from partner organisations to provide a unique combination of expertise.

The Mayor of London

As the elected leader of London’s regional government, the Mayor of London plays a full part in supporting the effective implementation of the Act and improving the preparedness of the capital.

In particular, the Mayor:

- is closely engaged in high-level discussions and decisions relating to the management of emergencies in London;
- is Deputy Chair of the LRRF;
- contributes as necessary to the pre-informing of Londoners about the content of emergency plans, the correct behaviour in an emergency and good practice in terms of preparedness in the home, as part of initiatives organised both locally and at the UK level;
- prepares to play a key role in warning and informing the public during an emergency in London;
- takes responsibility for civil protection issues in connection with the management of Parliament and Trafalgar Squares.

Borough forums

At the borough level, smaller multi-agency liaison groups may operate, bringing together Category 1 responders on a more limited basis. These groups are primarily to facilitate co-operation and information sharing at the operational level between local authorities and the emergency services, and should not duplicate the work of the LRF. They may refer issues to the LRF, as appropriate.
Summary

- Part 1 of the Act applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers in line with the devolution settlement. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, certain responders in Scotland are subject to Part 1 of the Act, the Regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers – the Health and Safety Executive, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the British Transport Police (paragraphs 10.1–10.4).
- Overall responsibility for civil protection policy in Scotland sits with the Civil Contingencies Division (CCD) of the Scottish Executive Justice Department (paragraphs 10.10–10.12).
- The Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee (SECC), chaired by the Scottish Executive, determines a national strategy for the development of civil protection. At the local level, a number of constabulary area-based strategic co-ordinating groups determine the strategy for response and recovery (paragraphs 10.13–10.15).
- Under the civil contingencies framework, Scottish Executive Departments, like their UK counterparts, operate on the ‘lead government department’ principle during an emergency. In non-devolved areas the Scottish Executive works closely with the UK Government to ensure that Scottish needs are catered for (paragraphs 10.5–10.9).
What the Act and the Regulations require in Scotland

10.1 The Act applies to a range of bodies in Scotland. However, responsibility for making regulations and guidance as to how responders in Scotland perform their duties under the Act is split between the Scottish Ministers and Ministers of the Crown. While the majority of responders exercise functions which fall within devolved competence (and so are subject to Regulations and guidance made by the Scottish Ministers), there are three responders which exercise functions that are largely reserved on a UK-wide basis. These bodies are subject to this guidance and to the Regulations made by a Minister of the Crown. These bodies are:

- the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (included as a Category 1 responder);
- the British Transport Police (included as a Category 1 responder); and
- the Health and Safety Executive (included as a Category 2 responder).

10.2 The Regulations and this guidance apply to these Category 1 and Category 2 responders in much the same way as they apply to Category 1 and Category 2 responders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Regulations require these Category 1 and Category 2 responders to co-operate with other Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Scotland in the performance of their duties under the Act in much the same way as they are required to co-operate with other Category 1 and Category 2 responders in England and Wales. In particular, the Regulations require these Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Scotland to participate in strategic co-ordinating groups (the equivalent of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in Scotland) and related activities, including compilation of a Community Risk Register.

10.3 Chapters 2 to 8 explain in more detail how each duty under the Act is to be performed by Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Scotland that fall outside devolved competence.

10.4 Regulations and guidance made by the Scottish Ministers detail how Scottish Category 1 responders and Scottish Category 2 responders (ie those responders in Scotland that are within devolved competence) should perform their duties under the Act. Those Regulations will also detail how those Scottish Category 1 responders and Scottish Category 2 responders should co-operate with the three Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Scotland that fall outside devolved competence.

Scottish Civil Contingencies Framework

10.5 The Scottish Executive departments are designated as leads on relevant issues in line with the ‘lead department’ principle. Within the Scottish Executive, responsibilities held in normal times remain in times of emergency. The lead Scottish Executive department, as at the UK level, is the department with day-to-day policy responsibility for the particular subject in question. That means that the Scottish Executive Health Department will lead on emergencies involving public health and the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department will deal with flooding.

10.6 The roles and responsibilities of lead departments in Scotland are broadly similar to those of UK-level departments. Details of Scottish Executive lead departments can be found at http://www.ukresilience.info/lead.htm

10.7 In an emergency affecting Scotland, the Scottish Executive will be involved because of its territorial role, irrespective of the reserved-devolved divide. It will co-ordinate local activity in support of the nominated lead UK department. The Scottish Executive departments and divisions which shadow the functions of UK departments act to ensure that they are aware of, and can play a complementary part in, these departments’ responses to emergencies that affect Scotland.

10.8 The Scottish Executive or Scotland Office, depending on the subject matter, are represented on the key committees and forums within central government relating to civil protection at both official and Ministerial levels. They work closely with UK departments to ensure Scottish needs are catered for in UK planning and in policy development.

10.9 The Scottish and UK departments act to ensure that they are aware of, and can play a complementary part in, responses to emergencies that affect Scotland.
**The Civil Contingencies Division**

**10.10** Overall responsibility for civil protection policy in Scotland sits with the Civil Contingencies Division (CCD) of the Scottish Executive Justice Department. It promotes and co-ordinates civil protection efforts across the Executive in a role similar to that of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat at the UK level.

**10.11** When an emergency affects a range of Scottish Executive departments, the lead role may be exercised by the CCD’s Emergency Management Unit until such time as a lead department is appointed.

**10.12** The CCD is also responsible for the Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER), a facility available for communication, information processing and the co-ordination of the central government emergency response led by the Scottish Executive. SEER comprises an Emergency Action Team of senior civil servants from Scottish Executive Departments whose role is to co-ordinate activity and brief Ministers, and an Emergency Support Team that gathers and processes information from a variety of sources.

**Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee**

**10.13** At the national level the Scottish Executive chairs the Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee (SECC), which ensures that steps are taken to respond to the changing risk environment and determines the national strategy for the development of civil protection. The membership of the SECC can be adjusted according to circumstances, but it includes Scottish Executive departments, emergency services, local authorities and the armed forces.

**10.14** The SECC may meet at a time of emergency to advise on development of the national strategy.

**The sub-Scotland level**

**10.15** Eight strategic co-ordinating groups based on police force areas and chaired by the Chief Constable or local authority Chief Executive promote effective planning for all types of incidents in their area. Planning involves risk assessment, making generic

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**Scottish bodies over which Scottish Ministers will have regulation-making powers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1</th>
<th>Category 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Local authorities</td>
<td>• Scottish Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Police authorities (excluding the British Transport Police)</td>
<td>• The Common Services Agency of the NHS Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fire authorities</td>
<td>• Gas distributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Scottish Ambulance Service</td>
<td>• Electricity distributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scottish health boards</td>
<td>• Telecommunications companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency</td>
<td>• Railway companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Airport operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Harbour authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following Category 1 and 2 responders have functions in Scotland but are governed by the Regulations made by UK Ministers:

• Health and Safety Executive
• Maritime and Coastguard Agency
• British Transport Police
and, if necessary, specific emergency plans, engaging with the community, training, testing, exercising and reviewing. All groups have experience of dealing with emergencies of different types. At a time of emergency, the groups determine the strategy for local response and recovery. The groups have links with the SECC in preparation, and with SEER in response.
Summary

- The arrangements set out in Part 1 of the Act apply in Wales. However, there are some differences in the requirements which the Regulations place on Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales because of the unique administrative arrangements in Wales (paragraphs 11.1–11.5).

- While functions under Part 1 of the Act have not been transferred to the National Assembly for Wales, the Assembly has significant interest in this area and is primarily responsible for a number of Category 1 and 2 responders. These interests are generally exercisable by its executive arm, the Welsh Assembly Government (paragraphs 11.6–11.14).

- Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations are engaged in response work together with the Welsh Assembly Government to address large-scale civil protection issues in Wales. The Wales Resilience Forum provides multi-agency strategic advice on civil protection at an all-Wales level. The forum aims to take forward resilience work in Wales through the Wales Resilience Programme co-ordinated by a Wales Resilience Partnership Team (paragraphs 11.20–11.32).
What the Act and the Regulations require

11.1 The duties in Part 1 of the Act apply in the same way in Wales as they do in England. Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales are subject to the Regulations and guidance made by a Minister of the Crown after liaison with the National Assembly for Wales. The Assembly has a statutory role to play in the introduction of regulations and guidance which apply to Category 1 and 2 responders falling within devolved competence. When a Minister of the Crown issues a risk assessment to a Category 1 responder exercising functions in Wales, the Regulations require the Minister of the Crown to consult the National Assembly for Wales.

11.2 In addition, there are some differences in the requirements which the regulations place on Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales because of the unique administrative arrangements in Wales.

Co-operation

11.3 As in England, the principal mechanism for co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders under the Act will be the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs). The respective Chief Constables presently chair the LRFs in the South Wales, North Wales, Dyfed-Powys and Gwent areas. Each forum considers its own membership and subgroup structures. There is consistency in the way each forum is structured, with each establishing subgroups covering such subject areas as media, risk, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear issues, but with local circumstances and challenges factored in.

Risk assessment

11.4 In Wales, a risk assessment at a pan-Wales level is undertaken by the Wales Risk Assessment Group (WRAG) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF). The WRAG is co-ordinated by the Welsh Assembly Government, drawing upon a wide range of expertise from LRFs and partner agencies in Wales. The WRAG includes members from each of the risk assessment groups under the four LRFs. The availability of the Wales risk assessment as a possible template for work at a local level assists in providing consistency in the approach taken to the assessment process. The approach adopted in Wales is consistent with the UK model but focuses on the identification and assessment of hazards not threats. In Wales, Category 1 responders will assess risks in the same way as their counterparts in England. The LRFs will be the focus for responder co-operation on Community Risk Registers in the same way. Category 1 responders are required to share their Community Risk Registers with the Welsh Assembly Government to ensure that the risk assessments, whether issued by the UK Government or the Welsh Assembly Government, are incorporated into the Community Risk Registers.

11.5 The Regulations under the Act allow the UK Government to issue risk assessments to Category 1 responders. In Wales, this information will be disseminated via the Welsh Assembly Government to Category 1 responders in Wales. The Welsh Assembly Government will be able to issue risk assessments in Wales where it would be appropriate for it to do so, subject to the consent of the UK Government.

The role of the Welsh Assembly Government

11.6 The UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government work together on the development of civil protection policy. Both parties consult with each other and exchange information on civil protection planning and response in a timely and constructive manner. The UK Government consults the Welsh Assembly Government as early as possible on any policy proposals (e.g., strategic guidance and national frameworks) relating to emergencies which affect or may affect Wales.

Devolved responsibility under the Act

11.7 Responsibility for local civil protection arrangements under Part 1 of the Act in England and Wales remains, in general, the responsibility of the UK Government. However, functional responsibilities in relation to health, the environment, animal health

1 In the rest of this chapter, references to the National Assembly for Wales will generally be by reference to its executive arm, the Welsh Assembly Government. Where action is reserved to the National Assembly for Wales itself, this will be made clear and will refer specifically to the full Assembly.
and welfare, local government, economic development, the Fire and Rescue Authorities and road networks enable the Welsh Assembly Government to engage in aspects of civil protection work and, as a consequence, it plays an important co-ordinating role. This points to the importance of ensuring good communications between the UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government.

11.8 Part 1 of the Act confers a number of delegated powers on UK Ministers. In particular, the content of the Regulations, orders, directions and guidance made by them under Part 1 of the Act will have a significant impact on the preparation for and handling of emergencies. The Welsh Assembly Government will be involved as soon as possible in the development of Regulations, orders, directions and guidance under Part 1 of the Act where this action directly affects Welsh Category 1 and 2 responders, or where there are significant cross-border implications.

11.9 Where action is taken by the UK Government under Part 1 (making regulations or orders, giving directions, issuing guidance or taking enforcement action), which applies to bodies in relation to which the Assembly has functions, the UK Government must seek the consent of the National Assembly for Wales. In other cases where such action will apply to Wales, the UK Government must consult the Assembly.

11.10 Should further functions be devolved to the National Assembly for Wales, agreement to ‘consult’ could be adjusted to a ‘consent’ agreement where appropriate. The consent of the Assembly will be required for the addition, removal and movement of local responders in Wales listed under the Act for which the Assembly has responsibility. In cases where local responders in Wales are not within devolved competence, the Assembly will be consulted.

11.11 When requesting information from Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales under Section 9(1c) of the Act, the UK Government will consider the case for using the Welsh Assembly Government to co-ordinate the process of gathering information on a pan-Wales basis. In other cases the UK Government will consider on a case-by-case basis the need to inform the Welsh Assembly Government of any request by it for information from:

- individual Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall within devolved responsibility (e.g. the Welsh Ambulance Trust); and
- Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall outside devolved responsibility (e.g. the police).

11.12 Where appropriate, the Welsh Assembly Government will be able to work with Category 1 and 2 responders in developing pan-Wales plans. In developing plans, the Welsh Assembly Government will be able to offer advice to Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales in terms of consistency with pan-Wales and pan-UK plans.

Communication with the UK Government

11.13 The Welsh Assembly Government or Wales Office, depending on the subject matter, is represented on the key committees and forums within UK government relating to civil protection at both official and ministerial levels. They work closely with UK government departments to ensure that UK civil protection policy and planning is tailored to Welsh needs. The UK Government works with the Welsh Assembly Government to ensure that it is kept informed and copied in to all information which will assist it in carrying out its responsibilities under the Act.

Concordat between the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK Government

11.14 A Concordat between the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK Government provides clarification as to how both sides see the role of the Welsh Assembly Government being delivered in practice under the Act. This guidance addresses this issue exhaustively in relation to Part 1 of the Act (“local arrangements for civil protection”) and therefore the Concordat focuses exclusively on Part 2 (“emergency powers”) issues. The Concordat is published on the National Assembly for Wales and UK Resilience websites: [http://www.wales.gov.uk](http://www.wales.gov.uk); [http://www.ukresilience.info](http://www.ukresilience.info)
How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

Co-operation

11.15 Generally, the models of operation and representation as set out in Chapter 2 will apply in Wales. But there are differences, because Wales has a devolved administration rather than a Government Office, and because of different NHS structures.

11.16 The Welsh Assembly Government will be represented on all four LRFs in Wales in an observer capacity. Local responders should also seek to engage the Welsh Assembly Government on wider issues, including notifying the Assembly of the appointment of a lead responder in any of the four LRFs.

11.17 Welsh NHS organisations are engaged in civil protection at every level. Local Health Boards, NHS Trusts and the Wales National Public Health Service progress this work individually and collectively through local health emergency planning co-ordinating groups based on LRF areas and through the all-Wales Health Emergency Planning Advisory Group. The NHS is also appropriately represented on multi-agency groups including the strategic LRFs. The Health Protection Agency is linked into health emergency planning arrangements in Wales and is represented on a number of health emergency planning groups. It provides specialist advice during both the planning and response stages. The Assembly’s Health and Social Care Department provides health emergency planning policy guidance to the NHS and works with the Department of Health in reviewing and developing health resilience.

Information sharing

11.18 Where appropriate, the WRF may be notified of the information flow between Category 1 and 2 responders and should be able to play a part, again where appropriate, in co-ordinating the request for and flow of information between Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales. In such a way, the WRF may be used as a vehicle for consideration of information-sharing issues which affect a range of responders across Wales.

Business continuity management

11.19 As in England, Category 1 responders in Wales will maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable. In Wales, the Welsh Assembly Government may be able to provide advice to Category 1 responders, where appropriate, on the development of business continuity plans, based on its own arrangements.

Welsh civil contingencies framework

11.20 Activity at the local level in Wales has to be considered in the context of activity undertaken on a pan-Wales basis by the Welsh Assembly Government and key resilience partners.

National-level planning in Wales

11.21 Two discrete types of planning are undertaken at the Wales level. The first type of planning supports emergency preparedness through capability development; the second supports response arrangements at the Wales level.

Wales Resilience Programme

11.22 The Wales Resilience Programme is an evolving strategic framework for capability development in Wales. The primary objective of the programme is to clearly identify the relationship between planning for emergencies at the local, Wales and UK levels and to co-ordinate this work. The programme ensures that co-ordination work at the pan-Wales level adds value to work being undertaken at other levels. At the core of the programme is a Wales Resilience Partnership Team, established to co-ordinate civil protection work in Wales.

11.23 As part of the Wales Resilience Programme it has been agreed that a Wales Resilience Stakeholders Forum should operate, to reinforce communication and information-sharing networks with Category 1 and 2 responders. The Stakeholders Forum helps to keep Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales informed of developments at the UK level and to enable them to contribute to the work of the Partnership Team. As such, there is no restriction on the number of attendees for these meetings, with all interested Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in response being invited to attend.
11.24 The Wales Resilience Programme, the Wales Resilience Partnership Team and the Wales Resilience Stakeholders Forum are all part of an evolving process in civil protection in Wales and will be developed further in time.

**Wales Resilience Forum (WRF)**

11.25 The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation at the Wales level is the WRF.

11.26 The WRF has senior representation from the Welsh Assembly Government, Cabinet Office, local authorities, the emergency services, the armed forces, the Environment Agency Wales, NHS Wales, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Health and Safety Executive. The forum considers planning and preparation matters and it functions in a similar way to the Regional Resilience Forums in England but with a higher level of political involvement as a consequence of devolved responsibilities.

11.27 The WRF works alongside other elements of the multi-agency civil protection framework at the local and UK government levels. However, this framework is not a hierarchy. LRFs in Wales are not subordinate to the WRF, which in turn is not subordinate to the UK Government. Communication and co-ordination flow in both directions. The LRFs operate in a similar way to their counterparts in England.

**Joint Emergency Services Group**

11.28 The Joint Emergency Services Group brings together all the emergency services and armed forces in Wales to consider how to meet their duties collectively under the Act and how to take forward their contribution to civil protection in Wales. The group has jointly funded the post of a non-statutory Emergency Services Civil Contingencies Co-ordinator for Wales, to co-ordinate the work of the emergency services in all aspects of civil protection.

**Wales Media Emergency Forum**

11.29 The Wales Media Emergency Forum was created to consider media issues relating to civil protection in Wales. The forum consists of a wide range of Welsh media representatives and press office staff from the emergency services, the armed forces, the Environment Agency Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government. The forum has agreed a protocol to provide effective communication in the event of a major incident or a wide-area disruptive challenge in Wales.

**Welsh Borders Resilience Group**

11.30 To facilitate co-operation and information sharing between Wales and the border areas of England, a group has been formed which brings together the Welsh Assembly Government with the Regional Resilience Teams from the Government Offices for the South West, West Midlands and North West. The group meets on a regular basis to discuss issues of mutual interest in civil contingencies and to help foster links at both the regional and local levels.

**Welsh Assembly Government Team**

11.31 In recognition of its functional responsibilities and its territorial role, the Welsh Assembly Government has adopted a collegiate approach to civil protection in Wales. The Welsh Assembly Government has set up a team, led by a senior official, dedicated to supporting multi-agency co-operation in Wales and engaging with the UK Government on all issues relating to civil protection and emergency preparedness. This team is supplemented by a wide variety of subject matter experts, based on the Assembly’s functional responsibilities, who support planning and response arrangements in Wales. For example, such support is provided by the Health Emergency Planning Team and specialists in environmental health, health, environmental science, animal health, and flood and coastal defence. This approach ensures that the Welsh Assembly Government is well placed to support Category 1 responders on civil protection matters and on specific resilience issues.

11.32 The Welsh Assembly team responsible for civil protection works in partnership with Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in response to address large-scale or wide-area civil protection issues in Wales. The team provides secretariat support to the WRF and works with the Regional Resilience Teams in England to ensure robust cross-border arrangements are in place.
Chapter 12
Northern Ireland

Summary

- Civil protection in Northern Ireland is largely a devolved matter, with functions being exercised by the Northern Ireland departments. Some functions are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK Government (paragraphs 12.1–12.7).
- The Central Emergency Planning Unit in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister promotes and co-ordinates civil protection arrangements in Northern Ireland (paragraphs 12.13–12.14).
- Sub-regional and local co-ordination is achieved by a variety of arrangements, including those involving the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the district councils (paragraphs 12.24–12.25).
- Some Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland are subject to Part 1 of the Act and the Regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers – the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and telecommunications providers (paragraphs 12.1–12.5).
- Arrangements are in place to ensure information exchange and co-ordination in the event of emergencies which cross the border with the Republic of Ireland (paragraph 12.26).
What the Act and the Regulations require

12.1 The duties in the Act apply only to a limited number of organisations which deliver functions that are not transferred. These organisations are:

• the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (included as a Category 1 responder);
• the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (included as a Category 1 responder); and
• telecommunications operators (included as Category 2 responders).

12.2 Because these organisations do not represent the full spectrum of response agencies in Northern Ireland, the Regulations treat these organisations in a slightly different way. The following principles apply to those Category 1 and 2 responders which operate in Northern Ireland:

• The Regulations which relate to how individual Category 1 and 2 responders should perform their duties apply to Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland in the usual way, but with some adjustments for the Northern Ireland situation.
• The provisions which rely on bilateral co-operation, etc. between Category 1 and 2 responders apply to Northern Ireland.
• The provisions in the Regulations relating to the Local Resilience Forum and its activities, including the production of a Community Risk Register, do not apply to Northern Ireland.\footnote{regulation 6}
• The provisions in the Regulations relating to the Local Resilience Forum and its activities, including the production of a Community Risk Register, do not apply to Northern Ireland.\footnote{regulation 57}
• The provisions which rely on bilateral co-operation, etc. between Category 1 and 2 responders apply to Northern Ireland.\footnote{regulation 58}
• Category 1 responders in Northern Ireland should have regard to the activities of other bodies in Northern Ireland that are engaged in civil protection (including Northern Ireland departments, the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service and relevant utilities) and, where appropriate, may rely on or adopt those activities.\footnote{regulation 6}

12.3 In practice, it is anticipated that the PSNI, MCA and telecommunications operators in Northern Ireland will undertake their individual and co-operative duties under the Act, but will relate to the other public service bodies listed in the Regulations in line with the arrangements in the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework and by participating in Northern Ireland co-operation, co-ordination and crisis management machinery.\footnote{regulation 57}

12.4 The Northern Ireland organisations have a reciprocal requirement under the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework to co-operate with the PSNI, MCA and telecommunications operators in the discharge of their duties under the Act.

12.5 Chapters 2 to 8 explain in more detail how each duty under the Act is to be performed by Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland.

Civil contingencies in Northern Ireland

12.6 Civil contingencies are largely a devolved matter with responsibilities lying with Northern Ireland government departments. Co-ordination falls to the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). The Northern Ireland Assembly would normally have oversight of civil contingencies arrangements for transferred functions. During any period of suspension of the devolved Assembly, Northern Ireland departments discharge their functions subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State.

12.7 Some civil protection functions, most significantly policing, are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK Government. The Northern Ireland Office (NIO), which is responsible for, among other things, policing, criminal justice and security in Northern Ireland, maintains a close relationship with the OFMDFM and relevant Northern Ireland departments to ensure activities are co-ordinated.

12.8 The “lead government department” principle applies to Northern Ireland departments. All Northern Ireland departments and divisions with responsibilities for the provision of a service in normal times remain responsible at times of emergency. The lead Northern Ireland department, as at the UK level, is the
department with day-to-day policy responsibility for the subject in question. That means that, for example, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety leads in preparing for and responding to infectious diseases in people, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development leads on infectious diseases in animals.

12.9 In Northern Ireland many functions which are delivered elsewhere in the UK by local authorities are delivered directly by Northern Ireland departments, or by their agencies or non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). This means that some activities which in Great Britain are covered by duties under the Act are in Northern Ireland carried out under lead department arrangements.

12.10 Lead departments in Northern Ireland are broadly similar to those at the UK level in terms of roles and responsibilities. Details of lead departments can be found at http://www.ukresilience.info/lead.htm Information on Northern Ireland arrangements can be found in A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland.

12.11 The Northern Ireland devolved administration or NIO, depending on the subject matter, is represented on the key committees and forums within UK central government relating to civil protection at both official and Ministerial levels. They work closely with UK departments to ensure Northern Ireland needs are catered for in UK planning and policy development.

12.12 In an emergency affecting Northern Ireland, the devolved administration will be involved because of its territorial role, irrespective of the devolution settlement division of responsibilities.

The Central Emergency Planning Unit

12.13 The Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) is located within the OFMDFM. It promotes the development of civil protection within the Northern Ireland public sector. It:

- encourages Northern Ireland departments and agencies and other public bodies to prepare, maintain and test their contingency plans;
- assists Northern Ireland departments and agencies and other public bodies in the preparation and exercise of these plans;
- advises Northern Ireland departments and agencies and other public bodies of appropriate training opportunities;
- encourages good practice in the field of emergency planning; and
- facilitates inter-agency co-ordination at Northern Ireland level.

12.14 The CEPU provides information and expertise to planners within organisations and facilitates co-ordination of planning between organisations through formal and informal structures and dialogue. Its customers are primarily government departments and agencies but the emergency services and other public service bodies are also engaged. The CEPU also represents Northern Ireland interests in policy discussions at UK and international levels.

Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework

12.15 The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework sets out the principles of policy and practice which will be adhered to by Northern Ireland public service organisations in their civil contingencies activities. The principles in the Framework are derived from existing Northern Ireland arrangements and structures and from the underlying principles of the Act and other UK policies. The Framework is supported by guidance documents, including A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland and A Guide to Risk Assessment in Northern Ireland.

Box 12.1: Membership of the CEMG

- CEPU
- 11 Northern Ireland departments
- NIO
- Northern Ireland Departmental Information Service (NIDIS)
- Food Standards Agency Northern Ireland
- Northern Ireland Ambulance Service
- Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
- Northern Ireland Fire Brigade
- Local Government Emergency Management Group (LEMG)
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
12.16 The Framework requires Northern Ireland public service organisations to co-operate with those organisations in Northern Ireland which have duties under Part 1 of the Act.

The Central Emergency Management Group

12.17 The Central Emergency Management Group (CEMG) is a pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. In addition to its policy role, the CEMG supports strategic co-ordination of emergencies, and has a relationship with the Crisis Management Group (CMG), supplementing existing lead department arrangements.

12.18 The CEMG is broadly analogous to the Regional Resilience Forums in England and Wales and it meets on a regular basis (at least two to three times per year) to review strategic issues. It may also meet at the request of the lead department or others in emergencies where a strategic multi-agency involvement is anticipated or required. The CEMG may also establish subgroups or working groups to deal with development of policy and good practice guidance on particular topics or areas of concern.

12.19 The specific functions of the CEMG are:

- the review of civil contingencies policy in government departments and public bodies in Northern Ireland, as appropriate, and seeking/gaining agreement on policy principles and standards;
- the maintenance of liaison between government departments, emergency services and other key public service bodies and district councils;
- the dissemination of information to and within member organisations on civil contingencies policy, current issues and risks and the response required to particular emergency situations;
- the collection and collation of information necessary to inform policy development or the response to emergencies and the provision of briefing on particular issues or emergencies;
- the facility to establish standing or ad hoc subgroups or working groups to develop policy for, or report on, particular issues or functions; and
- the discussion and co-ordination of non-emergency service responses to emergencies which require a multi-agency strategic approach but which do not require the active involvement of Permanent Secretaries or Ministers.

12.20 The group is chaired by a senior official from the OFMDFM. Its membership includes senior representatives from the bodies listed in Box 12.1.

12.21 As well as representing their immediate organisations, members also represent the interests of associated sub-regional and local public service organisations.

12.22 Various other co-ordination arrangements exist for planning and responding to specific situations. These are set up as needed by the key organisations involved. There are, for example, regional groups for flooding, overseas nuclear accidents and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) issues.

The Infrastructure Emergency Planning Forum

12.23 The Infrastructure Emergency Planning Forum brings together organisations which contribute to the Northern Ireland infrastructure to promote effective communication and co-ordination between them in the event of an emergency. Membership overlaps with the CEMG to some extent, in that some Northern Ireland departments, the emergency services and the Local Government Emergency Management Group are represented, but the forum also has members drawn from government agencies, NDPBs, utilities and communications providers.

Sub-regional and local arrangements

12.24 Co-ordination at local and sub-regional levels may be facilitated by a range of organisations, depending on the nature and outcome of particular emergencies. The police district commanders and the district council chief executives have key roles to play in co-ordination at local level.

12.25 Northern Ireland has its own unique constitutional and organisational structures. Unlike in Great Britain many services are delivered on a Northern Ireland-wide (regional) basis, either by government departments or by their agencies and NDPBs. Other services are delivered by organisations at sub-regional level.
Cross-border arrangements

12.26 Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK which has an international land border. As emergencies do not recognise borders, it is important that arrangements are in place with organisations in the Republic of Ireland to co-ordinate response to emergencies which cross the border or affect the island of Ireland as a whole. At local level, the emergency services have arrangements for co-ordinating the response to incidents at or near the border. Other arrangements are in place for co-ordinating information and efforts in areas such as public health emergencies and the response to nuclear accidents. These arrangements supplement national-level arrangements for co-ordination and co-operation through agencies such as the European Union.

Further information

12.27 Further information on civil protection arrangements in Northern Ireland can be found in the CEPU document A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland which was issued in July 2004. This and other information on civil contingencies arrangements in Northern Ireland is available from the CEPU website, http://cepu.nics.gov.uk, or by telephoning the CEPU on 028 9052 8862.
Chapter 13
Monitoring and enforcement

Summary

• The Act introduces a power for Ministers of the Crown to monitor performance of the civil protection duties (paragraph 13.1).
• The Government is not establishing a new inspectorate to monitor and enforce the duties under the Act. This will be done through Category 1 and 2 responders mainstream performance monitoring or regulatory regimes (paragraphs 13.9–13.14).
• However, the Government does not intend to use these monitoring powers on a regular basis to assess responders’ performance. Further details of how the power may be used are provided in Chapter 16.
What the Act and the Regulations require

Monitoring by the Government and by local responders

13.1 The Act gives a Minister powers to require:
• the provision of information about actions taken by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the performance of its Part 1 duties;¹ and
• an explanation as to why the responder has not taken action to comply with its duties under Part 1 of the Act.²

13.2 However, there is no proposal to use these powers at the moment. Ministers are not seeking powers in the Regulations that would support general assessments of the performance of local responders.

13.3 Also, there are no specific requirements in the Act or the Regulations for local responders to monitor their own performance.

13.4 The Government will rely on current good practice in performance management and on established audit and regulatory bodies across the Category 1 and 2 organisations to assess performance.

13.5 In the future, however, where the Government has reason in a particular case to require more information about responder compliance with the duties and to seek an explanation for non-compliance, it may choose to use these monitoring powers.

Enforcement by the Government and by Category 1 and 2 responders

13.6 In a particular case, the Government may not be satisfied with the information received from a Category 1 or 2 responder about the performance by it of its duties, or with the explanation given for non-compliance. In these circumstances, the Minister may choose to take enforcement proceedings in the High Court or Court of Session.³

13.7 Similarly, a Category 1 or 2 responder may itself take court action, in respect of a failure by another responder body to comply with its main duties under the Act.⁴ An example of the cause for such an action might be where one responder is unreasonably withholding information from another.

13.8 It is not anticipated that these powers will be used frequently. Where they are used, the Act also gives the High Court or the Court of Session powers to grant any relief or make any order as it thinks appropriate.⁵

Performance monitoring

13.9 Performance monitoring for civil protection is carried out by the organisations that have responsibility for monitoring and regulation.

13.10 The Government has examined the range of existing performance monitoring mechanisms in regard to the relevant functions of each local responder. It has engaged with the various inspectorates, regulators and ministries themselves to ensure that the duties of the Act feature within their future performance monitoring frameworks. Thus, for example for local authorities, the proposed 2005 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) looks at “Safer and Stronger Communities”. Within this broad heading, the CPA asks about local authority planning for internal and external emergencies. The Audit Commission discusses improvement plans, which are linked to issues identified in the CPA, on an annual basis.

13.11 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) will assess performance of the duties in the Act by police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through its Capability Review process. This will measure police forces’ capability to “identify, analyse and assess all potential threats and hazards that may lead to an emergency and provide a commensurate response to manage the situation and manage its effects”.

13.12 HMIC will undertake force-level assessments testing capability in this area against an established set of standards. These will be carried out on a rolling,
13.13 Several inspectorate bodies work collaboratively. Working together reduces the risk of duplication, as many organisations are scrutinised by more than one inspectorate on broadly similar issues. This would involve the development of a common and/or consistent set of standards. For example:
- the Audit Commission and the Fire Service Inspectorate have a memorandum of understanding to look at areas of common interest; and
- the 10 main bodies responsible for inspecting, regulating and auditing healthcare signed a concordat in June 2004. The purpose of this agreement is to provide more joined-up inspection programmes.

13.14 This approach is reflected in the long-term Government strategy to rationalise the inspectorates that have responsibility for national public services. This will take the number of inspectorates from eleven to four, reducing the burden upon inspected services. This strategy will result in greater collaborative working.

Self-assessment and audit: good practice and other information

Self-assessment

13.15 A series of seven self-assessment sheets has been developed in relation to the main duties of the Act. These are outlined in preceding chapters of this guidance. They may be used by local responders to help assess their own effectiveness in implementing the requirements of the Act and the Regulations. The sheets provide information to assist Category 1 and 2 responders meet the statutory requirements of the Act and the Regulations. They do not simply extract the requirements of the legislation, such as the requirement to maintain business continuity and emergency plans, as these are clearly laid out in the Act and the Regulations.

Co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operation</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) facilitates the effective delivery of those duties that need to be delivered in a multi-agency environment</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Category 1 and 2 responders are effectively represented on the LRF</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate voluntary organisations are effectively engaged in the LRF and/or its subgroups</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is an effective secretariat to the LRF</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is systematic upward and downward flow of information between the LRF and the RRF</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective arrangements are in place to link the LRF with its counterparts at the regional level and with other neighbouring RRFs</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The LRF has an agreed subgroup framework which allows it to deal with local issues effectively</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the LRF</td>
<td>Direct and bilateral co-operation between local responders operates effectively</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13.16 The sheets also reflect the good practice advice contained in the guidance to assist Category 1 and 2 responders in discharging their statutory responsibilities.

Use of the self-assessment sheets

13.17 The sheets use a series of statements and have a scale of agreement running from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ and 5 ‘strongly disagree’.

13.18 The sheets facilitate critical thinking about the effectiveness of performance and give an indication of areas for improvement and development.

Chapter 3

Information sharing

| General | Information sharing between Category 1 and 2 responders facilitates the effective performance of the civil protection duties | 1-2-3-4-5 |
|         | Information is shared with the appropriate local partners within the area | 1-2-3-4-5 |
|         | Most information is shared by way of informal agreement rather than formal request | 1-2-3-4-5 |
|         | Responders are making full and effective use of open source information-where this is available | 1-2-3-4-5 |
|         | Responders adhere to the framework for making formal information-sharing requests when these are required | 1-2-3-4-5 |
|         | Civil protection duties are delivered collaboratively as far as is appropriate | 1-2-3-4-5 |

| Sensitive information | Responders show a good awareness of what sensitive information is | 1-2-3-4-5 |

| Comments |

Chapter 4

Risk assessment

| Lead responsibility for assessing risks is clearly identified and agreed | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| Individual responder risk assessments have been completed. They identify the sources of risk, assess their likelihood and impacts, and rank them in terms of their overall risk | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| Individual responder risk assessments have been shared with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| Community Risk Registers (CRR) have been completed and kept up to date | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| CRRs have been approved by the LRF | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| CRRs have been shared with the Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) or the Wales Resilience Forum in Wales | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| CRRs are shared with the neighbouring LRFS and RRF | 1-2-3-4-5 |
| CRRs are used to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning | 1-2-3-4-5 |

| Comments |
### Chapter 5

#### Emergency planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td>The generic plan is flexible enough to mobilise staff and resources in relation to a wide range of possible scenarios</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk assessment</strong></td>
<td>Emergency plans are integrated with internal business continuity plans</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency plans provide an effective framework to manage significant risks</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans are considered for revision as a result of revised risk assessments</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usability</strong></td>
<td>Plans are clear, unambiguous and easy to use</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
<td>Planning has regard to the needs of diverse communities</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The needs of the more vulnerable members of society are identified</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements to respond in a co-ordinated way to different hazards and levels of threat are in place</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robust call-out and activation procedures are in place</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative arrangements that may need to be followed if the preferred action or arrangement fails are documented</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The concerns of partners have been taken into account</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The role of the media is detailed in the plan</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency planning has regard to the needs of survivors</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency plans address recovery as well as response issues</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans contain a clear policy on how to use voluntary effort</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans include processes for authorising expenditure</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans have regard for developments in technology and specialist equipment</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learning and validation</strong></td>
<td>Plans include provisions for carrying out exercises at appropriate intervals</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans include provisions for carrying out the training of staff or other persons and recording who has received training</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>Plans are supported by adequate resources, such as in-house staffing, contractors, communications equipment, emergency operations centre</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 6

### Business continuity management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme management</th>
<th>Responsibility for business continuity issues is well embedded within individual services or management units</th>
<th>1-2-3-4-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td>Critical functions and processes within the responder organisation have been identified and have been agreed by the executive board</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A robust business impact analysis has been undertaken, drawing on assessments of risk maintained under section 2 of the Act</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk assessment has been used to focus effort on the areas of greatest need and to develop appropriate continuity strategies</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The generic business continuity plan is flexible enough to maintain continuity through a range of different disruptive events</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business continuity planning</td>
<td>A clear procedure exists for invoking the business continuity plan (BCP)</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCPs identify objectives, personnel involved, and command and control arrangements</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCPs set out a route map for delivering the response</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCPs contain references to other sources of relevant information, advice and other documentation</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCPs outline arrangements for communicating with partners, stakeholders and the media</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A clear procedure is in place to ensure that the BCP is kept up to date</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning and validation</td>
<td>The exercise programme has clear objectives</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a balanced programme of exercise types which tests the full range of capabilities</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a documented process for capturing and taking forward the lessons identified</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a programme in place for training key staff and raising awareness throughout the organisation and its key stakeholders</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and evaluation</td>
<td>There is an established review process and identified trigger points</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A clear mechanism is in place for measuring the effectiveness of business continuity management arrangements</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The review process drives improvement by identifying lessons, and appropriate action is taken</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The outcome of reviews is documented</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Comments
## Chapter 7

### Communicating with the public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public awareness and education</th>
<th>All or parts of the relevant risk assessments and emergency plans have been published in a format that the public will find useful</th>
<th>1-2-3-4-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publicity materials have regard to other local, regional and national initiatives and to national messages</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publicity materials employ clear and simple language, using media appropriate to the audience</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning, informing and advising the public</td>
<td>Arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public are in place</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is clarity between local responders about the responsibilities for warning and informing; lead responders have been agreed</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements have been made to ensure that vulnerable people can be warned effectively</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements for issuing messages are designed with the target audience in mind</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is effective liaison with the local media</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel who would deal with the media in an emergency, or who deliver public information lines, have received appropriate training</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All arrangements are tested and exercised on a regular basis</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Comments
### Advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ownership</strong></th>
<th>Where the authority has entered into collaborative arrangements with other organisations, the allocation of responsibilities is clear</th>
<th>1-2-3-4-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A senior responsible owner has been identified within the authority</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td>The local authority has a business continuity management (BCM) advice and assistance strategy that identifies clear objectives and the means of achieving them, and has clear success criteria</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Category 1 and 2 responders (especially other local authorities) have been consulted in the preparation of the strategy and the LRF has endorsed it</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The strategy reflects other local responders’ business continuity work with business and voluntary organisations</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The local authority has a clear policy for dealing with requests for detailed business continuity advice</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery</strong></td>
<td>The local authority makes appropriate use of staff with existing experience and responsibilities in liaising with local businesses and voluntary organisations</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The programme addresses the needs of the business and voluntary sector community and the risk profile of the area</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The authority has made available information on BCM issues through relevant mechanisms (eg identified local risks and the impacts they may have)</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The format used to deliver business continuity messages has regard to the needs of local businesses and voluntary organisations</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key external partners (eg business representative groups, business support organisations and other Category 1 responders) are engaged in the delivery process</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review and evaluation</strong></td>
<td>There is an established review process with identified trigger points</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The authority has got a mechanism and success measures for assessing the effectiveness of its BCM advice and assistance activity</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The review process involves a full range of stakeholders consulted in developing the strategy (eg partners, elected members and other responders)</td>
<td>1-2-3-4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments**
Chapter 14
The role of the voluntary sector

Summary
• The voluntary sector has an important role to play in supporting the statutory services in response to some emergencies (paragraph 14.1).
• Category 1 responders who include the voluntary sector in their local planning arrangements will make the overall response more effective throughout the community. This is not just good practice: the Regulations require Category 1 responders to work with the voluntary sector. This includes building the voluntary sector into planning, training and exercising to respond to emergencies as appropriate (paragraphs 14.4–14.8).
• There are four models suggested for Category 1 responders to follow when engaging the voluntary sector effectively in order to discharge their duties at the local level (paragraphs 14.11–14.15).
• Responders should be aware of the kinds of services the voluntary sector can offer before making plans to involve them (paragraphs 14.16–14.18).
• It is essential that volunteers from the voluntary sector are trained and volunteers supported by the professionals they are helping (paragraphs 14.24–14.26).
• The way Category 1 and 2 responders work with the voluntary sector at the local level is supported by consistent regional and national arrangements (paragraphs 14.27–14.29).
What the Act and the Regulations require

14.1 In some circumstances, emergencies can overstretch the resources of the emergency services, local authorities and other local responders. The value of additional support from the voluntary sector has been demonstrated on many occasions.

14.2 The voluntary sector in the United Kingdom is very large and diverse. The skills and expertise available from the voluntary sector vary from place to place. Experience shows that advance planning enables voluntary sector activity to be more effective.

14.3 The Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to the activities of certain voluntary organisations in the course of carrying out their emergency and BC planning duties.1 The Regulations provide that Category 1 responders must only have regard to those voluntary sector bodies which carry out activities in the area for which the responder is responsible.

14.4 Voluntary organisations are those bodies whose activities are carried out not for profit and which are not public authorities or local authorities. Under the Regulations, they become relevant voluntary organisations if they carry on any activities for the purpose of preventing emergencies, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies, or taking other action in connection with emergencies.2 This is a broad definition that will capture charities and other voluntary organisations.

14.5 This does not mean that Category 1 responders should work only with those voluntary sector organisations established solely for the purpose of working in the field of civil protection. Few voluntary sector bodies are established for the sole purpose of responding to emergencies. Most will have a partial interest tangential to their main business. Nevertheless, these voluntary sector organisations must be factored into local civil protection arrangements where they may have a role to play in dealing with an emergency.

14.6 This obligation is intended to ensure that Category 1 responders actively consider the voluntary sector during the planning process, rather than at the end or not at all. As such, simply sending copies of plans to voluntary organisations is not sufficient, nor is including voluntary organisations in plans without consulting them. Instead, Category 1 responders must consider the capabilities that relevant voluntary organisations within their area have to offer, and whether those capabilities should be built into plans.

14.7 The requirement to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary sector organisations covers both emergency plans and business continuity plans (BCPs). In the case of the former, voluntary sector capabilities such as search and rescue or humanitarian support may be built into the response arrangements agreed between the statutory services. In the case of the latter, the voluntary sector may, in the course of everyday business, already deliver certain services on behalf of a statutory provider that would need to be maintained (such as ‘meals on wheels’). In addition, certain BCPs may use voluntary organisations to backfill functions that would be undermined by the diversion of resources to deal with the direct consequences of a major incident. For example, with ambulances diverted to the scene of a large emergency, an ambulance trust might have an agreement with the local St John Ambulance (cf. paragraph 14.17) for the latter to carry out routine patient collection.

14.8 The Act also requires local authorities to provide business continuity advice to those voluntary sector bodies which it considers to be appropriate.3 Advice on how to discharge this requirement is set out in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, local authorities may find it useful to consider how their engagement of the voluntary sector in the round might dovetail with work to meet that specific requirement.

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1 regulation 23
2 regulation 23
3 s. 4
How the requirements of the Act and the Regulations may be carried out

Engaging the voluntary sector at the local level

14.9 By establishing the right organisational framework, the voluntary sector can be properly factored into the planning process. Sound co-operation through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) processes and directly with individual Category 1 responders should be based on an agreed framework. This structure needs to suit local circumstances, be understood by all concerned and have clearly identified points of contact. Arrangements must be kept up to date by regular formal and informal contact at local level.

14.10 There are several different models that can be applied at the local level. None are mandatory, but these models, either individually or in combination, can help Category 1 responders to discharge their duties under the Act.

Model 1: engagement through the LRF

14.11 At the local level, each LRF should consider having a voluntary sector representative. The representative should be able to speak on behalf of all the major voluntary organisations operating in the area, as well as any smaller, local voluntary organisations.

Model 2: establishing a voluntary sector subgroup of the LRF

14.12 Setting up a voluntary sector co-ordinating group at local level can help co-operation between the statutory services and local voluntary organisations. A local authority civil protection officer will normally chair such a group. The group can bring together all of the voluntary bodies with an interest in civil protection that are active in the LRF area. The principal advantage of such a group is that it should ensure all Category 1 responders have a good understanding of the strengths and limitations of local voluntary sector bodies, and can include them in their planning to an extent that is sensible.

Model 3: bilateral links on the basis of functions

14.13 One method of involving voluntary organisations in civil contingency planning is to group them where appropriate on the basis of their functions, and link them with the Category 1 responder responsible for those functions. This functional grouping can clarify the contributions which individual voluntary organisations can make. It can prevent duplicated demands on their services and enable Category 1 responders and voluntary organisations to make the best use of the voluntary contribution.

14.14 In some cases there will be one Category 1 responder and one voluntary organisation linked to a specific function; for example the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI). In other cases, where a voluntary organisation performs a range of functions, it would need to be associated with more than one Category 1 responder and represented on all the relevant functional groups. In all cases, local civil protection officers should be fully aware of the level of voluntary service available and the arrangements for its provision in a co-ordinated manner.

Model 4: bilateral links on the basis of capabilities

14.15 A related method is to distinguish between the operational role of voluntary organisations when they directly help in the response to an emergency, and their support role, for example when they provide refreshments for the emergency services. An LRF-level
multi-agency plan can list which services are offered across the range of voluntary organisations. A key principle of the plan is to avoid double-counting by indicating which Category 1 responder has first call on (or priority need for) any particular voluntary contribution and to define a co-ordinated call-out system.

**Capabilities of the voluntary sector**

14.16 Those preparing emergency plans should be aware of the wide spectrum of operational and support activities provided by the voluntary sector in the United Kingdom.

- There are established organisations that provide a range of services, such as the British Red Cross Society, Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS), the Salvation Army, St John Ambulance (or St Andrew’s in Scotland).
- Many individual volunteers have particular skills, but are not necessarily in recognised voluntary organisations: for example interpreters or representatives from the faith communities.
- Certain organisations contribute specialist skills in various types of activity:
  - search and rescue organisations, such as the British Cave Rescue Council (BCRC), coastguard response teams (HM Coastguard’s Auxiliary branch), the Mountain Rescue Council (MRC), the RNLI, the International Rescue Corps (IRC), search and rescue dog teams;
  - groups of doctors, such as the British Association for Immediate Care Schemes (BASICS);
  - voluntary radio operators, such as the Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET);
  - non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and
  - organisations which specialise in providing emotional support and counselling, such as Cruse Bereavement Care and the Samaritans.

14.17 The voluntary sector can provide support in a number of generic areas:

- welfare;
- social and psychological aftercare;
- medical support;
- search and rescue;
- transport;
- communications;
- documentation; and
- training and exercising.

14.18 Annex 14A sets out examples of the wide-ranging support activities volunteers can provide and of the

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**A case study of best practice in local voluntary sector engagement**

In Derbyshire, the voluntary sector is closely involved in local civil protection work. Although there is no voluntary sector representative on the LRF, the LRF does have a voluntary sector subgroup.

The subgroup is chaired by a local authority officer, and its membership includes the British Red Cross, St John Ambulance, WRVS, Samaritans, Salvation Army, RAYNET, the National Voluntary Civil Aid Service, a Derby radio amateur group, Mountain Rescue, RSPCA and representatives of religious groups.

Individual voluntary sector bodies are then brought into the detail of planning through bilateral relationships with Category 1 responders on the basis of both capabilities and functions, ensuring full interconnectedness between the voluntary and statutory sectors. Voluntary sector bodies also take part in some other LRF subgroups, are offered training and take part in exercises.

“By establishing a voluntary sector subgroup of the LRF, we ensure that the statutory responders have access to a clear picture of the voluntary sector’s capabilities in Derbyshire.” Ian Shuttleworth, Chief Emergency Planning Officer, Derbyshire.

“The statutory services in Derbyshire have adopted a flexible but well-organised approach to our involvement. This careful engagement at the planning phase has proven its worth in the response phase, and we have successfully supported the statutory services when emergencies have stretched their resources.” Moya Wood-Heath, British Red Cross.
statutory organisations with which they frequently work.

14.19 It is important to be precise on the accountability of volunteers to a professional agency because of issues of legal liability, including statutory requirements under the Children Act, and because of insurance indemnity issues. Agencies using volunteers may become responsible for the health and safety of volunteers and will need to ensure that they are properly equipped, trained, supervised and supported. Where volunteers could reasonably be expected to work within an inner cordon, they should make arrangements to obtain the necessary skills and personal protective equipment to allow them to operate in safety.

14.20 It is of vital importance that, if an emergency occurs, the voluntary sector should be able to contribute what has been mutually agreed and written into local plans. Voluntary agencies have therefore to be able to demonstrate their capabilities and that their support is reliable, consistent and sustainable to the required standard. A record of available local voluntary resources should be maintained, where appropriate, as part of an LRF-level multi-agency plan.

14.21 The statutory and voluntary sectors should be clear about their respective roles in an emergency. They each have their own structures and constraints. Voluntary organisations must appreciate that the Category 1 responders bear the responsibility for the overall emergency response. Equally, the statutory services must develop an understanding of the voluntary sector as a rich resource for personnel, professional skills and equipment.

14.22 There should be agreement and effective plans on the use of volunteers, the decision-making process leading to their call-out and the method of call-out. Plans should determine who will organise, manage and brief volunteers. Debriefing should be included as part of plan maintenance procedures. Planners also need to establish that volunteers receive refreshment and are appropriately clothed, identified and equipped.

14.23 Plans should include effective procedures for alerting or calling out voluntary organisations. Early alert is desirable because of the lead time needed for contacting and assembling teams in organisations other than the emergency services. Contingency arrangements should reflect this.

Training and exercising

14.24 When considering the particular contribution that the voluntary sector can make, it should be noted that established voluntary organisations and volunteer groups will usually have their own training arrangements. They should be able to demonstrate their effectiveness to the Category 1 responders.

14.25 Additionally, the Category 1 responders and voluntary agencies should aim for joint training and exercising. It is very important that voluntary organisations understand the management framework of the response and how they fit into the response as a whole. There will be some overlap between the functions and capabilities of different voluntary organisations. Joint exercising will identify any problems, ensure plans and procedures are up to date and foster working relationships.

14.26 Effective communication, planning and training should aim to identify opportunities for sharing heavy workloads and providing mutual support. General issues of training and exercising are further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

The voluntary sector at the UK and regional levels

14.27 At the UK level, the voluntary sector has developed a co-ordinated approach to planning its contribution to civil protection, and local and regional responders should aim to fit into this framework.

14.28 At the UK level, a Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Working Party and Forum have been convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the British Red Cross. The aim of the Working Party and Forum is to identify and maximise the voluntary sector contribution to UK civil protection arrangements. There are currently 20 voluntary organisations with a national or UK-wide civil protection role that are members of the Forum. The Forum provides links between the voluntary sector, central government and statutory authorities. The Working Party supports the Forum. The National Voluntary Aid Societies’ Emergency Committee
NVASEC exists to coordinate the auxiliary role of the three Voluntary Aid Societies (VASs): the British Red Cross, St John Ambulance and St Andrew’s Ambulance. NVASEC ensures that the VASs develop coherent policies which fit with the overarching framework established by central government. It also allows the VASs to engage in an efficient way with the representative bodies of local responder organisations.

14.29 At the regional level, a representative of the voluntary sector forms part of the core membership of the Regional Resilience Forum (as set out in Chapter 17). The representative will form a bridge between the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Working Party, NVASEC and the local level.
Summary

- A principal aim of the Act is to bring into a single statutory framework those organisations which are most likely to be involved in most emergencies. However, not every organisation that may need to be involved in emergencies is covered by the Act (paragraphs 15.1–15.2).
- The fact that civil protection has a statutory basis should not be a reason to exclude organisations which do not have a duty under the Act (paragraph 15.3).
- Category 1 responders should encourage organisations which are not covered by Part 1 of the Act to co-operate in planning arrangements (paragraphs 15.4–15.17).
15.1 A principal aim of the Act is to bring into a single statutory framework those organisations which are most likely to be involved in most emergencies (Category 1) and those likely to be heavily involved in some emergencies (Category 2).

15.2 However, it was not appropriate to capture in the Act every organisation that may have some involvement in emergencies. For a variety of reasons, particular organisations with an important role to play – such as the armed forces, the broadcasting media and the insurance industry – have not been included in Schedule 1.

15.3 Even so, organisations which are not required to participate under the Act should be encouraged to take part in forums and co-operate in planning arrangements wherever this is appropriate. The statutory nature of the framework is not a consideration which in itself should imply their exclusion.

15.4 There are many organisations which fall into this category, including:
- the armed forces;
- retail companies, including supermarkets;
- insurance companies;
- bus and road haulage companies;
- taxi firms;
- airlines;
- shipping companies and ferries;
- media companies;
- private communications networks dedicated to public safety users;
- offshore oil and gas industry;
- security firms;
- internal drainage boards; and
- general practitioners and chemists.

15.5 The armed forces: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) can be sought to support the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to deal with an emergency arising from a natural disaster or a major incident. However, assistance is provided on an availability basis and the armed forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. It is therefore essential that Category 1 and 2 responders do not base plans and organise exercises on the assumption of military assistance. The local Regional Brigade Headquarters will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance.

15.6 Retail companies, including supermarkets: Food stocks and other goods held by private retail companies are sometimes not seen as resources likely to be called upon in emergencies. However, in widespread and prolonged emergencies, where shortages of foodstuffs occur, Category 1 responders may turn to the private sector, such as supermarkets, for practical and logistical assistance, and some will build this into their planning arrangements. More common are agreements with wholesale firms for the provision of, for example, building materials, and the identification of suitable private sector buildings as rest centres.

15.7 Insurance: There is a strong case for building the insurance industry into planning arrangements. Often insurance staff, such as loss adjusters, will attend at the scene of an emergency as quickly as journalists. The Association of British Insurers provides insurance information and advice to members of the public who have suffered loss or damage as a result of an emergency. They have the capability to set up an advice service close to the scene of an emergency.

15.8 Bus and road haulage companies: Bus companies may be included in plans to assist with evacuations. Arrangements for diverting and maintaining bus services in the event of a major central area evacuation may also require planning. Accidents involving the movement of chemicals by road are a key hazard which require specialist knowledge and equipment. The Fire and Rescue Service is greatly assisted in response to such incidents by the Chemical Industries Association.

15.9 Taxi firms: In some areas, and where local authority social services and NHS ambulances are unable to manage the movement of all people with walking difficulties in an emergency, agreements have been reached with local taxi firms to assist in the movement of these people.

15.10 Airlines: The Act brings airports into a formal arrangement as Category 2 responders to co-operate with the emergency services and other Category 1 responders in preparing for emergencies. But plans for responding effectively to the needs of distressed
friends and relatives at the terminal building require the co-operation, too, of airline companies. It is usual to invite their representatives to play a part in these arrangements.  

15.11 Shipping companies and ferries: As with airports, harbour authorities are included as Category 2 responders under the Act. Planning for emergencies at sea and in ports is likely to include the main shipping and ferry companies, which are not covered by the Act.

15.12 Media companies: Media companies are not included in the Act, partly because it is accepted that their independence as reporting organisations should not be compromised. However, they have a key role in providing information to the public and are likely to be heavily involved in communications planning, which is dealt with in Chapter 7.

15.13 Private communications networks dedicated to public safety users: The emergency services and other public safety agencies may rely upon private communications networks in order to carry out their duties. These organisations will want to ensure that the relevant communications providers are included in multi-agency planning for incidents.

15.14 Offshore oil and gas industry: The MCA and the Health and Safety Executive work closely with these companies and will want to ensure that they are included in multi-agency planning for incidents at sea or at oil and gas terminals. They will also be involved in planning for fuel shortages.

15.15 Security firms: Security firms have staff protecting premises of all types who are contactable by the police and may be useful during emergencies. They have a particular role in evacuations from shopping centres and sports grounds.

15.16 Internal drainage boards: Internal drainage boards have powers to undertake works on defined watercourses within their geographical area. These may include operating pumps and other structures to alleviate the effects of flooding. They may be involved in the response to an emergency and should be included, where relevant, in emergency plans.

15.17 General practitioners and chemists: General practitioners may be called to the scene of an emergency to provide direct medical assistance or to certify deaths. Access to medication and medical services may be required for people displaced by an incident. In addition, during periods of disruption, such as severe weather, access for the public to general practitioners and chemists may be required. Considerations such as these need to be included in Category 1 responders’ planning arrangements.

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1 Schedule 1 paragraph 26
2 Schedule 1 paragraph 27
Chapter 16
The role of the Minister

Summary

- A Minister of the Crown has certain functions available to him/her by virtue of the Act, which may be exercised subject in certain cases to Parliament’s approval (paragraph 16.1).
- These are not likely to be used frequently, but may include:
  - amending the Regulations which deal with the main duties (paragraph 16.3);
  - requiring a Category 1 or 2 responder to perform a particular function in an emergency (paragraph 16.4);
  - amending the list of Category 1 and Category 2 responders (paragraph 16.5);
  - issuing urgent directions to require action to be taken in relation to an emergency where there is insufficient time to make legislation (paragraphs 16.7–16.10); and
- The Act requires these Ministerial powers to be exercised in a way that is consistent with the various devolution settlements (paragraphs 16.13–16.14).
- These powers would usually be exercised by the Minister with lead responsibility for civil protection at the local level. But he/she would work closely with the relevant lead government department and seek the agreement of other departments with an interest (paragraph 16.15).
What the Act permits

16.1 Ministers have a range of powers under Part 1 of the Act. Most of these powers relate to the issuing of guidance and Regulations to support the delivery of the main duties under the Act, and are dealt with elsewhere in this guidance. However, a number of the powers are not in use as a matter of course, but could be used should the need arise, on the discretion of the Minister and with the approval of Parliament. These fall into three categories – legislative powers, urgent direction powers and monitoring powers.

16.2 This chapter does not deal with the emergency powers framework under Part 2 of the Act. The extent and exercise of emergency powers is addressed in Emergency Response and Recovery.

Legislative powers

16.3 A Minister may amend the Regulations or guidance issued under Part 1 of the Act. The powers to amend the Regulations are broad; the Minister may make any provision about the extent of the duties under sections 2 and 4 and the manner in which they are to be performed. (Section 2(5) lists a range of provisions which can be included in regulations – but this is not exhaustive.)

16.4 A Minister may also require a person to perform a function in relation to an emergency. For example, the Minister could require responders to purchase a particular range of interoperable equipment (subject to appropriate funding being in place). This power is only exercisable if both Houses of Parliament have approved the order.

16.5 Finally, a Minister may legislate so as to amend the list of Category 1 and/or 2 responders. This power is only exercisable if both Houses of Parliament have approved the order. The Minister may remove a responder from the list, upgrade the status of a Category 2 responder into a Category 1 responder (and vice versa) and add new responders.

16.6 The Government has maintained a close dialogue with practitioners and other responders when developing the Act framework. It intends to continue this consultative approach if it becomes apparent that further use of these legislative powers may be necessary.

Urgent powers of direction

16.7 There are circumstances during emergencies, or when they appear imminent, when consistent, decisive action is necessary. The response required might fall outside existing planning frameworks; Category 1 and 2 responders might lack the information or advice to deal with it effectively; or it may not be apparent to these responders how best to deal with the situation.

16.8 Section 7 is designed to enable action to be taken by a Minister of the Crown in cases of urgency where there is insufficient time to make legislation. It is an exceptional power designed to ensure that in cases of real urgency the Government can arrange for coherent, effective action to be taken at the local level.

16.9 The Act enables a Minister to issue a direction containing any provision that could be made by secondary legislation under sections 5 and 6 of the Act, to responders or a class of responders.

16.10 An urgent direction must be in writing, though it could of course arrive by fax or e-mail. The Minister must revoke his direction as soon as is reasonably practicable (which will be, at the latest, as soon as it is possible to legislate). Even if not revoked, a direction will lapse 21 days after it has been made.

Box 16.1: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice about the role of the Minister and useful information that is not supported directly by the Act. There is therefore no direct obligation under the Act for responders to have regard to it. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.
Monitoring powers

16.11 A Minister has a range of powers to assist him/her in monitoring and overseeing the new civil protection regime. He/she may ask any Category 1 or 2 responder to provide him/her with information about the action taken under the Act. The Minister may require a Category 1 or 2 responder to explain why it has not taken action under the Act. If the Minister considers that a Category 1 or 2 responder has failed to comply with its obligations under the Act, he/she may take proceedings against that responder in the High Court.\(^5\)

16.12 These powers are not intended to be used to establish direct monitoring by the Government as a standard procedure. They will be used in exceptional circumstances. For details of the mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Act, see Chapter 13.

Box 16.2: Urgent directions in practice

Emergencies are by their nature often unpredictable. But the breadth of the existing obligations under the Act is such that effective generic planning should be in place to deal with most emergencies.

If a threat or risk did arise which appeared to fall outside existing planning work, it might nevertheless be necessary to take rapid remedial action to fill a gap in capability.

For example, a very large-scale emergency in another part of the world might generate large flows of refugees, some of whom might end up in the UK. The arrivals would not be immediate – perhaps weeks away – but Category 1 responders might need to be instructed rapidly to acquire new equipment or take action to meet specific requirements. The direction power would allow the Government to ensure coherence of action and ensure a rapid step change in capability.

In practice, the Government would be unlikely to exercise urgent direction powers in a unilateral way. The Government maintains close links with those organisations which represent local responders, and that close working would strengthen if a new and difficult situation arose. The Government would be likely to develop the directions rapidly, working with representative bodies to produce workable proposals. It would not be in the Government's interest to adopt a non-consultative approach, not least because of the need to ensure directions made a rapid, practical difference to preparedness.

Box 16.3: How monitoring powers might be used

The Government would be most likely to use its monitoring powers to probe perceived systemic failures in the operation of the Act. For example, if a particular class of Category 2 responder was not sharing information about its local sectoral arrangements, Category 1 responders would be likely to bring this to the attention of their representative bodies. Those representative bodies would then pass this concern on to the Government.

The Government might then use these powers to request from all Category 1 and 2 responders in that particular sector details of the nature and volume of the information requests they had received under the Act, and how they had responded. The material provided would allow the Government to judge whether the sector was avoiding its obligations, or whether it was being put under unreasonable pressure, or whether there was some form of blockage in the system that could be removed. The Government could then take action, from adjusting the guidance so as to change expectations through to taking action in the courts.

\(^5\) s. 9
\(^6\) s. 10
Liaison with the Devolved Administrations

16.13 The Act requires a Minister of the Crown to consult the National Assembly for Wales before making any legislation, issuing any guidance, issuing any direction or bringing any proceedings in relation to a Category 1 or 2 responder in Wales. The Act also requires a Minister of the Crown to obtain the consent of the National Assembly for Wales before doing any of those things in relation to a Category 1 or 2 responder in relation to which the National Assembly for Wales have functions.

16.14 The Act requires a Minister of the Crown to consult the Scottish Ministers when making legislation in relation to Category 1 or 2 responders in Scotland.

Ministerial responsibility

16.15 The Act confers functions on “a Minister of the Crown”. In practice, the powers will usually be exercised by the Minister with lead responsibility for civil protection at the local level. However, all proposals to exercise these powers would be developed in close collaboration with relevant lead government departments and agreed between departments with an interest.

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1. s. 16(1)
2. s. 16(2)–(4)
3. s. 14(1)
4. For example, see s. 2(3) or s. 3(1)
Chapter 17
Co-operation at the regional level in England

Summary

• Co-operation at the regional level involves the representatives of Category 1 and 2 responders and central government bodies working together to address larger-scale civil protection issues (paragraphs 17.1–17.5).

• The Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) is the main focus for multi-agency co-operation (paragraphs 17.7–17.9).

• Each RRF will have the same kind of core membership. RRFs will include representatives of local public bodies; the emergency services; the Environment Agency; the voluntary sector; the armed forces; and the regional assembly. Good practice examples of the membership of an RRF are available to help Category 1 and 2 responders (paragraphs 17.23–17.27).

• Organisations will be expected to co-operate both within and outside the RRF. Co-operation outside the RRF can follow various models, including direct or bilateral co-operation and mutual aid (paragraphs 17.28–17.30).

• Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) are not subordinate to the RRF. In turn, the RRF is not subordinate to central government. Information, direction and support should flow freely between them (paragraphs 17.10–17.11).
Co-operation at the regional level

17.1 Co-operation at the regional level in England is a relatively new development in civil protection. The regional tier is not a judgement on the local level; rather, it is a mechanism for improving co-ordination and communication into and out from the centre of government.

17.2 The regional tier is a crucial part of England’s civil protection framework, but it was not appropriate for the Act to put it on a statutory footing.

17.3 Co-operation at the regional level involves the representatives of Category 1 and 2 responders and central government bodies working together to address larger-scale civil protection issues. Co-operation may take place within a multi-agency setting or directly between two or more responders. Organisations operating on a fully regional basis (for example regional assemblies) are also expected to be fully involved in this co-operation, depending on regional circumstances.

17.4 The operation of the regional civil protection tier is not, for the most part, dealt with by the Act. Activity at the regional level takes place on a permissive basis. As such, this chapter describes the arrangements which the Government has put in place, but does not oblige Category 1 and 2 responders to carry out activity in the manner described.

Role of the regional tier

17.5 The key function of the regional tier is to improve co-ordination and communication between central government and Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act and to ensure that regions are prepared to respond to events which would affect most or all of the region or which could overwhelm any locality. The successful delivery of the regional resilience capability rests critically on Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act and central government working together in partnership to ensure an effective and co-ordinated response.

Regional Resilience Teams

17.6 Since April 2003, Regional Resilience Teams (RRTs) have been operational in each of the Government Offices in the nine English regions. These teams, led by a senior official, with support from three or four staff drawing heavily on external civil protection experience, will facilitate much of the new regional activity. They take the lead in managing key relationships with Category 1 and 2 responders, communicating between regional partners, and between the regions and central departments. They also provide improved information-gathering and reporting back to the centre. In particular, the teams will provide secretariat support for the Regional Resilience Forums (see paragraph 17.7 below) and for Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs), in the event of regional response arrangements being called upon. The teams will also work with the devolved administrations to ensure strong cross-border arrangements are in place.

The Regional Resilience Forum

17.7 The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation at the regional level is the Regional Resilience Forum (RRF). The forum is a process by which the organisations with an interest in regional civil protection issues co-operate with each other. It is not a statutory body as such, nor does it have powers to direct its members.

17.8 The purpose of the RRF process is to ensure effective delivery of those elements of regional civil protection that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. In particular, the RRF process should deliver:

- compilation of agreed regional risk map;
- consideration of policy initiatives in the area of civil protection that emanate from local and central government and all other relevant sources;
- facilitation of information sharing and co-operation between its members, including for example reports on recent incidents and exercises;
- sharing, wherever appropriate, of lessons learned from emergencies and exercises in other parts of the UK and overseas;
- support for the preparation, by all or some of its members, of multi-agency plans and other documents, including Regional Capability Co-ordination Plans; and
• co-ordination of multi-agency exercises and other training events.

17.9 Model terms of reference are attached at Annex 17A.

The relationship between the RRF and the Local Resilience Forum

17.10 Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) are not subordinate to the RRF. In turn, the RRF is not subordinate to central government. Information, direction and support should flow freely between them. The RRF works alongside other elements of the multi-agency planning framework at the local and central government levels. The RRF will link to its LRFs in several ways:

• Overlapping membership: A member of the RRT will sit on each LRF (as set out in Chapter 2). In addition, some members of the LRF will also be members of their RRF. For example, the chief executive of a local authority might chair the relevant LRF, and also be the local authority representative on the RRF.

• Formal communication: The chairs of each Resilience Forum will be the lead point of contact for formal communications. As such, there is likely to be a dialogue between the chair of the RRF and his or her LRF counterparts.

• Informal communication: As established groups with a recognised membership, there will obviously be informal communication between LRF and RRF members. LRF members may raise issues through their RRF representatives.

17.11 Likewise, the RRF will be linked into central government through similar mechanisms.

Process

17.12 Because of its importance, the RRF should attract a senior level of representation. Because the discussions are strategic, the RRFs should meet relatively infrequently and the meetings should be thoroughly prepared so that the time of senior representatives is used well.

17.13 The aim should be to space these meetings evenly, and to develop a regular cycle. In establishing a regular cycle, forums should have regard to the needs of those members who are likely to be participating in more than one forum. For example, a major utility company is likely to have demands placed on it by the LRF structure, as well as the RRF.

17.14 It is critically important that the co-operation process is well organised and achieves its aims. The meetings should have a clear agenda and papers should be circulated sufficiently well in advance to allow for proper discussion. A clear record of meetings should be kept, and minutes circulated promptly. Minutes should be copied to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the region.

Leadership

17.15 The task of chairing the meetings will fall to the director of the relevant Government Office or, in his or her absence, the Regional Resilience Director. In London, the chair is currently taken by a Minister.

17.16 The chair should be regarded as the lead point of contact for the information cascaded down from the national level, or up from the local level. Information may also pass to the RRT itself.

17.17 The secretariat support role for the RRF is crucial in ensuring that it performs effectively. This role will also fall to the Government Office, in this case to the RRT. It will include:

• fixing the dates of meetings;
• agreeing the agenda and attendance;
• commissioning any discussion papers and presentations;
• briefing the chair;
• taking the minutes of the meeting;
• following up matters arising and action points;
• disseminating papers before and after the meeting; and
• ensuring that meetings of the various RRF subgroups (see paragraphs 17.19–17.21 below):
  – are effectively organised and recorded;
  – are scheduled to fit with the meeting cycle of the main RRF group; and
  – bring relevant matters to the attention of the strategic group.

17.18 The RRTs will meet a number of service standards in delivering the secretariat function. They should:

• be of a level of seniority or competence to support the chair at meetings of the strategic-level forum;
• have the back-up of an administration team within the Government Office, which can produce and circulate documents quickly; and
• be competent to organise, or to support, officers from other organisations, or their own, administrating the work of the subgroups.

Subgroups

17.19 The time constraints on the main RRF and the strategic level of their discussions are likely to necessitate the formation of subgroups. These groups will operate at the middle-management level, with organisations represented by individuals usually employed solely or in part to work in the field of civil protection. On the one hand, they will often take forward action points from the main RRF and discuss specialist civil protection topics in the necessary detail. On the other, they will ‘feed up’ matters for information, decision or endorsement by the strategic group.

17.20 Some of these subgroups will operate under every RRF. They are, for example:
• The Media Emergency Forum (MEF): The MEF exists to provide regional media with a forum to engage in civil protection issues. The forum brings together key media representatives. The secretariat to the forum will be provided by the Government News Network.
• Mass fatalities: Each RRF will have a subgroup to develop regional plans to deal with mass fatalities and emergency mortuaries.

17.21 Decisions about other subgroups should be made by the RRF. Nevertheless, there are several examples of subgroups that might be useful. It is essential that, in setting up subgroups, RRFs do not duplicate work that is already being undertaken by LRFs. Subgroups could include:
• Regional Working Group: This group would replicate the broad membership of the RRF and discuss in advance and in more detail proposals to be taken to the strategic group for their decision or endorsement. It would provide a process at the ‘working level’ through which multi-agency planning could be delivered. For example, this group would work on regional training and exercise programmes. It could be expected to meet as often as every six weeks.
• Risk group: This group would lead the work to develop the multi-agency regional risk assessment, based on the national risk assessment (and distinct from the Community Risk Register).
• Capabilities groups: These groups would lead the work to develop generic capabilities within the overall generic planning framework. For example, groups might be created to deal with site clearance, or mass decontamination.
• Local responder groups by sector: These groups would bring together all the organisations of a particular type within an RRF area. Examples might include a local authorities group, an NHS group, a utilities or transport group or a voluntary sector group.
• Specialist groups: These groups would bring together organisations with an interest in a particular aspect of civil protection. Examples might include exercises, events, welfare support for victims, media relations or CBRN.
• Project groups: These groups would be formed on an ad hoc, temporary basis to bring together Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act to develop a multi-agency approach to a particular short-term priority. Examples might include a particular multi-

Figure 17.1: The framework for regional planning
agency exercise, a specific large public event, or an urgent and unforeseen new planning requirement, such as a new terrorist threat.

**17.22** Figure 17.1 sets out what the regional planning framework might look like.

**Membership of the RRF**

**17.23** The membership of the RRF has an important influence on its operation. The most crucial aspect of this is the way in which individual Category 1 and 2 responders are represented. The optimum number for attendance at the main RRF meeting is likely to be around 20. Larger numbers will make the meetings inefficient.

**17.24** A fuller explanation of the role which individual classes of Category 1 and 2 responders have to play is set out in Chapter 2 of this guidance. On the basis of their respective roles, a core membership of the RRF has been established:

- **Local public bodies**
  - Local authorities: A single representative (or a small number of representatives) will represent all local authorities within the region. The representation is likely to be at chief executive level. It will be for local authorities within the region to agree with the Government Office optimum representation at the forum.
  - Police forces: A single representative will represent all police forces within the region. Nomination will be overseen by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The nominee is likely to be at Chief Constable level. In most RRFs, the nominated local force lead will represent the British Transport Police and other specialist police forces. The exceptions to this are likely to be those meetings where particular consideration is given to relevant risk assessments and plans.
  - Fire authorities: A single representative will represent all fire and rescue authorities within the region. Nomination will be overseen by the Chief Fire Officers’ Association. The nominee is likely to be at Chief Fire Officer level.
  - Health organisations: The health representation will vary depending upon the regional context and the views of the health community in the region. RRFs can draw upon Regional Directors of Public Health, the Health Protection Agency and Strategic Health Authorities to cover health interests. Ambulance services will have their own representative at the forum. Nomination will be overseen by the Ambulance Service Association.

- **National public bodies**
  - The Environment Agency: The Environment Agency will be represented by the Regional Director and will provide advice and information on all aspects of the environment for which the Agency has a statutory responsibility.
  - The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA): The MCA takes part in the RRF process only in those regions where it operates. In those areas, the MCA is directly represented by the relevant Regional Operations Manager.
  - The armed forces: As with the local level, the armed forces do not play a permanent role in regional civil protection. Nevertheless, they will be represented at the RRF to ensure that military aid arrangements and planning dovetail with civil planning, particularly in relation to larger-scale incidents. The armed forces will be represented by an appointed representative of the Regional Brigade Commander.
  - The Government News Network: GNN will be represented by the relevant Regional Director.

- **Voluntary sector**
  The voluntary sector within any region will be large and diverse, and most co-operation will be at the local level with Category 1 and 2 responders. Nevertheless, there are a number of prominent voluntary sector bodies which have an interest in regional-level planning, particularly for larger-scale emergencies. These voluntary sector bodies are all members of the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (VSCPF). The Working Party of this forum will assist regional forums to identify a lead voluntary sector representative for the RRF.

**17.25** In addition, a representative of the regional assembly will also form part of the core membership.

**17.26** Over and above the core membership, RRFs may also include additional members to reflect particular regional circumstances. These additional members may take part as full members...
or as observers. A (non-exhaustive) list of examples includes:

- more representatives from a particular class of organisation. For example, a region with a diverse local authority arrangement might choose further local authorities to attend;
- representatives of other RRTs, in order to foster effective inter-regional links;
- representatives of high-risk sectors with particular prominence in the region, such as the nuclear or chemical industries;
- representatives of central government departments, including the Civil Contingencies Secretariat;
- representatives of the Highways Agency or the Health and Safety Executive; and
- representatives of utility companies or transport companies.

17.27 The membership and terms of reference of each RRF should be available on the relevant Government Office website. This will help to ensure that all Category 1 and 2 responders within a region understand the route by which they can raise issues directly with the forum through their representative. Each representative is responsible for ensuring that the full range of views within their sector is properly presented to the forum and that information from the forum is effectively cascaded across the region. In deciding upon representation, forum members will want to consider the benefits of having representatives from each LRF in the region.

Co-operation outside the RRF

Direct and bilateral co-operation

17.28 Co-operation will also be expected between Category 1 and 2 responders outside the framework of the RRF.

17.29 The regional tier may also facilitate co-operation on issues which cross LRF boundaries. For example, they might bring together coastal LRFs to discuss coastal flooding or pollution. This work will be led by the RRT, in response to requests by LRFs or the RRF, or as a result of a need identified by the team itself.
Inter-regional co-operation

17.30 Where appropriate, the RRTs will facilitate co-operation across regional borders and with the devolved administrations.

Mutual aid

17.31 The regional tier may also have a role to play in brokering mutual aid agreements. Local areas have a well-established framework for developing mutual aid agreements, but there are some circumstances in which the regional tier may add value:

- **Brokerage:** The regional tier may need to be built into mutual aid plans. In the event of activation of mutual aid agreements, it may not be possible to achieve what was previously agreed because of the nature of an emergency. The regional tier may have a role to play in brokering between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act and helping to establish where the greatest needs lie. For example, a local authority might have arrangements with two neighbouring authorities. The regional tier could help that authority prioritise its assistance, helping it to direct resources towards the areas of greatest need.

- **Consistency and achievability:** With an overview of activity at the local level, the regional tier will be able to spot inconsistencies in terms of mutual aid. For example, some parts of a region may have decided to instigate mutual aid arrangements, but not others. The regional tier can pursue this to ensure that the decision is a conscious one rather than an oversight. Equally, they may be able to identify over-commitment, where local areas have entered into arrangements which are not manageable. For example, local authorities along a river might commit to provide each other with sandbags, and yet all might be affected by the same flooding incident.

- **Arbitration:** In some circumstances, mutual aid arrangements might be desired by one Category 1 or 2 responder but not others, or the terms of the agreement might prove difficult to agree. The regional tier can offer arbitration in such circumstances, not by directing any responder but rather by offering advice about other examples or hosting negotiations.

Liaison with national-level organisations

17.32 In some circumstances it might be more efficient for national-level organisations (eg utilities, transport operators, etc) to share information at a regional level, which would avoid duplication of work. However, sharing information at a regional level cannot substitute for good working relationships between such organisations and LRFs.
Chapter 18
Planning at the regional level in England

Summary

• Civil protection planning for emergencies at the regional level is different from planning by Category 1 and 2 responders at the local level. However, the purpose of planning is still for crisis management to operate as effectively as possible in the region (paragraphs 18.1–18.2).

• Each region must produce a generic emergency response plan to ensure that the regional tier is prepared to respond. Like local plans, this regional plan should deliver known key benefits (paragraphs 18.3–18.6).

• Each Government Office will have its own business continuity plan to ensure it can support regional responses to emergencies (paragraphs 18.7–18.8).

• Each region may also have Regional Capability Co-ordination Plans (RCCPs), covering the co-ordination and support of the local response and the support of local government responses (paragraphs 18.9–18.15).

• It is just as important for the Regional Resilience Forum to know how to validate regional plans through exercises as it is for Local Resilience Forums (paragraphs 18.16–18.25).

• All Category 1 and 2 responders need access to regional plans; Regional Resilience Teams may need to decide how to manage access to sensitive information in plans (paragraphs 18.26–18.27; see also Chapter 3).
Planning at the regional level

18.1 Planning at the regional level is different in many ways from planning by Category 1 and 2 responders at the local level. The objectives of this planning work are:

- improving co-ordination across the region and between regions;
- improving co-ordination between the centre and the region; and
- improving co-ordination between the region and the local response capability.

18.2 There are three types of regional plan:

- a generic response plan for activating Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) and regional apparatus;
- a business continuity plan for the Government Office; and
- Regional Capability Co-ordination Plans. Each type is explained in more detail below.

Generic Regional Response Plan

18.3 Each region will have a plan to ensure that, should it be necessary, regional crisis management machinery can be activated as smoothly as possible.

18.4 As at the local level, the generic plan will deliver four key practical benefits:

- a recognised corporate basis of response for the region to any type, or most types, of emergency;
- key supporting elements (that is, capabilities and procedures) which can be selected from and combined as necessary, depending on the nature of the emergency;
- a recognised framework for
  - awareness-raising throughout the region;
  - developing training and exercising throughout the region;
  - building ownership of regional civil protection throughout the region; and
- a recognised corporate framework for participating with Category 1 and 2 responders in any combined response.

18.5 The plan will have three main elements:

- procedures for communicating with the local level, other regions and the centre of government.

18.6 The plan will be owned by the Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) and maintained by the Regional Resilience Team (RRT).

Government Office Business Continuity Plan

18.7 The second element of regional planning is the Government Office Business Continuity Plan (GOBCP). The purpose of this plan is to make sure that the Government Office can continue to operate its essential functions in an emergency, particularly those which might be necessary for the response to that emergency.

18.8 The GOBCP will be developed on the same basis as Category 1 responder business continuity plans (as set out in Chapter 6). This is to ensure that Government Offices meet the same standards, and adhere to the same procedures.

Regional Capability Co-ordination Plans

18.9 The regional tier has an important role to play in terms of consistency of approach at the local level. This will not be true of each specific area of planning – many specific plans can and should be produced in isolation. But certain types of planning, particularly in relation to events which could impact across much or all of a region or which could overwhelm a single locality, are likely to fall to the regional tier to ensure an effective, co-ordinated response.

18.10 The purpose of a Regional Capability Co-ordination Plan (RCCP) is to support local planning, by ensuring that local plans can be scaled up in response to wider impact events. It will do this by identifying the resources needed.

18.11 The decision to have one or more RCCPs will be taken either by the RRF, reflecting local pressure for increased support, or by the relevant lead government department as part of its national planning work. The decision will not be taken by the RRT.
18.12 RCCPs will be critical in developing capabilities on a regional basis to deal with emergencies which overwhelm individual local areas. By setting out how mutual support will take place in a co-ordinated way, this planning will ensure that more effective arrangements are in place to deal with ‘mass’ impacts. For example, a large-scale incident with a high number of fatalities could exceed emergency mortuary capacity in a local area. But by drawing on a Regional Fatalities Co-ordination Plan, mortuary facilities across the region could be brought into play to support the affected local area.

18.13 Although much of the existing capacity to respond sits at the local level, some capacity also sits at the regional level. Essentially, this is the capacity that can be found in central government bodies which are located regionally. For example, the armed forces have a long history of providing capabilities to support the local response. Other government bodies such as the Department for Work and Pensions have staff who could, in the event of a serious emergency, be deployed to assist with certain tasks (as they were during the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak).

18.14 RCCPs will also identify those government resources in the regions which could be brought to bear in an emergency, and plan how that would be achieved with maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

18.15 These plans will be owned by RRTs, but developed in close collaboration with organisations involved. The plans will be drawn up in accordance with the principles and practices set out in Chapter 5. All plans will be signed off by the RRF.

Plan validation

18.16 The validation of regional plans is just as important as plan validation at the local level.

Plan publication

18.17 The publication and dissemination of an emergency plan for internal purposes (that is, for the staff, teams and organisations covered by the plan) is an important part of plan validation. A regional plan is not valid if it only exists in draft form. For a regional plan to be valid, it must be accepted as the stated policy of the RRF, on whose behalf it has been produced. For this to happen, both the RRF and the Category 1 and 2 responders it represents must have an awareness of the plan and have accepted part ownership of it where that is relevant.

18.18 Persons responsible for carrying out roles in the plan must be aware of those roles. Dissemination of the plan will often be accompanied by awareness-raising events designed to promote the plan to those ‘who need to know’.

18.19 There should also be a general level of awareness throughout the region that the plan exists and that organisations have a commitment to carry out agreed responsibilities under the plan.

Exercises

18.20 Regional planning will be supported by exercises. Just as at the local level, regional exercising has two main purposes:
- to validate plans; and
- to develop staff competencies and give them practice in carrying out their roles in the plans; and
- to test procedures and systems.

Most exercises will have some elements of both.

18.21 In developing an exercise programme across a number of plans and over a period of time the regional resilience tier will focus on:
- all aspects of the main Generic Regional Response Plan;
- plans which address the most probable risks and are most likely to be used;
- those elements of a plan which are weakest; and
- those plans or parts of plans where the least exercising has been done.

18.22 Persons writing and delivering exercises and training should be suitably experienced or qualified.

18.23 The combined response will be strengthened if Category 1 and 2 responders are aware of regional exercises and invited, where appropriate, to play a part in them. Multi-agency exercise and training programmes can be publicised through the RRF.

18.24 Equally, some regional participation in exercises will be on the basis of involvement in a locally or nationally organised event.
18.25 The detail of exercises at the regional level will be developed in accordance with the principles and procedures set out in Chapter 5.

**Access to plans**

18.26 As set out above, regional planning will not be effective if the work is not shared with the right organisations at both the regional and local levels. Better information sharing will lead to more effective planning and response. Equally, as Chapter 3 sets out, not all information can be shared because some of it is sensitive. But the general presumption is that information should be shared wherever possible.

18.27 On that basis:

- The Generic Regional Response Plan will be shared with members of the RRF and cascaded appropriately. This is both part of the validation process and a means to ensure that all are clear about their roles in a regional response.
- The GOBCP will not be circulated beyond the Government Office.
- RCCPs will be circulated to all those Category 1 and 2 responders which need to be familiar with their contents for the purposes of planning at the local level. The decision about how widely to disseminate an RCCP will be taken by the RRF, acting on the advice of the RRT in relation to sensitive information. Should the contents of the plan be deemed sensitive, the RRF might agree to issue parts of the plan or an abridged version of the plan.
Annex 2A: Model terms of reference for the Local Resilience Forum

Aim
The [insert area] Local Resilience Forum sits at the apex of [insert area]'s local civil protection arrangements. Its overall purpose is to ensure that there is an appropriate level of preparedness to enable an effective multi-agency response to emergencies which may have a significant impact on the communities of [insert area].

Objectives
The Local Resilience Forum’s specific objectives are:
• to agree on joint strategic and policy approaches relating to [insert area]'s preparedness and response;
• to approve the Community Risk Register, and ensure it provides a robust basis for planning;
• to ensure that appropriate multi-agency plans, procedures, training and exercises necessary to address identified or foreseeable local and wider area hazards are in place and outstanding gaps identified;
• to direct and oversee the activities of working groups as they are established and allocate tasks to them as appropriate;
• to receive reports from the working groups on current threat levels, gaps in planning and progress on actions tasked;
• to ensure that appropriate resources are made available to working groups to fulfil statutory and task-based responsibilities;
• to co-ordinate the individual approaches and responsibilities of each organisation to ensure that they complement each other and dovetail with partners’ arrangements; and
• to consider the implications of legislation, national initiatives and decisions of the Regional Resilience Forum for the Local Resilience Forum area.
Annex 3A: Formal procedures for requesting information

Procedure for making a request

3A.1 In any instance of information sharing, one or more Category 1 or 2 responders will request the information and one or more will receive the request. They are known respectively as “the requesting responder” and “the receiving responder.”

3A.2 An information request should be made in writing. It must specify either the information required or a description of the information requested. The request should be sufficiently precise that the nature of the information sought is clear. The request must include reasons as to why the responder needs the information.

3A.3 The request may specify a time limit for dealing with it, and the place at which the information should provide. The request may also specify the form in which the information is to be supplied (e.g. in paper form, on disk). In each case the time allowed, and the place and form specified, must be reasonable. For example, a requesting responder seeking details from an established plan might allow a week for the receiving responder to reply. But if the information being sought is, for example, not presently collated in an easy-to-share way, or can only be released with the permission of a third party, a month might be more applicable. Wherever possible, the mechanics of the request should be discussed in advance between responders.

3A.4 A template for requesting information can be found at Annex 3B.

Procedure for dealing with a request

3A.5 A valid request for information in possession of the Category 1 and 2 responder receiving the request, must be complied with unless one of the exceptions (set out below) applies. This is the case even where the information has been originally supplied in confidence – though the responder which receives the information is also likely to become subject to that duty of confidence. Where the responder is subject to restrictions on the disclosure of information in another enactment or a contract, the other enactment or contract will have to be considered in light of the Regulations. Which provision applies will depend on the particular terms of the other enactment or contract.

3A.6 In considering whether the request is valid, a responder should consider if the procedural requirements have been satisfied and whether the reasons given by the requesting responder indicate the information does appear to be reasonably required in connection with the requesting responder’s functions.

3A.7 The information must be provided within the time limit specified in the request. If no time limit is specified, the information must be provided in a reasonable period. The information must be supplied in the form and at the place specified by the request.

3A.8 The request relates to information, not documents. A responder which receives a request is not required to disclose all the documents which contain the information which has been requested.
However, this will often be the easiest way to deal with an information request. In other cases, a new document which contains the information being requested may be prepared.

3A.9 A template for responding to a request for information can be found at Annex 3B.
### Information request under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requesting organisation(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information-holding organisation(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information requested</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reason why the information is required in connection with the Act or other civil protection duties (and how the information is likely to be used)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of request</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date by which information is required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Form in which information is required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place to which information should be sent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact details</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Response to information request under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requesting organisation(s)</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information-holding organisation(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information requested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request accepted?</td>
<td>Yes/no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no, please set out the exceptions on which you are relying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes, please set out any sensitivities or further background information which might be necessary to ensure the information is properly understood and properly protected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date information supplied</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact details</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 4A: Summary of the six step local risk assessment process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step no.</th>
<th>Name of step</th>
<th>Forum level</th>
<th>Agencies involved</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1        | Contextualisation                                 | Risk assessment working group (RAWG) | Category 1 responders | - Define scope of project (relate to definition of emergency in the Act and process to be followed  
- Identify stakeholders  
- Set out risk evaluation criteria and principles  
- Review or describe social, economic, cultural, infrastructural and environmental issues within local context | - Prior internal discussions within all Category 1 responders  
- Views of Category 2 responders received |
| 2        | Hazard review and allocation for assessment       | RAWG                      | Category 1 responders | - Taking into account centrally provided guidance and drawing on information provided by Category 2 responders, Category 1 responders provisionally identify and describe hazards which might give rise to an emergency in the next five years and those which will not  
- Category 1 responders provisionally agree allocation of lead assessors  
- LRF endorses hazards to be assessed and determines lead assessor responsibility  
- RAWG convenes and reviews hazards identified at LRF for confirmation or possible Community Risk Register (CRR) amendment  
- RAWG confirms appropriateness of lead allocation and identifies any other agencies with key roles  
- RAWG agrees a project plan with deadlines for assessing individual or groups of hazards | - Category 1 responders bring own research on hazards  
- Views of Category 2 responders received  
- Government to provide Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)  
- Local Risk Assessment Guidance |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step no.</th>
<th>Name of step</th>
<th>Forum level</th>
<th>Agencies involved</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3       | Risk analysis  | Lead assessor | All Category 1 responders, UK and devolved administration departments and agencies | • Lead assessor considers the likelihood of hazards’ occurrence over five-year period, drawing on generic assessments from central government, other research and knowledge of Category 1 responders  
• Lead assessor suggests the range of potential impacts arising from the hazards as well as any vulnerabilities surrounding these, and discusses with RAWG  
• Lead assessor captures assessment details for each hazard and related reasoning within the individual risk assessment form. This generates a provisional risk statement with likelihood, impact(s) and an overall risk assessment for evaluation by RAWG | • Local Risk Assessment Guidance  
• Lead assessors’ impact and likelihood assessments  
• Input from other Category 1 and 2 administration |
| 4       | Risk evaluation | RAWG        | All Category 1 responders                                                        | • RAWG considers the individual risk assessment forms, compares the results to the risk criteria, and confirms or modifies these assessments as appropriate  
• Agreed assessments are collated and incorporated into CRR  
• Risk matrix is plotted for hazards  
• RAWG incorporates into CRR threat statement provided by central government within the LRAG, but does not assess likelihood or impact  
• RAWG highlights existing capabilities and mitigation plans for the hazards and threats and:  
  – considers the acceptability of risks  
  – identifies and recommends options for risk treatment for the LRF  
  – makes recommendations to the LRF on risk priorities for hazards and threats  
• LRF reviews the CRR and risk matrix in light of the evaluation criteria, and amends as appropriate  
• LRF determines the acceptability of the risks before considering treatment | • Lead assessors bring examples of individual risk assessments back to RAWG  
• Agreed risk evaluation criteria                                                                                     |
<p>|         |                | LRF         | All Category 1 responders                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                          | • Updated CRR, risk matrix and recommendations from RAWG                                                                                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step no.</th>
<th>Name of step</th>
<th>Forum level</th>
<th>Agencies involved</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5       | Risk treatment             | LRF         | LRF               | - Review the capability challenges posed by the risks against existing capabilities, mitigation plans or known gaps  
- Set risk priorities  
- Evaluate proposed options for additional treatment of risks and agree risk treatment plan  
- Identify officer or organisation to be responsible for implementation of actions  
- Actions communicated to appropriate working groups | - Updated CRR, risk matrix and recommendations from RAWG |
| 6       | Monitoring and reviewing   | LRF         | All Category 1 responders  
Category 2 responders (as appropriate) | - Formal review of all risks on four-year cycle, but reviewed and updated as and when appropriate | - Ongoing review of changes to context and hazards within responding organisations  
- Ongoing and regular reviews of risks by LRF between responders |
4B.1 This table is illustrative of the structure and type of content that will be included in the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG). It will identify the types of hazard that Category 1 responders may wish to add to their Community Risk Registers, and an assessment of the likelihood of these risks occurring in a five-year timeframe in a typical Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area. It also sets out the assumptions which underpin the likelihood assessment and guidance on how this might vary through the country. It also provides information on generic threats for Category 1 responders.

4B.2 Category 1 responders are collectively responsible for maintaining a Community Risk Register (CRR). This document is a guide which should assist Category 1 responders in compiling and assessing their CRRs. It aims to provide a consistent basis for emergency planning across the LRF area.

4B.3 For each risk, the following descriptors are provided:

- **Risk identifier:** Risks prefixed with ‘H’ are hazards which will require a national as well as a local response. Risks marked ‘HL’ would not ordinarily prompt a national response, and would usually be dealt with locally. Risks marked ‘T’ are threats which will require a national as well as a local response.

- **Risk category:** This indicates the type of threat or hazard in question (eg terrorist attack, industrial accident, severe weather, public protests). Risk categories should be read in conjunction with outcome descriptions in order to understand the magnitude of the event.

- **Outcome description:** This describes the immediate consequences or significance of the event. Outcome descriptions will often be expressed in terms of the facilities that have been destroyed, the numbers of fatalities and casualties, or extent of contamination. It is this information which enables the subsequent local or regional impact assessment.

- **Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions:** This column in the table sets out the central assessment of the likelihood of the risk arising, the assumptions which have underpinned this assessment and the department or agency which has made this assessment. There is an important distinction in the treatment of likelihood assessments for threats and for hazards. In the case of hazards, the table provides an assessment of the likelihood of relevant risks occurring in a five-year timeframe in a typical LRF area. Likelihood assessments for hazards are presented on a 1–5 scale. In the case of threats, the assessment of likelihoods is treated differently. The table does not show likelihood scorings for each threat event because doing so would be analytically misleading.

- **Variation and further information:** This column in the table provides additional descriptive or statistical guidance on how the generic likelihood assessment may vary across the country. Each region and local area will wish to identify which of those threats and hazards listed could not occur in their area because it lacks particular sites or characteristics; and ultimately each LRF will need to decide on its own likelihood assessments. This will lead to a reduced set of assessed risks for most, if not all, local areas and regions. To aid this process, cells have been shaded grey where the lead department or agency does not expect the likelihood assessment to vary significantly between local areas. However, in cases where a central government department or agency indicates range of likelihood for a particular risk (eg 1–2), then it is anticipated that the LRF likelihood score should usually fall within that range. In this way it is hoped that this guidance and the risk assessment process at national, regional/devolved administration and local levels will facilitate a consistent approach to the assessment of likelihood across the country.

4B.4 The Local Risk Assessment Guidance will be issued annually. Feedback from Category 1 responders about how this guidance could be improved is welcomed through the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of risk</th>
<th>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</th>
<th>Outcome description</th>
<th>Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions</th>
<th>Variation and further information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents and environmental pollution</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at a gas terminal as well as LPG, LNG, and other gas onshore feedstock pipeline and flammable gas storage sites</td>
<td>eg Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and 1,500 hospitalisations. Gas terminal event likely to be of short duration once feed lines are isolated; event at a storage site could last for days if the explosion damaged control equipment.</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Fire and Rescue Service (F&amp;R)/Health and Safety Executive (HSE)</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eg H1</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at an onshore ethylene gas pipeline</td>
<td>eg Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and 1,500 hospitalisations and serious downstream impact on oil and chemical production</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eg H2</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at a gas terminal or involving a gas pipeline</td>
<td>eg Up to 3km around site causing up to 10 fatalities and 100 hospitalisations</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eg HL1</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at an oil refinery</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site and tank storage of flammable or toxic liquids</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire or explosion at an offshore oil/gas platform</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE</td>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of risk</td>
<td>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents and environmental pollution (continued)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosion at a natural gas pipeline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toxic chemical release</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>eg HL2</strong></td>
<td>Industrial accident involving large toxic release, eg from a site storing large quantities of chlorine</td>
<td>eg Up to 3km from site causing up to 30 fatalities and up to 250 hospitalisations</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>eg HL3</strong></td>
<td>Industrial accident involving toxic release</td>
<td>eg Up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100 hospitalisations</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radioactive substance release from a nuclear reactor accident</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accidental or unplanned importation or release of radioactive material from incorrectly handled or disposed of sources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biological substance release from control measure failure (eg pathogen release from containment laboratory)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of risk</td>
<td>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
<td>Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions</td>
<td>Variation and further information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial accidents and environmental pollution (continued)</td>
<td>Widespread contamination of the food supply chain, arising from: 1. Industrial accident (chemical, microbiological, nuclear) affecting food production areas, eg Chernobyl, Sea Empress oil spill, foot and mouth disease (FMD) 2. Contamination of animal feed, eg dioxins, FMD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Food Standards Agency (FSA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime pollution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA Variation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land contamination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA Variation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air quality incident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA Variation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>Rapid accidental sinking of a passenger vessel in, or close to, UK waters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Department for Transport (DfT) Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>Storms and gales</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Meteorological Office (Met Office) (on behalf of EA) Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of risk</td>
<td>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
<td>Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions</td>
<td>Variation and further information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severe weather (continued)</strong></td>
<td>Low temperatures and heavy snow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Met Office (on behalf of EA) Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flooding: Major coastal/tidal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flooding: Major coastal/tidal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flooding: Major fluvial</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: EA Assumptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural hazards</strong></td>
<td>Land movement (tremors and landslides)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building collapse</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Fire/HSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human health</strong></td>
<td>Influenza-type disease (epidemic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Department of Health (DH)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influenza-type disease (pandemic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: DH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SARS-type disease</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: DH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of risk</td>
<td>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
<td>Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions</td>
<td>Variation and further information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Animal health</strong></td>
<td>Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (eg FMD, Classical Swine Fever, Blue Tongue and Newcastle disease of birds)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Defra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (eg Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), rabies and West Nile Virus)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Defra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public protest</strong></td>
<td>Large scale public protest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeted disruptive protest, ie fuel protest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: CCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial technical failure</strong></td>
<td>Technical failure of upstream (offshore) oil/gas network leading to a disruption in upstream oil and gas production</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: DTI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accidental failure at water treatment works</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Defra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-notice failure of a public telephony provider</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (CSIA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical failure of electricity network</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: DH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telecommunication infrastructure – human error</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: CSIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of risk</td>
<td>Risk categories (and sub-categories)</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
<td>Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions</td>
<td>Variation and further information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist bombs – infrastructure</td>
<td>eg T1 Conventional attack on main government buildings</td>
<td>eg Up to 400 fatalities and partial and temporary closure of the building</td>
<td>Likelihood rating: Lead: Home Office</td>
<td>Regions and local areas that include significant main government buildings are at greater risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4C: Example of an individual risk assessment

Individual risk assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard/threat category:</th>
<th>Sub-category:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>Flooding (main river)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard and threat description, including scale:</th>
<th>Risk reference no.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>River W – 10 square miles and 50 square miles</td>
<td>SW1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of revision:</th>
<th>Next review date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4C.1 Overview of hazard or threat

Flooding:
- Most commonly caused by intense bursts of rain causing flash floods or prolonged rainfall on saturated ground in river catchments, which result in rivers or other watercourses overflowing their banks.
- May lead to a minor inundation of properties and road closures, or result in widespread loss of life and devastation of property necessitating the implementation of a co-ordinated recovery plan.

4C.2 Key historical evidence

2000
October/November – United Kingdom – prolonged severe rainfall led to the flooding of 12,000 homes nationwide. The River Ouse at York flooded hundreds of properties with estimated £400 million damages. The Aire flooded over 300 properties in Selby and Barlby and 300 at Stockbridge near Keighley.

1999
March – North Yorkshire – River Derwent burst its banks and inundated Malton and Norton forcing 200 families to abandon their homes (recurred in November 2000).

1998
April – Midlands – extensive flooding killed 5 and damaged 4,500 homes in Northamptonshire, Warwickshire and Oxfordshire.

4C.3 Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard (main river)</th>
<th>Outcome description</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flooding</td>
<td>10 square miles</td>
<td>Probable (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flooding</td>
<td>50 square miles</td>
<td>Negligible (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Igleby appears to be experiencing more instances of all forms of flooding in recent times, in particular as building continues in several floodplains.
4C.4 Impact

Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Outcome description</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flooding (main river)</td>
<td>10 square miles</td>
<td>Significant (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flooding (main river)</td>
<td>50 square miles</td>
<td>Catastrophic (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details

Impacts associated with floods:

Primary:
- Drowning of people, pets and livestock
- Major damage to property and surrounding land
- Closure, or washing away, of roads, bridges, railway lines
- Loss of (and possible damage to) telephone, electricity, gas and water supplies
- Pollution/health risks from sewerage systems, chemical stores, fuel storage tanks
- Evacuation and temporary/long-term accommodation needs

Secondary:
- Need for recovery strategy in aftermath of major flood
- Disruption of economic life and major costs of rebuilding infrastructure
- Public need for information, advice, benefits/emergency payments
- Insurance implications, including help for the uninsured
- Safety assessments/possible demolition of damaged buildings and structures
- Overstretch of key resources (equipment and personnel) and agencies
- Overstretch of normal communication links, including mobile phones

4C.5 Vulnerability and resilience

Areas across Igleby with a high potential for flooding based on topography and historical incidents include Hotton, Nimby and Coneywood Bridge.

4C.6 Overall assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category:</th>
<th>Sub-category:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>Flooding (main river)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome description** | **Impact** | **Likelihood** | **Risk**
---|---|---|---|
10 square miles | Significant | Probable | VERY HIGH |
50 square miles | Catastrophic | Negligible | MEDIUM |

**Controls in place:**

- Council: Major Emergency Plan; Generic Flooding Plan; Major Flood Incident Plan for River Aire.
- **Other organisations:**
  - Police: Flood Warning and Flood Response; Flood Plan for River Wandle.

**Additional risk treatment required:**

- Assist Environment Agency in take-up of automated voice messaging for use in warning local residents and encourage better flood preparedness in communities.
- Work with Land Drainage on the mapping and identification of ‘flooding hotspots’ on beck’s and other watercourses.
# Impact scoring scale – qualitative measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Categories of impact</th>
<th>Description of impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>• Insignificant number of injuries or impact on health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Insignificant number of persons displaced and insignificant personal support required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Insignificant disruption to community services, including transport services and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Insignificant impact on local economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>• Insignificant impact on environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>• Small number of people affected, no fatalities, and small number of minor injuries with first aid treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Minor damage to properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Minor displacement of a small number of people for &lt; 24 hours and minor personal support required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Minor localised disruption to community services or infrastructure &lt; 24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Negligible impact on local economy and cost easily absorbed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>• Minor impact on environment with no lasting effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>• Moderate number of fatalities with some casualties requiring hospitalisation and medical treatment and activation of MAJAX, the automated intelligent alert notification system, procedures in one or more hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Damage that is confined to a specific location, or to a number of locations, but requires additional resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Localised displacement of &gt;100 people for 1–3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Localised disruption to infrastructure and community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Limited impact on local economy with some short-term loss of production, with possible additional clean-up costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>• Limited impact on environment with short-term or long-term effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Descriptor</td>
<td>Categories of impact</td>
<td>Description of impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>• Significant number of people in affected area impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple serious or extensive injuries, significant hospitalisation and activation of MAJAX procedures across a number of hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Significant damage that requires support for local responders with external resources &lt;br&gt;• 100 to 500 people in danger and displaced for longer than 1 week. Local responders require external resources to deliver personal support &lt;br&gt;• Significant impact on and possible breakdown of delivery of some local community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Significant impact on local economy with medium-term loss of production &lt;br&gt;• Significant extra clean-up and recovery costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>• Significant impact on environment with medium- to long-term effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>• Very large numbers of people in affected area(s) impacted with significant numbers of fatalities, large number of people requiring hospitalisation with serious injuries with longer-term effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Extensive damage to properties and built environment in affected area requiring major demolition &lt;br&gt;• General and widespread displacement of more than 500 people for prolonged duration and extensive personal support required &lt;br&gt;• Serious damage to infrastructure causing significant disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged period. Community unable to function without significant support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Serious impact on local and regional economy with some long-term, potentially permanent, loss of production with some structural change &lt;br&gt;• Extensive clean-up and recovery costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>• Serious long-term impact on environment and/or permanent damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explanation of categories of impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Encompassing direct health impacts (numbers of people affected, fatalities, injuries, human illness or injury, health damage) and indirect health impacts that arise because of strain on the health service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Encompassing the social consequences of an event, including availability of social welfare provision; disruption of facilities for transport; damage to property; disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of an electronic or other system of communication; homelessness, evacuation and avoidance behaviour; and public disorder due to anger, fear, and/or lack of trust in the authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Encompassing the net economic cost, including both direct (e.g., loss of goods, buildings, infrastructure) and indirect (e.g., loss of business, increased demand for public services) costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Encompassing contamination or pollution of land, water or air with harmful biological/chemical/radioactive matter or oil, flooding, or disruption or destruction of plant or animal life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

Strictly, levels 1 and 2 of the impact scale are likely to fall below the threshold for an emergency. Consequently, there may be no statutory requirement to plan for events that score 1 or 2 on the impact scale. This scale recognises that, to demonstrate a thorough analysis, Category 1 responders will wish to include in their risk assessment certain risks with impacts at these levels.

Likelihood scoring scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Likelihood over 5 years</th>
<th>Likelihood over 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>&gt;0.005%</td>
<td>&gt;1 in 20,000 chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>&gt;0.05%</td>
<td>&gt;1 in 2,000 chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>&gt;0.5%</td>
<td>&gt;1 in 200 chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>&gt;5%</td>
<td>&gt;1 in 20 chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>&gt;50%</td>
<td>&gt;1 in 2 chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk ref.</td>
<td>Hazard or threat category</td>
<td>Hazard or threat sub-category</td>
<td>Outcome description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW1</td>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>Flooding (main river)</td>
<td>River W - flooding 10 square miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Transport accident | Accident on motorway or major trunk road | Accident on M6. Up to 10 fatalities and 20 hospitalisations, Closure of lanes for up to 1 week | Possible | Significant | Very high | Motorway Incident Plans | Major Incident Plans | Multi-agency co-ordination exercises every 2 years | 3           | Fire Service/DfT | July 2005   |

| Industrial accident and environmental pollution | Toxic chemical release | Accident at AA chemical plant. Release up to 3km from site. Up to 30 fatalities and 250 hospitalisations | Unlikely | Significant | High | Toxic Incident and Environmental Pollution Plans | Major Incident Plans | Exercise safety every 5 years | 3           | Fire Service | July 2005   |

| Terrorist attack (information provided by central government) | Conventional/ explosive | Explosion in a crowded place killing up to 100 people | To be left blank | To be left blank | Inherent hospital surge capacity | Emergency Services Major Incident Plans | Identification of temporary mortuary sites | 2           | Police | July 2005   |
Annex 4F: Risk rating matrix

Definitions of risk ratings

- **Very high (VH) risk** – these are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic.

- **High (H) risk** – these risks are classed as significant. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as ‘very high’. Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also mitigation in the form of at least (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency.
• **Medium (M) risk** – these risks are less significant, but may cause upset and inconvenience in the short term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed under generic emergency planning arrangements.

• **Low (L) risk** – these risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category.
# Annex 5A:
Examples of generic and specific plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan category</th>
<th>Type of plan or planning procedure</th>
<th>Multi-level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generic</strong></td>
<td>Emergency or major incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generic capability or procedure</strong></td>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control centre operating procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determination of an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster appeal fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency interpretation service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency press and media team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency radio and mobile communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evacuation: minor, major, mass</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expenditure procedures during an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External disasters (outside Local Resilience Forum boundary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass fatalities</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rest centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary control centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Site clearance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency mortuary and body holding areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of voluntary organisations by different Category 1 responders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Warning, informing and advising the public, including public information team</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis support team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific hazard or contingency</strong></td>
<td>Aircraft accident</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical hazards</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal pollution</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dam or reservoir failure</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downstream oil</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental health emergencies</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of major utilities: electricity, gas, telephone, water</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foot-and-mouth disease</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influenza pandemic</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prolonged freezing weather</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rabies</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail crash</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>River and coastal flooding (general)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools emergencies</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan category</td>
<td>Type of plan or planning procedure</td>
<td>Multi-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific site or location</td>
<td>Airport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City or town centre evacuation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City or town centre severe weather disruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methane migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-storey block</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-COMAH industrial sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear power station</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public event temporary venue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road tunnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shopping centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific flooding sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sports ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5B: Generic plan: emergency or major incident

The minimum level of information to be contained in a generic plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick [✓]</th>
<th>Generic plan(^1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aim of the plan, including links with plans of other responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trigger for activation of the plan, including alert and standby procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activation procedures(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification and generic roles of emergency management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification and generic roles of emergency support staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location of emergency control centre from which emergency will be managed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generic roles of all parts of the organisation in relation to responding to emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complementary generic arrangements of other responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stand-down procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex: contact details of key personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex: reference to Community Risk Register and other relevant information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Plan maintenance procedures**

|          | Plan validation (exercises) schedule\(^3\) |
|          | Training schedule\(^4\) |

---

\(^1\) regulation 21(b)  
\(^2\) regulation 24  
\(^3\) regulation 25(a)  
\(^4\) regulation 25(b)
Annex 5C:
Specific Plan

The minimum level of information to be contained in a specific plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tick [v]</th>
<th>Specific plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aim of the plan, including links with the plans of other responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information about the specific hazard or contingency or site for which the plan has been prepared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trigger for activation of the plan, including alert and standby procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activation procedures¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification and roles of multi-agency strategic (gold) and tactical (silver) teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification of lead responsibilities of different responder organisations at different stages of the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification of roles of each responder organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location of joint operations centre from which emergency will be managed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stand-down procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex: contact details of key personnel and partner agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Plan maintenance procedures**

- Plan validation (exercises) schedule¹
- Training schedule¹

¹ regulation 21(a)
² regulation 24
³ regulation 25(a)
⁴ regulation 25(b)
Annex 5D: Example of a plan maintenance matrix for a local authority

Cycle of actions to maintain emergency plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle of actions</th>
<th>Generic emergency plan</th>
<th>Emergency management team</th>
<th>Central control team</th>
<th>Forward communications team</th>
<th>Public information team</th>
<th>Facilities set-up team</th>
<th>Access to resources</th>
<th>Crisis support team</th>
<th>Hospitals support</th>
<th>Emergency mortuary</th>
<th>Major evacuation</th>
<th>Rest centre</th>
<th>Disaster appeal fund</th>
<th>Specific plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Update and issue call-out lists (quarterly)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Visit key officers in departments</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Check resource lists for departments</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Integrate all plans with those of emergency services</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Visit all external bodies listed in plans</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Brief key officers within council and outside</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hold exercises to test plans and improve them</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Review all plans and revise as necessary</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7A: Communicating with the public: the national context

Delivering alerts

7A.1 It is over 10 years since the decision was taken to dismantle the national network of warning sirens used extensively during the Second World War, and maintained in a state of readiness throughout the Cold War period. The threat is different now and there are very few scenarios which would require the entire nation to take immediate action in the event of an emergency.

7A.2 The National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public was set up in the mid-1990s to advise government. Its recommendation, in the absence of any national warning mechanism, has been that local solutions should be tailored to local circumstances.

7A.3 Where credible and specific threats to national security are identified in advance, information is handled at a national level and public warnings issued by the police and/or Home Secretary. Any threat connected with international terrorism is going to be a national – even international – issue and information about it will be co-ordinated centrally regardless of what part of the country is under threat. Equally, any catastrophic emergency, wherever it takes place, will be of interest nationally, and media coverage will guarantee public attention.

Information and advice

7A.4 The scale and nature of any emergency will dictate the level of national involvement in the handling of it, particularly on the communications side. If ministerial involvement becomes necessary, then the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will also be set up in Whitehall by information staff within Cabinet Office. This will function alongside the government department leading the response and liaise closely with staff from the Government News Network at the scene of the emergency, if outside London.

7A.5 The NCC will help to co-ordinate the information activities of the various government departments and agencies involved, by pulling together briefing from the different expert bodies for ministers and ensuring that interview bids for ministers are handled appropriately. They will work closely with the national and international media in this. They will also monitor the output of major broadcasters so that they can correct inaccuracies and spot subject areas where additional material would provide better balance in coverage. It can be up and running within 90 minutes and can operate 24 hours a day as required.

7A.6 The NCC will have responsibility both for meeting the needs of the news agenda and managing the delivery of public information and safety advice at a national level. It will be manned by staff from the various affected departments, to ensure effective co-ordination of activities. Where necessary, it may invoke standing protocols with the media to issue Public Safety Information either nationwide or in particular regions.

7A.7 Robust communications links will be established with those at the scene and in charge of operations to make sure that strategic and high-level political decisions are based on accurate, up-to-date information. The NCC, or the Assembly Press Office

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1 http://www.nscwip.info
2 http://www.ukresilience.info/lead.htm explains more about the role and responsibilities of the lead government department
3 More information about the work of the Government News Network can be found at http://www.gnn.gov.uk
4 There is more detail about the work of the News Co-ordination Centre in Emergency Response and Recovery (see Bibliography)
in Wales, may send someone from the team to the site of the incident as a contact point, who can keep those on site in touch with central, political activities and interests.

**7A.8** It will not be directly involved in operational decisions on site about media arrangements. However, the central operations team which runs the NCC has, in close co-operation with central government, the devolved administrations, local government, emergency services, utilities and other operators, produced detailed protocols which cover many logistical aspects of dealing with the sort of massive influx of media organisations into an area which would be generated by a national-level catastrophe.
Annex 7B:
Lead responsibility for warning and informing the public

Arrangements for warning, informing and advising the public, including identification of the lead responder

The range of emergencies listed in the first column in this table matches the main classification of emergencies in Annex 4B. The remaining columns deal with the following:

1. Suggestions as to the Category 1 responders likely to have a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in relation to particular emergencies.

2. Suggestions as to which of those Category 1 responders should take the lead on behalf of the Category 1 responders in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the initial stages of an emergency. Responsibility may of course transfer from one Category 1 responder to another as the emergency situation develops.

Category 1 responders must of course make their own decisions about identifying which will take the role of lead responder in the light of local conditions. They may wish to make a more detailed breakdown of responsibilities, as suggested by the detailed classification of types of hazard in Annex 4B.

It is important to recognise that the lead Category 1 responder will not necessarily take the lead overall in warning, informing and advising the public. This role may in certain circumstances fall to a Category 2 responder or an organisation which is not a responder. This is dealt with in column 3. Column 2 suggests which Category 1 responder might be the most appropriate to take the lead on behalf of Category 1 responders within these overall arrangements.

3. Suggestions of non-Category 1 responders who, in particular circumstances, may play the lead role or a significant role in arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public.

The Act imposes a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public on Category 1 responders only. In practice, Category 2 responders and the Met Office, Defra or the Food Standards Agency will have a significant role in these arrangements in relation to particular emergencies. In some cases, it will even be appropriate for a Category 2 responder or the Met Office, Defra and the Food Standards Agency to take the lead role. Included in column 3 are organisations which are relevant in this way.

The Regulations provide that Category 1 responders must have regard to the arrangements maintained by these bodies in performing their duty under the Act. The Regulations also provide that Category 1 responders need not unnecessarily duplicate the arrangements maintained by these bodies.

4. Suggestions of other organisations which will have an important role in arrangements to warn, advise and inform the public and with whom Category 1 responders may wish to liaise.

In addition to Category 2 responders and the Met Office, Defra and the Food Standards Agency, there are other organisations which will play an important role in communicating with the public. These bodies are unlikely to play such a significant role that it is appropriate for Category 1 responders to be required to have regard to their activities under the Regulations. Nonetheless, there will often be merit in Category 1 responders considering the role that these bodies will play in communicating with the public in an emergency and in liaising with them in the planning phase.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERIC HAZARD OR THREAT</th>
<th>1. Category 1 responders likely to have a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public</th>
<th>2. Suggestions of Category 1 responders from whom a lead responder to maintain arrangements to warn etc may be identified</th>
<th>3. Organisations, not Category 1s, which may also play a lead or a significant role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public</th>
<th>4. Other organisations which may have an important role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>Police, British Transport Police, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, local authorities, NHS Trusts</td>
<td>Police, British Transport Police or Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
<td>Airport or port operator, train operating company, Highways Agency, Network Rail</td>
<td>Airlines, shipping companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe weather</td>
<td>Police, Fire, Environment Agency, local authorities, HPA, NHS Trusts, Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
<td>Police, Fire or Environment Agency</td>
<td>Met Office, utilities, transport, including Highways Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural hazards</td>
<td>Police, Fire, local authorities</td>
<td>Police, Fire or local authorities</td>
<td>Utilities, including water companies</td>
<td>Owners and operators of structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human health</td>
<td>Health Protection Agency, NHS Trusts, Port Health Authority, local authorities, Police</td>
<td>Health Protection Agency</td>
<td>Food Standards Agency</td>
<td>Utilities, Strategic Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal health</td>
<td>Police, local authority, Port Health Authority</td>
<td>Police or local authority</td>
<td>Defra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant disease</td>
<td>Police, Port Health Authority</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Defra, Food Standards Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public protest</td>
<td>Police, local authority</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial action</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial technical failure</td>
<td>Police, local authority</td>
<td>Police, local authority</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7C: Checklist of suggested protocols for warning, informing and advising the public

- To agree the identity of lead responders to warn, inform and advise the public on those scenarios which can reasonably be anticipated.
- To agree the process to be used to identify the lead responder to warn, inform and advise the public on any other type of emergency.
- To agree joint working procedures and allocation of responsibilities in support of the lead responder for warning, informing and advising.
- To agree the trigger points for the handover of the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising from one responder body to another, and the procedures to achieve this.
- To agree how services or products for warning, informing and advising (e.g., equipment for media centres) will be sourced.
- As appropriate, to agree with local companies and organisations the circumstances in which their facilities or resources (e.g., premises, call centres) may be made available to the responder bodies to help deliver advice and information to the public in the course of an emergency.
### Annex 14A: Examples of voluntary sector activities in support of statutory services

Appropriate parts of the voluntary sector should undertake the following activities only if the volunteers receive appropriate training that is recognised by the professional organisation seeking their support.

**Welfare**
- Staffing rest centres, family and friends reception centres, survivor reception centres and family assistance centres.
- Feeding.
- Provision of clothing.
- Advice on entitlements, grants, loans, claims.
- Resettlement of victims, evacuees, etc.
- Support and comforting.
- Providing information and advice.

**In support of:**
- Local authority social services
- Local authority education department
- Local authority housing department
- Police family liaison officers.

**Social and psychological aftercare**
- Befriending.
- Providing longer-term support.
- Listening skills, welfare support and comforting.

**In support of:**
- Local authority social services
- Local authority educational psychologists
- National Health Service (NHS).

**Medical support**
- Support to Ambulance Service.
- First aid and medical aid posts.
- First aid and medical aid support in reception and rest centres.
- Emergency feeding.
- Auxiliary roles in hospitals.
- Welfare.

**In support of:**
- NHS Ambulance Service
- NHS hospital trusts.
Search and rescue

- Mountain, cave, tunnels and shafts, cliff, moor, inland waterways, coastal rescue, coastal or inland flooding, etc.
- Supervision of other searchers (e.g., youth organisations).
- Loan of equipment.

In support of:
- Emergency services.

Transport

- Transport and escort of homeless, outpatients, next-of-kin, etc. to and from airports, railway stations, hospitals, mortuaries, rest centres, hostels, etc.

In support of:
- Local authority social services or housing departments
- Emergency services
- NHS.

Communications

- Providing radio and telephone communications and operators.
- Vehicles.
- Messengers.
- Interpreters and translators.

In support of:
- Emergency services
- Local authorities
- Utilities.

Documentation

- Tracing people nationally and internationally.
- Assistance at Casualty Bureau in some local areas.
- Logging/diary procedures.
- Computer support.

In support of:
- Emergency services (especially police)
- Local authority social services or housing departments
- NHS
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- International Committee of the Red Cross.

Financial aid

- Advice and provision of appeals, disaster funds.

In support of:
- Local authorities.
Training and exercising

- Analysis of training needs and capabilities.
- Devising instructional programmes.
- Joint planning and conduct of multi-agency exercises, including call-out arrangements and debrief.
- Formulation and dissemination of good practice.

In support of:
- Emergency services
- Local authority departments
- National utilities
- NHS.

Note
The emergency services may call on assistance from the armed forces, particularly military search and rescue resources. Voluntary organisations such as cave and mountain rescue may therefore sometimes find themselves working with the armed forces.
• Improving co-ordination across the region and between regions
  – Mapping of resilience at a regional level, identification of gaps and facilitation of preparedness activity, involving departments and agencies, emergency services, local authorities, etc.
  – Supporting cross-boundary working, mutual aid agreements and information sharing at local and regional levels.

• Improving co-ordination between the centre and the region
  – Improving access to information on threat assessments and risk management, in both directions.
  – Improving access to capability planning material, generic and specific plans and best practice, in both directions.

• Improving co-ordination between the region and the local response capability
  – Improving access to information on threat assessments and risk management, in both directions.
  – Improving access to capability planning material, generic and specific plans and best practice, in both directions.

• Supporting planning for a response capability
  – Creating and maintaining agreements between the central government bodies represented on the Regional Resilience Forum to provide personnel and equipment to support, on a mutual aid basis, the central government response to an emergency in the region.
Glossary

(The) Act
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004. This Act sets the framework for civil protection at the local level in the UK.

Body holding area
An area close to the scene of an emergency where the dead can be held temporarily before transfer to the emergency mortuary or mortuary.

Bronze
Operational level is the level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site or impacted areas.

Business continuity forum
Grouping of organisations to share and co-ordinate business continuity plans.

Business continuity management (BCM)
A management process that helps manage the risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring that it can operate to the extent required in the event of a disruption.

Business continuity plan (BCP)
A documented set of procedures and information intended to deliver continuity of critical functions in the event of a disruption.

Business impact analysis
A method of assessing the impacts that might result from an incident and the levels of resources and time required for recovery.

Capabilities Programme
The UK Capabilities Programme comprises a range of capabilities that underpin the UK’s resilience to disruptive challenges. These capabilities are either structural (eg regional response), functional (eg decontamination) or essential services (eg financial services).

Capability
A demonstrable capacity or ability to respond to and recover from a particular threat or hazard. Originally a military term, it includes personnel, equipment, training and such matters as plans, doctrine and the concept of operations.

Capability gap
The gap between the current ability to provide a response and the actual response assessed to be required for a given threat or hazard. Plans should be made to reduce or eliminate this gap, if the risk justifies it.
**Capability status**
Assessment of the level of capability in place.

**Capability target**
The level of capability that the planning assumptions and the plan require.

**Casualty Bureau**
The purpose of the Casualty Bureau is to provide the initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in the emergency. The primary objectives of a Casualty Bureau are: inform the investigation process relating to the incident; trace and identify people involved in the incident; and reconcile missing persons and collate accurate information in relation to the above for dissemination to appropriate parties.

**Catastrophic incident or emergency**
An incident or emergency that has a high and potentially widespread impact and requires immediate central government attention and support.

**Category 1 responder**
A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act.

**Category 2 responder**
A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are co-operating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.

**Central Emergency Management Group (CEMG)**
A pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. It is broadly analogous to the Regional Resilience Forums in England.

**Civil defence**
Preparedness by the civil community to deal with hostile attack.

**Civil protection**
Preparedness to deal with a wide range of emergencies from localised flooding to terrorist attack.

**Command and control**
Principles adopted by an agency acting with full authority to direct its own resources (both personnel and equipment).

**Community resilience**
The ability of a local community to respond to and recover from emergencies.

**Community Risk Register (CRR)**
An assessment of the risks within a local resilience area agreed by the Local Resilience Forum as a basis for supporting the preparation of emergency plans.

**Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA)**
The CPA was introduced in 2002 as a way of supporting councils to deliver improvements in services to local people.
Consequences
Impact resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazard or threat, measured in terms of the numbers of lives lost, people injured, the scale of damage to property and the disruption to essential services and commodities.

Control centre
Operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of response to an emergency is carried out.

Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, Northern Ireland 2000 (COMAH)
Regulations applying to the chemical industry and to some storage sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances, as identified in the Regulations, are kept or used.

Controlled area
The area contained – if practicable – by the inner cordon.

Cost-recovery basis
Situation where an organisation can charge another organisation for providing a service, but with no positive or negative cost implications. No profit can be made by the organisation providing the service.

Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA)
Police officers who provide advice on preventing and mitigating the effects of acts of terrorism.

Critical function
A service or operation the continuity of which a Category 1 responder needs to ensure, in order to meet its business objectives.

Cross-border co-operation
Co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders across boundaries with devolved administrations.

Cross-boundary co-operation
Co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders across the boundaries between LRF areas.

Data Protection Act
The Data Protection Act 1998 came into force in March 2000. It requires organisations that hold data about individuals to do so securely and to use it only for specific purposes. It also gives an individual the right, with certain exemptions, to see that personal data.

Delegation
A formal agreement whereby one organisation’s functions will be carried out by another. This does not absolve the organisation of any duty, merely re-designating the form of delivery.

Emergency
An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK or to the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. To constitute an emergency this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder.

Emergency management
The process of managing emergencies, including the maintenance of procedures to assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies.
Emergency mortuary
Demountable (temporary) structures or conversion of existing structures whose function is to provide an area where post-mortem and identification examinations of victims can take place and, where necessary, provide body holding capability prior to bodies being released for funeral arrangements to be made. Also known as a temporary mortuary.

Emergency planning (EP)
Development and maintenance of agreed procedures to prevent, reduce, control, mitigate and take other actions in the event of an emergency.

Emergency planning cycle
A continuous process of assessing the risk of and preparing for emergencies supported by procedures to keep staff in readiness and validate plans. Plans should also be reviewed and, if necessary, revised when they have been activated in response to an emergency.

Environmental Information Regulations
Fully in force from January 2005, these regulations give access rights to any person of any nationality to environmental information held by an organisation, such as water pollution statistics and health and safety policies.

Exercise
A simulation to validate an emergency or business continuity plan, rehearse key staff or test systems and procedures.

Exercise Directing Team
The team that assists in designing an exercise and then directing the exercise play.

Exercise Director
The individual who is charged with designing and directing an exercise.

Exercise Programme
Planned series of exercises to validate plans and to train and develop staff competencies.

Family and Friends Reception Centre
Secure area set aside for use and interviewing of family and friends arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port). Established by the police in consultation with the local authority.

Family Assistance Centres
A one-stop-shop for survivors, families, friends and all those affected by the emergency, through which they can access support, care and advice.

Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 allows the public access, regardless of nationality or country of residence, to information held by public authorities or anyone providing services for them, subject to certain exemptions. It came fully into force in January 2005.

Generic local assessment
Assessment provided by central government to the local level.

Generic plan
A single plan designed to cope with a wide range of emergencies.
Gold
Strategic decision makers and groups at the local level. They establish the framework within which operational and tactical managers work in responding to and recovering from emergencies.

Government Office Business Continuity Plan (GOBCP)
Plan to ensure that the Government Office for the Region can continue to operate its essential functions in an emergency.

Hazard
An accidental or naturally occurring event or situation with the potential to cause physical (or psychological) harm to members of the community (including loss of life), damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment or to structures (economic, social, political) upon which a community's way of life depends.

Hazard assessment
A component of the risk assessment process in which identified hazards are assessed for future action.

Hazard identification
A process by which potential hazards are identified.

Impact
The scale of the consequences of a hazard or threat expressed in terms of a reduction in human welfare, damage to the environment and loss of security.

Inner cordon
Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident.

Integrated emergency management (IEM)
An approach to preventing and managing emergencies which entails six key activities – anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. It requires a coherent multi-agency effort.

Joint Emergency Service Group (JESG)
A steering group for multi-agency working between the emergency services.

Joint working
A single programme being delivered jointly by a number of organisations.

Lead government department (LGD)
Government department which, in the event of an emergency, co-ordinates central government activity. The department which will take the lead varies depending on the nature of the emergency. The Government regularly publishes a full list of LGDs.

Lead organisation
Organisation appointed by a group of organisations to speak or act on their behalf or to take the lead in a given situation, with the other organisations’ support. The exact role of the lead organisation depends on the circumstances in which the lead role is being operated.

Lead responder
A Category 1 responder charged with carrying out a duty under the Act on behalf of a number of responder organisations, so as to co-ordinate its delivery and to avoid unnecessary duplication.
**Liaison officer**
Person within an organisation who co-ordinates their organisation's staff at the scene of an incident.

**Local resilience area**
The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in their local resilience area. Each local resilience area (with the exception of London) is based on a police area. The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation is the Local Resilience Forum.

**Local Resilience Forum (LRF)**
A process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a local police area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Act.

**Local responder**
Organisation which responds to emergencies at the local level. These may include Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act and other organisations not covered by the Act.

**Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)**
A document provided by central government with information on generic hazards and threats that should assist Category 1 responders in performing their local risk assessment duty under the Civil Contingencies Act.

**Major incident**
This term is commonly used by emergency services personnel operationally to describe an emergency as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act.

**Media plan**
A key plan for ensuring co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders and the media in communicating with the public during and after an emergency.

**Minister (of the Crown)**
Government Minister with power to act under the Civil Contingencies Act, usually relating to the issuing of guidance and regulations, but also including urgent powers of direction (for example, in times of catastrophic emergency or to deal with newly arising risks) and monitoring powers.

**Multi-agency plan**
A plan, usually prepared and maintained by a lead responder, on behalf of a number of organisations who need to co-ordinate and integrate their preparations for an emergency.

**Multi-level plan**
A plan, usually initiated and maintained by central government or a regional office, which relies on the participation and co-operation of Category 1 and 2 responders. The plan will cover more than one level of government.

**Mutual aid**
An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency which may go beyond the resources of an individual organisation.

**News Co-ordination Centre (NCC)**
The NCC works with the lead government department to provide co-ordinating media and public communications support during a crisis, emergency or major event.
Outcome description
An indication of the scale of a generic type of event (e.g., flooding) in terms of its intrinsic or immediate characteristics (e.g., rainfall or area flooded). Outcome description is to be distinguished from impact (see above).

Outer cordon
Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access.

Outsourcing
Where a duty is contracted to a third party on a commercial basis, either by an individual organisation or collectively.

Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996
Legislation on the management of pipeline safety, using an integrated, goal-setting, risk-based approach encompassing both onshore and offshore pipelines; includes the major accident prevention document, the arrangements for emergency plans and the transitional arrangements.

Plan maintenance
Procedures for ensuring that plans are kept in readiness for emergencies and that planning documents are up to date.

Plan validation
Measures to ensure that a plan meets the purpose for which it was designed, through exercises, tests, staff ‘buy-in’ and so on.

Planning assumptions
Descriptions of the types and scales of consequences for which organisations should be prepared to respond. These will be informed by the risk assessment process.

Primary Care Trust
Primary Care is the care provided by those professionals the public normally see when they have a health problem (e.g., doctor, dentist, optician, pharmacist). These services are managed by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).

Public awareness
A level of knowledge within the community about risk and preparedness for emergencies, including actions the public authorities will take and actions the public should take.

Public Information Line
A help-line set up during and in the aftermath of an emergency to deal with information requests from the public and to take pressure off the Police Casualty Bureau (which has a separate and distinct purpose).

The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR)
Implemented in GB the articles on intervention in cases of radiation (radiological) emergency in Council Directive 96/29/Euratom, also known as the BSS96 Directive. The Directive lays down the basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The REPPIR also partly implement the Public Information Directive by subsuming the Public Information for Radiation Emergencies Regulations 1992 (PIRER) on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of an emergency.

Readiness level
An assessment of the extent to which a capability meets the agreed capability target.
Recovery
The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.

Recovery time objectives
Identifies the time by which critical functions and/or their dependencies must be recovered.

Regional Capability Co-ordination Plan
Plan to support local planning by ensuring coherence and identifying resources, available at both local and regional level, across the region.

Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC)
A committee which meets during an emergency when a regional response or other action at regional level is required.

Regional Media Emergency Forum (RMEF)
Group of representatives from the media (editors, journalists), government, emergency services and other organisations involved in dealing with an emergency, meeting to plan and discuss communications challenges and common interests in planning for and responding to emergencies.

Regional Resilience Director (RRD)
Head of a Regional Resilience Team.

Regional Resilience Forum (RRF)
A forum established by a Government Office to discuss civil protection issues from the regional perspective and to create a stronger link between local and central government on resilience issues.

Regional Resilience Team (RRT)
Small team of civil servants within a Government Office for the Region working on civil protection issues, headed by a Regional Resilience Director.

Regional Risk Map
Map of assessed risks across a region.

Rendezvous point
Point to which all vehicles and resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed.

Resilience
The ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident.

Rest centre
Premises used for temporary accommodation of evacuees from an incident.

Risk
Risk measures the significance of a potential event in terms of likelihood and impact. In the context of the Civil Contingencies Act, the events in question are emergencies.

Risk appetite
Willingness of an organisation to accept a defined level of risk.
Risk assessment
A structured and auditable process of identifying potentially significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action.

Risk management
The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards the effective management of risks.

Risk priority
The relative importance of the treatment(s) required for the management of the risk, based on the risk rating and the additional capabilities required to manage risk.

Risk rating matrix
Matrix of impact and likelihood for an event, to ascertain the risk.

Risk treatment
A systematic process of deciding which risks can be eliminated or reduced by remedial action and which must be tolerated.

Safety Advisory Group (SAG)
Multi-agency group set up to provide advice on safety matters for a specific event, or events, such as a major sporting event or a concert held in a stadium.

Scottish Category 1 responder
A person or body listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers.

Scottish Category 2 responder
A person or body listed in Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers.

Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee (SECC)
A multi-agency group in Scotland which ensures that steps are taken to respond to the changing risk environment and determines the national strategy for the development of civil protection. The membership of SECC can be adjusted according to circumstances, but it includes Scottish Executive departments, emergency services, local authorities and the Armed Forces. The SECC may meet at a time of emergency to advise on development of the national strategy.

Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER)
A facility within the Scottish Executive Emergency Room for communication, information processing and co-ordination of the central government emergency response led by the Scottish Executive.

Sensitive information
Information that is not reasonably accessible to the public because its disclosure to the public would, or would be likely to (a) adversely affect national security, (b) adversely affect public safety, (c) prejudice the commercial interests of any person; or information that is personal data, within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, disclosure of which would breach that Act.

Silver
Tactical level of management introduced to provide overall management of the response.
Small or medium-sized enterprise (SME)
Defined by the DTI as a business with less than 250 employees.

Specific plan
A plan designed to cope with a specific type of emergency, where the generic plan is likely to be insufficient.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group
Multi-agency group which sets the policy and strategic framework for emergency response and recovery work at local level (see also Gold).

Survivor reception centre
Secure area where survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.

Survivors
Those who are directly affected by an emergency, but not killed by it. Including those who have been injured, traumatised or displaced.

Temporary mortuary
See Emergency mortuary.

Threat
The intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse consequences to human welfare (including property and the supply of essential services and commodities), the environment or security.

Threat assessment
A component of the risk assessment process in which identified threats are assessed for future action.

Utilities
Companies providing essential services, eg water, energy, telecommunications.

Voluntary sector
Bodies, other than public authorities or local authorities, that carry out activities otherwise than for profit.

Vulnerability
The susceptibility of a community, services or infrastructure to damage or harm by a realised hazard or threat.

Vulnerable establishment
An institution housing vulnerable people during the day or at night.

Wales Resilience Forum (WRF)
This Forum is a multi-agency group providing the mechanism for national multi-agency co-operation and strategic advice on civil protection and emergency planning at an all-Wales level.

Warning and informing the public
Establishing arrangements to warn the public when an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred and to provide them with information and advice subsequently.
Welsh Borders Resilience Group (WBRG)
A group bringing together the Welsh Assembly Government and Regional Resilience Teams from the Government Offices for the South West, West Midlands and North West to facilitate co-operation and information sharing between Wales and the border areas of England.

Z-Cards
A patented format for publishing information. Up to an A3-sized page can be folded down to credit card size. This size means it is convenient to carry and can be stored in pockets, handbags, etc.
### Acronyms

Not all acronyms appear in both *Emergency Preparedness* and *Emergency Response and Recovery*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABI</td>
<td>Association of British Insurers</td>
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<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Ambulance Service Association</td>
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<td>ATOC</td>
<td>Association of Train Operating Companies</td>
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<td>BASICS</td>
<td>British Association for Immediate Care</td>
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<td>BCI</td>
<td>Business Continuity Institute</td>
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<td>BCRC</td>
<td>British Cave Rescue Council</td>
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<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Division (Scottish Executive Justice Department)</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
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<td>CEPU</td>
<td>Central Emergency Planning Unit (OFMDFM)</td>
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<td>CFOA</td>
<td>Chief Fire Officers Association</td>
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<td>CHAI</td>
<td>Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection</td>
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<td>CMG</td>
<td>Crisis Management Group</td>
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<td>CSIA</td>
<td>Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (Cabinet Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>Department for Culture, Media and Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DfT</td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DH</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DPH</td>
<td>Director of Public Health (in a primary care trust)</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
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<td>EHO</td>
<td>Environmental Health Officer</td>
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<td>EPU</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Unit</td>
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<td>F&amp;R</td>
<td>Fire and Rescue</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Food Standards Agency or Financial Services Authority (depending on the context)</td>
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<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
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<td>GNN</td>
<td>Government News Network</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>Government Office</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Health Authority</td>
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<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>HMT</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Treasury</td>
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<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
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<td>HPA</td>
<td>Health Protection Agency</td>
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<td>HSC</td>
<td>Health and Safety Commission</td>
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<td>HSE</td>
<td>Health and Safety Executive</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Corps</td>
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<td>LA</td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
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<td>LFEPA</td>
<td>London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority</td>
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<td>LHB</td>
<td>Local Health Board</td>
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<td>LRRF</td>
<td>London Regional Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>LRT</td>
<td>London Resilience Team</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>Met Office</td>
<td>Meteorological Office</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mountain Rescue Council</td>
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<td>MRCC</td>
<td>Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>MRSC</td>
<td>Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre</td>
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<td>NAW</td>
<td>National Assembly for Wales</td>
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<td>NCIS</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NDPB</td>
<td>Non-Departmental Public Body</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Administration</td>
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<td>NIDIS</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Department Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISCC</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>NORMIT</td>
<td>Norfolk Major Incident Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPHS Wales</td>
<td>National Public Health Service for Wales</td>
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<td>NVASEC</td>
<td>National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODPM</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFCOM</td>
<td>Office of Communications</td>
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<td>OFGEM</td>
<td>Office of Gas and Electricity Markets</td>
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<td>OFMDFM</td>
<td>Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland)</td>
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<td>OFWAT</td>
<td>Office of Water Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHA</td>
<td>Port Health Authority</td>
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<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>RAWG</td>
<td>Risk Assessment Working Group</td>
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<td>RAYNET</td>
<td>Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network</td>
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<td>RDPH</td>
<td>Regional Director of Public Health</td>
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<td>RWG</td>
<td>Risk Working Group</td>
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<td>RNLI</td>
<td>Royal National Lifeboat Institution</td>
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<td>RSPCA</td>
<td>Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Scottish Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Strategic Health Authority</td>
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<td>SOLACE</td>
<td>Society of Local Authority Chief Executives</td>
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<tr>
<td>SoS</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSREP</td>
<td>Secretary of State's Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAS</td>
<td>Voluntary Aid Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAG</td>
<td>Welsh Assembly Government</td>
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<td>WCCC</td>
<td>Wales Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
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<td>WEWG</td>
<td>Wales Emergencies Working Group</td>
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<td>WLGA</td>
<td>Welsh Local Government Association</td>
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<td>WMEF</td>
<td>Welsh Media Emergency Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPI</td>
<td>Wales Programme for Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRVS</td>
<td>Women’s Royal Voluntary Service</td>
</tr>
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